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ABSTRACT 
'Vagueness in Mathematics Talk' 
The Cockcroft Report claimed that "mathematics provides a means of communication 
which is powerful, concise and unambiguous". Such precision in language may be a 
conventional aim of mathematics, particularly when communicated in writing. 
Nonetheless, as this thesis demonstrates, vagueness is commonplace when people 
talk about mathematics. 
In this thesis, I examine the circumstances in which vagueness arises in mathematics 
talk, and consider the practical purposes which speakers achieve by means of vague 
utterances in this context. The empirical database, which is considered in Chapters 4 
to 7, consists almost entirely of transcripts of mathematical conversations between 
adult interviewers (including myself) and one or two children. The data were collected 
from clinical interviews focused on a small number of tasks, and from fragments of 
teaching. For the most part, the pupils involved in the study were aged between 9 and 
12, although the age-range in Chapter 7 extends from 4 to 25. 
draw on a number of approaches to discourse associated with 'pragmatics' -a field of 
linguistics - to analyse the motives and communicative effectiveness of speakers who 
deploy vagueness in mathematics talk. I claim that, for these speakers, vagueness 
fulfils a number of purposes, especially 'shielding', i. e. self-protection against 
accusation of being wrong. Another purpose is to give approximate information; 
sometimes to achieve shielding, but also to provide the level of detail that is deemed to 
be appropriate in a given situation. A different purpose, associated with a particular 
form of vagueness (of reference), is to compensate for lexical gaps in pursuit of 
effective communication of concepts and ideas. I show, in particular, how speakers 
use the pronouns 'it' and 'you' in mathematics talk to communicate concepts and 
generalisations. 
Some consideration is given to the intentions of 'exper speakers of mathematics when 
they deploy vague language. Their purposes include some of those identified for 
novices. Teachers also use vagueness as a means of indirectness in addressing 
pupils; this strategy is associated with the redress of 'face threatening acts'. 
My thesis is that vagueness can be viewed and presented, not as a disabling feature of 
language, but as a subtle and versatile device which speakers can and do deploy to 
make mathematical assertions with as much precision, accuracy or as much 
confidence as they judge is warranted by both the content and the circumstances of 
their utterances. 
I report on the validation and generalisation of my findings by an Informal Research 
Group of school teachers, who transcribed and analysed their own classroom 
interactions using the methods I had developed. 
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PAGE 
MISSING 
IN 
ORIGINAL 
TRANSCRIPT CONVENTIONS 
Whilst a good deal of transcribed speech is used in evidence in this thesis, I have kept 
the conventions used in such transcripts to a minimum. One advantage of this decision 
is that the text can be read more fluently. A disadvantage is the loss of many nuances 
of speech, particularly of intonation. 
Conventions: 
S3 the coded name of the transcript to which the speech belongs - all such 
transcripts are listed in Appendix 1. 
12 number of the speaker's turn in the transcript. 
S3: 12 the 12th turn in transcript S3. 
John: the name or code-name of the speaker. 
[points] description of non-linguistic communication. 
[inaudible] indecipherable speech 
[her teacher] transcriber's situational elucidation or comment. 
[... ] transcript ellipsis of words or turns. 
so ... we '... 'indicates a short (untimed) pause or hesitation. 
[pause] a longer pause or silence. 
so ... utterance interrupted and/or not completed. 
// encloses utterance overlapping that of next or previous speaker. 
think (italic) word or words stressed by the speaker. 
think (bold) highlighted by the transcriber for the attention of the reader. 
F- 
.. 
Then said the teacher, 'Speak to us of Teaching'. And he said: 
'No man can reveal to you aught but that which already lies half 
asleep in the dawning of your knowledge. 
The teacher who walks in the shadow of the temple, among his 
followers, gives not of his wisdom but rather of his faith and his 
lovingness. 
If he is indeed wise he does not bid you enter the house of his 
wisdom, but rather leads you to the threshold of your own mind'. 
[Kahlil Gibran, 1926: The Prophet] 
I study mathematics as a product of the human mind and not as 
absolute. 
[Emil Post] 
Pilate said to him, "What is truth? " 
[John 18: 38] 
Man: What is your disappointment in life? Your major one, 
I mean, if I may ask? 
Woman: [... ] Oh, I don't know. Not getting more than three 0 levels, 
I suppose. 
Man: Which? 
Woman: Sorry? 
Man: Which three? 
Woman: English language, English literature. And French. 
Man: Good. Good. Language orientated. 
[Dennis Potter, 1991: Secret Friends] 
INTRODUCTORY PREFACE 
In 1981, I wrote an article (Rowland, 1982) about the teaching of directed numbers: 
what they 'are' and how to add and subtract them. Essentially it proposed a 'concrete' 
model of the integers. The learner was intended to become acquainted with the model 
with a view to performing 'natural' actions on it for the purposes of extending arithmetic 
on natural numbers. I reported and evaluated an empirical study of an implementation 
of the model. 
From 1986 to 1990, the SCDC/NCC-funded curriculum development project Primary 
Initiatives in Mathematics Education (PrIME) was based at Homerton College, 
Cambridge, where I work. One major component of PrIME was the introduction of a 
calculator-aware number curriculum (CAN) in selected schools. In 1986, I began a 
study of children aged six and seven in three CAN schools. My report was completed 
in 1988 and reprinted as Rowland (1994b). 
The CAN children were using the usual icons and models for natural numbers 
(principally number lines and Dienes blocks), but they also had free access to 
calculators. Amongst other things, I was struck by the variety of their personal mental 
methods, and by the sensible and cogent use made of calculators by all but a few of 
the children. This contrasted starkly with their reluctance to use the manipulatives 
('apparatus') with which they were supposedly familiar, even when specifically urged 
by their teachers to use them. I commented: 
If children are to learn through "experience", we have to ask what kinds of 
experience, and not to overlook the importance of internal mental activity, 
possibly prompted and supported by a calculator, in the construction of 
mathematical knowledge. (p. 25) 
subsequently reformulated this account: 
The calculator consistently demonstrates mathematical structures and rules 
about how numbers are represented and how they behave. However, it does 
not impose on the user any specific form of concrete imagery with which to 
think about numbers. Thus, children are given maximum intellectual freedom 
to set each new experience with a calculator alongside their other 
experiences, and thus to construct, modify and add to the frameworks of 
meaning they already possess (Rowland, 1990, pp. 1-2) 
Articles by Pimm (1986), Fielker (1988) and others resonated with my observations 
and my developing thinking in this area. Statements such as: 
maybe all that children learn from manipulating blocks is an understanding of 
how to manipulate blocks. (Fielker, 1988, p. 6) 
Far from mathematics being all around us, I offer the alternative tenet that 
mathematics is only inside us. (Pimm. 1986, p. 51) 
seemed to capture what I was coming to believe, whilst at the same time appearing to 
undermine some conventional tenets of primary mathematics practice. 
One consequence of these converging influences was personal rejection of the tacit 
epistemological and pedagogical assumptions which underlay my 1982 article - 
namely, that pupils learn by accepting the meanings (of mathematical objects, 
operations, and so on) that teachers provide for them, clean and pre-processed. In 
effect, my earlier belief was that it is the teacher's job to make sense of mathematics 
on behalf of the pupil, and that the didactical transposition (Chevallard, 1985) of 
mathematical knowledge is a matter of neat, even ingenious, packaging and careful 
training. 
Certainly I had managed to train some children to exhibit some of the behaviours I had 
wanted in relation to the addition and subtraction of integers, but now I wondered what 
meanings those children attributed to the mechanics of solving the 'problems' I posed 
them. The CAN experience in particular convinced me that children may well 
eventually reject the teacher's pre-selected, pre-packaged mathematics in preference 
for their own personal and private meanings, constructed from the totality of their 
experience. 
My aim and desire, by about 1988, was to access and describe the mathematical 
frameworks and private constructions locked away in children's minds; for, as far as 
teaching is concerned, this is the Aladdin's cave. 
Everyone - almost everyone - agrees that our goal is the study of the 
mathematical mind in action. (Ginsburg, 1981, p. 4) 
At the outset of the period of research which culminated in this thesis, my approach 
was guided by two fundamental principles: 
Linguistic principle: language is one important means of access to thought. 
Thus, by talking with children, I would (with suitable reflection) be given insight into the 
structure of fragments of their mathematical understanding. The roots of the principle 
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are in Freudian psycho-analysis and its provenance as a research method in education 
goes back at least to Piaget and famously bears fruit in mathematics education in 
Ginsburg (1977). The work of Douglas Farnham (1975) belongs to a strand of work 
with an explicitly linguistic foundation. Farnham drew on contemporary work of Barnes, 
Coulthard and others on patterns of classroom interaction to account for the child's 
development of mathematical understanding in terms of social sense-making. 
Imagery principle: mathematical thought about entities and relationships is 
structured and accomplished by reference to personal, internal images of various 
kinds. 
Thus, imagery is the key to describing mathematical understanding and performance. 
For examples of studies based on this principle, see Plunkett (1979), Ernest (1983) or 
Presmeg (1986). 
In 1991,1 spent a term working in a school with a class of eight- and nine-year-old 
children. I began systematically to tape record and transcribe my teaching sessions 
and one-to-one interviews with these children. Two things emerged. On the one hand, 
I achieved little success in eliciting substantial descriptions of any relevant imagery 
from the children. On the other, I experienced a growing awareness (which I describe 
first in Chapter 4) that the language the children used when talking about mathematics, 
whilst revealing little about imagery, was of considerable interest in its own right - not in 
the sense that I had originally expected (by providing descriptions of images), but in 
the subtle ways that these children used language to point to private concepts, 
meanings, beliefs, feelings or attitudes in the context of their mathematical thinking. 
Consequently, I held on to the linguistic principle (and will discuss it in detail) as the 
foundation stone of my research, but was forced to abandon (but not to deny) the 
imagery principle, replacing it with: 
Deictic principle: speakers use language for the explicit communication of thought, 
and as a code to express and point to concepts, meanings and attitudes. 
I coined the name because it derives from the Greek word deiknumi, meaning 'to show' 
or'to point', and is associated with a linguistic tem, 'deixis', which features in 
Chapter 4. The centrality of the linguistic and deictic principles to my research 
orientation will be examined further in the next chapter in a discussion of the clinical 
interview, and again in Chapter 3, where I shall set out some linguistic interpretive 
tools. 
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A NOTE ON 'PRAGMATIC' AND RELATED TERMS 
In this thesis, variants of the word 'pragmatic' are used in three different, but related, 
senses. The first two are technical terms. 
Pragmatism (or Pragmaticism) is the name of a philosophical position due to the 
American polymath Charles Sanders Peirce (1839-1914). It is intended to be a 
'practical' (as opposed to 'theoretical') kind of philosophy, which embeds rational 
discourse in life and conduct. The name 'pragmatism' derives from the Kantian term 
pragmatisch, expressing relation to some human purpose. The essence of pragmatism 
is that human rationality and purpose are inseparable. Peirce's ideas have evolved 
through William James, John Dewey and others, and are central to the philosophical 
foundations of the interpretivist research paradigm (Giarelli, 1988). 
Pragmatics is the name of a branch of linguistics which attempts to interpret the 
meaning of utterances by reference to the motives of speakers and to context of use. 
The distinction between syntax, semantics and pragmatics goes back ultimately to 
Peirce's theory of signs, or semiotics (Lyons, 1977, p. 114). Indeed, Morris described 
pragmatics as "the relation of signs to interpreters" (1938, p. 6), although these 
Peircean origins are now more or less irrelevant (Lyons, 1977, p. 119). The domain of 
pragmatics can usefully be viewed as those aspects of meaning that cannot be dealt 
with by means of truth-conditional semantics (Gazdar, 1979, p. 2). 
The adjective corresponding to both the philosophical position and the branch of 
linguistics is'pragmatic'. I am also obliged to use the same word in the everyday, non- 
technical sense of real-world realism, utilitarian, sometimes in contrast to'ideal'. 
I intend that the particular use will be clear from the context; the first two meanings will 
be recapitulated and expanded when the context requires in subsequent chapters. 
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CHAPTER 0: PREVIEW AND METHODOLOGY 
It [APU practical testing] afforded an opportunity to hold a prolonged 
mathematical conversation with a child. My understanding of children's 
thought processes when solving problems has been considerably extended. 
(A teacher, quoted in Foxman et al., 1980, p. 73). 
INTRODUCTION 
In the preface, I described the aim which motivated the early stages of this research, 
namely to access and describe the mathematical frameworks and private constructions 
locked away in children's minds. My concern at that time was to uncover what they 
'knew'. and how they structured that knowledge. I saw this as the most likely kind of 
outcome (in the spirit of the linguistic principle) of the mathematical conversations in 
which I planned to engage them. In other words, I began with my attention focused on 
that function of language that Brown and Yule (1983, pp. 1-4) call 'transactional': 
That function which language serves in the expression of content we describe 
as transactional, and that function involved in expressing social relations we 
will describe as interactional. 
Whereas linguists, philosophers of language and psycholinguists have, in 
general, paid attention to the use of language for the transmission of 'factual 
propositional information', sociologists and psycholinguists have been 
particularly concerned with the use of language to negotiate role-relationships, 
peer-solidarity, the exchange of turns in a conversation, the saving of face of 
both speaker and hearer. 
The two categories of language function are not exclusive, and I shall argue that both 
are of the utmost importance in talk about mathematics. But my initial interest in 
transactional elements is reflected in my implementation of variants of Piaget's clinical 
interview, which I discuss later in this chapter, in many conversations with children. 
This research orientation is most strongly represented in Chapter 4. 
Thereafter, my analytical focus shifts towards interactional components of mathematics 
talk. In particular, I began to explore (in the spirit of the deictic principle) how speakers 
in such conversations show their concern for a number of pragmatic goals, principally 
those to do with the saving of 'face' (Goffman, 1967). 
The deictic principle is at the heart of a paper in which the linguist Michael Stubbs 
(1986) draws attention to a number of ways, many of them relevant to this thesis, in 
which speakers use language to convey beliefs and attitudes, or to distance 
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themselves from the propositions they make. (A new presentation of the paper will 
appear as Chapter 8 of Stubbs, 1996. ) This epistemic subtext is sometimes summed 
up in the phrase 'propositional attitude' (Ginsburg etal., 1983, p. 26) which is glossed, 
in effect, by Sperber and Wilson (1986a, pp. 10-11) as follows: 
Utterances are used not only to convey thoughts but to reveal the speaker's 
attitude to, or relation to, the thought expressed; in other words, they express 
'propositional attitudes' [... ] 
Stubbs asserts that no utterance is neutral with regard to the belief and commitment of 
the speaker, and urges the importance of the study of markers of propositional attitude: 
whenever speakers (or writers) say anything, they encode their point of view 
towards it: whether they think it a reasonable thing to say, or might be found to 
be obvious, questionable, tentative, provisional, controversial, contradictory, 
irrelevant, impolite, or whatever. [... ] All sentences encode such a point of view 
[... ] and the description of the markers of such points of view and their 
meanings should therefore be a central topic for linguistics. (1986. p. 1) 
Stubbs identifies vagueness and indirect language as a principal means of encoding 
propositional attitude. In fact, vagueness is the linguistic feature which unifies the data 
which I analyse in this thesis; more precisely, it is vague aspects of the language of 
participants in mathematical conversation that I shall single out for my analytical 
attention. My principal reason for choosing that particular focus is that I came to see 
the significance, for mathematics talk, of Stubbs' insight about the encoding of 
propositional attitude. More surprisingly, I came to perceive how vagueness, suitably 
deployed, can also assist the transactional purposes of mathematics talk. The main 
and subordinate aims of my thesis are best understood in the light of these surprising 
perceptions. 
AIMS AND THEMES OF THE THESIS 
My overall aim is to expose and understand some of the ways that participants in 
mathematics talk use language - especially vague language - to achieve their 
communicative and affective purposes. This comprehensive aim guides my choice of 
subject matter, and finds empirical expression in work that I shall present as four 
studies, reported in Chapters 4 to 7. Each study was motivated by a particular sub-aim, 
related to the main one. 
First, in this Chapter 0 and in Chapter 3, I review the methodological and linguistic 
matters which underpin the design and interpretation of each of the four studies. Given 
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the unifying theme of this thesis, I discuss some mathematical and philosophical 
dimensions of vagueness in Chapter 2. The mathematical process of generalisation 
features strongly in three of the four studies; since I hold the view that this process 
encapsulates the essence of mathematical thought, I have devoted Chapter 1 to an 
exploration and exposition of its unique character. 
Chapter 4 is principally a detailed study of one nine-year-old child, Susie. My aim In 
that chapter is to demonstrate the transactional effectivenes of the pronouns 'it and 
'you' in our mathematical conversations. The vagueness of these words is associated 
with reference indeterminacy. I shall show how the first of these pronouns enables 
Susie to introduce certain concepts and generalisations into our conversation, despite 
the fact that she has no name for them. I shall demonstrate that the second is 
associated with vagueness-as-generality, and that'you' surfaces in children's 
mathematics talk as a natural language pointer to generalisation. 
The study in Chapter 5 is based on several similar conversations with pairs of children 
aged 9 to 11. The similarity lies in in the fact that each begins from the same 
numerical-combinatorial task, designed to provoke generalisation. A paper of George 
Lakoff (1972) had first alerted me to a linguistic feature of the transcripts of these 
conversation, namely 'hedges' (such as 'I think', 'maybe', 'about' and 'around'). My aim 
in this study is to identify the use and prevalence of hedges in connection with 
conjectures. I shall show, as Stubbs suggests, that such hedges are powerful 
indicators of propositional attitude. In particular they point to vulnerability, they protect 
against loss of face. I shall introduce a construct which I call the Zone of Conjectural 
Neutrality, a space in which conjectures can be tested whilst minimising the affective 
risk to their originators. 
In Chapter 6, I report a large-scale study which aims to trace the development, 
between the ages 4 and 11, of modal language competence, especially in the use of 
modal auxiliaries and hedges. The mathematical activities entailed in this study are 
counting and estimation. I shall identify a trend towards a developing ability to indicate 
propositional attitude in these ways in the primary years, and an increasing awareness 
that vagueness is essential to estimation. I shall identify an anomaly in this trend, and 
account for it by reference to institutional factors. 
The final empirical study, in Chapter 7, examines a disparate collection of teaching 
episodes across a wide age-range, and involving eight different teachers. Here, the 
aim is validate three claims which arise from the findings in the earlier chapters. First, it 
is a demonstration of the applicability of the linguistic toolkit which I have assembled, 
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to the analysis of transactional and interactional features of transcripts of talk in 
mathematical interaction. Second, it confirms the prevalence and interactional 
significance of a number of previously-identified (in the earlier studies) aspects of 
vague and indirect language in mathematics talk, across a wide age-range. Third, by 
involving a group of teachers to work with me for that study, I was able to validate the 
relevance of my methods and findings for their day-to-day work in the classroom. The 
justification of this claim of relevance is implicit in Chapter 7 and explicit in the final 
chapter. 
A CONTEXT IN LANGUAGE RESEARCH 
The linguist Joanna Channell has researched aspects of vague language for some 
fifteen years. Channell concludes her recent book (1994, p. 209) with a call for more 
research in 'variation study', including "the study of occurrence of vagueness in 
different registers or genres". The term 'register refers to the specialised language 
peculiar to certain user-groups (Halliday et at, 1964). Such studies of aspects of vague 
spoken language exist in certain academic fields, for example medicine (Prince et at. 
1982) and biology (Dubois, 1987). One aspect of variation not specifically included by 
Channel) in her call for research is age-variation: the informants in every empirical 
study of vagueness of which I am aware are adults. I believe that this thesis makes a 
contribution to the study of vague language in these two dimensions of variation - 
register (mathematical) and age (especially five- to eleven-year-olds). 
This work is a thesis in mathematics education, not linguistics. But mathematics 
education is necessarily and beneficially an eclectic discipline; the relevance of 
linguistics to this thesis is principally interpretive, in that certain organising principles of 
language use, particularly those which have become associated with the young 
linguistic science of 'pragmatics' (Levinson, 1983; Mey, 1993), are applied to make 
sense of some vague features of mathematics talk identified in various corpora. 
Hymes (1972) has claimed: 
Studying language in the classroom is not really 'applied' linguistics; it is really 
basic research. Progress in understanding language in the classroom is 
progress in linguistic theory. (p. xviii) 
As it happens, most of the language data for my study were gathered in the course of 
'interviews' in classrooms, rather than in naturalistic classroom settings per se. I see 
this study as basic research, not in linguistic theory, but in mathematics education. A 
number of regularities of speech discovered in the data will be described and 
interpreted as phenomena observable in the interaction between individuals as they 
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talk about mathematics. Some evidence of the presence and broader consideration of 
the pedagogic significance of these phenomena in the interaction between practising 
teachers and pupils is offered in Chapter 7. The thesis concludes with some proposals 
for the application of this basic research in the cause of improving the teaching of 
mathematics, informed by my commitment to a constructivist view of learning and a 
quasi-empiricist philosophy (this philosophy is described in Chapter 2) of the learning 
of mathematics. In fact, there is already evidence (reported in Chapters 7 and 8) that 
teachers other than myself might be able to 'use' what I have learned from this 
research in the classrooms where they teach. 
The ability of speakers to encode ideas, commitments, attitudes and beliefs in their 
utterances - not least, in teachers' and pupils' mathematical utterances - would be of 
little use if their interlocutors were unable to decode, interpret and understand the 
intended subtext in such utterances. The communication and interpretation of 
propositional attitude is central to mathematics education because the articulation of 
beliefs, conjectures and even 'answers' in mathematics is notoriously a risk-taking 
activity; this point is developed further in Chapter 5. Acknowledging that some relevant 
groundwork has been done in linguistics, David Pimm identifies interpretation, within 
classroom discourse, as an area which is now ripe for research effort: 
I predict the extremely subtle pragmatic interpretive judgements regularly 
made by both teachers and pupils in the course of mathematics teaching and 
learning in classrooms will move steadily to the fore as a research topic. 
(Pimm, 1994, p. 167) 
In summary, this thesis could be viewed as 
"a response to Stubbs' call for the description of markers of propositional attitude, 
in the specific context of mathematics; 
"a contribution to variational study (Channell) of vague spoken language - in the 
domain 'mathematics'; and 
"a partial fulfilment of Pimm's prediction concerning research in mathematics 
education. 
MATHEMATICAL CONVERSATIONS 
For the most part, the data examined in this thesis consist of transcripts of 
mathematics talk. Much of this mathematics talk took place in the context of clinical 
interviews. In this chapter, I shall discuss the application of this interview method to 
research in mathematics education, and describe some principles which underpin my 
9 
interpretation of the transcript data. 
The 'linguistic principle' which I asserted in the preface reflects my confidence in the 
value of talking to pupils and students with a view to accessing their mathematical 
thinking. It is an conviction widely shared by researchers into children's thinking, 
deriving from a sense of the benefit of personal communication with the subject: 
It is my belief that the researcher can best formulate and test hypotheses and 
interpret the results of the tests in intensive interactive communication with the 
child, so that a close personal and trusting relationship can be formed. (Stelle, 
1991, p. 178) 
An approach to the study of children's thinking through 'interviews' with them is closely 
associated with Jean Piaget. 
Plagetian Legacy 
In 1920, at the age of 23, Piaget moved from post-doctoral study of philosophy of 
science and pathological psychology at the Sorbonne to a post at the Binet Laboratory 
in Paris (Piaget, 1952a, p. 244). [Note 0.1 ] His task was to standardise Cyril Burt's 
reasoning tests on Parisian children. In the administration of such tests, the wording 
and format of the questions were precisely defined, and had to be adhered to by the 
tester to safeguard the reliability of the procedure. Differences in performance between 
children (scaled by various "measures") were calculated by reference to the correct 
responses given by them. Piaget, however, found the incorrect answers much more 
interesting, since they caused him to wonder what kind of reasoning gave rise to them. 
He realised, moreover, that such questions could not be researched by means of 
standardised tests. 
The first method that presents itself is that of tests (... In which] the question 
and the conditions in which it is submitted remain the same for each child (... J 
But for our particular purpose the test method has two important defects [... ] 
the essential failure of the test method in the researches with which we are 
concerned is that it falsifies the natural mental inclination of the subject [... ] 
The only way to avoid such difficulties is to vary the questions, to make 
counter-suggestions, in short, to give up the idea of a fixed questionnaire. 
(Piaget, 1929, pp. 3-4, my emphasis) 
He concludes, having considered and dismissed both the 'test method and'pure 
observation', that a third approach may be deployed, one which exploits the best of 
each of the rejected methods whilst avoiding their disadvantages. 
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This is the method of clinical examination, used by psychiatrists as a means of 
diagnosis [... in which] the good practitioner lets himself be led, though always 
in control, and takes account of the whole of the mental context. Since the 
clinical method has rendered such important service in a domain where 
formerly all was disorder and confusion, child psychology would make a great 
mistake to neglect it. (ibid., pp. 7-8) 
Piaget's interest in psychiatry originated in his mother's mental illness which 
significantly coloured his own childhood (Piaget, 1952a, p. 238), but in fact the (then) 
novel clinical methods of psycho-analysis were under wide discussion as to their 
educational application, and not only in Europe (Mackie, 1923). 
Contingent Questioning 
Piaget's introduction to The Child's Conception of the World (1929) contains his only 
discussion of the clinical interview as a research methodology. The method was 
subsequently developed and adapted (or'revised' - see Ginsburg et al., 1983, p. 10) 
by Piaget from pure adult-child discourse to include manipulation of materials so that 
actions as well as words are added to the interpretive data bank. Piaget's classical 
work using the revised method is that on conservation e. g. Piaget and Szeminska, 
1952. The clinical method became the basis of Piaget's work for half a century. 
Ginsburg (1981) and others (Ginsburg et al., 1983) argue strongly for the eff icacy of 
the. method in research into children's mathematical thinking 
Ginsburg is perhaps best-known in this field for his classic 1977 book Children's 
Arithmetic, in the preface to which he is explicit: 
The primary method is the in-depth interview with children as they are in the 
process of grappling with various sorts of of problems [... ] Interviews like 
these, involving close observation of individuals, are rare in mathematics 
education, but essential to improving it. (p. iv) 
The clinical method is appropriate for the purposes of identifying (eliciting), describing 
and accounting for cognitive processes (Ginsburg et a!., 1983, pp. 11-13). In this 
thesis, such processes will include prediction, generalisation and explanation in 
mathematics. The description of 'intensive interviewing' in social science research, as 
given in Brenner (1985), has much in common with Ginsburg's account of the clinical 
method. 
The characteristic dimensions of the verbal clinical interview [Note 0.2] are: 
9 the interviewer employs a task or tasks to channel the subject's activity: typically, 
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the interviewer presents a problem of some kind at the outset of the interview. 
Subsequent tasks or problems will depend on the subject's reaction to the initial 
task. 
" The interviewer's questions are contingent on the child's responses: indeed, after 
the initial task has been presented, the interviewer's whole contribution to the 
interaction is judged and decided on the basis of the subject's contribution. That 
is not to say that the interviewer necessarily surrenders control of the interview 
(see my comments on 'frame' later in this chapter), but that s/he constantly 
makes instantaneous decisions about her/his questions and the direction of the 
interview. 
" There may be some degree of standardisation. the actual extent of 
standardisation will depend on whether the interview is intended to discover or to 
elucidate cognitive phenomena. For example, concerning behaviour which has 
been previously identified and considered, standardisation may assist 
'explication' of behaviour or detailed study of the prevalence of some 
phenomena. 
" The procedure demands reflection: the interviewer asks the subject to reflect on 
what s/he has done and to articulate her/his thoughts, typically by means of 
questions such as "How did you do that? ", "Can you explain that? ", and so on. 
" The interviewer makes appropriate use of scientific experimental method, such 
as holding some variables constant whilst deliberately varying others. The 
contingent nature of the interviewer's responses enable her/him to test 
hypotheses that s/he has generated (either in the interview or as a consequence 
of reflection on previous interviews with the same subject) to account for 
cognitive processes or other phenomena which have been identified in this 
interview, or in earlier interviews. 
(based on Ginsburg et al., 1983, pp. 18-20) 
Ginsburg insists that "contingency of questioning" (1981, p. 6) is at the heart of the 
method; that the essential and distinguishing feature of the clinical interview mode is 
the contingent (responsive, interactive) nature of the interviewer's contribution. 
The contingent interviewer is like a barrister in court, having continually to make rapid 
assessments of what 'witnesses' say, to probe without leading the witness. Unlike the 
advocate, of course, the role of the clinical interviewer is not supposed to be 
adversarial (winning a case) but analytical, striving to create the conditions for the 
surface manifestation - especially in speech - of the subject's thought. 
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The Use of the Clinical Method in Testing 
A form of contingent questioning which is well-known in the British context is the so- 
called Practical Testing mode used by the Mathematics Monitoring Team of the 
Assessment of Performance Unit (APU) in the decade 1978-1987. [Note 0.3] 
Alongside large-scale pencil-and-paper tests, the APU team developed a number of 
semi-structured, individual interviews based on practical tasks with weights, shapes, 
money, and so on. The purposes of these one-to-one interviews, which were unique 
among national assessment programmes, include "exploration of children's reasoning 
and understanding of mathematical ideas" (Foxman etal., 1981, p. 4), an outcome 
which began to be stressed early in the APU testing programme. Despite the 'practical' 
label, the essential feature of this testing mode is that it is interactive. Having assigned 
a prepared task for the pupil, the tester (a teacher, trained for the role of 'practical 
tester') notes the child's responses. S/he may then offer'prompts', to enable the pupil 
to reconsider an unprofitable strategy or to progress from a 'stuck' situation, and 
'probes' to elicit or clarify the rationale underlying the pupil's response. For further 
discussion of the contingent questioning dimension of APU practical testing, see 
Rowland (1996). 
"Long Practice" - Researching versus Teaching 
The professional skills of teachers related to questioning potentially equip them 
particularly well to deploy this method, either for cognitive research or for diagnostic 
purposes. Indeed, the Department of Education and Science invested in the mid-1980s 
in the distribution of APU Practical Testing 'kits' to schools with this diagnostic purpose 
in mind. A clinical interview with a child may well result in learning for the child; the 
child may even perceive such an interviewer as a kind of 'teacher'. The primary 
purpose of the interview is, however, to inform the interviewer about the child. The 
cultural obstacle for teachers is the improbable notion of a sustained mathematical 
discussion with a child which is not (by intention) in some way an improving experience 
for the child. As Lynn Joffe, a member of the APU Mathematics Monitoring Team, 
observed, there is a powerful temptation for teachers to teach: 
Although it is extremely difficult, and is asking a lot, testers are asked, as far 
as they possibly can, [... ] to suspend their inclination to teach [... ] One way of 
getting round the urge to teach, is to try and substitute non-directive questions 
where one might be tempted to teach. (Joffe, undated, p. 3) 
Earlier, Piaget had noted a related, but different, problem for teachers: 
the clinical method can only be learned by long practice [... ] It is so hard not 
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talk too much when questioning a child, especially for a pedagoguel (Piaget, 
1929, pp. 8-9) 
Piaget's remarks on the need for 'practice' convey the notion of the clinical interview 
(and in turn, by implication, the mathematical conversation) as a kind of art form, in 
which the artist (the interviewer) strives over time to develop and improve her/his 
performance. The analogy with questioning as a style of teaching is clear; an 
improvised, unique, oral 'performance' for which there are guidelines but no script. The 
development of the artistry through the study of tapes and transcripts is part of the 
satisfaction, for teaching as well as for researching. In the final chapter of her 
remarkable book Wally's Stories, an American kindergarten school teacher. Vivian 
Gussin Paley, explains how, in her classroom, 
the tape recorder preserves everything. It has become for me an essential tool 
for capturing the sudden insight, the misunderstood concept, the puzzling 
juxtaposition of words and ideas. I began to tape years ago (... j and I was 
continually surprised by what I was missing in all discussions. I now maintain a 
running dialogue with each tape as I transcribe its contents (... j The tape 
recorder trains the teacher not the child, who never listens to the tapes and 
who is curious about the machine only the first time. (Paley, 1981, pp. 217.8. 
my emphasis) 
In Paley's book, episodes which are explicitly mathematical are the exception rather 
than the rule. She demonstrates, however, that - even in the routines of daily 
classroom events - talk, tape and transcripts can be a powerful means of researching 
and refining practice and of coming to understand children's thinking. 
Conversations can be preserved as data, for later scrutiny, in the form of videotapes, 
audiotapes, field notes or transcripts (electronic or hard copy). Each of these media 
has advantages and disadvantages. The videotape, for example, includes non-verbal 
data (such as gestures and actions on materials) and seems to facilitate subsequent 
group consideration of features such as critical moments in the discourse; the 
audiotape preserves speech features such as intonation, pauses, and voice tone; the 
transcript, a transformation of the primary record of the event, focuses attention on the 
spoken word, or coded speech features. The transcript as electronic text file is 
invaluable to the computational linguist with an interest in (say) the relative frequency 
of use of certain words or grammatical structures. Since I have chosen to focus on 
spoken language, I principally audiotaped my data, and transcribed the tapes using a 
word processor. 
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CONTRARY TRENDS: FRAMING AND SAMPLE SIZE 
Contingency and standardisation are contrasting and, inevitably, competing 
dimensions of the clinical method. Both are related to, but not in direct causal 
relationship with, the notion of control. Bernstein has offered a theoretical construct 
which he calls 'frame' to capture the essence of the control of knowledge in the 
teacher-pupil relationship. 
This frame refers to the degree of control teacher and pupil possess over the 
selection, organisation and pacing of the knowledge transmitted and received 
in the pedagogical relationship. (Bernstein, 1971 a, p. 50) 
Frame is a form of boundary, in a given context, between what is to be included and 
what is to be excluded. [Note 0.4] In the context of teaching and learning, where 
framing is 'strong', the fence around that which is to be learned is (supposedly) sharp, 
well-defined. Where framing is 'weak', the boundary is blurred, fuzzy. Thus, for 
example, 'investigational learning' in mathematics would seem to require a weakly- 
framed pedagogical relationship since, outside a core (possibly but improbably empty) 
of intended content learning outcomes, it is expected and hoped that pupil activity will 
result in the acquisition of other kinds of mathematical and strategic knowledge. 
As I have already observed, research interviewing is not, by design, teaching, but I find 
it helpful to borrow the terms 'weakly-framed' and 'strongly-framed' to identify poles in a 
continuum of control exerted by the interviewer over the content and direction of the 
interview. The standard 'method of tests' (Piaget, 1929, p. 3), in which the interviewer's 
questions are scripted and the subject's responses possibly coded, must lie at or close 
to one pole (strongly-framed), in that the interviewer retains total control over the 
agenda. (Strictly speaking, the test designer has control in absentia, whilst the 
interviewer totally lacks control, since s/he has no discretion to deviate from the script. ) 
The empirical account in this thesis begins with just two children (Susie and Simon) 
and a sequence of extended one-to-one contingent interviews with each child. In no 
way are these interviews standardised; in each interview, only the initial task or 
question was pre-planned, and not one of the tasks was presented to both children. 
The interviews were weakly-framed in the sense that, beyond the initiation gambit, 
I had no pre-set agenda of my own for these interviews, no prepared schedule of 
questions or tasks, since the aim was the discovery of phenomena and related 
intellectual processes (Ginsburg, 1981, p. 5). It could be said, therefore, that Susie and 
Simon had a significant share in the determination and control of the agenda for these 
interviews. A major outcome (for me, as researcher) was the identification of particular 
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linguistic pointers (surface phenomena) to generalisation (private mathematical 
process). These pointers are the subject of Chapter 4. 
The next empirical stage in the research (Chapter 5) was designed to study the 
prevalence of such linguistic phenomena in relation to generalisation and associated 
mathematical processes. The sample size was increased to 20 children, who were 
interviewed in pairs to facilitate peer interaction. Given the sharper enquiry focus of the 
interviews, a standardised interview agenda was planned in the expectation that each 
conversation would proceed in 'phases' leading to conjectures and, in some cases. 
attempts at the explanation of 'rules'. Contingency remained an important factor of my 
role as interviewer, allowing in particular for differences in interpretation of the initial 
task. Nonetheless, in comparison with one-to-one interviews in the first stage, the 
framing was stronger. The class of linguistic pointers which were identified for study at 
this stage are called 'hedges' in the linguistics literature. 
The final empirical stage - rather, the final empirical stage at which I exercised any 
control over the agenda for the interviews - was designed to test a hypothesis 
concerning children's use of hedges in the context of the mathematical process of 
numerical estimation. This study is reported in Chapter 6. The design at this stage 
required a much larger sample, in the event the whole population (230 children) of one 
primary school. Each interview needed to be relatively brief, typically five to ten 
minutes, with the questions standardised and focused on three prescribed tasks. A 
small measure of contingency was necessary, depending on each child's initial 
responses to each of the three tasks, with corresponding prompts requiring the child to 
reflect on her/his responses. Otherwise, little deviation from the tasks was permitted. 
Thus, the framing of these interviews was relatively strong, but not as strong as a 
standardised 'test interview. [Note 0.5] 
Two trends are therefore inherent in the design and administration of these clinical 
interviews. Whilst sample size increases from 2 to 230, the interviewers control over 
the agenda and the data he (in this case) gathers - corresponding to Bernstein's notion 
of 'frame' - shifts from relatively weak to relatively strong. In other words, as the sample 
opens up, contingency closes down. A wish to display these two contrary trends and to 
preserve the chronological order of events between 1991 and 1995 has influenced my 
decision to present the three studies in Chapters 4,5 and 6 in the order that I have. 
ETHNOGRAPHY AND INTERPRETATION 
Having accounted for the use of the verbal form of the clinical method as my principal 
means of data collection, I shall sketch here a broader framework of ideas which 
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underpin my methodological commitment throughout this thesis. At the heart of this 
commitment is a belief that human events have no absolute 'meaning' [Note 0.6], but 
that it is possible that they be made meaningful (connected to other agreed meanings) 
both individually and socially. That is to say that meaning is dependent on 
interpretation, which in turn is shaped by the world-view of the interpreter. 
I maintain that "critical reasoning" is an oxymoron, because consistent critical 
thinking shows that we are always inside our own vocabularies and our own 
angle on the world. We should give up the idea that we can somehow jump 
right out of our own limitations and achieve absolute knowledge, while yet 
remaining ourselves. (Cupitt, 1994, p. 20) 
This is the perspective of interpretivism, a philosophical position often contrasted with 
logical positivism. Of course, the maintenance of personal sanity and inter-personal 
communication requires that social groups with a common interest - teachers, for 
example - normally go about their business as though consensual, interpreted 
meanings were absolute. This is the nature of inter-subjective knowledge. One of the 
signs of insanity and extremist politics is the inability to acknowledge the fallibility of 
interpreted reality. 
Research into education, and mathematics education in particular, is necessarily an 
anthropological endeavour, since it entails the study of the behaviour of members of 
homo sapiens by members of the same species. The advantages and disadvantages 
of this peculiar state of affairs are evident. Quasi-scientific methods of research, 
deriving from experimental psychology, with arms-length collection of measurements 
from questionnaires and the like, may assist the researcher in achieving 'objectivity' 
through emotional detachment from the fellow creatures whom s/he is studying. Yet 
this in itself may be insufficient for the researcher to gain critical insight into the 
phenomenon that s/he has identified for study (Fischbein, 1990, p. 11). 
Qualitative methods, which have grown enormously in use and acceptance over the 
last twenty years, are characteristically descriptive, inductive, speculative, interpretivist; 
drawing on 'naturalistic' data such as recordings made in working classrooms, case 
studies, extended but loosely-structured interviews, and from participant observation. 
Such methods permit the researcher to exploit his or her membership of and 
association with the species or sub-species (e. g. 'teacher') which s/he is studying; to 
get close to, to make contact with the context of study, or even to participate in that 
context. 
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Participation and Detachment 
The research reported in this thesis sprang from cognitive ambitions. I never lost touch 
with those ambitions, nor did I lose my desire for insight into the mathematical mind in 
action. But within a year (by 1991), the focus of my work had shifted from the cognitive 
in the direction of the affective; and from preoccupation with the individual as an 
isolated thinker towards an interest in the interaction between individuals (more often 
than not, 'teachers' and 'pupils' of various kinds) when they talk about and do 
mathematics. As will become apparent, I make reference to linguistic forms in order to 
understand pedagogic interactions. This is interpretive in that the effort is oriented 
towards meaning-making, the goal is "knowledge about social action within a context" 
(Kilpatrick, 1988, p. 98). The action that I study is speech, focusing on aspects of 
language that can, for one reason or another, be classified as 'vague'; the context is 
people talking about mathematics. 
Margaret Eisenhart (1988) gives a thorough survey of the interpretivist view of 
research and discusses some implications for research in mathematics education. 
Perhaps the most fully-committed form of interpretive research is in the ethnographic 
tradition, which emphasises a holistic understanding of some social group, an 
understanding achieved through immersion in and, to some extent, identification with, 
that social group. Eisenhart's article derives from an ethnographic perspective, but 
nonetheless confirms the conviction with which I began this research: that I would gain 
insight by interaction with the pupils, students and (as it turned out) the teachers whom 
I was studying. 
The purpose of doing interpretivist research, then, is to provide information 
that will allow the investigator to "make sense" of the world from the 
perspective of participants; that is, the researcher must learn how to behave 
appropriately in that world and how to make that world understandable to 
others, especially in the research community. (Eisenhart, 1988, p. 103) 
I also recognised that the holistic goal of interpretivist research would best be served 
by both affirming and drawing on, rather than denying, my personal and professional 
identification with the enterprise which I was studying - the teaching and learning of 
mathematics. Such familiarity necessitates a determined effort of detachment by the 
researcher at certain points in the research [Note 0.7], otherwise s/he is unable to 
discern anything at all remarkable about the events s/he observes, even at a 
phenomenological level. Paul Atkinson (1981), discussing the study of classroom 
language, writes that: 
18 
The very familiarity of mundane, ordinary social activity can be a great barrier 
to analysis. [... ] One has to work rather hard to make the effort of will and 
imagination to render what is familiar strange. One has to approach the data 
as if one were an anthropologist, confronted with a new, alien and exotic 
culture, and hence suspend one's own commonsense, culturally given 
assumptions. This is what ethnomethodologists mean by the task of making 
everyday life 'anthropologically strange'. (p. 100) 
A tape recording is a permanent, transformed record of an ephemeral event which had 
a sound (here, principally speech) component. Atkinson speaks of the making of 
transcripts of classroom talk as a 'discipline' (p. 99), in that it forces attention to details 
of the talk such as hesitation, interruption, false starts and incoherence. The listener's 
brain is inclined to 'tidy up' such details as a gratuitous, sense-making kindness when 
talk is experienced as a purely auditory event. If I had been present (usually as a 
participant) at the recorded event, a memory of the original context and the event 
remains. In the transcript, the word is made manifest as a random-access witness to 
the event. The text is now a transformed object in the world, tangible and accessible 
for study in its own right. For me, this transformation of tape into text is a significant 
means of achieving detachment from interactions in which I participated. 
A Spiral Process 
The interpretive challenge is to translate knowledge of the text into knowledge about 
the participants in the original context. Professional linguists have given little attention 
to mathematical discourse, perhaps because mathematics does not, on the whole, 
present itself as much of a social phenomenon as compared with, say, doctor-patient 
interviews. But because conversation about mathematics is nevertheless a social 
phenomenon, it would be expected to have some linguistic features of human 
interaction in common with some other social situations. 
It would, I imagine, have been possible to identify (from the pragmatics literature, say) 
some linguistics concepts - person deixis and conversational implicature, for example - 
and to have sifted my data for examples of these concepts. This might have served the 
cause of pragmatics but probably not that of mathematics education. Instead, the 
approach I have taken is substantially inductive, drawing on a precept of 'grounded 
theory' (Glaser and Strauss, 1967) which recognises and legitimises the use of data as 
the source of research questions and hypotheses, not just a means of seeking 
answers to a priori questions and testing a priori hypotheses. For me, the transcript 
data is the source of my observations about linguistic phenomena in the text of the 
conversations. I may not know the 'technical' linguistic name of a phenomenon when 
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first I notice it, or even know that it has a name. My interpretation of how and why 
these speakers use that feature of language in mathematical conversation. as an 
aspect of their communicative competence, is subsequently informed by my reading of 
related literature in pragmatics, as well as by the the usual diverse range of knowledge 
(mathematics, mathematics education, general education, psychology, philosophy. 
sociology, and so on) which comprises the broad research-cultural base of 
mathematics education. 
In an absolute sense, of course, every hypothesis about the world arises from 
experience and in that sense from some kind of data. This observation is at the heart 
of the discussion of generalisation in Chapter 1. In the context of educational research, 
Rene Saran (1985) presents some remarks on grounded theory methodology which 
forge particular philosophical links between this chapter and the next two, making 
reference to: 
three methods which I use repeatedly in a spiral-like research process - 
abduction, deduction and induction. (p. 228) [Note 0.8] 
The term 'abduction' is due to Peirce (1934, pp. 99 ff. ) and refers to the process of 
hypothesis formation; the human mind 'invents' and proposes meaning (expressed as 
a hypothesis) as an imaginative leap from the data. The researcher applies deduction 
on returning to the data "but with new eyes, to [... ] order the facts in a new way" 
(Saran, 1985, p. 229), whilst needing to be aware of the dangers of wan enchanting 
love affair with the hypothesis". For example, the creation of a classification of selected 
features of the data (abduction) could have the effect of relating previously 
unconnected elements of the data. Peirce reserves 'induction' to refer to hypothesis 
testing - making comparisons between the data, as perceived "with new eyes", and the 
previously unordered data, or indeed with additional data which was not used for 
abduction. Saran summarises the Peircean trichotomy in the following diagram 
(p. 230): 
Hypothesis 
Facts Induction Facts 
(unordered 4; (ordered through 
given facts) (Comparison) new eyes) 
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Linguistic theory plays a part in the process of abduction in this thesis. Awareness of 
regularities and theories of 'ordinary' language caused me to surmise that similar 
regularities might be found in mathematics talk and be accounted for in similar ways, 
but with a specifically mathematical dimension. Where this is the case, spoken 
mathematical interaction is indeed viewed with new eyes. The detailed application of 
the interpretive process is discussed further throughout the empirical sections of the 
thesis, especially Chapters 4,5 and 6. 
Hans Freudenthal has urged the possibility of viewing methodology as arising from a 
posteriori reflection on research activity. 
I don't remember when it happened but I do remember, as though it were 
yesterday, the bewilderment that struck me when I first heard that the training 
of future educationalists includes a course on "methodology". This is at any 
rate the custom in our country but, judging from the literature in general, this 
brain-washing policy is an international feature. Please imagine a student of 
mathematics, of physics, of - let me be cautious, as I am not sure how far this 
list extends - impregnated, in any other way than implicitly, with the 
methodology of the science that he sets out to study; in any other way than by 
having him act out the methodology that he has to learnt In no way do I object 
to a methodology as such -I have even stimulated the cultivation of it, but it 
should be the result of a posteriori reflecting on one's methods, rather than an 
a priori doctrine that has been imposed on the learner. 
I readily admit that the principle of "learn first, apply later" works in educational 
methodology no better than it ever did in mathematics; that is, where it works it 
does so to the benefit to a small minority of learners only - the future 
specialists of methodology. Yet, fortunately, the intimidated majority can count 
on the precious assistance of this authoritative guild, the pure methodologists, 
whose strength consists in knowing all about research and nothing about 
education. (Freudenthal, 1991, pp. 150-51) 
Whilst Freudenthal is harsh on 'pure methodologists', his suggestion that the 
researcher should experience an intuitive sense of 'rightness' in her/his methodology, 
as an outcome of implicit "impregnation", was a guiding principle at various times when 
I deliberated how best to proceed with both collection and interpretation of data. The 
interplay between action and reflection has a place in the progress of knowledge and 
understanding of all kinds. Justification of methodology, in particular, may be the 
outcome of reflection on research activity. 
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INTERPRETATION AND PARTICIPANT OBSERVATION 
In particular, an interpretivist perspective on the data caused me to revise my initial 
view of my influence on and contribution to the data I had collected. In a summary of 
some characteristics of qualitative research, Burgess (1985, p. 8) suggests that 
"studies may be designed and redesigned": 
All the methods associated with qualitative research are characterised by their 
flexibility. As a consequence researchers can turn this to their advantage, as a 
rigid framework in which to operate is not required. Researchers can, 
therefore, formulate and reformulate their work, may be less committed to 
perspectives which have been misconceptualised at the beginning of the 
project and may modify concepts as the collection and analysis of data 
proceeds. (ibid. ) 
Perhaps the shift of 'perspective' which most complicated my interpretation of the rich 
transcript data that I was obtaining was my eventual acceptance that my contribution to 
the clinical interviews was itself an object of interest. Hence the kernel of my attention, 
which initially was on the nature of children's mathematical constructs, shifted towards 
interaction, language and affect. This was, at first, a shift which I made with some 
reluctance. It initially came about because, when I made public presentations of my 
work, my talk would be about the children, the subjects of my interviews, with 
reference to fragments of transcripts which I had distributed. Invariably, before long, 
someone would turn the discussion to some aspect of my contribution as interviewer or 
'teacher'. [Note 0.91 It seemed pointless to deny that my part in the conversation had 
some influence on the child's, yet I had begun determined to be neutral in these clinical 
interviews, a mere channel (as it were) for the outpouring of the child's mathematical 
thinking. If that had been my expectation, it was not confirmed by the peer group 
feedback I received from these seminars. 
My recognition of my influence as teacher-substitute, simultaneous with my role as 
clinical interviewer/researcher, was double-charged. On the negative side, I could no 
longer claim to be eliciting some kind of 'pure' cognitive data from these children. Yet 
Piaget had never suggested that one could, and acknowledged the influence of the 
interviewer on the subject, at the very least as a person to be 'satisfied' with answers - 
Piaget (1929, p. 16) speaks of children "romancing", sometimes inventing plausible, 
supposedly-introspective accounts in order to produce an answer to the interviewer's 
question. On the positive side, I no longer had to defend my clinical interview 
technique as a flawless, quasi-psychiatric performance, but was at liberty to consider it 
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critically as a quasi-pedagogic transaction insofar as it succeeded in managing the 
children's interaction with me and (in the study reported in Chapter 5) with each other, 
enabling children to predict, generalise and explain and to articulate their beliefs. 
Furthermore, if I analysed some transcripts as if they were teacher-pupil interactions 
(and not just investigator-subject interviews), then there would be greater prospect of 
drawing conclusions that could be relevant to other teachers with regard to their 
pedagogic interactions with pupils. 
I do not, however, believe that this shift of perspective is in conflict with the standard 
guidance to clinical interviewers to resist the urge to teach. The shift of perspective 
came in the analysis of the transcripts, not in the method which guided my conduct of 
the interviews. The point is not that I viewed myself as teacher in these interviews, but 
that the children may have. 
The first phase of this study, the weakly-framed interviews with Susie principally, and 
also with Simon, correspond to my period of strongest 'denial' of my influence in the 
interaction, and here (Chapter 4 and Appendix 2) the cognitive dimension in my 
analysis and interpretation of the children's language is strongest. 
In the next phase Chapter 5) I begin to consider the subtle ways in which children 
convey uncertainty, distancing themselves from their assertions in which they lack 
confidence. This is a feature of the interaction between the child and the interviewer 
perceived as teacher-substitute. And the 'teacher' himself (me) is also seen to use 
hedges and other indirect language, as a mark of respect for the children's 'face', and 
to sustain their active participation. The effort to interpret my own linguistic behaviour 
(in response, initially, to the urging of others) is a dangerously schizophrenic 
enterprise, and has to be recognised as just that. The major justification is that I have 
some access to the interviewer's intentions in any utterance that he makes. That, of 
course, depends on memory and integrity - adults are capable of 'romancing' too. At 
least my interactions with these children were recorded and transcribed to become, as 
I remarked in Chapter 0, a permanent object in the world, detached from the event. 
This transformation is helpful, but the major safeguard for me was (again) peer 
evaluation: between 1991 and 1995 I regularly shared my progress with research 
students and supervisors at research days at the Centre for Mathematics Education at 
the Open University, gave nine accounts of aspects of my work at conferences and 
research seminars, and enjoyed the critical attention an 'Informal Research Group' 
(this is reported in Chapters 7 and 8). 
Next, I designed a developmental study (Chapter 6) and interpreted data collected 
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from it. This study also involves interaction between children and an interviewer, 
although I was not involved in the interaction myself beyond the pilot stage. Finally, all 
but one of the transcripts which I analyse in Chapter 7 do not involve me, being 
records of other teachers teaching. Here I am not, in any sense, a participant observer; 
I view these cases as events from the outside, events which confirm the widespread 
occurrence of vague features in mathematical teacher-pupil interaction, and give me 
confidence to interpret related aspects of these interactions. The exception, in that 
Chapter, is my mathematical conversation with a student. Here at last I can present 
myself, no longer as split-personality teacher/researcher, but simply as a teacher 
enjoying mathematics talk with a student. 
In effect, then, I begin as 'pure' contingent-questioner and end as 'pure' teacher. The 
fixed point, for the purpose of analysis and interpretation of texts, is that I must be 
researcher throughout. What I cannot claim as fixed is my perspective on my role - the 
study had to be "designed and re-designed" (Burgess, op. cit., p. 8). But a changed 
perspective is a fresh insight; in that sense at least I am encouraged to cling to 
Freudenthal's precarious but liberating proposal (1991, p. 150) that methodology might 
be created in and identified from action; that is that "methodology [... ] should be the 
result of a posteriori reflecting on one's methods". 
SUMMARY 
This thesis will encompass a number of themes and related aims, with the 
superordinate aim of revealing and analysing some of the ways that participants in 
mathematics talk use vague language to achieve their communicative and affective 
purposes. Much of the transcript data that I analyse is obtained from contingent, 
clinical interviews with children, which may be described as mathematical 
conversations. I have reported a shift of perspective in my analysis of the transcripts, 
(though not in the method which guided my conduct of the interviews) as a 
consequence of acknowledging that my contribution to the conversations must be one 
factor to be taken account of in the analysis. Whereas I did not view myself as teacher 
in these interviews, it is possible that the children may have. 
One tenet which I held constant before, during, and after the study for this thesis, is a 
belief in the central place and function of generalisation in mathematics. In 
consequence, this process is central to the design and analysis of much of the thesis. 
I therefore devote the next chapter to an examination of the ways that generalisation 
gives rise to the greatest delight and satisfaction in mathematical activity, and also to 
the greatest uncertainty. 
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CHAPTER 1: GENERALISATION 
Analysis and natural philosophy owe their most important discoveries to this 
fruitful means, which is called induction. Newton was indebted to it for his 
theorems of the binomial and the principle of universal gravity. (Laplace, 1902, 
p. 176) 
have had my results for a long time, but I do not yet know how I am to arrive 
at them. (Gauss, quoted by Lakatos, 1976, p. 9) 
Much of the empirical work to be reported in this thesis is set in contexts where 
students (of various ages) are carrying out and talking about mathematical tasks. The 
precise mathematical content of the tasks is of less importance, for my study, than the 
mathematical processes which the students are engaged in. In order to understand 
what students say in such circumstances, and why they say things the way they do, it 
is important to understand the nature of the processes themselves. 
Yet, it can be dangerous and unhelpful to make sharp distinction between process and 
content in mathematics. Arguably it is the content - numbers, shapes, groups, 
topological spaces, and so on - that most clearly distinguishes mathematics as 
mathematics, that marks it out from other domains of knowledge, for example science 
or history - whilst in both of these cases there are content overlaps with mathematics. 
Time, for example, is a concern for all three. On the other hand, without the processes 
there would be no mathematics, or at least mathematics would have no products, no 
propositional content, no truths (theorems) about the objects of study - numbers, 
groups, and so on. Bell et al. (1983, p. 206) describe the process dimension of 
mathematics in terms of: 
the style and atmosphere of the activity in the mathematics classroom [... ] 
whether [pupils] see mathematics as a field of enquiry, or a deductive system, 
or a set of methods to be learnt from the teacher. 
It is the activity, as opposed to the product of the activity, that picks out process 
aspects of mathematics. Shuard (1986, p. 104) lists a number of aspects of 
mathematics which were considered to be processes by a group of primary school 
teachers. It is a long list, and begins (gratifyingly, from the point of view of subsequent 
themes in this thesis) with: classifying, generalising, predicting and estimating. The list 
concludes with some processes related to personal qualities: cooperating, working 
independently, persevering. Shuard comments: 
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It is interesting to note that these processes are all couched in terms of 'doing'; 
we do a process [... ] processes are actions, or verbs. Some of these verbs, 
however, have related nouns which represent areas of mathematical content 
that express the same ideas. (p. 105) 
The glib answer to the question "What is mathematics? " is "Mathematics is what 
mathematicians do". Leaving aside the inherent circularity of this statement, it is a 
definition that stresses the fact that mathematics is brought into being by human 
activity. 
Processes which feature significantly in this thesis, especially in Chapters 4 to 7, are 
generalisation, prediction, explanation and estimation. The extended discussion of 
generalisation which follows will comprehend significant (for this study) aspects of 
prediction and explanation, and have unexpected links with estimation. 
GENERALISATION AND INDUCTIVE REASONING 
To begin, here are two tasks. [Note 1.1 ] Each proposes some activity - things to do - 
and poses a question or questions - things to think about in consequence of the 
activity. 
Task 1. Partitions. 
The integer 3 can be 'partitioned' into an ordered sum of (one or more) positive 
integers in the following four ways: 3,2+1,1+2.1 +1 +1. Find all such ordered partitions 
of 4. In how many ways can other positive integers be partitioned? 
Task 2. Reflections. 
Draw two intersecting lines 1, rn in the plane. Choose a motif M (such as a capital F) 
and position it in the plane. Locate in turn the image M' of M under reflection in !. and 
the image M" of M' under reflection in in. How is M" related to M? Name a (composite) 
plane transformation which maps M to M". What happens if you choose other pairs of 
lines, other motifs and initial positions? 
Suppose, then, that I (a student) carry out these tasks: I produce the activity, and 
consider the questions. Having done the tasks, I might ask myself the questions 
spontaneously, even had they not been explicitly stated - an act of curiosity as a 
consequence of the activity. The activities themselves yield'data', secure but isolated 
'knowledge', information-in-hand. The questions (spontaneous or explicit) cause me to 
look beyond the isolated items of information, to view that information as known 
samples from a (substantially) unknown class of phenomena, as specific instances of 
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items in that class. The questions associated with the tasks suggest limitations to the 
class, although I may choose to work with restrictions or extensions of such limits. 
In the case of the given Task 1, my information-in-hand will soon include the 4 given 
partitions of 3, the 8 possible partitions of 4, and very possibly the 2 partitions of 2. The 
question "In how many ways can other positive integers be partitioned? " prompts the 
thought that my data belong to a class P={(n, r(n)): nEN} where r(n) is the number of 
partitions of the natural number n. My data consist only of the subset corresponding to 
n=2,3 and 4. What might the (infinite) remainder of the class be like? The information- 
in-hand is limited, and in any case is bound to be insufficient in itself for me to know 
the values of r(n) for values of n beyond those for which I have data. It may, however, 
be sufficient to cause me to form some beliefs about those unknown r(n) values, and I 
may be prepared to articulate such beliefs in terms of predictions or conjectures. 
For example, I may observe that r(n+1)=2r(n) for n=2,3 and hence predict that 
r(5)=2r(4) i. e. r(5)=8 on grounds of cognitive systematization (Rescher, 1979). Such a 
prediction is amenable to confirmation. In this case, to achieve confirmation I would 
need to undertake identification and listing of the partitions of 5. Once confirmed, I 
might then go on to predict values of r(6) and r(7). I may anticipate the corresponding 
acts of confirmation with eagerness, or with distaste as they become progressively (in 
this case, exponentially) more tedious. I may use a computer to automate the listing of 
partitions. All this will add to my sense of regularity in the system, but will always leave 
a countable infinity of unknown values of r(n). 
I may, indeed I am likely to, go further than making a finite (in principle, confirmable), 
set of predictions, and make the following conjecture: that for all natural numbers n, 
r(n+1)=2r(n). Since I know that r(2)=2, I may formulate the conjecture as: for all natural 
numbers n, r(n)=2n-1 . These conjectures have the quality of generalisations; they are 
statements (of beliefs) about properties of an entire class, statements made despite 
the fact that the whole class has not been directly inspected and tested - indeed, could 
not be - for the property or properties in question. 
Prediction can be viewed as a specialized form of generalisation. Each feeds on the 
other, each is both parent and child of the other, although predictions are (generally) 
more straightforward to articulate since they entail fewer quantifiers. As to the nature of 
mathematical generalisation in terms of cognitive activity, an individual observes 
events, instances of some kind in a mathematical domain, of numbers or shapes 
perhaps. Some compelling desire to "make sense" in a holistic way, of this set of 
27 
information inputs - to impose regularity, to gain predictive power " seems to drive an 
involuntary unifying tendency, a generalising force of the intelligence. One of the 
rewards of maturity can be delight in the awareness of insight. It is an intense physical 
sense of well-being, of things holding together, that I have committed to public writing 
only twice (Rowland, 1974; 1993). In a recent e-mail conversation, Anne Watson 
(1995) attempts here to say what generalising feels like: 
I only know what it feels like to me when I generalise, I cannot say what it feels 
like to someone else, but I assume the mental action of generalising feels like 
something to other people. I found it very difficult to explain "how to 
generalise" in words or actions when I was a classroom teacher, but quite 
effective to catch a moment when generalising seemed to be going on and 
suggest that children tried to hang on to the feeling of that moment, whatever 
it was, so that they might recognise it again in future. For me, I feel a different 
level of power, an approaching completeness, a different positioning of self 
when I generalise but I bet this won't be a universally useful description. 
The kind of generalisation I have described in the context of Task 1 is a classical 
'pattern spotting' activity (Hewitt, 1992) - duly, meaninglessly and sometimes joylessly 
performed by the nation's adolescents since GCSE coursework institutionalised 
mathematical 'investigations' (Love, 1988, p. 250). The object of this kind of pattern 
spotting is to identify some mapping whose domain is the natural numbers. 
Task 2: Reflections, is not of the same kind, for in this case a generalisation associates 
a plane transformation with each pair of lines in the plane. The initial position of the 
motif affects its images, but the composite transformation, the 'product' of the two 
reflections, is independent of that position. That observation is itself a generalisation; 
another generalisation following from it might be a claim that (for intersecting lines) the 
composite of two reflections is always a rotation. At another level, the angle of the 
rotation can be related to the angle between the lines 1 and in. The associated class 
from which information-in-hand is available then consists of triples (l, m, t(I, m)) where 
t(1, m) is the composite of reflections in 1 and in. The imaginative problem poser is 
aware of how the class can be extended; the judicious one knows about closing down 
parameters in order to highlight regularities. 
Generalisation is a particular form of the epistemic phenomenon of induction 
[Note 1.2], and is properly and usefully considered from that broader perspective. The 
term 'induction' is derived from the Latin rendering (using ducere, to lead) of Aristotle's 
epagoge (epi-agoge, leading outside). The change of prefix, from out(side) to in(side) 
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is interesting; inductive reasoning takes the thinker outside the evidence, by somehow 
discovering (by generalisation) some additional knowledge inside themselves. The 
mechanism which enables an individual to arrive at plausible, if uncertain, belief about 
a whole population, an infinite set, from actual knowledge of a few items from the set, 
is mysterious. The nineteenth-century scientist William Whewell captures the wonder 
of it all: 
Induction moves upward, and deduction downwards, on the same stair [... ] 
Deduction descends steadily and methodically, step by step: Induction mounts 
by a leap which is out of the reach of method. She bounds to the top of the 
stairs at once [... ] (1858, p. 114) 
Here deduction is portrayed in terms of descent, just as the argument or syllogism is 
presented on the written page - methodical, steady, safe, sterile, descending. By 
contrast, induction is framed as daring, creative, ascending. Whewell discusses the 
complementary characters of induction and deduction (or 'demonstration'), and the 
symbiotic relationship between them. They must be "processes of the same mind". 
Without induction there is nothing to justify by demonstration; but it is the business of 
deduction to "establish the solidity of her companion's footing". [Note 1.3] We may 
describe the process of inductive reasoning and theorise about it, but it remains a 
mystery that an individual may confidently claim an infinite kind of knowledge from a 
finite kind of information base. The notion of 'knowledge of variability' (Holland et aL, 
1986), to be considered later, offers some insight into the conditions which seem to 
trigger and assist such inductive leaps into that which is unknown, yet which may be 
grasped with sufficient confidence to allow articulation. 
WHAT IS INDUCTIVE REASONING? 
The philosopher Nicholas Rescher (1980) offers some ways of looking at inductive 
reasoning that have relevance for subsequent chapters, especially Chapters 5 and 7. 
He begins by emphasising that the crucial thing about induction is its movement 
beyond the evidence in hand. It is a tool for use by finite intelligences, a solution to the 
problem of providing answers to questions on the basis of limited evidence. 
I suggest that questions requiring inductive solutions, such as "What is the composite 
of any two given reflections? " must in principle be infinite in character. That is to say, 
the set of instances of the phenomenon which are the subject of the question must in 
principle be an infinite set to require an inductive solution. For if the set were finite, it 
would (in principle) be possible to compute every instance (member of the set) 
29 
individually, thereby acquiring certain knowledge as to whether in every case such 
instances conformed to some supposed rule or regularity. 
Rescher (1980, pp. 8-9) goes on to analyse possible responses to the question: 
10] "Is it the case that every F is also a G? ". 
Mathematical examples include: Are all prime numbers odd? Is n2+n+41 prime for all 
neN? Is the angle subtended at the circumference of a circle by a diameter always a 
right angle? Are all cyclic groups abelian? [Note 1.41 Rescher leaves aside the 
motivation for asking such questions, i. e. the process by which they are generated as 
matters worthy of attention. The argument which follows is based on Rescher's 
epistemological analysis. 
Suppose we observe a finite set of Fs. Suppose further that each observed F is indeed 
a G. On this evidence, we are bound then to agree that at least some Fs are Gs. 
Moreover, we have no evidence as yet that there exists any F which is not a G. We 
could just say "I don't know" in response to 0. Whilst this is truthful, it is also evasive, 
adding nothing to either knowledge or belief. In the circumstances the response "Yes, 
all of them are" intuitively presents itself as the best available, albeit provisional 
response; the optimal solution from the point of view of plausibility. I use'plausible' 
here in the way that Polya uses the word - not in the sense of being specious, but of 
being pleasing, satisfying. (Latin plaudere, to applaud, clap hands). 
Thus, induction can be seen to represent a responsible form of cognitive 'gap-filling'. 
which supposes that our consistent sample of Fs faithfully represents the whole. This 
is not to claim that the solution "Yes, all of them are" securely represents the truth, but 
that it qualifies as the best estimate to the truth which we are able to make, on the 
basis of the evidence available. 
An inductive inference can be viewed as an aspiring but failed deductive inference, in 
the following sense. Suppose I set out to examine the claim (C, say) that no integer 
strictly between 1329 and 1360 is prime (Watson, 1994). This is equivalent to the 
conjunction of thirty individual propositions {P1} where P; asserts that i is composite, 
and i takes every integer value between 1330 and 1359. From thirty premises P1, 
P1331, P1332, """. 
P1359, I am entitled to infer C, because it is a syntactic conclusion of 
these premises. Suppose I then proceed to test the truth of each member of the set 
{P1}, for example by noting the divisor 2 for even values of i and then running divisibility 
checks for each of the ten possible odd prime divisors between 3 and 31 for each 
remaining odd value of i. I confirm that P1330 is true, P1331 is true, P1332 is true, ..., 
30 
P1359 is true. Since classical semantics is faithful to syntax, I am now assured of the 
truth of C. I have given a secure, deductive demonstration of it, in the form: 
P1330 
P1331 
P1332 
P1359 (premises above the line) 
C (conclusion below the line) 
In contrast, consider now the situation with inductive inference, typified by (Task 1): 
The number of partitions of 2 is a power of 2 
The number of partitions of 3 is a power of 2 
The number of partitions of 4 is a power of 2 
The number of partitions of 5 is a power of 2 
The number of partitions of 6 is a power of 2 
<The number of partitions of any integer greater than 6 is a power of 2> 
The number of partitions of every positive integer is a power of 2 
The first five premises can be directly confirmed as true (by listing and counting), but 
do not by themselves justify the conclusion below the line. The plausible inference of 
the conclusion is enthymematic (information extending); that is to say, the missing but 
necessary premise (shown inside the brackets < >) is tacitly supplied, thus presenting 
an inductive argument as if it were a deductive one. Since enthymematic premises are 
normally suppressed, there being no firm evidence on which to claim their truth, the 
induction has the appearance of a failed (incomplete) deductive inference. The missing 
premises are tacitly supplied in order to enable us to cross the 'epistemic gap' which 
separates the data from the 'answer (to essentially infinitary questions). The epistemic 
gap is the'residual distance' to be accomplished, requiring nothing less than an 
'inductive leap'. As I have already argued, the inductive conclusion represents the most 
satisfying solution, the most plausible truth-estimate available, and so provides a post 
facto justification of the tacit addition of enthymematic premises. 
This is not to say that the inductive conclusion has the status of certain knowledge. Nor 
is it simply an uninformed guess. It is a conjecture. As Polya says, discussing 
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Goldbach's (unproved) conjecture that every even non-prime is a sum of two primes: 
We arrived so [from a finite data set] at a clearly formulated general statement, 
which, however, is merely a conjecture, merely tentative. That is, the 
statement is by no means proved, it cannot have any pretension to be true, it 
is merely an attempt to get at the truth. The conjecture has, however, some 
suggestive points of contact with experience, with "the facts". with "reality". It is 
true for the particular even numbers 10,20,30, also for 6.8.12.14,16. 
(Polya, 1954, p. 5) 
Polya's reference to an "attempt to get at the truth" shares the same epistemic quality 
as my earlier reference to induction as truth-estimation in the erotetic enterprise. 
Observe that inductive inference is to be distinguished from stochastic (statistical or 
probabilistic) inference. Given that every F we have examined is also a G. I do not 
conclude (inductively) that most Fs are Gs. The inductive inference that every F 
(including the infinite set of F's which we have not inspected) is a G, is an 
uncompromised, if provisional, commitment to a regularity in 'nature'. The degree of 
commitment of an individual to the inductive conclusion, the extent to which they 
believe it to be true, may and does vary considerably. 
At the heart of this thesis is the study of how individuals are able to convey, by spoken 
language, the strength or fragility of inductive truth-estimates. A link can, and will, be 
made with conventional estimation of quantities. Indeed, Chapter 6 focuses on 
vagueness in the context of children giving a plausible estimate of the size (cardinality) 
of a discrete set of objects. The notion of induction (of which generalisation is one 
form) as truth-estimation forges the following pleasing association between 
generalisation and estimation. Given a discrete set, there exists a precise integer no 
such that the statement "there are n objects in the set" is a true statement when n=no; 
for all other values of n the statement is false. An estimate of no is therefore, in 
common with an inductive inference, a pragmatic, optimal solution to an erotetic 
dilemma. In the case of estimation, an accepted, associated language of 
approximation exists, including words like 'around' and 'about'. This language Is 
cultivated to express the awareness of the speaker that, whilst the claim that s/he 
makes is an estimate of the truth, in the classical bivalent sense (if n0 no) it may 
actually be false. In the case of generalisation, I will show that speakers find their own 
pragmatic, linguistic means of conveying such awarenesess. 
32 
INDUCTION AND THE MIND 
A cognitive account of inductive reasoning, and generalisation in particular, should 
include both a description of mental re-structuring to include the acquisition of new 
knowledge (or a new way of looking at old knowledge) and an attempt to explain how 
the individual accomplishes the 'inductive leap' as a synthetic act. The literature seems 
to be strongest in the former aspect, and much of it relates in one way or another to 
the formation of concepts. 
Abstraction 
Skemp (1979) gives an account framed in broadly Piagetian terms. We possess 
cognitive schemas (networks of concepts) of various kinds which structure our 
perception of reality; in fact, they sensitise us to reality, but in a selective way. For 
example, I have a schema which includes the concept 'polygon' and links it to a 
number of spatial, numerical and aesthetic concepts. This schema has a selective 
influence on the way that I perceive spatial inputs, in that I am able to process them 
comfortably within the schema that includes 'polygon', and I will do so if at all possible. 
This schematic shaping of reality (or whatever we choose to call the incoming data) is 
'assimilation'. But the concept 'polygon' came about (for me) by a process of 
'abstraction' (ibid., p. 24) so that I might include objects like pentagons and hexagons 
(less familiar) in a conceptual class along with triangles and quadrilaterals (more 
familiar). Note that inclusion of certain objects entails exclusion of others; concept 
formation requires that certain qualities be stressed whilst others are ignored. 
One consequence of this generalisation (to the concept 'polygon' from a number of 
instances) is to bring within my reflective horizon an infinite class of concepts 
(including 22-gons and 469-gons) examples of which I have never seen, nor am I ever 
likely to. Nevertheless I am able to state and prove theorems about such objects. 
Skemp calls such generalisation (concept expansion) 'reflective extrapolation'. It has 
the quality of Piaget's notion of accommodation, which Skemp prefers to call 
'expansion'. Thus, Skemp speaks of assimilation bya concept, and expansion of a 
concept. 
It is certainly a feature of inductive reasoning that the truth of an infinite 
(enthymematic) set of untested propositions is claimed, in order to expand and bind 
together a finite (usually small) set of items of data. The essential finiteness of the 
data-base of information-in-hand may be obscured by the manner in which it is 
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obtained and presented. I am thinking here of the new generation of dynamic geometry 
software, typified by Cabri-G6ombtre. Suppose, for example, that I create a triangle 
and construct its three medians. I observe that the medians are concurrent. I vary the 
triangle by dragging one of its vertices on the screen. The concurrence of the medians 
is an invariant of every frame in the cinematographic presentation. The inductive 
generalisation is readily made, and with conviction (Schumann and Green, 1994, 
pp. 85-6); perhaps because the software has enabled a vast set of confirming 
instances to be realised. Indeed, given the apparent continuity of the dragging process, 
the data set appears to be continuous, uncountable. This is an illusion. since the 
hardware design - pixels and the like - only permits a finite, though vast. set of 
configurations to be calculated and displayed. 
Construction and Expansion 
Harel and Tail (1991) observe that 'generalisation' may refer both to a process 
(inductive thinking) and to the product (an inductive inference) of that process. They 
distinguish three different kinds of generalisation: 
" expansive generalisation, the expansion of a schema without need for its 
reconstruction; 
" reconstructive generalisation, which occurs when a subject reconstructs an 
existing schema in order to widen its range of applicability; 
" disjunctive generalisation, the construction and addition of a new, disjoint schema 
to an existing one, to deal with a new context. 
Rather than give Harel and Tall's example (of three students solving linear equations), 
I prefer to cite the growth of my own understanding of two ideas from group theory. Let 
H be a subset of some group G, and C1 the idea that I can calculate the cosets of H in 
G. Let C2 be the idea that it is possible to calculate the conjugacy classes of the group 
G. Having first encountered C1 (for the purpose of proving Lagrange's theorem on 
subgroups), I subsequently met C2 (perhaps in order to enumerate normal subgroups, 
I don't really remember). Initially I regarded C2 as a concept disjoint from C1. Both C1 
and C2 were set in a schema of related examples and theorems -a case of disjunctive 
generalisation . Somewhat later I took an 
interest in equivalence relations, was struck 
by the beauty of the Fundamental Theorem (that the equivalence classes Induced by 
an equivalence relation form a partition), and became aware of the unifying 
significance of the set partition theorems associated with both C1 and C2. I could, 
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moreover, write down equivalence relations R1 and R2 on the elements of G which 
induced the respective Cl- and C2-partitions of G. Insofar as I now perceived C1 and 
C2 as being examples of the same thing, this was expansive generalisation. Many 
years later, in the study of transformations of vector spaces V(F), I learned about 
group actions (in order to prove the orbit-stabiliser theorem). The partitions associated 
with C1 and C2 were both, I deduced, the sets of orbits of elements of G under 
suitably-defined actions of G on itself. This reconstructive generalisation, I felt, not 
merely included C1 and C2, but made them somehow inevitable and special (in both 
senses of the word) cases. A group action will partition any set that it acts upon - 
including the group itself. 
Disjunctive "generalisation" barely merits the name at all, since it misses the 
opportunity for economy of intellectual effort and places a heavy load on memory. As 
Polya puts it: 
there are two kinds of generalisations, one is cheap and the other is valuable. 
It is easy to generalise by diluting; it is important to generalise by condensing. 
(Polya, 1992, p. 11) 
Harel and Tall argue that expansive and reconstructive generalisations are "more 
appropriate for cognitive development", and that expansive generalisation is the more 
straightforward of the two. I would comment that, in the context of inductive activity and 
learning, disjunctive generalisation could relate to the accumulation of individual but 
isolated instances of a phenomenon; expansive generalisation has some quality of 
conservative extrapolation, rather like a prediction of the next case on the basis of the 
previous cases; reconstructive generalisation seems like inductive inference, so that 
each observed instance is viewed as a special case of a phenomenon with wide 
applicability. Harel and Tall conclude: 
In principle we believe that the most desirable approach to generalization is to 
provide experiences which lead to a meaningful understanding of the current 
situation, to allow the move to the more general case to occur by expansive 
generalization, but there are times when the situation demands a re- 
construction and, in such cases, it is necessary to provide the learner with the 
conditions in which this reconstruction is more likely to take place. (p. 39) 
It may be fair to observe that mathematics education lacks a unified theory of 
generalisation, although most mathematics educators will say they know it when they 
see it. 
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Intuition 
How is it that humans (and other animals) manage to organise experience in such a 
way as to provide a basis for judgement about situations outside experience? The 
mysterious nature of this capability is nicely captured in the word 'intuition' - that which 
(at first, or never) we cannot rationalise, we label intuition. The Latin root of the word 
means 'to look inside', suggesting in-tuition, or teaching of/by the inner self. Fischbein 
(1987) uses 'intuition' to denote a "type of cognition" by which we recognise some 
'facts' about the world. Fischbein emphasises a distinction between intuition and 
perception, the later being awareness of objects and facts as a result of sensory 
inputs. Knowledge (more correctly, beliefs) gained as a result both of perceptions and 
intuitions may be false. For example, visual perceptions permit optical illusions; naive 
intuitions are the basis of laws of 'intuitive physics' such as "velocity is proportional to 
applied force". (Orton, 1985; Champagne et a!., 1980, p. 1077) 
It is worth adding that intuition can be an obstacle to the acceptance of truth; for 
example (Fischbein's), it is virtually impossible to accept intuitively that a set may be 
equivalent to one of its subsets (Dedekind's characterisation of an infinite set). We 
exploit this - at least, I do - to play linguistic tricks on our students when we 
demonstrate that n ---> 2n defines an injection of N, and then ask them to agree that 
there are "as many" even natural numbers as there are natural numbers. Tirosh (1991, 
p. 203) tested the plausibility of this particular infinite-cardinal'paradox' and several 
others with a sample of 1381 students aged 11-17, finding 'incorrect' Intuitions 
commonplace in the comparison of infinite sets. What is particularly interesting is her 
finding that student misconceptions were relatively stable across this age range. One 
of the great didactic challenges (not just with regard to intuitions about Infinity) for 
mathematics education is the identification and confrontation of students' 
'epistemological obstacles' (Bache lard, 1938; Cornu, 1991) - beliefs which become 
embedded in a knowledge-schema because they function well in one domain of 
activity, but which malfunction and lead to contradictions in another. 
Intuition can be viewed as a form of induction, in the sense that: 
intuition [... ] always exceeds the given facts. An intuition is a theory, it implies 
an extrapolation beyond the directly accessible information [... ) One may affirm 
then that intuitions refer to self-evident statements which exceed the 
observable facts. (Fischbein, 1987, pp. 13-14) 
It appears that intuition can be said to occur when an individual reaches a 
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conclusion on the basis of less explicit information than is ordinarily required to 
reach that conclusion. (Westcolt, 1968, p. 97) 
In everyday use we perhaps stretch this to a point beyond induction, so that intuition, 
rather like premonition, advises us of facts and events in the absence not just of 
adequate evidence, but of any evidence whatsoever. Such intuitions may be ascribed 
to 'extra-sensory' forces and powers - in effect, extending the scope of the notion of 
sensory inputs, so that intuition becomes 'merely' a different kind of perception. By a 
criterion of inner confidence in the intuitive disclosure, however, this kind of cognitive 
experience seems not to be excluded by Fischbein: 
An intuition always exceeds the data on hand. However, being an 
extrapolative guess is not sufficient to define an intuition. A feeling of certainty 
is also a necessary characteristic of an intuition. Otherwise it is a mere guess 
[... ] The extrapolativity aspect is not always evident, because the apparent 
obviousness of intuitions hides the incompleteness of the information on which 
they are based. (p. 51) 
One could read the italicised (by Fischbein) comment in two ways. The'extrapolativity' 
may not be evident in the (intended) sense that the individual may be unaware that the 
basis of evidence for their new'knowledge' is incomplete, that it is indeed a 
generalisation. Alternatively, in the case of 'mere' everyday intuition, and possibly 
some cases of mathematical intuition, the extrapolativity may not be evident in the 
sense that the individual may be unaware that the new knowledge builds in some way 
on old experience; s/he may not consciously be aware of some deeply embedded 
kinds of evidence that s/he does in fact possess. 
Constraints and Default Hierarchies 
Peirce (1932) noted the capability of humans to exercise appropriate, pragmatic 
constraints in the kinds of questions that they ask, so as to gain information which is 
not just new, but (in some sense) worth knowing. He poses the question as to how 
individuals manage to ask the 'right' questions about the data (the fruits of experiences 
of every kind) available to them. 
Nature is a far vaster and less clearly arranged repertoire of facts than a 
census report; and if men had not come to it with special aptitudes for 
guessing right, it may well be doubted whether [... ] their greatest mind would 
have attained the amount of knowledge which is actually possessed by the 
lowest idiot. (paras 2: 752-3, pp. 474-476). 
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The matter of constraints is also a factor in the calculation of how much data we need 
before a generalisation can appropriately be made. Suppose (Holland et al.. 1986)1 
visit a remote Pacific island. I see a bird which my informant calls a "shreeble'. and it is 
blue. I am likely to suppose (a conjecture, provisional generalisation) that (all) 
shreebles are blue. Suppose, however, that I see an inhabitant of the island whom my 
informant calls a "Barrato", and he is obese. I am not likely to suppose that all Barratos 
are obese. Why the difference? As John Stuart Mill put it, 
Why is a single instance, in some cases, sufficient for a complete induction, 
while in others myriads of concurring instances, without a single exception 
known or presumed, go such a very little way towards establishing a universal 
proposition? (1873, p. 314). 
The answer proposed by Holland et al. lies in the notions of (a) default hierarchies of 
concepts, and (b) variability of objects with respect to others in the default hierarchy. In 
the example above, my default hierarchy recognises the set of shreebles as a 
subcategory of the class of birds, and BLUE as a member of the category of colours. 
The observation of one blue shreeble activates the possibility that all shreebles are 
blue. I then calculate (i. e. make a judgement about) the extent of variability of the 
superordinate category BIRD with respect to the superordinate property COLOUR, by 
reference to my knowledge of appropriate subordinates - robins, ravens, seagulls. 
parrots, and so on. In this case, my calculation suggests only modest variability in the 
BIRD-COLOUR relation, and so I attach some confidence to the conjecture (the 
possibility activated in my mind) that all shreebles are blue. A more sophisticated 
judgement might result from a more refined default hierarchy, e. g. choosing 
TROPICAL BIRD as the immediate superordinate category to SHREEBLE. The 
difficulty with the obese Barrato should now be evident: body-shape (from skinny to 
obese) varies considerably within peoples of any given nationality - at least there Is 
sufficient variability for me to be unwilling to make any conjecture about Barratos from 
such a modest base of evidence. Indeed, it is unlikely that the observation of the single 
example (the obese Barrato) would even trigger the suspicion, the generalised 
conjecture. 
Stamp (undated) recalls teaching a lesson on right-angled triangles. In the first two 
examples considered - (6,8,10) and (5,12,13) - it was observed that the area and 
perimeter had the same numerical value. This led to the conjecture that "this happens 
every time". Stamp reports that he "denied" that this can be so, and in fact proceeds in 
the note to deductive demonstration that, with the exception of the given examples, the 
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proposition is universally false! Why, given two confirming instances, was Stamp 
disinclined to formulate the conjecture? What prompted him to spontaneously denial 
that it could be true? The default hierarchy/variability analysis is certainly plausible 
here; mathematics teachers are very conscious of the confusion between perimeter 
and area, and very aware themselves that there is considerable variability between the 
two in fact. Had the class tried just one more right-angled triangle they would have 
been obliged to modify their hypothesis. One can speculate that anxiety that a false 
relationship might be inferred for a// triangles or polygons explains Stamp's 
'authoritarian' intervention. 
What we believe or judge to be significant as a basis for generalisation, in given 
circumstances, enables a distinction to be made between the logic and intuition of 
inductive confirmation. Consider the hypothesis: "All ravens are black". The 
observation of a black raven is clearly a confirming instance, strengthening conviction 
that the proposition "All ravens are black" is true. But the hypothesis is logically 
equivalent to its contrapositive, which says that all non-black things are not ravens. 
Thus, on this logical account, it follows that a white shoe (for example) is a confirming 
instance, confirming and adding to belief that all ravens are black. Yet, intuitively, it 
does no such thing. This dilemma is called "Hempel's paradox" (Hempel, 1965). The 
approach to generalisation through default hierarchies and variability accounts for, and 
justifies, the intuitive, sceptical reaction. For whereas (as with shreebles) we are in a 
position to judge the variability of the superordinates BIRD and COLOUR, the concepts 
NON-BLACK and NON-RAVEN have no meaningful superordinates, and we cannot 
even begin to make variability judgments. 
MATHEMATICAL HEURISTIC 
George Polya must take the credit for a revival of interest in mathematical heuristic in 
the two decades following the second world war. Heuristic, by Polya's definition (1945, 
p. 102) is the study of methods and rules of discovery and invention. Heuristic 
reasoning, he affirms, is in the service of discovery, and so is to be regarded as 
provisional and plausible; it is often based on induction, or on analogy. Polya codified 
heuristic methods and strategies; for example - if you cannot solve the proposed 
problem, can you imagine a more accessible related problem? (ibid., p. 103). Polya's 
How to Solve it, published in his 58th year, has all the freshness of a rediscovered art. 
This is still possibly the best-known of his heuristic quintet (Polya 1945; 1954a and 
1954b; 1962 and 1965). Unfortunately, it has been widely (mis)represented, in 
summary, as a four-stage recipe for problem solving: 
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" understanding the problem 
" devising a plan 
" carrying out the plan 
" looking back 
as if adherence to some heuristic algorithm were a sure path to a solution. The four- 
point list is is too general to be helpful in the solution of actual mathematical problems; 
it is, I suggest, more realistically viewed as a generic analysis of problem solving rather 
than a prescriptive guide to action. I concur with Burton (1984, p. 10) that problem 
solving cannot be taught, although one can over time acquire a few techniques (such 
as tabulating data) and a great many, less tangible heuristic instincts (such as calling 
to mind familiar, analogous situations; see below). 
Perhaps Polya wants to correct the false impression that the processes of 
mathematical problem solving can be "learned" when later, an old man, he writes: 
Solving problems is a practical art, like swimming, or skiing, or playing the 
piano: you can learn it only by imitation and practice. [... ] if you wish to learn 
swimming you have to go into the water, and if you wish to become a problem 
solver you have to solve problems. (Polya, 1962, p. v) 
If he [the problem solver] possessed a perfect method, an infallible strategy of 
problem solving, he could determine the next step from the data of the 
incoming situation by clear reasoning, on the basis of precise rules. 
Unfortunately there is no universally perfect method of problem solving, there 
are no precise rules applicable to all situations, and in all probability there will 
never be such rules. (ibid., p. 89) 
It is clearer in Induction and Analogy that what Polya is doing is encouraging the 
problem solver to recognise and reflect on their own heuristic, as well as that of some 
distinguished mathematicians of the past, such as Pappus, Descartes, Leibnitz, Euler. 
Laplace, Bolzano. 
I tried to illustrate each important point [... ] In several cases I was obliged to 
take a not too elementary example to support the point impressively enough. 
In fact, I felt that I should present also examples of historic interest. examples 
of real mathematical beauty ... 
I should add that for many of the stories told the final form resulted from a sort 
of informal psychological experiment. I discussed the subject with several 
classes, interrupting my exposition frequently with such questions as: "Well, 
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what would you do in such a situation? " ... 
In short, I tried [... ] to give an appropriate opportunity to the reader for 
intelligent imitation and for doing things by himself. (Polya, 1954, p. vii) 
Polya goes on to stress the central place of induction as a paradigm for plausible 
reasoning, and continues: 
Observe also (what modern writers almost forgot, but some older writers, such 
as Euler and Laplace, clearly perceived) that the role of inductive inference in 
mathematical investigation is similar to its role in physical research. Then you 
may notice the possibility of obtaining some information about inductive 
reasoning by observing and comparing examples of plausible reasoning in 
mathematical matters. And so the door opens to investigating induction 
inductively. (p. viii) 
Thus, Induction and Analogy in Mathematics is a primer for the reflective, 
mathematical fieldwork that the reader is to undertake; it supplies "the data for the 
inductive investigation of induction" which is to come in Patterns of Plausible Inference. 
In the same way, Mathematical Discovery, Volume /(1962) is the reader's 
mathematical preparation for the cognitive exploration in Volume II (1965). This is the 
way of the inductive investigation of induction, and it is the method for the reflective 
investigation of mathematical problem solving. As William Whewell put it: 
For an Art of Discovery is not possible. At each step of the investigation are 
needed Invention, Sagacity, Genius - elements which no art can give. We may 
hope in vain, as [Francis] Bacon hoped, for an Organ which shall enable all 
men to construct Scientific Truths [ ... ] this cannot be. The practical results of 
the Philosophy of Science must be rather classification and analysis of what 
has been done, than precept and method for future doing. (Whewell, 1858, 
p. V) 
TRUTH AND CONVICTION: THE THEORY OF NUMBERS 
The Theory of Numbers is notorious as fertile ground from which to generate inductive 
inferences; those (like Goldbach's conjecture) which deny as yet any counter-example, 
yet defy deductive proof, have a way of acquiring celebrity status. Perhaps Fermars 
Last Theorem is currently the best-known, given the interest in Andrew Wiles' 1993 
endeavours (Granville and Katz, 1993). 
Polya (1954, pp. 91-98) gives, in extensio, a translation of a memoir of Leonard Euler. 
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It is an account by Euler of his discovery of a 'formula' -a recursive scheme, in fact - to 
determine the sum a(n) of the divisors of (in principle) any positive integer n. Interest in 
a(n) derives, in part, from Greek fascination with'perfect' numbers, such as 28 and 
496, for which a(n)=2n. My purpose in re-examining the story is to gain insight into the 
nature of belief and conviction, from the perspective of a genius. to use an inadequate 
cliche, among mathematicians. 
Euler begins by remarking on the lack of orderliness in the sequence of prime 
numbers, and proceeds to an exposition of the well-known method of evaluating a(n) 
from the prime factorisation of n, using the simplicity of a(pp) for primes p and the 
multiplicative property of the function Q. He then lists the calculated values of Q(n) for 
n=1 to 99: 
13 476 1281513... 120 252 98 171 156 
Euler remarks that the list, like the sequence of primes. is a disorderly one (arguably 
more so, since it isn't even monotonic). Nonetheless he continues, "I just happened to 
discover an extremely strange law" to bring order to the apparent chaos. The 'law' is 
what we would call a recursive one, defining c(n) in terms of the set of preceding 
values a(m), for m<n. At first sight the scheme is as chaotic as the sequence it 
purports to explain: 
a(n) = a(n-1) + a(n-2) - a(n-5) - a(n-7) + o(n-12) + a(n-15) - a(n-22) - a(n-26) + 
a(n-35) + a(n-40) - ... taking, if necessary, a(0) to be n. 
On inspection, the aspect of the scheme which is most obscure is the sequence 1.2. 
5,7,12,15,22,26,35,40, ... Euler explains that It will become clear by listing first 
differences: 1,3,2,5,3,7,4,9,5,11,6,13,7... The patterns in the even and odd 
(placed) terms of this sequence is now evident, so that the list Is indefinitely 
extendable. 
There is no sign as to how Euler arrived at his recursive scheme by inductive 
consideration of the data. Indeed, it Is not clear from the memoir that he did; It appears 
that he derived it from yet another of his number-theoretic conjectures, in the theory of 
partitions. In any case, he had no deductive proof that the law Is universally true (i. e. 
for all n£N). Euler freely admits this to be the case; the quotations which follow are 
from Polya (1954, pp. 93-95): 
must admit that I am not in a position to give it a rigorous demonstration ... 
It is now fascinating to examine what Euler considers sufficient grounds for belief in the 
generalisation - for the reader and, presumably, for himself, since he has sufficient 
confidence to publish the result. He proceeds: 
it is not difficult to apply the formula to any given particular case, and so 
anybody can satisfy himself of its truth by as many examples as he may wish 
to develop. 
That is to say, the finite set of confirming instances can be as large as the reader 
chooses, and anybody can satisfy "himself" of their truth. He cannot, of course, 
establish (in a demonstrative sense) the truth of the formula (the generalisation) by 
pointing to any number of examples, except by the addition of enthymematic premises. 
Euler, by reference to truth by, rather than of, examples, is claiming that (despite his 
admission that he cannot 'demonstrate' the truth of the formula) it will be possible - in 
this case at least - to achieve conviction of its truth. Not content to leave it to the reader 
to generate some data, he says: 
I will justify it by a sufficiently large number of examples. 
Clearly "justify" must be about plausibility rather than proof, if Euler is not to be 
accused of 'naive empiricism' (Balacheff, 1988, p. 218). What is "sufficiently large" is a 
tricky question, but Euler implicitly suggests that 20 belongs (in this context) in the 
vague category of sufficiently large numbers, since he proceeds to recursive 
calculation, with his formula, of the values of ß(n) for n=1 to 20. In every case the value 
coincides with that given by direct calculation by means of prime decomposition. Was 
he just lucky? Certainly not: 
I think these examples are sufficient to discourage anyone from imagining that 
it is by mere chance that my rule is in agreement with the truth. 
"In agreement" - the "rule" and the "truth" coincide for these 20 values of ß(n). Yet 
awareness that, for example, n2+n+41 is prime for n=1 to 39, but not prime for all nEN, 
can bring about a sceptical frame of mind, which Euler recognises. In particular, the 
recursive calculation of a(20) only calls on six previous terms; a(n-1) + a(n-2) - a(n-5) - 
a(n-7) + ß(n-12) + a(n-15). He acknowledges the tentativeness behind his remark "I 
think these examples are sufficient": 
Yet someone could still doubtwhether the law of the numbers 1,2,5,7,12, 
15[ ... ] is precisely that one which I have indicated [... ] Thus the law could still 
appear insufficiently established and, therefore, / will give some examples with 
larger numbers (emphasis added). 
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He then picks 101 and 301 (the first prime, the second composite) and proceeds to 
confirm, as it were, agreement between the rule and the truth. Surely, he seems to 
say, that clinches it: 
The examples I have just developed will undoubtedly dispel any qualms which 
we might have had about the truth of my formula. 
Here Euler nicely exemplifies the role of prediction in relation to conjecturing activity. 
Its effect is to dip into the box of enthymematic premises, pick an item, and to examine 
either (a) whether it is in agreement with, i. e. an extrapolative extension of, the finite 
set of data-in-hand, or (b) whether it is a confirming instance of an already-formulated 
generalisation. The more random the choice, the more powerful Is the epistemic effect 
of the confirming instance. It is like the celebrity drawing the winning raffle ticket, who 
looks away from the box as she dips her hand into it, or the magician who rolls back 
his sleeves to show that nothing is concealed from the audience. The "choice" of 101 
and 301 is most interesting. With a "live" audience, Euler could invite numbers to be 
tested; in written exposition he must appear to pick them randomly. In effect, he is 
saying, "If it works for 301 it must work for anything". The psychological thrust of this 
was recently illustrated for me by some first year undergraduate mathematics students 
investigating the continued fractions of 'in for nFN. Their findings were written up in 
project reports. 
Emma notices that X13 =[1,1,2], '16 = [2, 
i, _4_1,4 11- [3,3,61,418 = [4, , 81. She 
makes a conjecture (inductive inference), tentatively expressed, and a conservative 
extrapolative prediction: 
Whenever n is of the form r2+2 It seems as if the continued fraction Is always 
of the form [r, r, 2r]. Therefore I would predict that X127 - 15,5,10J. 
Emma proceeds to confirm her prediction. 
Sarah generates data similar to Emma's, and makes the conjecture that 
I(n2+1) = [n, 2n] for all nrN. Her prediction then proceeds: 
I then picked a large value of n to check this general solution to make sure it 
worked. (emphasis added) 
She predicts that q82 = [9,18] and proceeds to confirm it. For Sarah, the case n-9 
serves to confirm, to make sure of, all remaining instances. She suggests, as Euler 
might have done, that this is an example which will undoubtedly dispel any qualms that 
we might have had about the truth of her formula. Emma proceeds cautiously, her 
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prediction being for the next value (5) of n outside her data. There is a strong sense 
here that she needs to reassure herself first, before she considers convincing others. I 
shall analyse my own experience of the need for such personal reassurance towards 
the end of this chapter. 
Both students conformed to the normative requirements of proof, by algebraic 
transformation of their generalised surds, using the continued fraction algorithm. But 
Sarah, in common with Euler, offers us a'crucial experiment' (Balacheff, 1988, p. 218) 
in preparation for (Euler - in place of) the deductive argument. The crucial experiment 
tests the plausibility of a generality by confirmation of an instance which is chosen for 
being not-special; a nice paradox. 
I shall weave some personal remarks into a summary of the remainder of Euler's 
memoir. For me the Theory of Numbers has been an inner laboratory, more like a 
playground, in which I experimented and theorised as an adolescent, read as a sixth 
former (when I first discovered the existence of books on primes, divisibilty and the 
like), studied as an undergraduate (personally supervised by Keith Hirst, since there 
was no taught course), and latterly returned to as a teacher. The course which I give 
(in its content and the inductive approach to the content) is inspired by, and based on, 
Burn (1982). The course includes a topic on partitions (unordered, in distinction to 
Task 1). The sequence {p(n)} of partitions of 1,2,3,4 ... is in fact 1,2,3,5,7,11,15, 
22,30, ... The list has something of the impenetrable randomness of the sequence of 
primes. The course includes a Lemma: 
E(n), the number of partitions of n into an even number of distinct parts is equal to 
O(n) the number of partitions of n into an odd number of distinct parts, unless n is of 
the form V2m(3m±1); that is to say, unless n= 1,2,5,7,12,15,22,26,35,40, ... ; in 
which case E(n) and O(n) differ by 1. 
Whilst I had not encountered Euler's formula for a(n) before I read Euler's memoir, I 
certainly recognised the sequence 1,2,5,7,12,15,22,26,35,40, ..., although I could 
not imagine such a direct connection between a(n) and p(n). This situation exemplifies 
the unconscious activation of one element of Polya's heuristic catechism : 
Here is a problem related to yours and solved before. Can you use it? (1945, 
p. 19) 
In my case, the answer was "No". It was by analogy (with the Lemma on partitions) 
that I recognised the obscure pattern of Euler's sequence, yet I was unable to develop 
the analogy in order to achieve any explanation of Euler's formula for a(n). As Pimm 
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observes (1981 and 1987, p. 100), analogy assumes a recognition of similarity (Greek 
analogia -'proportion') between two situations, but has a preferred direction of 
application. My knowledge of p(n) offered potential for the illumination of c(n), even if 
the potential was, for me, unrealised. 8 
It turns out, however, that Euler had deployed proto-Polyan heuristic, and arrived at his 
"extremely strange law" for a(n) precisely because he had become aware of such a 
similarity. He did, after all, invent the theory of partitions. The memoir concludes with 
an ingenious but 'formal' proof of the 'law'. (Encumbered by our modern inhibitions 
about convergence, its validity would trouble us no end. ) Assuming (Note 1.51 that the 
generating function s for E(n)-O(n) is (1-. v)(1-X2)(1-. ri)(1-. t4)..., Euler demonstrates that 
- (X/S) ds/dt is the generating function for o(n), and thus forges the link between a(n) 
and p(n). The remainder of Euler's argument is unimportant for my present purposes. 
the study of awareness of mathematical process. 
EXPLANATION AND PROOF 
In mathematics, proof may fulfil, at any time, one or more of a number of purposes. 
These purposes include not only assurance of truth, but explanation of (accounting for) 
observed regularities; and clarification of what it is that is being claimed (Hersh, 1993). 
For example, consider Task 1: Partitions. 
Seeking to account for the observation that the number of (ordered) partitions of each 
positive integer is twice that of the previous one, I argue as follows. Consider any 
partition of n. If I increase the size of the last part by 1, I have produced a partition of 
n+1. If instead, I adjoin an additional part of size 1, I have produced a second partition 
of n+1. So there are at least twice as many partitions of n+1 as there are of n. Finally, I 
have to make some remarks about there being no duplicates and no partitions of n+1 
unaccounted for. This constructive argument is very satisfying in that it explains why 
this remarkable and unexpected doubling phenomenon occurs. It Is then easily 
adapted to a proof by Mathematical Induction that, for all neN, r(n) = 211"1. 
Later, I have an entirely different insight. Imagine n as a sequence of n 1's. separated 
by n-1 boundaries (one boundary between each consecutive pair of 1's). Each partition 
of n can be achieved by removing some of the boundaries, and "gluing together" 
(adding) the 1's which are no longer separated by a boundary. For each of the n-1 
boundaries I have two options: remove it or leave it in place. Therefore there are 2n4 
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partitions of n. 
Polya (1954, p. 114) remarks that this "happens not infrequently", i. e. that a theorem 
which is proved first by Mathematical Induction is subsequently proved "by some other 
method". I would comment that my second proof is "neat", economical, yet it leaves me 
little wiser about why I got the doubling pattern. Of course, I realise that 2n is indeed 
double 2n"l, but that observation seems to have no contact with the original problem 
about partitioning integers. This is at the heart of Hewitt's (1992) complaint that "their 
[children's] attention is with the numbers and is thus taken away from the original 
situation". 
The first argument above (relating partitions of n+1 back to those of n) is effectively 
presented, from the point of view of concreteness and conviction, by assigning a 
particular value to n, say 4. The exposition then describes how each partition of 4 
begets two partitions of 5. Indeed, my experience with students indicates that careful 
scrutiny and comparison (with n=3, say, for manageability) of the 4 partitions of 3 
alongside the 8 partitions of 4, can trigger explanatory insight concerning the way each 
partition of 3 is related to two partitions of 4. Such an argument amounts to proof by 
'generic example' (Mason and Pimm, 1984; Balacheff, 1988). 
The generic proof, although given in terms of a particular number, nowhere 
relies on any specific properties of that number. (Mason and Pimm , 1984, 
p. 284) 
The story (probably apocryphal, but see Polya, 1962, pp. 60-62 for one version) is told 
about the child C. F. Gauss, who astounded his village schoolmaster by his rapid 
calculation of the sum of the integers from 1 to 100. Whilst the other pupils performed 
laborious column addition, Gauss added 1 to 100,2 to 99,3 to 98, and so on, and 
finally computed fifty 101 s with ease. The power of the story is that it offers the listener 
a means to add, say, the integers from 1 to 200. Gauss's method demonstrates, by 
generic example, that the sum of the first 2k positive integers is k(2k+1). Nobody who 
could follow Gauss' method in the case k=50 could possibly doubt the general case. It 
is important to emphasise that it is not simply the fact that the proposition that the sum 
1+2+3+ ... + 2k = k(2k+1) has been verified as true in the case k=50. It is the manner 
in which it is verified, the form of presentation of the confirmation. 
By contrast, consider the (false) proposition that n2+n+41 is prime for all nEN. I may 
confirm the truth of the instance when, for example, n=30; by evaluating 302+30+41, 
which is 971, and checking that no prime from 3 to 31 divides 971. But this gives no 
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insight whatsoever as to why n2+n+41 is prime for any other value of n. (The ambiguity 
of 'any' suits me well here; I want it to mean first 'some' (true) and then 'air (false). ) By 
contrast, I could demonstrate, with a diagram, that 52+2x5+1 is a perfect square. in a 
manner that could convince that nz+2n+1 Is a perfect square for all positive integers ýr. 
As Balacheff (1988) so clearly and elegantly puts it: 
The generic example involves making explicit the reasons for the With of an 
assertion by means of operations or transformations on an object that is not 
there in its own right, but as a characteristic representative of the class. 
(p. 219) 
Closely related, if not identical, to proof by generic example, is the notion of 'action 
proof (Semadeni, 1984; Walther, 1984). The generic example serves not only to 
present a confirming instance of a proposition - which it certainly is - but to provide 
insight as to why the proposition holds true for that single instance. Walther indicates, 
for the validity of an action proof, the psychological necessity of the identification of 
aspects of special examples which are "invariant regarding a transfer to other arbitrary 
examples". (ibid., p. 10). The transparent presentation of the example is such that 
analogy with other other instances is readily achieved, and their truth is thereby made 
manifest. Ultimately the audience can conceive of no possible instance in which the 
analogy could not be achieved. 
In effect, the generic example triggers an inductive inference; that the argument holds 
in all cases. In saying this, I am suggesting that the generic example (suitably and 
skilfully presented) has the same role for proof as the confirming instance does for 
generating a conjecture. This may appear to be a fundamental methodological flaw in 
the method of proof by generic example. That is to say, it appears that the existence of 
a general proof is no more than a conjecture, an inductive inference in fact from the 
generic example. But this is to ignore the different demands of confirming Instance and 
generic example, in the form of their presentation. The confirming Instance only has to 
be demonstrated to be true, by any means whatever; the subtlety or lack of it in the 
demonstration is of no consequence. But In the generic example, the demonstration 
must be more than a demonstration of truth; it must In some way explain, account for 
the property, in one instance, in the process of confirming it, so that that one Instance 
is seen to be more than a case of serendipity. 
The ability, indeed the tendency, of young children to explain by generic example is a 
feature of Chapter 5 of this thesis. I detect in the 'mathematical community' the general 
view that such proofs are naive and imperfect. That view is represented by Tall: 
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Of course, it is essential in advanced mathematics to take the step from 
[generic] explanation to formal proof. (1991, p. 9, emphasis added) 
I question that conventional view, and believe that learners of mathematics at all 
levels, including university students, should be assisted to perceive and value that 
which is generic in their particular insights, explanations and arguments. The barrier 
between such a level of knowing and the writing of "proper" proofs is then seen for 
what it is -a lack of fluency not with ideas, but with notation. 
RECOLLECTION 
A thesis is, or can be, a personal document presented for public examination; a marker 
in time of change in the writer over time. I therefore take the liberty, before concluding 
this chapter, of reassessing a personal, but publicly-documented event. I believe that I 
can use it to illustrate and pull together some of the foregoing threads. 
In Rowland (1974), I described a sequence of intellectual and domestic events leading 
to a mathematical insight (about regular polygons and generators of dihedral groups) 
which caused me very great excitement. It centred on a class of polynomials and their 
roots. At one point I was stuck with the cubic a3-5a2+6a-1. A solution and indeed, a 
generalisation, derived from the crucial insight that a solution of the previous 
polynomial, a2+3a+1, could be written as w2, where W is the golden ratio, realised 
geometrically by the ratio [side of pentagram : side of pentagon]. 
I offered (p. 46) an 'elegant geometrical confirmation of the truth of this insight, before 
announcing the generalisation that it suggested to me. I had no idea as to why the 
generalisation should be true, I simply dared to hope that it could be - not (just) 
because I wanted to solve the problem that I had set myself, but because this solution 
had such beauty. I specialised the generalisation I had made to three simpler cases, 
involving a regular hexagon, a square and an equilateral triangle, and was able to 
confirm them easily. If my generalisation held, then the square of the ratio (side of 
heptagram : side of heptagon] would satisfy the stubborn cubic. 
What I needed, at that moment, was merely to confirm that it did; for, if not, I had a 
counter-example to my generalisation, and the prospect of disappointment. The 
momentary prediction required confirmation without delay. In contrast to pentagons 
and hexagons, I knew nothing of the pure geometry of the heptagon; as I put it: 
Too excited to be sophisticated, I resort to trigonometry. (A diagram of a 
regular heptagon then indicates the angle 0 between a side AB and a short 
diagonal AC. ] 0 =n/7 so (AC/BC)2 = (2cos n/7)2 = 3.24 approx., which [... ] does 
seem to satisfy my cubic. 
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Aware of the blunt tools I had used for confirmation, I then asked: 
Can anyone demonstrate this more elegantly? 
I was, perhaps, seeking a demonstration that had the quality of a generic example. 
The rest of the article is concerned with the plausibility of the generalisation, but (at 
that time) I had no proof. I confessed: 
It has to be admitted that my "conclusion" is rather a sweeping one. being pure 
conjecture based on six instances of the result. So far I have no proof [... ] I 
need hardly affirm my belief in the conclusion, but as a piece of mathematics 
the work is incomplete ... 
The strength of my "belief", in the total absence of proof, surprises me now. So strong 
it was, that I was prepared to go into print, to put it on record. The editor, David Fielker, 
did not hinder me. When a postgraduate student, Alan Barnes, presented me with a 
proof just as MT69 went to press, I was pleased but not surprised that my belief was 
vindicated. In the end it was the beauty of the conjecture that assured me - nothing 
could, at the same time, have such beauty, yet be false. 
Beauty is truth, truth beauty - that is all 
Ye know on earth, and all ye need to know. 
[Keats, 1820, Ode to a Grecian Urn] 
SUMMARY 
For all learners of mathematics there is the possibility of acquiring new knowledge by 
reflection on appropriate and relevant experience (and arguably there is no other way). 
Generalisation - unifying and information-extending insight - is central to such a means 
of coming-to-know, and may be viewed as a form of inductive reasoning. In the 
introduction to his inductive Pathway into Number Theory, Burn (1982) reminds us of 
an adage of Jacques Hadamard, that the purpose of rigour is to legitimate the 
conquests of the intuition. For the great mathematicians, as well as for novices, 
mathematics characteristically comes into being by inductive intuition, not by 
deduction. The products of induction are plausible truth-estimates. Therefore tentative 
belief, as opposed to certain knowledge, is an essential component of mathematical 
thought. In the next chapter I shall link this observation to constnictivist and quasi- 
empirical philosophies of mathematics learning, and begin to explore how vague 
language can be used to advantage in talk about beliefs and provisional knowledge 
about mathematics. 
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CHAPTER 2: PERSPECTIVES ON VAGUENESS 
it is a mark of the educated man and a proof of his culture that in every subject 
he looks for only so much precision as its nature permits. (Aristotle, 
Nicomachean Ethics) 
Two plus two equals five - for sufficiently large values of two. (per Eric Love, 
source unknown) 
The empirical database of this thesis, which will be considered in Chapters 4 to 7, 
consists almost entirely of transcripts of mathematical discourse. Many of the features 
of this discourse which are singled out for special attention are aspects of vagueness, 
as it is manifest in the spoken language. I shall claim that both students and teachers 
employ and exploit vagueness in mathematical discourse. I mean, by that, that the 
emergence of vagueness as a surface feature of mathematics talk is not evidence of 
any linguistic carelessness or deficiency, but that vagueness of various kinds - such as 
indeterminacy, ambiguity, approximation - is deliberately and explicitly utilised by 
speakers to achieve particular ends in the context of mathematical discussion, 
exposition, questioning, and so on. This view is at odds, superficially at least, with a 
conventional view of mathematics as the language par excellence of precision. The 
purpose of this chapter is to present a background for the subsequent analysis of 
vagueness in mathematics talk. 
PRECISION AND TOLERANCE 
The first page of the 1982 Report of the Committee of Inquiry into the Teaching of 
Mathematics in Schools (the Cockcroft Report) included, in bold type, an assertion 
that: 
mathematics provides a means of communication which is powerful, concise 
and unambiguous. (HMSO, 1982, p. 1) 
and proposed the communicative power of mathematics as a "principal reason" for 
teaching it. There was a refreshing novelty in such a claim, which seemed to be 
justifying mathematics teaching in much the same way that one might justify the 
learning of a foreign language, and it did much to promote and sustain popular interest 
in the place of language in the teaching and learning of mathematics. Such a view of 
mathematics is in contrast, however, with that expressed in a more-or-less 
contemporary pamphlet issued by the Association of Teachers of Mathematics, whose 
authors argued that: 
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Everyday speech is a highly tolerant medium. This tolerance is necessary 
because conversation is a form of action in the world; [... ) Because it Is a 
tolerant medium, everyday language is necessarily ambiguous. 
[... ] Now, mathematising is also a form of action in the world. And its 
expressions, however carefully defined, have to retain a fundamental 
tolerance [... ] Because it is a tolerant medium, mathematics is also necessarily 
an ambiguous one. (ATM, 1980, pp. 17-18) 
This description of mathematics and conversation as forms of action emphasises 
mathematics as human activity and suggests discourse as a means of communication, 
for mutual understanding and agreement. Furthermore. it offers the radical proposal 
that ambiguity is a beneficial ingredient in the formulation, the "expression' of 
mathematics. As a product (polished, final), mathematics may be presented, 
particularly in writing but also in speech, as though it lacked ambiguity. representing 
truths about the world - or at the very least, about itself - in a sure, exact and 
unequivocal kind of way. This is tidy, but it is a deception of sorts. As Goguen puts it: 
Exact concepts are the sort envisaged in pure mathematics, whilst inexact 
concepts are rampant in everyday life. This distinction is complicated by the 
fact that whenever a human being interacts with mathematics. it becomes part 
of his ordinary experience, and is therefore subject to inexactness. (1969, 
p. 325) 
The issue of vagueness has received relatively little attention in the literature of 
mathematics education, with the exception of the dimension of lexical ambiguity. The 
language with which mathematics is communicated and shared is a subtle blend of 
words and syntax, which is rooted in natural language or'Ordinary English', but which 
also includes elements of technical language -'Mathematical English' (Kane eta].. 
1974) - much of which has Greek or Latin etymology and logical force (e. g. 'oe is 
interpreted inclusively). In Rowland (1 995a) I have analysed this blend, and some of 
the difficulties experienced by learners, in terms of mathematics talk taking place at 
two discourse levels - essentially object level and meta-level. The object level 
language bears the mathematical and logical substance which Is capable of being 
coded in a formal first-order theory of mathematical logic. The meta-level language is 
not mathematics per se, but a means of social interaction between people doing 
mathematics. It is what remains when the object level text is stripped away from the 
text of discourse. 
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Here, for example, two eleven-year-olds, Kerry and Runa are finding pairs of integers 
whose sum is fourteen. The elements of mathematical object langage are shown as 
[abc], and were in fact recorded on paper in symbols by the girls as they talked. 
T8: 73 Runa Let's put [fourteen], and then .. 
74 Kerry Right. [Ten add four] Underneath. 
75 Runa [Ten]. OK. 
76 Kerry [Ten add four] um [twelve add two] Um [thirteen add one] 
77 Runa Wait a minute. 
78 Kerry [Five. Nine add five] 
79 Runa Yeah, I was just thinking that. 
The distinction between the two language levels, object level and meta- level, is often 
blurred because the mathematical object language incorporates and re-defines many 
words from natural language. Ambiguities are inherent in words such as 'difference', 
'similar' and 'or', whose mathematical meanings are related to their ordinary English 
meanings, but which cannot be inferred from them with adequate precision; they have 
to be learned within a process of mathematical enculturation. The clashes and 
ambiguities which result, especially for learners of mathematics, from this seemingly 
haphazard appropriation of ordinary English for mathematics is widely appreciated 
(Ullmann, 1962, Chapter 7; Shuard and Rothery, 1984, Chapter 3; Pimm, 1987, 
Chapter 4; Barham, 1988; Durkin and Shire, 1991). One strand of the literature 
(Otterburn and Nicholson, 1976; Hardcastle and Orton, 1993) has highlighted the 
lexical deficiency of novices as users and and interpreters of mathematics at the object 
level, whereas I shall explore the interactive fluency of pupils in the use of 
mathematical meta-language. 
Hans Freudenthal (1978, pp. 259-60), whilst not directly acknowledging the 
significance of vagueness as a conceptual or linguistic phenomenon, is nevertheless 
critical of careless or spurious precision, and cites a Dutch encyclopedia giving the 
length and weight of a lion as 2.40-3.30m and 180-225kg - data which betray their non- 
metric origins. [Note 2.11 In another example, he points out that whereas, with regard 
to size, there is no significant difference between 1010 and 1010 -1, there is a world of 
arithmetical difference, in that one is divisible by 9 and the other is not. The difference 
between the two situations is pragmatic, i. e. related to purpose - the appropriate 
degree of precision depends on what you want to do with the number. Freudenthal 
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points out the need for pupils to acquire judgement to distinguish between two worlds; 
"the world where precision is a virtue, and the other where it is a vice. and (... j to be at 
home in both of them". - 
These essentially pedagogic perspectives on mathematical and linguistic aspects of 
vagueness can be viewed as contributions to a debate concerning the place of 
precision, prescription and completion as factors in the acquisition of knowledge in 
general and mathematics in particular. In the remainder of this chapter. I review some 
ways in which this debate is rooted in philosophies of mathematics and of language. 
VIEWPOINT: MATHEMATICS AND MATHEMATICS EDUCATION 
The Cockcroft view of mathematics as precise and unambiguous reflects a popular 
view of mathematics, based on a tacit 'absolutist' philosophy. That is to say, that the 
truths (theorems) of mathematics are sharp and certain, and in some way represent 
objective knowledge. Indeed, in this view, mathematics stands above and apart from 
empirical science in its purity and freedom from experimental error. Science can only 
offer 'theories', whereas the objects of mathematical thought and the assertions which 
are the products of mathematics are certain. Such a view is represented with passion 
and eloquence by G. H. Hardy in A Mathematician's Apology. 
mathematical objects are so much more than they seem. A chair or a star is 
not in the least like what it seems to be; the more we think of it. the fuzzier its 
outlines become in the haze of sensation which surrounds it; but '2' or '31T 
has nothing to do with sensation [... ] 317 is a prime, not because we think so, 
or because our minds are shaped in one way rather than another, because it 
is so, because mathematical reality is built that way. (1940, p. 130) 
There is a comfortable sense of certainty in Hardy's words, but it reflect the state of 
mind of one who already knows. In the next section I present a 'fallibilistic' view of 
knowledge and truth which offers a truer reflection of the experience of one who is 
coming to know. 
FALLIBILISM 
The austere perspective of absolutism, characterised by Hardy, contrasts with and is 
challenged by a fallibilist philosophy of mathematical knowledge. Fallibilism makes 
explicit my pedagogical credo in this thesis. 
First, it is reassuring to note that the rejection of absolutism is neither new nor 
irresponsible. Absolutism is linked, though not indissolubly, with the platonisrs (Note 
54 
2.2] belief that mathematical truth is 'out there', pre-existing and independent of human 
knowledge or lack of it. Each mathematical truth is, as it were, waiting to be discovered 
by the intelligence who, by genius or diligence, uncovers it. Over the last century, 
absolutism has been worked out in two major forms, logicism and formalism. The 
logicism of Russell and Frege attempted to reduce all mathematics to pure logic. 
Hilbert took the formalist view that mathematics is more than pure logic, but is capable 
of being axiomatised. 
The arguments against absolutism (and, to some extent, against platonism) from within 
mathematical logic are essentially twofold. First, the deductive arguments which 
terminate in mathematical theorems must begin from a baseline of axioms, which are 
plausible products of observation or intuition. Any claim to absolute truth must then be 
suspect, since the very foundation is beyond the reach of demonstration. Secondly, 
truth begets truth according to an agreed (or tacit) set of logical axioms and rules of 
inference. Yet these rules are not beyond question or reproach, and alternatives to the 
classical scheme (first order predicate calculus) include modal logic (Ackermann, 1956) 
and intuitionist/constructivist logic (Heyting, 1964). 
The fallibilist critique of absolutism has been put forward in the writing of Imre Lakatos 
(1922-1973), notably in his posthumously-published book Proofs and Refutations 
(1976). The book is explicitly set against the background of Polya's mathematical 
heuristic and Popper's critical philosophy of science (ibid., p. xii). Central to Lakatos' 
critique is the failure of formalism to account for the growth of mathematical thought, 
either in peoples (phylogenesis) or in individuals (ontogenesis). Lakatos offers an 
alternative view of mathematics as the product of human mathematical activity and 
inter-personal dialogue. 
[... ] informal, quasi-empirical mathematics does not grow through a 
monotonous increase in the number of indubitably established theorems, but 
through the incessant improvement of guesses by speculation and criticism, 
by the logic of proofs and refutations. (p. 5) 
The term 'quasi-empirical' mathematics refers to the observation that conjectures are 
the inductive outcome of consideration of 'data' collected in mathematical activity. An 
asymptotic refinement of definitions, theorems and proofs, argues Lakatos, is the 
outcome of human dialectic, acted out in the histories of cultures, and again (though 
not necessarily in the same way) in the classroom. In this 'fallibilist view, mathematics 
is a relative and subjective form of knowledge, perpetually open to revision. 
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The fallibilist position has been recognised and adopted subsequently by a number of 
writers, whose stance is typified by these words of Reuben Hersh: 
It is reasonable to propose a new task for mathematics philosophy: not to seek 
indubitable truth but to give an account of mathematical knowledge as it really 
is - fallible, corrigible, tentative and evolving, as is every other kind of human 
knowledge. (1979, p. 43) 
Whilst Hersh's comment is essentially epistemological, Sandy Dawson has explored 
the profound implications of P akatos' quasi-empiricist philosophy for the teaching of 
mathematics. Writing about a "fallibilistic way of teaching", Dawson has recently 
summarised his insight as follows: 
It was from ideas contained in Lakatos' articles and book that an alternative 
way of working in mathematics classrooms developed. (... j Lakatos claimed 
that the creation of mathematics comes about as the result of a process (... j in 
which a conjecture is created, tested and proved, or refuted and modified, or 
rejected outright. A classroom designed for pupils to operate In a fallibilistic 
fashion would provide pupils with a problem about which they could make 
conjectures as to its solution. [... j Opportunities to test and examine critically 
each conjecture must also be provided. 
A teacher who is functioning fallibilistically [... ] establishes a classroom climate 
in which an atmosphere of guessing and testing prevails, where the guesses 
are subjected to severe testing on a cognitive rather than an affective level (... ) 
where knowledge is treated as being provisional. Because of the provisional 
nature of knowledge, pupils are encouraged to confront the mathematics, their 
peer group and, where appropriate mathematically, even their teacher. (1991, 
p. 197, emphasis added) 
Over the last decade, John Mason has, in effect, been a consistent and effective 
champion of Dawson's pedagogic interpretation of Lakatos' fallibilist philosophy. 
Writing about the place of conjecturing in mathematical activity, Mason describes the 
qualities of what he calls a'conjecturing atmosphere' In which 
every utterance is treated as a modifiable conjecture! (Mason, 1988, p. 9; 
emphasis in original). 
Clearly, then, a fallibilist view of mathematics has implications for classroom conduct. 
This is certainly also true of a constructivist view of learning, which recognises that 
knowledge is shaped by individual schemas and social frameworks of thought. 
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CONSTRUCTIVISM 
The precision and tidiness that characterise the public face of mathematics education, 
as it appears in school mathematics textbooks for example, reflects the sense that the 
author has made of it, or a sense negotiated and agreed by a group of people. This is 
not to say that meaning is arbitrary, nor that any meaning is acceptable, but that each 
individual must construct meaning for themselves. A non-absolutist view of 
mathematical knowledge is implicit in recent formulations of radical (individual) and 
social constructivist epistemologies. Both assert the inevitability of the active sense- 
making role of the individual learner in assigning meaning to mathematical experiences 
(including the experience of being 'taught' or'told') which, if not rejected altogether, are 
assimilated into his or her pre-existing schema, or disturb and cause it to be revised. In 
this sense, no two individuals can 'know' one thing in quite the same way, although 
they might both assent to one linguistic or symbolic expression of it. The Piagetian 
roots of the radical epistemological theory are evident. 
Constructivism is a theory of knowledge with roots in philosophy, psychology 
and cybernetics. It asserts two main principles [... ] (a) knowledge is not 
passively received but actively built up by the cognizing subject; (b) the 
function of cognition is adaptive and serves the organisation of the experiential 
world, not the discovery of ontological reality. (von Glasersfeld, 1989, p. 162) 
Radical constructivism shares with Intuitionistic constructivist philosophy a view of the 
primacy of the individual in intellectual action and construction, and in its apparent 
neglect (or lack of emphasis) of a cultural dimension to knowledge (Wilder, 1965, 
pp. 247-8). For a back-to-back discussion of the two 'constructivisms', see Lerman 
(1989). 
The social constructivist account sets individual construction of knowledge in a context 
of enculturation. Culture (both macro and micro) is the broad milieu in which learning 
takes place and contributes to the framework into which knowledge is integrated. It 
also emphasises the role of language in the mediation and production of thought and 
in the development of meaning (Bishop, 1985). In this social sense, it follows that 
'negotiated' understandings also possess a certain cultural relativity. There is an 
imperative in the social account in the particular cultural context of institutional 
teaching and learning - schools and universities - with affective as well as cognitive 
implications, such as issues of status and 'face' (Johnson, 1970), dimensions which 
recur in subsequent chapters of this thesis. 
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INTERFACE: MATHEMATICS AND LANGUAGE 
A central concern for both mathematics and linguistics is the relationship between form 
and meaning. It ought to follow that insights of each may potentially contribute to the 
understanding of the other. As an example of the interaction between mathematics and 
linguistics, one with a formative and recurring influence in this thesis, I now consider a 
linguistic application, to the vagueness-related problem of 'hedges'. of the recent 
mathematical theory of 'fuzzy sets'. 
FUZZY SET THEORY 
Classical logic admits only two possible truth values for a statement i. e. 'true' or'false'. 
A number of attempts have been made to extend the notion of truth in order to 
accommodate vague, in-between states and concepts, such as drizzle and 
adolescence. Peirce had evidently entertained the idea of a three-valued logic (Fisch 
and Turquette, 1966) and Lukasiewicz (1920) independently developed a triadic logic 
which attracted some attention. 
A more radical solution to the problem of strict semantic interpretation of vague 
propositions involves a real-valued notion of truth, in which the value of a statement is 
a real number in the closed interval [0,1]. The truth value of statement A Is a measure 
of the extent to which A is true, with 1 and 0 corresponding to perfect truth and falsity. 
An early attempt at such a solution was due to the philosopher Max Black (1937). 
Aspects of Black's approach have been developed more recently by Lotfi Zadeh. in the 
invention of 'fuzzy set theory' (Zadeh, 1965). An electrical engineer. Zadeh was 
interested in the design of systems (such as pattern-recognition or air conditioning 
systems) that 'worked' without requiring unrealistic or prohibitively-expensive amounts 
of computing power. In other words, he was interested in ways of achieving solutions 
that are good enough as opposed to exact. He achieved this through fuzzy set theory, 
in which elements are deemed to belong to particular sets to a given degree. 
Zadeh expounds his theory by reference to the fuzzy set (TALL) of tall men. Suppose 
we agree that men less than Oft tall are members of the set TALL with degree 0. and 
that those over 7ft are tall with degree 1. Zadeh then proposes a smooth curve (more 
an ogive than a straight line) joining (4,0) to (7,1). The degree of tallness of any person 
(well, any man... ) can now be read from the graph. Zadeh then extends this to set 
algebra; if T' is the complement of T and m(T, x) is the extent of membership of x of set 
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T, then m(T', x) is defined to be 1 -m(T, x). Likewise m(TuS, x) is defined to be 
max{m(T, x), m(S, x)}. The valuations of all other Boolean functions of T, S, follow from 
these definitions; an example is given below. 
Zadeh's original paper was on fuzzy sets. Four years later, Joseph Goguen had 
worked out a corresponding fuzzy logic (1969), in which a statement A may be true, 
false or partially true, insofar as it is assigned a value ('degree') [A] in some partially- 
ordered set (L, <), the simplest example being the interval [0,11. 
For a thorough (and thoroughly pretentious) survey of the theory and practice of 
fuzziness, see Kosko (1994). Seven years after Zadeh's initial 1965 paper, Lakoff 
published a linguistic application of the theory to hedges. 
HEDGES 
Some recent approaches to the problem of vagueness within the field of linguistics 
originate in consideration of the meaning and function of a class of words and phrases 
called 'hedges', which turn out to be central to my interpretation of vague aspects of 
mathematics talk in this thesis. Hedges include words such as'sort of', 'about', 
'approximately' - words which have the effect of blurring category boundaries or 
otherwise-precise measures - as well as words and phrases such as 'I think', 'maybe', 
'perhaps', which hedge the commitment of the speaker to that which s/he asserts. 
The work of Zadeh (1965) and Goguen (1969) laid the foundation for fuzzy 
interpretation of vague language, and some details of the edifice were worked out soon 
after in an important paper'Hedges: a study in meaning criteria' by George Lakoff 
(1972,1973). The paper is an ambitious fusion of mathematical logic and linguistics. 
The result of the 1972 version, presented to the Chicago Linguistics Society, was to 
import vagueness from the domain of logic and philosophy of language to that of 
professional linguists. 
Lakoff's paper is chiefly concerned with vagueness as it applies to category 
membership, and addresses the concern that "natural language concepts" such as 'tall' 
lack sharply-defined boundaries. He makes this point by reference to work by the 
psychologist Eleanor Rosch, who asked subjects to rank a number of creatures as to 
the degree to which they matched a prototypical ideal of 'bird'. A well-defined hierarchy 
emerged, in which robins were seen as typical birds, eagles less so, chickens 
somewhat less, followed by penguins, with bats hardly at all, and cows not at all. 
Lakoff gives a resume of Zadeh/Goguen fuzzy theory, and concludes that: 
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one need not throw up one's hands in despair when faced by the problems of 
vagueness and fuzziness. Fuzziness can be studied seriously within formal 
semantics (... j For me some of the most interesting questions are raised by the 
study of words whose meaning implicitly Involves fuzziness - words whose job 
is to make things fuzzier or less fuzzy. I will refer to such words as'hedges'. 
(1973, p. 471, my emphasis). [Notes 2.3,2.4] 
It is clear from some of Lakoffs examples - e. g. 'sort or. in a manner of speaking' - 
that "words" in the definition is intended to include phrases. Note also that words that 
"make things [... ] less fuzzy" are included by Lakoff in the category 'hedge'; examples 
include 'typical'. 'definitely'. [Note 2.5] Brown and Levinson (1987. p. 145) observe that 
this sense is an extension of the colloquial sense of 'hedge': In fact. this sense will 
feature very little in my pragmatic analysis of mathematics talk. 
Lakoff's paper belongs to the linguistic tradition of 'truth-conditional semantics'. the 
purpose of which is to determine the conditions under which a sentence isIrue' (as 
opposed, conventionally, to'false'). However, the "formal semantics" which Lakoff has 
in mind entails specifying conditions under which vague propositions could be said to 
be true to some extent. That extent is measured on a continuum from 0 (perfectly 
false) to 1 (perfectly true). Lakoff describes a precise valuation of vague predicates 
and develops a corresponding truth-valuation of propositions through an exact 
mathematical calculus of truth-degrees -a task that had been set in train by Zadeh. 
Truth-degrees need first to be assigned to a set of atomic statements such as 'Jack is 
tall', 'a penguin is a bird' and 'a rhombus is a sort of rectangle'. Once fixed, the 
valuation of any composite statement is determined in a precise and non-negotiable 
way. For example, if Jack is rich to degree 0.7 and handsome to degree 0.4. then 'Jack 
is rich and not handsome' is true to degree 0.6 precisely. [Note 2.61 
Whilst much of Lakoffs paper is taken up with technical details in mathematical logic. 
he begins from and frequently returns to the Issue of the meaning of vague language in 
use. My subsequent linguistic studies in pragmatics - how speakers and writers use 
language to achieve their practical purposes - grew out of the root source of this paper. 
In Chapter 5,1 shall draw on a study which categorises hedges, and which I review at 
this point. 
A Taxonomy of Hedges 
Hedges can be usefully viewed as one of four basic types. This observation was 
initially made in a study (Prince, Frader and Bosk, 1982) of paediatric clinicians, whose 
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spoken language in case-conferences turned out to be unusually rich in hedging - 
about one hedge every 15 seconds. The following representative examples of 
physician-physician talk (ibid., p. 85) have an authentic ring to them: 
Well, I think he's uh -I think he's always se -I still think he's seizing a- a little bit. 
There is evidence that's been presented that makes me think that it might be a little risky. 
To elucidate the ways (identified by Prince et al. ) that different hedges work, I shall 
introduce and illustrate the four types by reference to this corpus of physician-talk, and 
also to some intuitive language data. 
The first major type of hedges -a SHIELD - is exemplified above by "Well. I think that 
... " and "There is evidence that's been presented .... ". These indicate some 
uncertainty in the mind of the speaker in relation to some proposition. The marker 
(such as I think that lies outside the proposition itself, which may be unequivocal. For 
example the sentence 
1: 2.1 Maybe the pharmacy is still open [Note 3.1] 
invests all the vagueness in the speaker's uncertainty, as opposed to any possible 
degree of openness of the pharmacy. The speaker is asserting a proposition (call it S) : 
1: 2.2 the pharmacy is still open (S) 
S is thus made available to others, who may then (if they so wish) discuss whether or 
not it is true, and to act on it if , for example, they are in need of aspirin. The effect of 
the hedged assertion "Maybe S" is to comment on the plausibility of S without 
qualifying S itself. This is an important distinguishing feature of Shields in relation to 
mathematical discourse. For example, with reference to a Pythagorean triple (x, y, z) 
with x2 + y2 = z2 
1: 2.3 I think that x or y is a multiple of 3 
The italicised part is a mathematical sentence in the object language (here, a subset of 
mathematics called Number Theory), whereas the hedge phrase "I think that" is in a 
meta-language (English: the object-meta distinction is considered further towards the 
end of Chapter 3). This difference of linguistic status can be made more visible in the 
form 
1: 2.4 I think that [31x v 31y] 
Such a hedge presents a mathematical assertion in the form of a conjecture, and 
implicitly invites comment on the conjecture. 
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With a little fine-tuning, Prince et al. subdivide Shields Into two kinds. The first of these 
is termed a Plausibility Shield, typified by'I think', 'probably' and 'maybe'. A 
Plausibility Shield 'implicates' (i. e. infers, by a mechanism to be discussed in the next) 
a position held, a belief to be considered - as well as indicating some doubt that it will 
be fulfilled by events, or stand up to evidential scrutiny. 
The second kind, an Attribution Shield, implicates some degree. or quality. of 
knowledge to a third party. A favourite Attribution Shield with the clinicians, with 
evident attendant suspicion, was "According to the mother... ". An Attribution Shield 
may even fail (for whatever reason) to divulge the source or informant, as in the 
following notice (I have emboldened the hedge-preface) published in March 1996 by 
the Library Syndicate of the University of Cambridge: 
The Library Syndicate is concerned at the increase in the number of cars 
parked outside the designated spaces at the front and side of the University 
Library. [... ] There is evidence to suggest that the shortage of spaces is 
exacerbated by people using the Library car park when they are not in the 
Library. 
The second major category of hedges (APPROXIMATORS) includes about' and'a 
little bit'. In distinction to Shields, these Approximator-hedges are located inside the 
proposition itself. The effect is to modify (as opposed to comment on) the proposition, 
making it more vague. For example, from the Prince et al. corpus 
Um, the baby's blood pressure on the ride over here was also about uh something 
between forty and fifty palpable. (1982 p. 87) 
A sub-category of Approximators - called Rounders - consists of the standard adverbs 
of estimation, such as 'about', 'around' and 'approximately', which are commonplace in 
the domain of measurements, of quantitative data. 
The second type of Approximator is called an Adaptor. These words or phrases such 
as 'a little bit', 'somewhat, 'sort of, attach vagueness to nouns, verbs or adjectives 
associated with class membership. These Adaptors exemplify the hedges which are 
the subject of Lakoffs semantic work (Lakoff, 1972), and the issue here is class 
membership. 
Prince et al. summarise their analysis in the form of the following binary tree: 
62 
HEDGE 
Shield Approximator 
Plausibility Attribution Adaptor Rounder 
In Chapter 5,1 shall examine the particular purposes achieved by these categories of 
hedge in mathematics talk. In particular, I shall show that, on occasion, speakers use 
Approximators for Shield-like purposes. 
VIEWPOINT: PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE 
Tthe contribution of philosophy to the pragmatic understanding of language cannot be 
overlooked. 
[when] linguistic pioneers such as Ross and Lakoff staked a claim on 
pragmatics in the late 1960s, they encountered there an indigenous breed of 
philosophers of language who had been quietly cultivating the territory for 
some time. (Leech, 1983, p. 2) 
Philosophers had made the problem of vagueness very much part of their territory from 
about 400 BC, in disputes and attempted resolutions concerning a type of paradox 
called 'sorites', which means 'the heap'. [Note 2.7] 
The first definition of vagueness is, in fact, due to the philosopher-mathematician 
Peirce, in a dictionary entry: 
A proposition is vague when there are possible states of things concerning 
which it is intrinsically uncertain whether, had they been contemplated by the 
speaker, he would have regarded them as excluded or allowed by the 
proposition. By intrinsically uncertain we mean not uncertain in consequence 
of any ignorance of the interpreter, but because the speaker's habits of 
language were indeterminate; so that one day he would regard the proposition 
as excluding, another as admitting, those states of things. Yet this must be 
understood to have reference to what might be deduced from a perfect 
knowledge of his state of mind; for it is precisely because those questions 
never did, or did not frequently, present themselves that his habit remained 
indeterminate. (1902, p. 748) 
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Peirce's definition is not easy to penetrate without reference to Peirce's (somewhat 
impenetrable) semiotic theory, but can be seen to involve (a) modality, uncertainty 
concerning "possible states of things", (b) the question of borderlines between what is 
and what is not of a given kind, and (c) inconsistency of speaker habit. 
Peirce later theorises about the nature of vagueness in his 1905 paper'Issues of 
Pragmaticism' (reprinted in Peirce, 1934), making a distinction between two kinds of 
indeterminacy; generality and vagueness (ibid., para. 5.447). The indeterminacy of the 
former lies in the fact that it refers, not to this or to that, but to anything (in a given 
class). The indeterminacy of the latter has more to do with class boundaries, so that its 
field of reference is indeterminate. This distinction will become significant In 
considering indeterminacy with regard to the referents of pronouns (in Chapter 4). 
Peirce acknowledges the endemic presence of vagueness in everyday discourse: 
In another sense, honest people [... ] intend to make the meaning of their 
words determinate [... ] they intend to fix what is implied and what is not 
implied. They believe that they succeed in doing so, and if their chat is about 
the theory of numbers, perhaps they may. But the further their topics are from 
such precise, or 'abstract' subjects, the less possibility is there of such 
precision of speech. In so far as the implication is not determinate, it is usually 
left vague; (1934, para. 447). 
Whereas Peirce is concerned only with vagueness and propositional meaning, my 
interest extends to propositional attitude and the social functions of vagueness. I will 
therefore want to go further than Peirce, to claim (e. g. In Chapter 7. Case 8) that 
vagueness has an essential communicative function in "chat [... ] about the theory of 
numbers". 
As I noted in the preface, Peirce is the originator of the philosophical position called 
'pragmatism'. His successors include Dewey (1923), Rorty (1980) and Bernstein 
(1983), who refute objectivism and subscribe to a view that all knowing involves 
interpretation. The pragmatic tradition locates thought and enquiry in argument and the 
development of sound judgement (Giarelli, 1988, pp. 23-4). A fallibilist view of 
mathematical knowledge can clearly be seen to flow out of this philosophical stream 
(Ernest, 1991, p. 201). 
Vagueness is also recurrent theme in the philosophical work of another mathematician, 
Bertrand Russell, from 1913 to 1948. His main Ideas are assembled In the1923 paper 
'Vagueness', in which he holds that vagueness Is not Inherent in "things", but is a 
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property of the symbols (including words) that represent them. Things are what they 
are; both vagueness and precision are features of their representation. He goes on to 
argue that all language is vague. For example, the word 'red' is vague because 
there are shades of colour concerning which we shall be in doubt whether to 
call them red or not, not because we are ignorant of the meaning of the word 
"red", but because it is a word the extent of whose application is essentially 
doubtful. (1923, p. 85) 
Russell makes an elaborate case for the vagueness of all words, including names and 
even logical connectives, and this lexical vagueness in turn infects all propositions. 
One vague word is enough to entail the vagueness of a sentence. Russell argues that 
all knowledge is vague, and our communication of knowledge by language is 
contaminated by vagueness. In adopting such an extreme position, it is as if Russell is 
engaging in a philosophical game. However, by exposing us to the thought that 
everything is vague, he raises our awareness of the possibility of vagueness when we 
may may least expect it. Moreover, whilst asserting its inevitability, Russell explicitly 
acknowledges a positive epistemic characteristic of vagueness which will feature later 
in pragmatic analysis of mathematics talk: 
It would be a great mistake to suppose that vague knowledge must be false. 
On the contrary, a vague belief has a much better chance of being true than a 
precise one, because there are more possible facts that would verify it. If I 
believe that so-and-so is tall, I am more likely to be right than if I believe that 
his height is between 6ft. 2in. and 6ft. Sin. (p. 91) 
More recently, Tiegen (1990) has captured the same notion - which he calls the 
'preciseness paradox' - in the following, similar, terms. Suppose two speakers, P and 
V, give similar information (the date of an historical event, say), but P is more precise 
than V (who is vague). One would then suppose P to be better informed than V in the 
field (history) in question. However, disregarding the knowledge level of the two 
speakers, V's statement is more likely to be true than P's, because the set of 
conditions (dates) which would make it true is much greater. The tendency is therefore 
to trust the person who is most likely to be wrong. Tiegen confirmed this prediction 
empirically. 
The same point is made yet again by the Oxford philosopher of language, John Austin 
(best known to linguists as the originator of the theory of speech acts, which I describe 
in the next chapter): 
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And isn't it surprising that precision should be paired off with incorrigibility, 
vagueness with impossibility of verification? After all we speak of people 
'taking refuge' in vagueness - the more precise you are, in general the more 
likely you are to be wrong, whereas you stand a good chance of not being 
wrong if you make it vague enough. (1962a, p. 125) 
In a discussion of vagueness in Sense and Sensibilia (1962a), Austin recognises that 
'vague' covers a number of concepts. As he puts it: 
'Vague' is itself vague. (p. 125). 
Others have encountered the same dilemma. 
Vagueness is not easy to characterise or define. One reason for this difficulty 
is that there appear to be a number of different conceptions of vagueness, and 
it is not clear just what they have in common. (Bums, 1991, p. 3). 
If one looks more closely at this vagueness one soon discovers that the term 
itself is rather vague and ambiguous: the condition that it refers to is not a 
uniform feature (... j (Ullmann, 1962, p. 118) 
Austin continues: a description of something, say a house, might be pronounced 
'vague' on account of one or more of a number of features ("not necessarily defects". 
says Austin, "that depends on what is wanted"), including roughness, ambiguity. 
imprecision, generality and inaccuracy. 
The words which signify these aspects of vagueness are not themselves precise or 
uncontentious. Channell (1994, pp. 34-8) distinguishes between vagueness and 
ambiguity, whilst pointing out that an utterance can be both. Her main point Is that 
vagueness is much more significant factor than ambiguity in real communication, 
because ambiguity is usually automatically resolved by hearers, whereas vagueness 
"often plays an important part in the act of meaning". 
Central to an understanding of vagueness in use, is Austin's comment (1962, p. 125) 
that vague features of language are: 
not necessarily defects, that depends on what is wanted. 
His brief but important contribution to the discussion of vagueness affirms what Russell 
proposed in rather a grudging way: that vagueness in language can be, in some 
circumstances, not a flaw but a 'Good Thing'. Peirce, in defining "a proposition is 
vague when [... ] it is intrinsically uncertain whether [the speaker] would have regarded 
[certain things] as excluded or allowed", is saying that vagueness offers speakers a 
way of saying something without needing to be sure of its scope of reference. From 
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this perspective vagueness is not a limitation, but a means to do things which are 
inhibited by precise communication. Allowed vague components of language, I can still 
say something without having to say something precisely. But more than this, I can 
exploit the vagueness to convey something of my 'propositional attitude'; for example, I 
can let it be known that what I am saying is provisional. 
MODALITY 
Modality is a dimension of language which has some prominence in this thesis, 
because I am concerned with the ways in which speakers convey conviction, or the 
lack of it. From a semantic viewpoint, modality has to do with attitudes on the part of 
the speaker (or writer) towards the factual content of what s/he says. 
Modal logic is traditionally concerned to distinguish between propositions that are 
necessarily true and those that are contingently true. Necessity and possibility are the 
two aspects of alethic modality. Propositions which are necessary truths are referred 
to as alethic necessities, those which are not necessarily false as alethic possibilities. 
A second kind of modality - epistemic - is concerned, not so much with objective truth, 
as with human knowledge and belief. For example, the epistemic sense of "It may be 
raining" would be "I have reason to entertain the possibility that it is raining". The 
epistemic quality is explicit and clear in "I think that a bus will come soon". Epistemic 
modality enables the speaker to indicate her/his commitment to the truth of a 
proposition. Epistemic modals are included in "the general category of means used to 
convey the attitude of the speaker towards the utterance he makes" (Dubois, 1969, 
p. 118). An epistemic modal continuum has confidence and doubt at its extremes. 
A third kind of modality - deontic - is related to the necessity and possibility of action. 
The appropriate notions here are obligation and permission. Thus: obligation = 
necessity to act, permission = possibility to act (Stephany, 1986, p. 376). 
In English, modality is achieved syntactically in one of three possible ways: 
" Mainly by the use of modal auxiliary verbs such as 'may', 'can', 'must, 'could'. 
" By the use of epistemic adverbs such as 'possibly', 'maybe', 'perhaps'. 
" Less commonly, by the use of verb moods and tenses. For example, "She 
appeared as though she were asleep" uses the 'modal preterite' i. e. past tense. 
In a study of the modal auxiliaries 'must', 'should', 'ought', 'may', 'might', 'can', 'could', 
'would', 'will', 'shall', Coates (1983) emphasises the importance of epistemic modality in 
normal (as opposed to logical) language (p. 18), and also the essentially subjective 
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nature of epistemic modality (pp. 18-20), which serves to indicate the speaker's 
confidence (or doubt) in the truth of the proposition s/he expresses. Coates uses the 
term 'root' for some types of non-epistemic (including deontic) modality. This root 
category is problematic if one accepts Stubbs' position (1986. p. 15). that 
[... ] all utterances express not only content, but also the speakers attitude 
towards that content. 
In effect, Stubbs declares that there is no root modality, that no utterance is neutral in 
respect to the speaker's commitment to what s/he is saying. Put differently, if all 
utterances were placed on a modal continuum from confidence at one extreme to 
doubt at the other, then there would be zero density in the middle. Yet it remains the 
case that the strength of the propositional attitude conveyed by an utterance is on a 
different, but related continuum. In particular, there is a strong case for believing that 
there is a root quality in mathematics - and that it is highly valued. Recall the words of 
Hardy: 
317 is a prime, not because we think so [... ] but because it is so, because 
mathematical reality is built that way. (1940, p. 130) 
Hardy's passionate confidence is certainly epistemic, but when the commentary is 
stripped away from his uttererance, what remains is 
317 is a prime, 
which simply asserts what is the case. Surely many young men and women desert 
mathematics for literature because mathematics is so numbingly root. In their 
experience, not even their teachers seem to care much either way about its ideas and 
theorems; there is no passion in their experience of it, neither confidence nor doubt, no 
commitment of any kind. 
In the end, I found a working distinction between root and epistemic to be helpful in 
relation to utterances of a mathematical kind. That is not to say that the distinction is 
clear-cut. I shall speak of epistemic modality in connection with commitment (or the 
lack of it) to hypothetical states of affairs, as opposed to perceived actualities. and 
particularly in connection with the attitude of the speaker to what s/he asserts about 
such contingent or hypothetical matters. Root modality will be (more or less following 
Coates) a more matter-of-fact kind of modality, not caught up in the belief or 
commitment of the speaker. I shall give evidence to show that epistemic modality is a 
prevalent and important means by which pupils mark tentativeness about their 
mathematical assertions. 
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PRAGMATICS AND VAGUENESS 
As I have noted, Peirce's philosophy of pragmatism recognises the place of intention 
and interpretation in the determination of meaning. Pragmatics considers language 
from the point of view of the user - choices, constraints, purposes, and so on. To some 
extent, pragmatics has arisen in response to the limitations and artificial abstraction of 
truth-conditional semantics. 
Pragmatics is a young linguistic discipline, and has suffered to some extent from a 
reputation as the 'waste-basket' of linguistics [Note 2.8] - to which to consign linguistic 
matters which were not the concern of 'pure' syntax or of truth-conditional semantics. 
As I shall show, the discipline of pragmatics is now richly endowed theoretically, and 
the 'waste-basket' reputation is manifestly passe. Both Levinson (1983) and Mey 
(1994) explore at length what it is that characterises pragmatics and how it 
complements syntax and semantics. Mey summarises: 
Pragmatics is the science of language seen in relation to its users. That is to 
say, not the science of language in its own right, or the science of language as 
seen and studied by the linguists [... ] but the science of language as used by 
real, live people, for their own purposes and within their limitations and 
affordances. (1994, p. 5) 
Now Lakoff's resolution of the problem of vagueness by means of (fuzzy) formal 
semantics attempts, by precise truth-valuation, to take the uncertainty out of 
vagueness - which is to ignore when and why, in the world, anyone should want to be 
vague in the first place. Or how communication can be possible, let alone effective, 
when (as Russell suggests) it is infused with vagueness. Such questions are outside 
the scope of truth-conditional semantics, but well within the province of pragmatics. 
Lakoff's definition of 'hedges', "words whose job is to make things fuzzier or less 
fuzzy', conveys the presupposition that language can do things. Lakoff (1973, p. 490) 
and others (Prince et al., 1982) include as hedges certain epistemic modal forms such 
as 'I think' and 'maybe' which hedge performatives, obscuring the degree of 
commitment of the speaker to what s/he is saying. Stubbs (1986) associates this with 
inexplicitness, "which implies vagueness and therefore deniability". Thus, concern for 
meaning begins to entail a concern for speaker intention. 
In 1977, Sadock offered a radical pragmatic alternative to Lakoff's precise semantic 
truth-valuation of sentences containing 'hedges. (Sadock more-or-less limited his 
attention to the word 'approximately'. ) Sadock takes the view that: 
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it is the purpose of the estimate that essentially determines how close to the 
truth it must be to be warranted. (1977, p. 434, emphasis added) 
Later in the same paper he argues that: 
the role of an approximator [ ... ] is to trivialise the semantics of a sentence, to 
make it almost unfalsifiable. (p. 437, emphasis added) 
Extensive study of the purposes underlying vague language. Including hedges. has 
been undertaken by Channell, who identifies (from empirical data) a number of goals 
which speakers and writers achieve by the use of vague expressions. These include: 
" giving the right amount of information; 
" deliberately withholding information; 
" saying what you don't know how to say; 
" covering for lack of specific information; 
" acknowledging and achieving an Informal atmosphere; 
" expressing uncertainty; 
" downgrading the importance of something so as to highlight something else; 
" expressing politeness, especially deference; 
" protecting oneself against making mistakes. 
(Channel[, 1985,1990,1994) 
Many of these goals are evident in the mathematical conversations that I shall present 
and analyse later in this thesis. Channell's identification of these purposes presents an 
extremely useful pragmatic starting point from which to consider vagueness in such 
conversations. For example, it is not at all uncommon that novice speakers of 
mathematics have difficulty in giving expression to their mathematical thoughts, 
perhaps because they lack fluency in the mathematics register. In Chapter 4.1 shall 
show some ways in which vague language enables such pupils to say what they don't 
know how to say. Similarly, uncertainty and lack of specific information are ever- 
present epistemic factors in any creative discussion of mathematics. where 
conjectures are asserted in advance of certain knowledge. The last of Channeirs goals 
- protecting oneself against making mistakes - is associated with Sadock's notion of 
making a sentence "almost unfalsifiable". The use of hedges to Introduce vagueness 
into propositions in mathematics talk will be examined in detail in Chapter 5. 
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SUMMARY 
The world, insofar as it is entertained by thought or expressed in language, is infused 
with vagueness. This may be perceived as problematic if precision is, or is deemed to 
be, desirable, and is inhibited by vagueness. The problem of vagueness is only 
redeemable, if at all, by imposition of artificial syntax and interpretation, to achieve 
precision of expression and meaning in a stipulative way. Even vague language itself 
can be furnished with precise interpretation in such a way, recognising that this 
amounts to a formal 'game' of some kind, irrespective of relevance and truth. 
Mathematics itself, however, is seen to be fallible, shot through with uncertainty as to 
the origin and the truth of its propositions. The learning of mathematics may be viewed 
as a process of active construction in which, from time to time, vagueness is 
experienced individually and expressed socially. The enthymematic nature of inductive 
reasoning suggests that knowledge arrived at by inductive inference is provisional, 
plausible rather than certain. 
This social perspective on learning presents an entirely different pragmatic perspective 
on the phenomenon of vagueness as a component of mathematical discourse. The 
thesis that I set out to demonstrate in subsequent chapters is that vagueness can be 
viewed and presented, not as a disabling feature of language, but as a subtle and 
versatile instrument which speakers can and do deploy to make mathematical 
assertions with as much precision, accuracy or as much confidence as they judge is 
warranted by the circumstances of their utterances as well as by their content. 
My interest in vagueness per se arose because, as I shall demonstrate in subsequent 
chapters, vagueness turns out to be a unifying theme, common to many of the 
pragmatic aspects of language which I identified in mathematics talk in general, and in 
conjecturing talk in particular. As I have shown, a strict definition and circumscription of 
vagueness is problematic. It is useful to observe, however, that vagueness 
complicates the truth-conditional semantics of the propositional content of language, 
and that pragmatics deals with aspects of meaning that are outside the scope of truth- 
conditional semantics. 
A principle which guides my choice of subject-matter is the aim to expose some of the 
ways that participants in mathematics talk use vague language for interactional and 
transactional purposes. My analysis occasionally extends beyond a strict focus on 
vagueness, in pursuit of insight into "the extremely subtle pragmatic interpretive 
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judgements regularly made by both teachers and pupils in the course of mathematics 
teaching and learning" (Pimm, 1994, p. 167). 
In the next chapter. I review some linguistic topics. In particular. I survey some 
approaches to discourse which I shall refer to and apply later In the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 3: DISCOURSE AND INTERPRETATION 
Interpreting an utterance is ultimately a matter of guesswork, or (to use a more 
dignified term) hypothesis formation. (Leech, 1983, pp. 30-31) 
"I think your interpretation of this utterance might be controversial. " 
(supervisor's written comment on student's essay) 
OVERVIEW 
In Chapter 0,1 explained how and why I tape recorded and transcribed a number of 
mathematical conversations. These transcripts become the data which is analysed in 
Chapters 4 to 7. The purpose of the analysis was essentially threefold. 
" To infer the transactional meanings of many of the utterances in these 
conversations, and in particular the way that individual children structure aspects 
of their mathematical understanding. 
" To investigate how participants used and decoded language to support their 
contribution to a cooperative social interaction. 
" To consider the motives which determine the character of that contribution to that 
mathematical interaction. 
The pursuit of each of these purposes is an interpretive process. Whilst Leech's dictum 
(above) is superficially cynical, it would be optimistic to insist that it was entirely false. 
Nevertheless, I suggest that Leech's choice of the word 'guesswork' is not only 
undignified, but misleading. 'Guesswork' has an air of arbitrariness about it, so that it 
hardly matters whether or not the guess is wild of the mark, or a good guess, or 
remarkably accurate. The responsible analyst will take what steps s/he can to minimise 
guesswork by drawing on what is known about the process of analysis. In my own 
interpretive accounts of mathematics talk, I shall draw on the literature of linguistics - of 
pragmatics, in particular - with an eye to regularities and purposes. 
" Where discourse linguists have found distinctive ways of describing and 
analysing aspects of language (in particular, in terms of indirect speech acts, 
implicatures and preference organisation) to be of interactive significance, I shall 
use these approaches to inform the analysis of my data. In this case, that data is 
overlaid with particular mathematical significance - the mathematical component 
of the context will be one that will also inform my interpretation. 
" Where linguists have associated particular types of language (and for me, 
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Channell's work on vague language is the paradigm example) with particular 
goals, I shall look for those goals in situations where such language appears in 
mathematics talk. 
The interpretation of the meanings and motives of others is, first and foremost. a 
synthetic act of meaning-making for the analyst, whose 'reading'of a particular 
utterance must be made to fit, to be consistent with. the way that s/he construes the 
utterance in its multi-dimensional context - social, psychological. mathematical, textual 
and who knows what else. The participants In the conversation are bound to be 
making such interpretations 'on the hoof within the conversation itself. otherwise they 
could make no interactive contribution to it. The analyst after the event (in contrast with 
the clinical analyst-in-conversation) is subject to no interactive obligations. and so may 
'interpret at her/his leisure. At the same time, s/he has no interactive opportunity, and 
so is denied the possibility of testing interpretive conjectures (Stefe, 1991, p. 178) In 
order to validate or refute them. 
I shall proceed now to outline a number of (mainly pragmatic) aspects of language, to 
which I shall refer in subsequent chapters. The survey Is organised Into two parts. The 
first of these examines the topic of reference, and pronouns In particular, the second 
considers some approaches to discourse. The topics which I shall address are: 
REFERENCE 
" pronouns, particularly the pronoun 'you' 
" deixis 
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS 
" speech acts 
" conversational implicature 
" politeness theory 
" conversation analysis 
I shall show, at various points later in the thesis, how these issues relate to the 
analysis of mathematics talk. They will be seen to provide me with certain cues and 
expectations about the interactions, to inform my interpretation of the interlocutors' 
meanings and motives. 
I begin with consideration of the bearing of language on the philosophical notion of 
reference. 
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REFERENCE 
LANGUAGE AND REFERENCE 
The theme of Chapter 4 is the value of vagueness as a means of referring to 'things' in 
mathematics talk. The linguist John Lyons, presenting a traditional view of reference 
(1968, p. 404), indicates that words refer to things. Thus, in the sentence "The book is 
blue", the definite noun phrase 'the book' is held to refer to some real-world object (a 
book). In a more recent exposition, Lyons (1977, p. 177) holds that it is the speaker 
who refers, by use of some expression. At heart, this is clearly a pragmatic, as 
opposed to lexical semantic, view of reference. In this view, reference can be viewed 
as an action on the part of the speaker/writer (Brown and Yule, 1983, p. 28). 
Successful reference is achieved by the speaker if the hearer (as interpreter of the 
utterance) is able to recover the intended referent(s). Such interpretation is bound to 
draw on aspects of the context of the utterance, especially in conversation, and 
speakers depend on this to achieve economy of utterance. In the utterance (father to 
son) "Have you fed the cat? " the son might be expected to pre-suppose that his father 
was referring to their household cat, rather than someone else's. When the son replies 
"Yes, I fed her this morning", the pronoun 'her' is then expected to be understood by 
the father to be 'anaphoric', that is co-referential with his earlier'the cat'. Hence, the 
father would infer that, in using the pronoun, his son was referring to the household 
cat. 
Some precision of reference is achieved by the use of names (e. g. 'Windsor Castle') 
and noun phrases (e. g. 'the man at the bus stop'). The referents of pronouns are 
potentially vague, in the sense of ambiguous or indeterminate, if they cannot easily be 
associated with a co-referential name or noun phrase. Context then becomes even 
more crucial for the purpose of interpretation. 
PRONOUNS AND REFERENCE 
The intended referent of a pronoun may be associated with a name or noun-phrase 
elsewhere in the text. Thus, in the sentence - 
1: 3.1 The next candidate to be interviewed was well-qualified for the job, and the panel agreed 
that she was impressive. [Note 3.1 ] 
- both the pronoun 'she' and 'the next candidate to be interviewed' refer to the same 
person (i. e. the speaker uses both to refer to the same person). The use of the 
pronoun is anaphoric, being co-referential with a noun phrase which was uttered 
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earlier in the discourse, in this case earlier in the same sentence. Of course, pronouns 
may refer forwards ('cataphora') as well as backwards. as in the demonstrative 
1: 3.2 This will be the last time I shall ask you to help me. 
In the case of both anaphora and cataphora, the pronoun clearty relates to another 
item or items in the text or utterance; use of the pronoun is economical (Leech et aL. 
1982, p. 191), and lends interest by avoiding the tedium of repetition of a noun or noun 
phrase. 
It is not unusual for speakers to use pronouns in an irregular, somewhat anarchic way. 
with the pragmatic effect of conveying a range of social dimensions and attitudes to 
themselves and their audience: 
When I got there (Oxford), I think the first thing I learned was that for the first 
time in my life you were totally divorced from your background. You go there 
as an individual. So what did we learn? (Margaret Thatcher. ITV Interview, 29 
March 1983, quoted in Rees, 1983). 
In this example, the speaker uses singular and plural. first and second person 
pronouns co-referentially. There is a fascinating shift from very personal recollection 
('I') to description of shared experience conveyed in the second person (you'), to 
reflection with hindsight ('we'). Knowledge of the speaker prompts the suspicion that 
the 'we' is a royal plural, a pronoun used by the (then) Prime Minister to refer to 
herself. The pronouns are used to code aspects of personal identity and group 
association. 
REFERENTS OF'YOU' 
In Chapter 4, I shall demonstrate some of the subtle ways that children make use of 
particular pronouns in mathematics talk. The use of you' to refer to generalities is 
familiar in mundane language use, but has attracted little analysis In the literature. The 
exposition in this particular section therefore requires reference to evidence beyond my 
own data corpus in order to establish the perception that I shall apply to that corpus. 
Helen Simons (1981, p. 39) records the following fragment of an interview with a 15- 
year-old girl. The subject was participation in class discussions. 
HS: Did you fool ... that you did have things to say? 
P: Yes. But often other people said them ... 
HS: And that put you off saying something another time did it? 
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P: Umm. If you say something you sometimes think that if you say something 
wrong people are going to think it is funny. 
Simons uses 'you' to refer to the girl. The informal way that the pupil uses 'you' is 
utterly familiar. She refers, not to Simons, but (presumably) to herself and other pupils. 
Simons makes no comment on this - whilst it would look out of place in a formal text, it 
is a perfectly acceptable use of 'you' in speech, of the following kind: 
The pronoun of the second person may be used vaguely to denote some one 
(often the speaker himself) to whom something happens, or may happen, in 
the ordinary course of events: 
It was not a bad life. You got up at seven, had breakfast, went for a walk, and at 
nine o'clock you sat down to work. (Zandvoort, 1965, p. 128) 
Now this kind of 'you' is vague in that it is unclear who is meant to be included by it, the 
only certainty being the speaker "himself" (by implication, since s/he does not choose a 
third person pronoun). This exemplifies the kind of reference indeterminacy associated 
with generality (Chapter 1). The fragment of dialogue which follows was broadcast on 
Radio 4 on 24th February 1995. Sue Lawley, host of Desert Island Discs, interviews 
Jimmy Knapp, President of the TUC: 
Lawley: Are you an emotional man? Can you be moved by music? 
Knapp: Aye, I think you can. There's a stirring in the breast that you can't deny. 
Lawley's questions are clearly addressed directly and personally to Knapp. He is, after 
all, her chat show guest, and she wants to know what kind of a man he is. The 
potential ambiguity of her'you' is demonstrated by his response, in which he deflects 
the spotlight from himself to comment - with uses of 'you' of the kind indicated by 
Zandvoort - on the general effect of music on human emotions. Knapp's'you' is 
deliberately impersonal, and vague as to who is comprehended by it. This ambiguity 
was mischievously exploited in the Clive James Show (ITV 16th July 1995). 
Addressing an image of Margaret Thatcher on a giant video screen, Clive James, with 
a glint in his eye, suggests that there was once something between them, and asks the 
image 
James: What do you suppose that did to me, an impressionable young man? 
to which the image replies, in a recorded quotation, wickedly out of context: 
Thatcher: I think it gave you a flavour of what life was all about. 
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My supposition is that Thatcher's 'you'was originally a reference to some shared 
experience, as used by her in the quotation about life at Oxford given earlier in this 
chapter. James exploits the ambiguity of her you' to suggest that she is addressing 
him. The type of marked pronoun alternation, which I noted earlier in Thatcher's 
reminiscences of Oxford, is deployed for effect In literature. In one of his novels. 
R. F. Delderfield gives this portrait of Evan Rhys-Jones, bank manager and landlord. 
described by his bank clerk and lodger, Charlie Pritchard. 
He had.. a gravity that you could mistake for dignity until you adjusted to the 
maddening deliberation of his movements. It was this characteristic that 
fascinated me on that first occasion, so that I found myself wondering how 
long it would take him to to select a stick of celery, bring it up to his chubby 
jaws and produce the soft, carefully modulated snap. In contrast to his wife's 
regular volleys from across the table. You had the feeling that if you asked 
him to pass the salt the meal would falter to an uncertain halt. so in the end I 
compromised, watching him but listening to his wife's coy exploration of my 
non-existent love-life. (Delderfield, 1969. p. 13. emphasis added) 
This alternation between first and second person pronouns. 'I/me/my' and you'. has 
the effect of distinguishing experiences and feelings from detached observation and 
generalised objective comment. 
In effect, 'you' is being deployed in place of the more formal indefinite pronoun 'one' 
which might be regarded as somewhat affected in English speech. There is some 
indication that there is a corresponding trend in French. Laberge and Sankoff (1980, 
p. 271), in a fascinating and relevant sociological study of Montreal French, remark 
that "Tu and vous [... ] are now locked in combat with on for indefinite champion, a title 
on thought it had locked up". The issue is that of generality in relation to what is being 
asserted. 
a detailed study of the contexts of use of indefinite on shows that tu and vows 
can be used in virtually all of them. Perhaps the most central element unifying 
these various contexts is the theme of generality or generalization. (... ] It Is 
important to note that the indefinite referent here Is always vague as to the 
possible inclusion of speaker and hearer: anybody' neans' just that " possibly 
you, possibly me, or anyone else in like circumstances. (ibid, p. 275) 
As I remarked, this matter seems to have escaped analytical attention with regard to 
English speech. I take it up again in the next chapter. 
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DEIXIS 
The link between the use of pronouns and the pragmatic notion of deixis will be 
important in Chapter 4. Deixis is concerned with aspects of meaning that are 
inaccessible without the provision of context; for example, the use of a word or phrase 
whose referent is determined by the context of its utterance. Deictic features of speech 
and writing correspond to what philosophers call 'indexicals', which reveal attributes of 
place or person. Deictic forms such as 'you', 'now', 'here' are effectively context- 
dependent variables, or'shifters' (Mey, 1994, p. 90). Divorced from the context of 
utterance, their meaning may be ambiguous or obscure. The authors of the 1980 ATM 
booklet Language and Mathematics refer implicitly to the importance of deixis for 
communication: 
Everyday conversation is easy to understand, its meanings are clear, because 
we speak in the context of everyday. When we are in a bus shelter, and a bus 
comes round the corner, the words 'here it is' have a clear meaning. (p. 17) 
Similarly, as an example of temporal deixis, observe the difference in the intended 
immediacy of 'now' in the two utterances below, and how this difference is clarified by 
the context: 
1: 3.3 I'm going for lunch now. [context: workplace] 
1: 3.4 I suggest you begin the next chapter now. [context: supervisor to student] 
The word 'deixis' is usefully related to its Greek root deiknumi, meaning 'to show' or'to 
point'. From this same root, the more familiar noun 'paradigm' derives - meaning an 
example which acts as a pointer to a general type. The Greek word has another 
meaning, namely 'to prove'. A diknumi (sic) proof (Fauvel, 1987, p. 5) is one which is 
presented - typically by means of a diagram of some sort - in such a way that no 
explanation is necessary, for one can 'see' the result and the argument. For example, 
a suitable arrangement of pebbles in pairs 'demonstrates' that the sum of two odd 
numbers is even. The example displayed - the arrangement of a particular set of 
pebbles - is generic (in the sense of Mason and Pimm, 1984), it points to a more 
general truth. In the diknumi proof, a train of thought is shared yet unspoken. 
Mühlhäusler and Harre (1990) emphasise the primacy, in their view, of the deictic role 
of pronouns. 
From developmental evidence we know that the ability to use pronouns in their 
deictic function predates the correct use of pronouns in their anaphoric 
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function. [... ] whilst anaphoric pronouns almost invariably contain deictic 
information, the reverse is not true. One is led by such observations to 
conclude that the deictic function of pronouns Is their pamary function... 
(p. 58, my emphasis. See also Note 3.2) 
Roger Wales, in a survey of developmental aspects of deixis (1986) observes that: 
[deictic expressions) serve as a meeting point for semantic. syntactic and 
pragmatic aspects of language. This is because they are, to use G. Stem's 
(1964) term, contingent expressions. By this is meant that, to interpret them. 
the interpreter needs not only context-independent semantic information but 
also information which is contingent on the actual (or construed) context. They 
are used to direct the hearer of a communication towards some object or 
event. (p. 401) 
Deixis is concerned with ways in which language draws on and points to context. 
SOME APPROACHES TO DISCOURSE 
Over the last forty years or so, a number of approaches to the analysis of discourse 
have arisen and evolved. The roots of these analytical traditions have been in 
disciplines such as philosophy, sociology and anthropology. and their particular 
emphases and contributions vary accordingly. I now consider some of these ways of 
approaching discourse, each of which offers some insight into interactive dialogue. My 
purpose is not to suggest which of these frameworks is best or most appropriate. but 
(in the spirit of Schiffrin, 1994) to make a number of approaches available, because I 
draw on them in my own analysis in this thesis. 
The first approach is based on Austin's insight that an utterance can be a means of 
performing an action. 
SPEECH ACTS 
An account of how speakers "do things with words" can be seen as an outcome of the 
theory of 'speech acts' which, for three decades, has occupied a central place In 
pragmatics. A declarative utterance such as "The window is open" expresses a 
proposition with a truth-semantic value - true or false. By contrast, the imperative 
utterance "Shut the window" does not express a proposition in the truth-conditional 
sense, since it cannot, under any conditions, be evaluated as true or false, or even 
something in-between. It is an order, requiring the hearer to do something; an action 
performed by language (speech In this case). 
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A quite different example of such an action is "Good luck! ", which is a wish (may you 
have ... ), a projection of a felicitous state of affairs in the near future. I can assert the 
truth of my sincerity in making the wish, but not the truth of the wish itself. 
This insight is due to Austin (1962b), who called non-propositional requests, wishes 
and the like 'speech acts'. The essential property of speech acts is that they do 
something in the world, that they bring about (or have the potential to bring about) a 
change in some state of affairs. They are 'performative' utterances. 
A speech act is accomplished, canonically, by the explicit use of a performative or 
speech act verb (SAV) such as 'promise'. The non-necessity of an explicit SAV in a 
speech act is born out by the "Good luck" example. The formal (if somewhat odd) 
paraphrase "I (hereby) wish you good luck" makes the SAV explicit. 
Certain paradigm performatives powerfully convey the character of speech acts. When 
a priest says to the infant cradled in his or her arms "I baptise thee in the name of the 
Father, etc. " then, as Mey (1993, p. 112) says "there will be one more Christian among 
the living". The standard bench test for a performative verb is whether the adverb 
'hereby' can be sensibly, even if unnaturally, inserted into the utterance containing it. 
Thus, "I hereby request you to shut the window" stands up to the test, whereas 
"I hereby go to work by car" does not. Austin's initial position concerning speech acts 
was that they had to be associated with (possibly implicit) SAVs. He therefore urged 
the value of compiling a list of explicit performative verbs, a task that he judged would 
be "a matter of prolonged fieldwork" - by which he meant using the 'hereby' test to 
uncover the SAVs in a dictionary. 
Force and Felicity 
A speech act has three different kinds of 'forces' (Austin 1962b), as follows: 
Locutionary force: the actual act of speaking. 
Illocutionary force: the direct, conventional action of making a promise, request, 
command, denial, etc. 
Perlocutionary force (or effect): the indirect (and sometimes unpredictable) 
consequences of the speech act which arise from circumstances of, and beyond, its 
utterance. 
Example: "For tonight's homework I want you to finish the exercise". Illocutionary force 
- an order to finish the exercise before the next lesson. Perlocutionary effect - three 
pupils are very late to bed that evening. 
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In order to qualify as a speech act, the utterance in its context also has to satisfy 
certain 'felicity conditions' (Levinson, 1983, pp. 239-40). otherwise it does not 'count' as 
a properly-performed speech act. When the priest says to the child 'I baptise thee', 
his or her pronouncement is felicitous provided that the sacrament Is properly 
convened and the priest is invested with the authority to perform it. A more mundane 
example: if I ask you to close the door, the request Is felicitous if the door Is open, if I 
desire it to be closed, and if your situation is such that you are capable of closing it. On 
the other hand, a promise is not a performative if I have no Intention of honouring it: 
nor is a million pound bequest, if I don't have that kind of money. 
Implicit Performatives 
Human rites, particularly religious and legal ones such as baptism by a priest or 
sentencing by a judge, are carefully formulated to include (if not deliberately) 
performative verbs which emphasise the fact that those who speak the words are 
doing something in the world. When the priest says, "I [hereby] pronounce you man 
and wife", this is the precise moment in which the speech act effects the union of two 
persons in marriage. 
Consider an earlier statement, in the same ceremony, "I Jack. take thee Jill. [... j in 
sickness and in health". At one level, this is a description of something that Is true at 
that moment, with no performative marking. But the importance of these 'solemnized' 
words is that they constitute a commitment (for example. to mutual fidelity) and a belief 
in a present and future state of affairs. Likewise, The verb 'to love' does not pass the 
'hereby' test (? "I hereby love you") and so does not qualify, In Austin's strict sense. as 
a performative verb. Yet (I would argue) the declaration "I love you". simply cannot be 
uttered by the speaker as a pure and simple proposition, true or false: it has to convey 
an attitude, a commitment, a promise even, and In that sense it Is a speech act. 
Herein lies a difficulty for classical speech act theory, that a great many propositions 
can legitimately be viewed as 'acts' if the explicit performative requirement is relaxed. 
Austin himself recognised this difficulty and progressively adopted a broader view of 
speech acts. Levinson (1983) summarises thus: 
what starts off as a theory about some special and peculiar utterances - 
performatives - ends up as a general theory that pertains to all kinds of 
utterances. (p. 231) 
Thus, the declaration (in the police station interview room) 'My husband was at home 
in bed with me" can be viewed as a speech act, establishing an alibi, with the force of 
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"I hereby assert that my husband was at home in bed with me" (entailing that he was 
not simultaneously robbing a bank). This is the position of Austin's student and 
successor (as regards speech act theory) John Searle (1969), that every utterance can 
be classified as some kind of speech act: for example, the proposition "I am a man" is 
at the same time the speech act "I [hereby] assert that I am a man". 
Indirect Speech Acts 
The actual form of a speech act is not an arbitrary matter. Indeed, a whole range of 
personal factors - strategies, attitudes, beliefs, positions relative to other persons, 
desires, commitments and detachments - may be encoded in the way that a speech 
act is formulated. In particular, 'indirect speech acts' are "cases in which one 
illocutionary act is performed indirectly by way of performing another" (Searle, 1975, 
p. 60). Common forms of this are to state a preference or use of an interrogative form 
in order to convey a request. For example: 
1: 3.5 Teacher: I'd like to take in your exercise books. 
1: 3.6 Diner: Can you bring me the wine list? 
These are both instances of how speakers frequently accomplish an indirect speech 
act by stating or questioning one of the felicity conditions (Gordon and Lakoff, 1971). In 
1: 3.5, the teacher explicitly states his wish to receive the books i. e. that s/he meets the 
'sincerity' condition (Levinson, op. cit. ); in 1: 3.6, the diner questions the ability of the 
waiter to provide the list i. e. s/he questions one of the preparatory pre-conditions 
(ibid. ). Note that 1: 3.6 is only conventionally interrogative, in that the waiter does not 
have the option of treating the question as a request for information rather than for 
action. I shall give particular attention to these matters as features of mathematics talk 
in Chapter 7, in the context of a Theory of Politeness. Traditionally, three major 
language functions are identified - statement, question and command - having typical 
realisations in declarative, interrogative and imperative verb forms. Indirect speech 
acts break down these canonical correspondences between language function and 
form. Thus, 1: 3.5 and 1: 3.6 achieve commands through declarative and interrogative 
forms respectively. Sinclair and Coulthard observe that: 
Modal verbs play a large part in producing the lack of direct correlation 
between the three grammatical forms and functions. (1975, p. 11) 
Indirect speech acts are one of the means whereby a speaker may convey 
propositional attitude whilst at the same time making a declarative utterance. Consider 
an imagined scene from the mathematics classroom. The teacher singles out one 
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child, and asks "How many lines of symmetry does a rectangle have? 4. The child might 
simply answer "Two". But it is possible to imagine circumstances in which the child 
may wish to convey that their answer is tentative, controversial, questionable or 
whatever. Some possible formulations include: 
I think it's two. 
Two, maybe. 
Basically, it's two. 
I'd say it was two. 
My Dad said it was two. 
In each of these cases, the illocutionary force of the utterance is hedged so as to 
convey doubt that 'two' is the correct answer, and to withhold full commitment to it. 
There is associated with each of them a'hedged performative' (in some cases. tacit), 
so that what in a more confident speaker would be a statement of fact ('There are 
two") becomes an action signifying uncertainty. The use of hedged performatives in 
mathematics talk is a major theme of this thesis. 
CONVERSATIONAL IMPLICATURE 
I come now to the notion of conversational implicature, due to the philosopher Paul 
Grice (1975,1989), who proposed that ordinary conversation is posited on a 
Cooperative Principle (CP), whose meaning is embodied in four sub-principles or 
'maxims' of conversation. These maxims [Note 3.3] specify what participants need to 
do in order to converse rationally and cooperatively. The requirements are. essentially: 
" maxim of Quality: let your contribution be truthful; 
" maxim of Quantity: let your contribution be informative but not too informative; 
" maxim of Manner: let your contribution be clearly expressed " e. g. be brief. 
orderly, unambiguous; 
" maxim of Relevance: let your contribution be relevant to the matter in hand. 
Now it is evidently not the case that all participants in all conversations observe all of 
these four maxims in all contributions. More often than not. this has nothing to do with 
an intention to lie or mislead (in which case the participation could not be deemed 
cooperative). Conversation can and does include utterances - such as refusals, 
disagreements and abuses - which would not be regarded as'cooperative' In the 
ordinary meaning of the word. In what sense, then, does Grice use the word, given that 
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participants will be expected (Grice, 1989, p. 26) to observe the CP? Grice himself 
does not attempt much of a gloss on his intended meaning: 
We might then formulate a rough general principle which participants will be 
expected (ceteris paribus) to observe, namely: Make your conversational 
contribution such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the 
accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in which you are engaged. 
One might call this the Cooperative Principle. (ibid. ) 
One can proceed from this start in two ways. Mey adopts a position which holds that a 
contribution may fail to be cooperative. At least, this is the clear message of his telling 
and analysis of an anecdote in which a family'friend' is abominably rude to his six- 
year-old daughter. Irritated when Sarah loses her ball in his book-lined study, he 
flaunts his erudition, to the bewilderment of the child, by directing her to "look behind 
Volume 6 of Dosteyevski's collected works". My human sympathy is with the father, 
who tersely comments (Mey, 1993, p. 67): 
the adult interlocutor failed to observe the principal demand set up by Grice in 
the CP: namely, to cooperate with your conversational partner. 
On the face of things, the Dosteyevski utterance violates the maxims of Manner and of 
Quantity. There is, however, an alternative reading of the incident. Being cooperative is 
not the same thing as being pleasant. Since Grice is sparing in his commentary on the 
meaning of 'cooperative', one could suggest that the essence of cooperation is an 
intention to assist other participants in their pragmatic efforts to make human sense of 
the spoken interaction. Thus, in being angry or nasty, or in making a complaint, we 
may fail to be'nice', but we certainly assist the communication of our meanings, 
feelings and attitudes. In fact, I suggest that Mey may be mistaken in his assumption 
that the friend's remark (which Mey takes to be uncooperative) is addressed to the 
child. Surely the intended audience was in fact the father, and the intended implicature 
something like "I'm irritated because your daughter is playing in my study", or perhaps 
"Please remove your daughter from my study". 
How, then, do hearers interpret speech which is supposedly cooperative, yet which is 
for example, superficially untrue or irrelevant? Viewed from the other side of the coin, 
how do speakers successfully violate the maxims in order to communicate fine 
nuances of meaning, to enable the hearer to read 'between the lines' as it were? 
The genius of Grice's theory is the following recognition. Whilst speakers do not always 
observe the maxims at the surface level, nevertheless hearers interpret the 
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contributions of other participants in conversation as if they were intended to observe 
the maxims at some level of meaning other than that contained in the semantic content 
of the utterance. This has proved to be a robust theory, concise yet surprisingly 
complete, with a wide field of application, finding resonance with common sense and 
experience. For Grice describes and explains what we all know - that "communication 
involves the publication and recognition of intentions" (Sperber and Wilson, 1986a, 
p. 24). 
Such a view of communication underpins a means of pragmatic inference identified by 
Grice, and which he named 'conversational implicature'. On many occasions, I shall 
show this means of inference in action in mathematical conversation. To clarify the 
meaning and process of implicature, consider the following exchange: 
1: 3.7 Teacher: Why haven't you brought your calculator to my lesson? 
1: 3.8 Pupil: My brother has a maths exam today. 
The pupil's reply, taken literally, is irrelevant to the teacher's question. Indeed, the pupil 
appears to be flouting the maxim of Relevance. We could interpret the pupil's 
contribution to be simply non-cooperative, failing to address the teacher's enquiry 
about the missing calculator. In practice, we interpret the exchange as cooperative at 
some level, albeit not a superficial one. and so we infer, from the ostensibly irrelevant 
1: 3.8 that: 
1: 3.9 my brother has my calculator, because he needs it for his exam. 
The inference is an example of a (conversational) Implicature, and we say that 1: 3.8 
implicates the conclusion 1: 3.9. An implicature is rather like a hint. Thus, the human 
tendency is to accept Grice's theory as an accurate insight, one that exposes and 
codifies that which we 'knew', but had not yet isolated. 
It is not my intention, here, to discuss the mechanics of pragmatic inference, i. e. how 
implicatures might be 'calculated'. Suffice to remark that the hearer brings his or her 
'cognitive environment' (Sperber and Wilson, 1986a) to bear on the situation, for the 
purpose of interpretation. This 'environment' consists of a (very large) set of facts 
which are manifest (ibid. ) to individuals by knowledge or by assumption (including, for 
example, the materials usually needed by candidates in a maths exam). What matters 
here is that pragmatic implicature is different from logical implication, in that the 
inferred conclusion - 1: 3.9 in the example - cannot be obtained solely from what has 
actually been uttered by application of a syllogism, or other process of logical 
deduction. 
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A useful way of looking at the Gricean interpretive framework would be to say that 
either speakers are overtly cooperative because they observe the maxims, or they are 
implicitly cooperative by setting up implicatures by means of maxim violations. In this 
technical sense, though not in the everyday sense, one can argue that every 
contribution to conversation is 'cooperative'. This is convenient in that Grice's maxims 
then become absolutes rather than mere ideals. Whenever possible, I shall approach 
the CP and the maxims with the expectation that speakers intend their interlocutors to 
make sense of what they say, even though they will not always (superficially) simply 
say what they mean. 
For a final example, consider the hedged performative (promise, in fact) 
1: 3.10 Maybe I'll come and visit you next week. 
which flouts the maxim of Manner, and thereby implicates 
1: 3.11 I may fail to come to see you next week. 
because, if I were firm in my desire and intent to come, I would have made the promise 
without hedging the speech act. Hedges will be the linguistic focus of Chapter 5. I shall 
show how these words and phrases can be seen to act as indicators of propositional 
attitude in mathematics talk. Grice's theory of implicature accounts for their 
communicative effectiveness in conveying uncertainty, lack of commitment. 
POLITENESS THEORY 
Discussing a mathematical investigation with a 14-year-old boy, Allan, his teacher 
asks: 
IRG5: 51 Judith: Right. Can you make any predictions before you start? 
The indirect form of Judith's request for a prediction (questioning a felicity condition, 
i. e. the boy's ability to provide it) is very characteristic of many of the teachers whom I 
studied through transcripts. In fact the boy made a prediction, but the vagueness of his 
answer suggests to me that it was far from secure: 
54 Allan: The maximum will probably be, er, the least'll probably be'bout fifteen. 
(A full discussion of Judith's conversation with Allan will follow in Chapter 7. ) 
A particular quality of insight into such indirectness and vagueness in classroom 
mathematics talk is provided by a sociolinguistic theory - of 'politeness' - due to 
Penelope Brown and Stephen Levinson. First published in Goody (1978), the authors 
re-issued their account with minor revisions in Brown and Levinson (1987). 
In essence, politeness theory is constructed to account for some indirect features of 
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conversation; it claims that speakers avoid threats to the 'face' of those they address 
by various forms of vagueness, and thereby implicate their meanings rather than 
assert them directly. More often than not, Grice's principles explain how their intention 
is conveyed to hearers. An outline of the theory now follows. 
Politeness theory is based on the notion that participants are endowed with two 
properties - rationality and 'face'. 'Face' (Goffman, 1967) consists of a public self- 
image, with two 'wants': 
" 'positive face' -a desire to be appreciated and valued by others; desire for 
approval; 
" negative face - concern for certain personal rights and freedoms, such as 
autonomy to choose actions, claims on territory, and so on; desire to be 
unimpeded. 
The Model Person (MP) of the theory not only has these wants her/himself, but 
recognises that others have them too; moreover, s/he recognises that the satisfaction 
of her/his own face wants is, in part, achieved by the acknowledgement of those of 
others. Indeed, the nature of positive face wants is such that they can only be satisfied 
by the attitudes of others. 
Now some acts ('face threatening acts', or FTAs) intrinsically threaten face. Orders and 
requests, for example, threaten negative face, whereas criticism and disagreement 
threaten positive face. The MP therefore must avoid such acts altogether (which may 
be impossible for a host of reasons, including concern for her/his own face) or find 
ways of performing them whilst mitigating their FTA effect, i. e. making them less of a 
threat. 
Imagine, for example, that someone says something that MP believes to be factually 
incorrect. MP would like to correct them. Such an act would threaten the first speaker's 
positive face - the esteem in which s/he is held as a purveyor of knowledge. Or 
suppose that MP would like someone to open the window, but is aware of the threat to 
the other's negative face. Brown and Levinson identify a taxonomy of strategies 
available to MP in such circumstances. 
Don't do the FTA - simply agree or keep quiet. 
2 Do the FTA: in which case there is a further choice of strategy: - 
2.1 Go off record- don't do the FTA directly, but implicate it e. g. "Don't you 
think it's hot in here? " (indirect request to open the window). 
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2.2 Go on record: either 
2.2.1 'baldly - essentially making no attempt to respect face; or 
2.2.2 with redressive action: having regard either for the other's 
2.2.2.1 positive face ("You're the expert in these matters, but I 
thought that ... "; see also this chapter heading); or 
2.2.2.2 negative face ("I'm sorry to trouble you, but would you 
mind... ") 
These strategies are summarised in the diagram below, which is due to Brown and 
Levinson, (1987, p. 69). 
Greater 
2.2.1 without redresswe action, baldly 
2.2 on record 2.2.2.1 positive politeness 
ö 
ö ý+ 2. Do the FTA 2.2.2 with redressive action 
/ 
ro Eö 
W 2.1 off record 2.2.2.2 negative politeness 
1 `1. DonadotheFTA 
Lesser 
Going on record baldly suggests a greater concern for one's own face than for that of 
one's audience. I associate it with being 'assertive'; it sounds like bullying, but may be 
the only way that someone in a position of weakness can avoid being ignored or bullied 
themselves. 
Redressive action is very commonplace when FTAs are in prospect; such action is a 
way of indicating that no face threat is intended. The strategies in the lower part of the 
diagram offer the least such threat, those in the upper part the greatest. 
It is important to note that whereas an utterance (request, criticism, etc. ) most 
obviously stands to threaten the face of the addressee (H), it may in fact threaten the 
face of the speaker (S). For example, making an excuse or accepting an offer may 
offend S's negative face (s/he feels obliged to justify, s/he is in debt to someone). 
A confession or emotional outburst offends S's positive face (s/he is seen as less 
worthy, less in control). 
Sociological dimensions of 'face' 
Brown and Levinson (1987, pp. 74-84) - building on work of Brown and Gilman (1970) 
on the social connotations of second-person pronoun use - isolate three factors in the 
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assessment of the seriousness of an FTA. These factors are: 
" the 'social distance' (D) of S and H; 
" the relative 'power' (P) of S and H; 
" the absolute ranking (R) of impositions in the culture. 
D, P and R reflect the extent to which the actors (S and H) perceive these factors as 
mutual knowledge, as opposed to some rating of actual power, for example. A value for 
each of these three factors is assessed (notionally, on a scale of 1 to n), against the 
following descriptions. 
D is a symmetric function D(S, H) which measures social proximity. Notions of class 
and educational achievement, for example, might be factors in the assessment of D. 
More fundamentally, D depends on frequency of interaction and mutual exchange of 
goods (material and non-material). A high value of D, reflecting close social proximity, 
is generally associated with mutual concern for the other's positive face - such as 
concern for the self-esteem of a colleague. 
P is an asymmetric function P(H, S) which measures the relative power of H over S, in 
particular the degree to which H can impose his/her own wants at the expense of S's. 
The sources of P are either material (such as physical force) or metaphysical (by virtue 
of metaphysical powers ascribed to H). Usually, both will be relevant. A high value of P 
will generally be associated with deference - such as a pupil might be expected to 
show to a teacher, or a teacher to the headteacher. 
R is a culturally and situationally-determined constant RX, indicating the ranking of the 
imposition of the FTA x. Thus an employee's request for'time off on account of a 
hospital appointment might (in appropriate circumstances) be ranked lower than a 
similar request to attend a child's school play. 
The dependence of R on context is clear; Brown and Levinson also argue for the 
context-dependence of D and P. For example, a high-rated social distance (in the 
context of the home town) between a parent and his child's teacher might significantly 
lessen if they found themselves in the same Mediterranean holiday hotel. In addition, 
Brown and Levinson argue for the independence of the three social factors, and 
thereby justify the simple summation of D, P and R in a given situation, in the 
assessment of an FTA. It will not be necessary, here, to give more detailed exposition 
of Brown and Levinson's development and application of this model. The sketch that I 
have given should be seen to be sufficient and relevant for the purposes of this thesis. 
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Indirectness 
Brown and Levinson identify and catalogue a number of linguistic strategies associated 
with the face-respecting options shown in the diagram above. These include use of 
indirect speech acts, including quasi-interrogative forms such as: 
1: 3.12 You couldn't just pop out and get me a newspaper, could you? 
which redress the threat to the addressee's negative face, their autonomy, respecting 
their right to refuse. However, given high values of D and P for example, there may be 
mutual recognition that refusal is not a real option. The following example is from one 
of a number of interviews with 10 and 11-year-old children, which I shall examine in 
detail in Chapter 5. 
T3: 17 Tim: OK, now let's think about two numbers that add up to twenty. Would you 
like to start off Caroline? 
Both Caroline and I know that this is a command, that the indirectness (marked here 
by the avoidance of the imperative) is conventional. Caroline knows that she has no 
option but to "start off". I am nevertheless, sincere in my wish to be seen by these 
young students to be gentle, considerate and non-threatening. 
I shall draw attention to the prevalence of this kind of indirectness in Chapter 7. 
CONVERSATION ANALYSIS 
Broadly speaking, the pragmatic theories that I draw on in this thesis derive from the 
philosophical tradition of language analysis, which is mainly associated with sentence 
structure and the logic of meaning. These latter semantic interests have most recently 
extended into what Mey (1993) calls 'micro pragmatics', by which he means those 
aspects of language use which are analysed by reference to individual sentences or 
utterances, or at most pairs or short sequences of such units of text. A number of 
philosophical contributions to pragmatics at this level have been outlined in this 
chapter, notably the notions of speech act and implicature. 
One characteristic of the philosophical approach to language is the status of invented 
(or intuitive) sentences as data, an approach somewhat alien to the late twentieth 
century education research tradition in which sociology and anthropology are so 
influential - though not, perhaps to a pure mathematician whose only 'data' are self- 
generated. For the philosopher, introspection and appeal to intuition are valid elements 
of method and sources of data. The following invented exchange is quoted from 
Grice's (1989, pp. 32) exposition of conversational implicature: 
91 
A: Smith doesn't seem to have a girlfriend these days. 
B: He has been paying a lot of visits to New York lately. 
No source (such as a corpus of conversation) is cited, and it is assumed that none 
exists, other than Grice himself. The argument (that B implicates that Smith has, or 
may have, a girlfriend in new York) is not dependent on the claim that this is a 
fragment of a 'real' conversation. Similarly, Brown and Levinson's account of off-record 
FTAs proceeds (1987, p. 69): 
So, for instance, if I say'Damn, I'm out of cash, I forgot to go to the bank 
today', I may be intending to get you to lend me some cash, but I cannot be 
held to have committed myself to that intent [... ] 
Is the conclusion ('I cannot be held etc! ) any weaker because no tape recording exists 
of a spontaneous utterance "Damn, I'm out of cash etC'? Gazdar (1979, p. 11) is 
explicit: 
I shall assume ... that invented strings and certain intuitive judgements about 
them constitute legitimate data for linguistic research. 
Philosophers such as Austin and Grice have usually based their arguments on 
consideration of such 'invented strings'. Nevertheless, such an approach has some 
limitations. The most obvious is that the audience for the argument must accept the 
plausibility of the invented text; in effect, to agree that the proposed sentence or 
sentences might well occur in some actual discourse. 
Harvey Sacks himself laid the foundation for an overtly empirical approach to the 
analysis of discourse in a series of lectures from 1964-72. Garfinkel coined the term 
'ethnomethodology'to capture the notion of 'ordinary' people studying naturally 
occurring speech data. With this perspective, Sacks developed the approach to 
discourse termed conversation analysis (CA). In fact, CA does not limit itself to 
mundane, 'ordinary' conversation, and the term 'talk-in-interaction' (Schegloff, 1987) 
has gained acceptance to indicate the scope of CA. Indeed, some of the most notable 
contributions of CA have been achieved in particular institutional settings, such as law 
courts (Atkinson and Drew, 1979) and medical interviews (Frankel, 1990). 
CA came into being as a response to some perceived inadequacies of Searle's speech 
act theory - arguably one of the philosophical frameworks most sensitive to social 
organisation, and offering great promise in the illumination of particular institutional 
practices. The work of Labov and Fanshel (1977) attempted to apply speech act 
analysis in a study of psychotherapeutic interviews. Such interaction is typically 
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indirect, and in viewing meaning as fundamentally emergent from sentence or 
utterance, Labov and Fanshel were obliged to propose a large set of context-sensitive 
'translation rules' in order to move from the surface form of an utterance to its force as 
an action. One essential shortcoming of the speech act approach to the analysis of 
discourse exposed in this study is the tendency to look for the acts performed by small 
units of speech. As Drew and Heritage comment: 
There can, by now, be no serious doubt that sentences and utterances are 
designed and shaped to occur in particular sequential and social contexts and 
that their sense as actions derives, at least in part, from such contexts. (Drew 
and Heritage, 1992, p. 12). 
A defining feature of CA is the approach to conversation in terms of extended 
sequences of utterances. Such sequences themselves contribute to a rich view of 
'context, which construes utterances (and the social 'acts' they perform) as doubly 
contextual (Heritage, 1984). First, such utterances and actions are context-shaped, in 
that their production takes place in both a local configuration of speech (the co-text) 
and action which precedes them, and also a wider spatial, temporal and inter-personal 
environment which contains that configuration. Second, utterances and actions are 
context-renewing, forming the immediate context for some next action in a sequence. 
In this way, the CA analyst takes a dynamic approach to context, in contrast to the 
'bucket' theory of context which prescribes and proposes a fixed framework of 'context' 
to account for certain features of a given discourse. 
A speech act-based approach to discourse which takes account of the sequential 
organisation of action had in fact been developed by Sinclair and Coulthard and their 
collaborators in Birmingham. In their study of classroom discourse (Sinclair and 
Coulthard, 1975), a model of interaction was developed in terms of sets of acts, 
moves, exchanges and transactions. One such regularity associated with teacher 
questioning is the three-part Initiation-Response-Feedback (I-R-F) cycle, the 
prevalence and relevance of which to mathematics classrooms has been widely 
acknowledged since Sinclair and Coulthard first drew attention to it. In one example 
(due to Pimm, 1987, p. 27), a teacher Initiates a cycle by asking his class how a route 
map on the blackboard might be communicated to someone in the next room. A pupil 
gives a one-word Response "Coordinates". The teacher follows up with evaluative 
Feedback, "[... ] That would be a very good way of doing it", and immediately Initiates 
the next cycle with another question, "What do you mean by coordinates? ". 
Such attempts to specify. discourse text in terms of such 'rules', to develop a kind of 
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grammar of interaction, are viewed with suspicion by CA proponents such as Drew 
and Heritage: 
In their preoccupation with the rules for discursive action within a context, the 
Birmingham group tended to ignore the task of analyzing how mutual 
understandings are achieved by the participants [... ] This engendered a 
related failure to specify in their model how participants show their orientations 
to the particular institutional context in which they are interacting. For example 
[... ] their analysis failed to disclose the ways in which successive elements of 
the I-R-F sequence constitute its instructional character. (1992. pp. 14-15) 
Drew and Heritage appear to discount the value of the Birmingham research in 
sensitising the transcript analyst to the structure of the text s/he is examining, and the 
opportunity it presents for expert theorising about the relevance of the 'rules'. For 
example, Pimm (op. cit. ) makes it his business precisely to illuminate, with reference to 
particular fragments of transcript data, how the I-R-F sequence exposes "how 
participants show their orientations to the particular institutional context in which they 
are interacting", (e. g. the teacher's desire for control, the pupil's sense of "exam" 
questions in the classroom), and conversely how these orientations can be seen to 
give rise to the I-R-F sequence. Consideration of these same orientations might 
suggest that the I-R-F sequence is not a regularity to be found in, for example, 
mundane dinner-party conversation. 
CA rejects the premature construction of theories and any consequent deductive 
inferences from them. The CA approach is fundamentally inductive, although this is by 
no means a distinguishing feature of CA. In keeping with the interpretive research 
paradigm, there is constant dynamic interplay between data, theory and analysis 
(Hooper, 1989, p. 52). Data consist of tape recordings and detailed transcriptions of 
those recordings, coding pauses, intonation, sound stretches, interruptions and 
overlaps, dysfluencies and so on, using special symbols devised by Jefferson. This 
renders fluent reading of such transcripts difficult, but that is not the transcriber's prime 
objective. 
A piece of CA: Adjacency Pairs and Preference Organisation 
A major object of inductive attention in CA is the organisation of sequences of 
utterances, and in particular the sequential partition of conversation into 'turns' (in the 
sense that participants 'wait their turn'). This has led to the creation of a literature on 
the management of conversational turn-taking, and the related notions of directionality 
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(projection from one participant to another) and intersubjectivity (so that next actions 
display a particular understanding of prior contributions). 
These notions came under consideration in discussions of the concept of adjacency 
pairs (Schegloff and Sacks, 1973) and preference organisation. The notion of an 
adjacency pair arises in consideration of paired utterances. A pair is initiated by one 
speaker with a 'first part': 
1: 3.13 A: Can you come over for coffee tomorrow? 
which is followed by the second part: 
1: 3.14 B: Yes, thank you, I'd love to. 
or perhaps: 
1: 3.15 B: Well, er, let me see, I probably ought to go and get the lawn mower fixed in 
the morning, and my brother said he might come over sometime, so it's a 
bit tricky really. 
Some types of second parts are routinely 'dispreferred' in response to first parts such 
as questions, offers, requests. (The term 'dispreferred' is intended in CA to describe an 
empirical regularity, and not to imply any state of mind in the speaker). 1: 3.15 is a more 
complex, hesitant response than 1: 3.14, which is a 'preferred' second part, in this case 
acceptance of the invitation. The complexity of the dispreferred second part is an 
observed linguistic (CA) regularity. The more elaborate structure of 1: 3.15 marks it as 
'dispreferred' (non-acceptance). 
Levinson (1983, p. 336) lists a correlation between different types of first parts and 
preferred/dispreferred second parts: 
FIRST PART request offer/invite assessment question blame 
SECOND PART 
Preferred accept accept agree expected answer denial 
Dispreferred refuse refuse disagree unexpected admission 
Characteristics of dispreferred seconds include (Atkinson and Drew, 1979): 
" delays: such as pauses before delivery; 
" use of prefaces: particles such as 'well', token agreements (I'd like to, but.. ); 
" accounts: carefully formulated, over-elaborate explanations for the dispreferred 
act. 
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In Chapters 5 and 7,1 shall draw attention to utterances in mathematical discourse 
which exemplify these characteristics. Here, for example, a teacher (Hazel) asks a 10- 
year-old pupil (Faye) a question which presupposes a certain belief. Faye's reply is 
delayed a prefaced, marking it as a dispreferred second pair part: 
IRG3: 33 Hazel: ... why do you think that for certain? 
34 Faye: Because ... well, I don't know for certain but I think ... 'cos the numbers that 
we've done are quite close to the first ... 
The second part disagrees with an assessment presupposed by the question. It is also 
an unexpected answer to a question. 
The complexity of my intuitive example 1: 3.15 above (consistent with the characteristics 
of dispreferredness) can alternatively be interpreted in terms of (a) violation of the 
maxim of Quantity, or (b) redress of threat to A's positive face. Indeed, the 
characteristics of dispref erred seconds listed above are all consistent with the 
avoidance of FTAs; much of politeness theory could be reconstructed within CA. More 
fundamentally, Levinson (1983, pp. 345-364) has devised an ingenious CA re- 
interpretation of the notion of indirect speech act as a particular type of 'pre-sequence', 
on the basis of this framework of turn-taking and preference. 
OVERVIEW: APPROACHES TO DISCOURSE 
Levinson (op. cit. ) is probably responsible for presenting CA as an approach to 
discourse which is in opposition to less empirically-based approaches. His somewhat 
adversarial approach has since been taken up by supporters on both 'sides' (see, for 
example, Hopper, 1989, p. 60; Mey, 1993, pp. 48-49). This is unfortunate, because 
each approach offers different kinds of insights into interactive talk, and the wise 
analyst would do well not to be exclusive when interpreting transcripts. 
In a recent book, Deborah Schiffrin (1994) sets out to reconcile many of the differences 
between alternative traditions in discourse analysis. She identifies six such 
approaches, including those associated with Speech Act Theory, with the Gricean 
cooperative framework, with Interactional Sociolinguistics (embracing Politeness 
Theory) and with Ethnomethodology. Schiffrin illustrates the different ways that these 
approaches illuminate sample texts. She argues that 
All [these approaches] attempt to answer some of the same questions, 
e. g. How do we organise language into units that are larger than sentences? 
How do we use language to convey information about the world, ourselves 
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and our social relationships? (p. viii) 
Schiffrin concludes that: 
[... ] all the approaches to discourse view language as social interaction, and all 
are compatible with a functionalist rather than a formalist paradigm. (p. 415) 
One of six unifying principles identified by Schiffrin (p. 416) asserts that analysis of 
discourse is empirical; analyses are predictive, they produce hypotheses. This is 
important, because it characterises the approach I took to the transcripts which 
I accumulated in this research. 
Elsewhere, Brown and Yule (1983, p. 22) similarly claim that: 
The discourse analyst, with his 'ordinary language data' [... ] may wish to 
discuss, not'rules', but regularities, simply because his data constantly 
exemplifies non-categorical phenomena. (author's emphasis) 
This interest in regularities is indicative of my own approach to the analysis of the 
transcripts of mathematics talk. But, for me, those regularities must have some 
inferential significance because, as a mathematics educator, I cannot be content 
merely to describe them. I do want to try to get "behind conversation", to make 
inferences and conjectures about "what is really going on" (Levinson, 1983, p. 287) - 
transactionally and interactionally - in mathematics talk. 
My analytical approach is eclectic. My study of transcripts has been formative of more 
general analytical methods and in that sense (for me) highly inductive. I come to the 
transcripts without particular linguistic expectations. I describe what I find there, and 
then I set about studying that regularity, that phenomenon. 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter I have laid out the linguistic elements of the analytical framework that I 
shall apply to the analysis of many mathematical conversations. It is a highly eclectic 
framework, with the aim of insight into pragmatic aspects of talk in interaction. Speech 
is perceived as performing actions of various kinds, the effects of which on others may 
be indirect. Similarly, the intended meanings of utterances may be superficially 
obscure. Grice's theory of implicature asserts that cooperation (in the sense I have 
described) is nevertheless assured in conversation, and that this principle is central to 
the very possiblity of pragmatic interpretation of various kinds of vague and indirect 
contributions to conversation. 
Whereas considerations of politeness can be argued to account for many vague and 
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indirect features of conversation, these same features can be viewed (from a CA 
perspective) as an empirical regularity of interactive talk. 
In the opening chapter, I explained my decision to reflect the chronological order of my 
work between 1991 and 1995 in the order of presentation in Chapters 4 to 6. In the first 
of these chapters, I give an account of how I first became aware of the significance of 
deixis in my data. I shall demonstrate the crucial communicative and meaning-making 
function of deictic language elements of mathematical discourse. 
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CHAPTER 4: POINTING WITH PRONOUNS 
What is implied in the proper use of pronouns? Do children recognise them 
early and integrate them in their own speech with ease and total 
comprehension? (Gattegno, 1981, p. 5) 
In this chapter, I shall argue that the contribution of context to the interpretation of 
vague utterances enhances the ability of speakers (particularly novice speakers of 
mathematics) to refer to aspects of their own mathematical thinking, and thus assists 
their communication of such ideas. The argument centres on the use of pronouns in 
mathematics talk, and is based on two generative case studies. [Note 4.1 ] 
THE INFORMANTS 
The early stages of my data collection were based on extended, weakly-framed 
mathematical conversations with two children, Susie and Simon. My technique in 
contingent questioning was substantially trialled and developed in a series of 
interviews with Susie. I then undertook a somewhat smaller case-study applying the 
same weakly-framed interview method; the subject of these three interviews, which 
took place over a Christmas vacation, was Simon, aged 123/4 at the time. Being my 
son, he may have been a captive audience, but he was interested and cooperative. 
Like Susie, he is a quick thinker, and he articulates his thinking well. Paradoxically 
perhaps, being in close family relationship with me, Simon probably sees me as an 
'authority' figure in mathematical matters more than Susie does; he is aware of my 
background and what I do when I'm at work - and sometimes when I'm not supposed 
to be at work (Rowland, 1992b). 
If only on grounds of availability, Simon was an obvious choice as'informant (the term 
given by linguists to a source of linguistic data). Yet Simon plays only a supporting role 
in this thesis, whilst Susie has the lead. It was the conversations with Susie that jolted 
my research into life, and affirmed my conviction in the value of close study of 
individual children. As Stephen Brown says: 
One incident with one child, seen in all its richness, frequently has more to 
convey to us than a thousand replications of an experiment conducted with 
hundreds of children. (1981, p. 11) 
Susie was nine years old at the time that we began our extended mathematical 
conversations. For me it was an important period - for the particular purpose of 
investigating Susie's mathematical thinking, and with the general aim of developing my 
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own competence in contingent questioning. We talked together for over three hours in 
total, initially on four occasions over a period of five weeks [S1-4] and again some 
months later [S5]. The transcripts run to nearly eight thousand words. [Note 4.2] 
I had spent most of the Spring term with her class at her school. Her teacher favours 
children working and learning together, but Susie was a child who did not seem to 
thrive in a co-operative group situation; she rarely seemed to be impressed by the 
ideas of her peers. Conversely, her proposals were usually ignored by them, partly (I 
think) because her insights were frequently inaccessible, or were elaborated at a 
length beyond the attention-span of her audience. 
However, I was frequently fascinated by her contributions to teacher-managed class 
discussions when she showed that she was articulate and willing to expose her 
thinking to external scrutiny: for example, in a debate to determine the cost of one 
ruler, ten of which cost £3.50, Susie volunteered, "It's 35p, 'cos you cross off a 
nought". This was immediately followed by other estimates and proposals which 
suggested that very few of the children had listened to Susie's contribution, or had 
regarded it as being especially significant. My own instinctive reaction was that she 
had chosen an appropriate operation, but that she was 'merely' rehearsing a rule she 
had learned somewhere to execute the calculation. Perhaps with the same thought in 
mind, her teacher returned to Susie, and invited her to say more to the class about her 
method. "You cross off a nought, " repeated Susie, continuing: 
"If you have ten, and you take away nine ones, you have just the one left ... it's 
because you take away a ninth ... no, nine-tenths. So there's one-tenth left. " 
I was, and am, fascinated by the fact that Susie 'explains' division by ten by talking 
about subtracting nine-tenths i. e. take away nine-tenths of ten (she seems to be 
saying) and you're left with one, just like crossing off the nought. Appendix 2 is 
principally an analysis of Susie's idiosyncratic approach to a particular class of division 
problems. 
On this and on other occasions, Susie gave evidence of confidence, efficiency, and an 
unusual self-monitoring capability in her mathematical thinking, As it happens, her 
reading and writing of English were at that time significantly behind her mathematical, 
scientific, and indeed her artistic attainments. 
She had another quality which was invaluable for my research purposes; that is a quiet 
but determined intellectual independence (not to put too fine a point on it, stubborn- 
ness), coupled with a direct kind of honesty which can manifest itself as rudeness, as 
measured by conventional social norms. Consequently, I never felt, in our 
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conversations, that Susie was saying what she thought might please me in preference 
to what she believed. She frequently interrupted me when it suited her to do so. I 
initiated our conversations, but I didn't feel that I controlled them. To this extent they 
were weakly-framed as well as 'contingent': Susie seemed very happy to think on her 
feet, and I was compelled to do the same. Originally, I transcribed our conversations in 
search of data about her imagery in relation to number concepts and operations. This 
is particularly evident in the opening passages of transcript S4. What I got turned out to 
be generally disappointing in that respect. However, on close inspection of the text, I 
uncovered a significant linguistic phenomenon, her use of certain pronouns. 
THE EXCLUSIVE 'WE': PRONOUNS AND MATHEMATICS EDUCATION 
In Chapter 3 of Speaking Mathematically, David Pimm discusses the use of the 
pronoun 'we' in adult social practice, in particular in mathematics pedagogy. The 
following dialogue is from a classroom excerpt (Pimm, 1987, p. 65) involving a teacher 
and a ten-year-old pupil. The problem under discussion is 26 - 17. 
Teacher: What column's that? The tens column. Right. And what do we do there? 
Pupil: We cross that one out ... and then we put one there. 
Teacher: We take a ... 
Pupil: Er ... er ... er ... 
Teacher: We take a ... What do we take from the tens column? We take a ten, don't 
we? 
It is a ritual intonement of a procedure (in this case, for subtraction by decomposition) 
which has been imposed on the audience, the child. This particular algorithm 
(decomposition) seems to be a particularly rich source of teacher 'we's. Hilary Shuard 
transcribed a similar conversation (given in full in Shuard, 1986) around the'sum' 
42 - 25, which includes 
Teacher: [... ] Why can't you do it? 
Pupil: Two ones. 
Teacher: You've only got two ones haven't you? You haven't got enough. Do you 
remember, when we went through these sums last week, what we said 
you had to do, if you hadn't got enough? 
Pupil: ... errr ... 
Teacher: What did we say you had to do? 
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It is improbable that the child is included in the tine' in phrases like "what we said you 
had to do". The phrase could be intended to imply "What I said in your presence". 
Mühlhäusler and Harrd (1990, p. 129) propose that when academics use 'we' in 
exposition, it is in order to draw the listener into complicity. They point out that the 
addressee is thereby trapped in tacit agreement, and so prevented from voicing hostile 
opposition by the special (if ephemeral) relationship that has been artificially forged 
between expositor and audience. [Note 4.311 believe that the teacher's 'we' has much 
of this quality. Pimm (1987, pp. 69-70) suggests that the teacher is often associating 
herself with some other (un-named) person or persons. He argues that the teacher, by 
using the plural pronominal form, is sometimes appealing to an un-named'expot 
community to provide authority for the imposition of a certain kind of classroom 
practice. Like the editorial We' (Wales, 1980, p. 27), the effect Is to associate the 
speaker with a select and powerful group, from which the audience is clearly excluded. 
The result is to discourage and devalue any sense that the child might make of the 
situation, and to urge acquisition of the 'proper way' of doing such'sums'. Such 
appeals to the support and authority of unspecified others is not. of course, peculiar to 
mathematics. Wills observes that: 
'We' seems to have the greatest imprecision of referent of all English 
pronouns, and therefore is the most exploited for strategic ends (Wills, 1 977, 
p. 279; emphasis added). 
Prime Minister John Major, in a speech (12th June 1991, reported in The Times 
Educational Supplement, 19th July 1991, p. 5) to the Centre for Policy Studies 
asserted that: 
We have been engaged in the struggle to resist insidious attacks on literature 
and history in our schools. 
Given Wills' observation, it is interesting to speculate whether Major was associating 
himself with the right-wing, self-appointed CPS, or with the elected government. 
I now turn to consider some ways in which Susie used two particular pronouns in our 
mathematical conversations. 
'IT' 
Initially, I was struck by the frequent appearance of the personal pronoun 'it' in our 
dialogue. By way of illustration, consider the following extract from our third session. 
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S3: 68 Tim: What about this one you did; two hundred and sixty divided by ten is what? 
69 Susie: Twenty-six. 
[Tim write s 260=10=26] 
70 Tim: Right. And what's twenty-six times ten? 
71 Susie: Twenty-six times ten ... twenty-six lots of ten ... ten lots of twenty-six ... oh, 
it's with forty it doesn't work. With forty I don't think it ... except with ones 
and tens and ... ones and tens. It wouldn't ... and twenties, sometimes 
twenties, ... em, sometimes thirties, sometimes forties, sometimes fifties, 
sometimes sixties, sometimes seventies, eighties, nineties, ... 
72 Tim: You mean ... 
73 Susie: If you do ten.. and I think it would be ten if it, ... I don't, I'm not sure ... 
suppose you had 266 ... I'm not sure about this, I'll just find out. 
74 Tim: Yes, you experiment and find out 
[Susie writes 266=10=26.6] 
75 Susie: That's twenty-six point-six. And twenty-six point-six lots of ten ... so you'd 
in a way put a nought on the end, but you'd end up like that [she has 
written 26.6x10=266] 
76 Tim: When you say ... [interrupted] 
77 Susie: So any tens with any other, with any number, it would end up like that. 
78 Tim: With tens ... [interrupted] 
79 Susie: [forte] and the same with ones, but not with something like sevens, or 
whatever. And sometimes with twenties and thirties and forties and fifties 
and sixties and so on. 
80 Tim: What's another number like seven that you think it wouldn't work with? 
81 Susie: It wouldn't work with ... [writes 30-7- ] 
82 Tim: You're doing seven again? 
83 Susie: Yep, I thought you asked me for seven. 
84 Tim: I said, it doesn't work with seven, is there another number like seven that it 
wouldn't work with? 
85 Susie: Oh, with forty, keeping the forty? 
86 Tim: I don't mind, you can change it if you want. I mean, is it the number your 
dividing by that makes it work, or the number you're dividing into ... 
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Susie: I'm not sure if five does do It or doesn't do It. So could I find out if five does 
do It? 
Tim: Of course you can. 
Susie: But I'm not saying that this one will not work, OK? [writes 30+511 want to 
know whether it's doing it or not. (pause) Six. And then six lots of five; five 
lots of six [writes 6x5-30] . It does work. 
Tim: So it works with five. 
Susie: With tens ... ones, fives and tens It probably always works. 
And sometimes 
fifteens, twenties, twenty-fives. [then very fast] thirties, thirty-fives, forties, 
forty-fives, fifties, fifty-fives, sixties, sixty-fives, seventies, seventy-fives. 
eighties, eighty-fives, nineties. 
Tim: It works with all those numbers d'you think? 
Susie: Sometimes it works. Sometimes. 
I selected the passage above in order to make a point; but is it misleading? I shall 
consider the full corpus. But in any case, how to judge whether the occurrence 
[Note 4.4] of the neuter third person singular pronoun in that corpus is in any way 
unexpected, or untypical? To make a start on this question, a list of the words which 
children use frequently is needed, such as that compiled by Rinsland (1945) in the 
USA, from children's writing and conversation. More recent studies of the vocabulary of 
English children include those of Burroughs (1957) from speech data, and Edwards & 
Gibbon (1973) from children's spontaneous writing. [Note 4.51 Despite their differing 
methodologies, there is a high level of agreement between these two studies about the 
ranking of very common words. The speech/writing data for both of these studies were 
from children up to two years younger than Susie. However at age 7+ the nine words 
used most frequently are (in decreasing order of popularity): 
and, the, a, 1, to, it, is, my, go 
In fact the first five are way out in front on the basis of a 'popularity index' [Note 4.6] 
used by Edwards and Gibbon, followed by'it and the other three above, which are 
about equal to each other. 
So I compared the incidence of 'it' with that of these other eight words in my 
transcripts, for each of my meetings with Susie, and aggregated over the full 
7760-word corpus. My findings on these eight words are shown opposite in Table 4.1. 
Table 4.2 overleaf gives additional comparative data on the first eight of these words 
and others which occurred most frequently in the transcripts. 
104 
The frequency-trend for the first five words in Table 4.1 is much as expected from the 
studies of Burroughs, Edwards and Gibbon, and indeed from broadly-comparable 
studies (in particular that of Howes, 1966) of adult language. [Note 4.7] The seventh- 
ranking 'is' (according to Edwards and Gibbon) occurs significantly less frequently (less 
than half as often) than those first five, as expected; in fact, it is ranked 12th in the 
Susie corpus. I find it unsurprising that appearances of'my' and 'go' are rare in our 
maths talk. The observation that Susie makes extensive use of 'I' in the first session 
may be accounted for by the fact that she was at that time acquainting me with some 
of her personal approaches to arithmetic; perhaps Susie also felt the need to assert 
herself most in our initial intellectual manoeuvres. 
Si S2 S3 S4 S5 ALL PER 1000 
and 41 44 47 42 55 228 29 
the 40 71 39 26 51 227 29 
a 29 48 26 28 89 220 28 
47 38 16 25 63 189 24 
to 28 47 11 30 41 157 20 
it 26 57 48 28 64 223 29 
it's 13 10 11 2 13 49 6 
is 17 15 20 6 32 90 12 
my 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
go 0 0 1 4 4 9 1 
LENGTH 1130 1810 1310 1060 2450 7760 1000 
Table 4.1 
The pronoun 'it' (ranked sixth by Edwards and Gibbon) is consistently used more often 
in my conversation with Susie than these quantitative studies of natural language 
would lead one to expect, clearly ranking alongside 'and', 'the' and 'a'. Table 4.2 shows 
that effectively only 'you' (which I will consider later) occurs more frequently, and even 
that is no longer the case if occurrences of 'it's' are included. Indeed it (by which I 
mean 'it') is one of the lexical hallmarks of our conversation. 
Pimm (1987, p. 22) remarks that: 
Like much informal talk, spontaneous discourse about mathematics is full of 
half-finished and vague utterances. 
He proceeds to illustrate the point by drawing attention to the use of 'it' in an exchange 
(about enlargement) between a teacher and secondary pupil. 
105 
C. 
CD 
IV 
m 
a 
Q. 
C) 
C. 
g 
CD 
V 
W 
N 
0 
N 
CD 
a, 
A) 
w 
A) 
ýc 
f 
y 
N 
CD 
O 
M 
N 
th 
O 
ä 
Cl) 
I 0 
II1 
CL 
N 
a 
C- 0 A ný 
y 
0 
Co 
Co 
N 
N N N N N N + -+ -ý -+ ; -+ -+ -+ i tD co V Qf ul A W N + ; Ln A W O tD OD cl, i A W N + O pý 
r O ' 5 . M 7 O cD 
f in to ° O O a W( N p 
w 
y 
N d; O O a C O ä ä 
J 
-1 (V 1 
2 
+ + -ý V . A C) O) V -+ Of + + + + N A W N N ýa . N Cý ' + -+ W W N N V V N OD OD V N t0 OD O + Q) `C c p Ö + C 
N (C i N - - - N .. ' + N + + N N A W O 
V A 
w N OC (n 
J 
co W 
1 
0ý (71 A N Qf (J N Nf O 
I 
N V D P N 
O 
i - i i C) (p (3) 0) i V i O + + N + + N + r /ý N l+ W A X71 
W_ l l O -+ + Q1 (7f (0 A O OD W 1 C) - Cf tG 0) 1 co to V N I W 
O 
+ O -+ N (T N co co co - + tC -+ + Q1 W co ;3 W N - N N N A N O N O N O V O UI V 0) co O) N OA N 
I 
I l 
O 
U1 + -+ -+ CO N - + N N W + N W A UI 
+ . 
A 
+ 
Of 
W 
Of 
+ 
CD 0) 
A 
UI 
- 
cn 
A 
co 
O -Al 0) G) W Co (T co C. ) 0) . t0 0) fV W 0) - t0 
O 
V A . A U1 Ut (T U1 Of -4 V V -4 Co (D N N N 
N N 
CO t0 lD - W tD CD W O N W V + O O V C) N Ö W N 
V 7 G W 
A + (n (n 0) r + + + .+ + N A N N N W W N 
O N N + + (T UI - C) N N Co Q1 C. ) N 0) W -ý 
O 
O 
i (T 0) OD -+ V OD Co -+ V CO - V CO + -' -+ N N N N W W N A N Of W W -+ N N O -+ t0 V + CO . 01 N + 
N 
O 
O 
co co co cn V (. 71 Q) (J1 r js i + + + i N OD + N N W W W A 
(7º + ýJI A O O N N O V O (7) N -+ W 
O i N (n N CD co W t0 + OD cD + 0) W O* N 
J 
N 
W 
N 
A 
- 
Qi 
N 
Qi 
N 
C) 
N 
(n . O 
N 
to - i J Qi 
O 
M -4 U" V A i Cf V W - + 00 + + "' N + + N N W N N N W 
r r W + W Co + t0 -4 C) NI O) Q, - N W -ý 
I 
p 
O 
O 
O Qf O> V V O Co O W O W Ö . N - 
O O O N Co) M. V Co (00 (00 W A 
L 
O O O O 
Cf i r to + + V Of N -+ X71 A Cf W Of N + W -. * 
N O N N O Ö O A N W to OD C. ) j 
CA) O O 
V X71 V W X71 + N O V A Vf X71 V t0 (2% N 
Uf O (. n o. V 
O 
p 
y 
N 
+ i + N -ý N N N t0 N + + N + + -ý V A N + V1 Ca W Qf _ A Oý N N Cý1 A W V1 O V ýO -+ W + OD O 
7c 
CJ to 
V X71 -+ O W V V N - N W W V V W C) C A r P' + C 
O -+ N O + 0 
(1f ß. J1 V1 (A th 0 A 
+ N -+ V OD W A -+ Cf V + + N Oo . W N A V UI -ý + C W , r- O) N N W N W 03 W (71 A Uf Qf CO V O N ? 
(3) 
1 
' 
l 
O 
7C W 
106 
Teacher: [... ] Its width is only a third as long as that one so -[... ] how many of the 
smaller squares can you fill in? - nine, right. 
Pupil: Is it that you square it - every time? 
Pimm comments on the ambiguity of the referents for the occurrences of 'it', 
particularly in the pupil's question. He suggests that in saying "you square it", the pupil 
is making a generalisation. He picks up the "crucial expression ... every time" in 
evidence. I shall examine the pupil's use of 'you' to support his conclusion further. 
Incidentally, the pupil's first 'it' could well be seen as an embryonic form of the 
cataphora "Is it the case that... ", drawing on the philosophical register. 
Building on Pimm's observation, and my awareness of the frequent occurrence of 'it' in 
my Susie corpus, I have considered the varied purposes for which 'it' is being deployed 
in the corpus, and suggest that 'it' is a distinctive and important feature of maths talk, to 
the extent that it acts as a linguistic pointer, invariant at the surface level. To 
investigate this, I considered (for each occurrence) what 'it' is referring to. What is it 
being used to mean? The variable character of the referent of 'it' is illustrated in the 
examples which follow. 
Our first conversation began as follows: 
S1: 1 Tim: Imagine a square standing on its edge, on a table. Sketch what you see. 
[Susie draws the table and the square in 3D, showing edge of card] 
2 Susie: It's the width of it. 
3 Tim: Imagine a very thin square. The square rocks around on its bottom 
corners, jumps up, floats off the table, spins around, slows down, and 
drops back onto the table. 
4 Susie: It's all floppy over ... it bounces and sort of flops down. 
From the outset, in Susie's very first 'turns' [S1: 2,4] in our conversation, the'it's are in 
evidence. There is a superficial and coincidental resemblance to Pimm's 
Pupil: Is it that you square it - every time? 
Squares feature in both situations, though one is algebraic (a product), the other 
geometric. The second 'it' In S1: 2 and those in S1: 4 are anaphoric as she makes 
reference to a square which I have already introduced in S1: 1. Rather, she is referring 
to to her mental image of a square. There are questions that I could pursue about this 
geometric image (where is it?; what is it like?; can I get access to it?; of what class of 
squares is it a representative? ). Note that "the table" is a viable (if unlikely) alternative 
referent in S1: 4, on the basis of the interchange above; at the time I did not even 
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consider that possibility, since my own attention was on the square - my square. With 
her first 'it' [S1: 2] she refers to her drawing of the edge of the card; I am able to infer 
this from her gesture to the relevant part of the drawing. The pronoun is not co- 
referential with anything that has been (or is about to be) said. 
This is an example of the linguistic phenomenon of deixis, by which a referent must be 
inferred by consideration of spatial, temporal, personal or other aspects of the context 
of speech (Levinson. 1983, Chapter 3). Thus, (above) the pupil's first 'it' is cataphoric, 
formulating the question that follows, but the second is deictic (referring to a ratio of 
lengths). 
Towards the end of the second session, I say: 
S2: 94 Tim: One last thing. You remember last week we were doing multiplying by five. 
and you said that's easy. What you did, you multiplied by ten, you added a 
nought, ... 
95 Susie: ... and then you halved it. 
Here the referent is a number, ostensibly the original number multiplied by ten. Or is it 
the original number with a zero tacked on the end (which may be the same thing in 
form only; but recall my tale of Susie and the Problem of the Ten Rulers)? Or does 
economy suggest that it is precisely the original number which Susie halves, leaving 
the zero to hold the end place? Like the teachers 'we', Susie's use of the pronoun 'you' 
- referring to herself but perhaps not only to herself - is an interesting instance of 
participant deixis (Wills 1977); the 'you' has an indefinite, impersonal quality, to be 
considered later in this chapter. 
The dialogue continues : 
S2: 98 Tim: Now why, do you think, when you multiply by ten, you just add a nought. 
99 Susie: Because ... 10 lots of ... if you count up in twos, suppose, the tenth will be 
twenty. And fours forty, fives fifty, and so on. Sixes sixty, sevens seventy, 
eights eighty, nines ninety, tens one hundred. And so on. ten lots of, that's 
just a nought on the end. 
100 Tim: That's extraordinary isn't it. Does that surprise you? 
101 Susie: Not to me. 
102 Tim: Why does that happen with ten though, and not twelve, or nine, or.. Why 
does multiplying by ten add a nought on the end? 
103 Susie: Twenty would add two noughts, for instance. 
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104 Tim: So if I multiplied, say, three by twenty, that would give three with two 
noughts? 
105 Susie: No. No, no, no, no, no. Silly me. Silly me. No. It's only with ten. For twenty 
you would double the number at the beginning. 
106 Tim: Why is ten the magic number like that? 
107 Susie: I don't ... it's just mathematics. 
108 Tim: [laughs]. You mean the magic number might have been thirteen, or seven, 
but it just happens to be ten. 
109 Susie: By how the mathematics is made. How it was invented. 
110 Tim: Who invented it then? 
111 Susie: No, I didn't invent it! 
112 Tim: No, who invented it? 
113 Susie: Don't know. They invented the mathematics and then people sort of added 
to it. It grew over the years. 
114 Tim: Why did the people that invented the mathematics make ten the magic 
number? 
115 Susie: I don't know [laughs] 
In this case (S2: 105 "It's only with ten") the referent is a symbolic procedure. She is 
noting a property which belongs to powers of ten, but not to all multiples of ten. The 
property in question is clear from the context above. Indeed I explicitly state the 
simplest version [S2: 102]; Susie formulates and subsequently withdraws a 
generalisation of it. 
I have included the concluding lines [S2: 106-115] in which [109,113] Susie makes 
anaphoric reference to 'mathematics', which she seems happy to discuss as an 
objective entity, even to the extent of giving it the definite article. Is it fanciful to suggest 
that Susie takes a non-platonist position vis-ä-vis mathematics? She certainly sees it 
as something "invented" rather than 'just there' or discovered. The clearest statement 
of her position is given quite spontaneously: 
S1: 113 Susie: Don't know. They invented the mathematics and then people sort of added 
to it. It grew over the years. 
come now to some examples which show how Susie makes effective use of the 
pronoun 'it to point to ideas of a general nature which neither she nor I have named, 
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and whose nature I must be expected to infer. 
Deixis 
I shall demonstrate that Susie sometimes employs 'it' as a conceptual deictic i. e. to 
point to concepts. The following example comes from our third session. 
S3: 17 Susie: No, no ... but times can do it can't it. and add, and take ... no, takeaways 
can't do it. 
The second 'it' seems to have the earlier 'times' (multiplication) as referent. The first 
(and third) 'it' is more problematic. On the basis of these 18 words alone one can 
certainly surmise what the first/third referent - object of the verb'to do' - might be. For 
example (given that Susie is nine) "which operations make bigger". Her syntax 
indicates that it is the operations themselves which can or can't do whatever-'it'-is. A 
more extensive context is required. A short lead-in gives some help: 
S3: 12 Tim: Why is it that twelve divided by two is equal to six. then? 
13 Susie: Well what it is, is this number [12] and see how many times that [2] goes 
into there [12] . How many times two goes into twelve. 
14 Tim: ahh.. two goes into twelve.. 
15 Susie: or twelve goes into two 
16 Tim: or twelve goes into two 
17 Susie: No, no ... but times can do it can't it, and add, and take ... no. takeaways 
can't do it. 
I am quite sure that Susie has introduced the concept of commutativity into our 
dialogue. Not only does she not name the concept, but she is probably unable to give 
a name to it; perhaps it would be very surprising if she could. However she certainly 
knows when 'it' holds. With the deictic'it', used here as a provisional object (Zandvoort, 
1965, p. 135), she can articulate aspects of what she knows, and she does so quite 
spontaneously and unexpectedly. [Note 4.8] 
I regard her use of deixis in my final example (which is a prelude to the extended 
extract from transcript S3 given earlier in this chapter) as even more fascinating. To set 
the scene: Susie had divided 56 by ten and written 5.6. She explained what point-six 
signifies: 
S3: 28 Susie: It means it's six of the number you're doing it by, a tenth. Six-tenths. 
29 Tim: Ah, six-tenths. 
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30 Susie: It's six-tenths of the real number. 
[Note 4.9] 
I'm suspicious that she is using decimals as remainders. To test this hypothesis, I ask 
her for 56 divided by 17. The question is a contingent one, chosen with the aim of 
precipitating cognitive conflict; it is chosen to give 5 as remainder. Susie duly writes 
3.5. Closing in, I ask her: 
S3: 37 Tim: What does that point five mean? 
38 Susie: It's a half of a ... it's a half, of the real number. That's three of the real 
number and the point five means it's going to be tenths. The three is three 
whole numbers. 
It now seems that her remainder-is-decimal rule is getting some interference from her 
confident knowledge that point five is a half. So next I set up 40 divided by 7. Susie 
writes 5.5, and again confirms that the point five is a half. 
S3: 40 Tim: Right, let's get this absolutely clear. Is that five whole ones and a half of 
one? 
41 Susie: Yep. 
42 Tim: So how many lots of seven in forty, it's five and a half? 
43 Susie: Yep. 
She continued, to my surprise, by volunteering an arithmetic deductive inference: 
43 Susie: Yep. So seven lots of five and a half is forty. 
Unawares, she has opened up a chink that I can exploit to 'correct' her generalised 
mis-construction about decimals. So I press home the cognitive conflict, and ask her to 
work out seven lots of five and a half [S3: 44.53]. She obtains 38.5, preferring to work 
with 0.5 for a half. 
. S3: 51 
Susie: You could do this [she writes 0.5=7=3.5, corrects 'I 
52 Tim: So what's seven lots of five point-five altogether? 
53 Susie: Thirty-five point-five ... thirty-six point-six ... no, thirty-eight point-five [writes 
5.5x7-38.5] 
Thinking that I have a checkmate situation, so to speak, I home in: 
S3: 60 Tim: Now what does that mean? [indicates 40=7=3.5] 
61 Susie: How many times does seven go into forty 
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62 Tim: When you actually work it out, five point-five times seven, you don't get the 
number you started with. 
63 Susie: I know 
64 Tim: Isn't that a bit funny? 
65 Susie: No, that isn't, because whatever number you put in there [indicates 7] 
you'd never reach forty, except for one. And you're not allowed one 
66 Tim: Why not? 
67 Susie: 'cos it's not really in the maths, it's just one. two. three, four. five, six. 
seven, eight,.. [meaning the one-times table? ] 
Susie is unperturbed. When 40 is divided by 7, and the quotient is then multiplied by 7, 
she has no problem in living with a product which differs from 40, or so it would 
appear. In fact, Susie subsequently enters into a lengthy and self-driven exploration 
into what she considers to be 'special cases' in which divisor x quotient - dividend. 
First she considers 10, in which she has some confidence, but which she tests with a 
'crucial experiment (Balacheff, 1988, p. 218), taking 266 for the 'crucial' dividend. 
S3: 73 Susie: If you do ten-and I think it would be ten if it.... I don't. I'm not sure ... 
suppose you had 266 ... 1'm not sure about this, Ill just find out. 
7 Tim: Yes, you experiment and find out 
[Susie writes 266=10=26.6] 
75 Susie: That's twenty-six point-six. And twenty-six point-six lots of ten ... so you'd 
in a way put a nought on the end, but you'd end up like that [she has 
written 26.6x10=2661 
Susie proceeds to consider whether 5 is also a 'special case', although her test case, 
involving 30, seems rather lenient in comparison: 
S3: 87 Susie: I'm not sure if five does do it or doesn't do it. So could I find out if five does 
do it? 
88 Tim: Of course you can. 
89 Susie: But I'm not saying that this one will not work, OK? (writes 30+5] I want to 
know whether it's doing it or not. (pause] Six. And then six lots of five; five 
lots of six (writes 6x5-30]. It does work. 
She goes on to make conjectures, and she articulates generalisations freely: 
S3: 90 Tim: So it works with five? 
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91 Susie: With tens ... ones, fives and tens it probably always works. And sometimes 
fifteens, twenties, twenty-fives, [then very fast] thirties, thirty-fives, forties, 
forty-fives, fifties, fifty-fives, sixties, sixty-fives, seventies, seventy-fives, 
eighties, eighty-fives, nineties. 
92 Tim: It works with all those numbers d'you think? 
93 Susie: Sometimes it works. Sometimes. 
One week later, at our next meeting, Susie is able to recall, with remarkable fidelity, 
what it was that she had come, in a tentative way, to believe: 
S4: 31 Tim: OK, here's something left over from last week. We had 260=10=26 and 
26x10=260. We also had 40=7=5.5 and 5.5x7=38.5 [Tim writes all these] 
OK? You remember that we talked about that? 
32 Susie: Yes, but if five or ten you do it with, it always comes out the same number. 
33 Tim: Yes, l was going to say that you said to me that sometimes ... [interrupted] 
34 Susie: And sometimes fifteen, twenty, twenty-five, thirty, thirty-five, fifty, fifty-five, 
sixty, sixty-five, seventy, seventy-five, eighty, eighty-five, ninety. 
35 Tim: Ninety-five? 
36 Susie: Yes. 
37 Tim: A hundred? 
38 Susie: Sometimes. 
39 Tim: A hundred and five? 
40 Susie: Sometimes. Any by five or by ten will sometimes do it. 
41 Tim: What will it do? 
42 Susie: You start with the same number as you end. 
Susie has abstracted a connection between dividing and multiplying which becomes 
the focus of so much of our subsequent conversation. She has no name for this 
relation, so she makes deictic use of the neuter third person pronoun, and frequently 
by saying that such-and-such a number (the divisor) will "do it", or in the phrase "it 
works" [S3: 87,89]. Her vagueness achieves for her the goal of covering for lexical 
gaps. Channell (1985, pp. 12-15) noted the same ability in her linguistics students in a 
tutorial, "to get across a meaning where they do not have at their disposal the 
necessary words or expressions which they need to associate with the concepts they 
are forming" (p. 12). 
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Recall that Pimm notes the significance of the "crucial expression ... every time" in the 
formulation of his pupil's generalisation. His (the pupil's) generalisation is offered in the 
form of a question, giving it a certain tentative rather than assertive quality. Likewise 
Susie knows that there is a generalisation waiting to be articulated, but she is uncertain 
about how comprehensive it can be. For convenience, denote by s(b) the sentence: 
"For all n, bx(n=b)=n. " Now Susie is confident that s(5) and s(1 0) hold - this is evident 
in S4: 32. Here, for Susie, the "crucial" word is'always', used with identical meaning 
and effect as 'every time'. In no way is S4: 32 tentative. On the other hand she 
suspects the truth of s(1 5), s(20) and so on but conveys her doubt in the word 
'sometimes' which she uses repeatedly, and in contrast to 'always'. 'Sometimes' does 
not promise 'every time'. 
This episode illustrates how Susie's use of the deictic 'it' enables us to share and 
discuss a concept which Susie possesses as a meaningful abstraction, yet is unable to 
name. This particular concept is an interesting case in point, since, I suggest, it has no 
name. I recognise, however, that words like 'inverse', 'reverse' and 'opposite' are 
commonly used in naming the sentence 'for all non-zero b, s(b)'. The Statutory Orders 
for the National Curriculum in England and Wales [Note 4.10] opt for "recognise that 
multiplication and division are inverse operations, and use this to check calculations". 
I'm not happy with this statement - perhaps this is pedantry on my part? - because it is 
commonplace to conceive multiplication and division as being binary operations (give 
me a pair of numbers, and I'll tell you their product). Thus, for me, the word 'inverse' 
implies, quite wrongly, that these ideas are set in the framework of a calculus of binary 
operations. But what we actually have (for every non-zero real number a) are two 
mappings (unary operations); multiplication by a and division by a; and now it does 
make sense to say that these are inverse mappings, under composition. It Is well- 
known (Graham, 1992) that the authors of our National Curriculum were in too much of 
a hurry to think about such niceties. 
This analysis demonstrates that the beauty of the deictic 'it' lies in its function as 
conceptual variable. It (i. e. 'it) conveys the message, 'I have something in mind. I 
know what I mean, and I think that you know what I mean". It can be a linguistic pointer 
to a shared idea, to an understood but un-named mathematical referent at the deep 
structure level. It can give both of us secure and economical access to an algebraic 
proposition, whilst Susie sets about trying to put bounds on its generality. 
The notion of a (possibly tacit) object of attention is sometimes captured by the term 
'focus'; see e. g. Chafe (1972) for a linguistic account, Garrod and Sanford (1982) for a 
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psychological one. Moxey and Sanford (1993) connect pronoun use to'focus', in a way 
that confirms my view of 'it' as a linguistic pointer to concepts which occupy the 
attention of the speaker: 
focus can be inferred through ease of pronominal reference. Because 
personal pronouns such as 'it', 'she' and 'they' carry only minimal information 
to recover the referent [... ] it is clear that in practice things in a discourse that 
that can be referred to by pronouns must be a small subset of the possible 
previous antecedents, otherwise ambiguity would be rife. For this reason focus 
has become closely associated with the conditions of felicitous pronominal 
anaphora (... ]. The point is that pronouns are good for referring to things in 
focus, while noun-phrases of a more complex and informative kind are best for 
things not in focus. In this way ease or acceptability of pronominal reference 
can be used as an index and a probe for the state of focus, other things being 
equal. (p. 58, my emphasis) 
Although she was not aware of it, Susie caused me to notice and to reflect upon the 
deictic use of pronouns in maths talk. As a consequence of our first four conversations, 
over a period of a month or so, I began to work on her deployment of 'it'. There were 
signs however, on my fourth visit to her school, that she was becoming irritated by my 
probing questions. I had asked her to explain her answer to the multiplication 8x32.4, 
which she had insisted on doing in her head. As she muttered to herself, I said: 
S4: 54 Tim: I hope you're going to explain this to me later. 
I persisted until she said: 
65 Susie: Help!... [pathetic tone] This will take hours to explain. 
66 Tim: What will take hours to explain? 
67 Susie: All of it. 
Our conversation went into recess. When I returned, six months later, my attention 
shifted from 'it to another pronoun. 
ON'YOU' AND GENERALISATION 
I have already noted [S2: 951 Susie's use of 'you' to mean 'I' in her statement "... and 
then you halved it". Whilst such a use of 'you' as a vague referent is familiar in adults 
as well as children, it would make perfect sense (but imperfect truth) if Susie had 
intended 'you' to mean her audience (i. e. myself). The ability to interpret the deictic 
element (pronoun in this case) is dependent on knowledge of the 'coordinates' (time, 
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place, speaker, topic etc) of the deictic context. I discussed usage of the pronoun 'you' 
in the previous chapter. I shall now consider the particular significance of you' in 
mathematical conversation. 
'You' can, of course, be used to address the person or persons to whom one is 
speaking. Such use is typically deictic but generally unambiguous. The following 
anaphoric examples come from longer transcripts in Brissenden (1988) of two groups 
of children using a computer program, Trains. 
Craig: Nine add seven, that's sixteen, it's one ten and six. (but he enters 6 first 
and then 1J 
Steven: Craig, you've got sixty-one now, it's the wrong way round ... 
Gavin: Seventy-two plus seventy-two, that's a hundred and forty-four. 
Teacher: Gavin, that was quick. How did you work it out? 
In adult-child mathematical conversations where the power relationship is 
asymmetrical, my transcripts indicate that the teacher interviewer frequently uses You, 
to address the child, whereas the reverse is relatively rare. 
It is as though such usage of 'you' is a device which directly points to the other. And is 
it not rude to point? With the decline and disappearance of 'thou', English is almost 
unique among western European languages in having neither plural nor honorific 
distinction in second person pronouns. (Note 4.111 Brown and Gilman (1970) give an 
account of the power of pronouns as linguistic devices for expressing social 
distinctions in non-British European languages. French, for example. retains a 
pronominal social semantics in its T-V(tu, vous) system: tu is the marked singular, 
expressing intimacy or certainly informality, occasionally condescension (to children by 
default). Vous, the unmarked plural, is also the singular for public or formal 
conversation, occasionally used as a marked pronoun of respect (or distancing with 
adults). 
My data strongly suggests that the majority of instances of 'you' by children in 
mathematics talk can be seen to be indicative of things that happen "in the ordinary 
course of events" (Zandvoort, 1965, p. 128). Such things are generalities. Recall once 
more the pupil in Pimm's transcript: 
Pupil: Is it that you square it - every time? 
As Pimm observes, one pointer to the fact that the pupil is offering a generalisation is 
116 
the expression "every time". Another, I suggest, is the use of the vague, unmarked 
'you, functioning as a vague 'generaliser. 
In Chapter 3,1 drew attention to this phenomenon in non-mathematical text. I shall 
proceed to give four examples of it from my transcript data. 
Anna 
In the extract which follows (dipping a toe into data which will be introduced in the next 
chapter) I am talking to two girls about ways of 'making' twenty. Anna (aged 10) has 
proposed'minus one add twenty-one'. In my 'bookend' questions, probing for 
Roksana's position, she (Roksana) is the referent of my 'you'. But now study Anna's 
'explanation speech', and consider "Who is 'you'? " for Anna. 
T1: 54 Tim: Minus one add twenty-one. What do you think, Roksana? [pause] Right, 
explain to us why that would give us twenty, Anna. 
55 Anna: Cos nought add twenty equals twenty ... 
56 Tim: ... right 
57 Anna: ... so 
if you're going into the minuses you've got to ... em ... you've, 
instead of saying twenty, that would equal nineteen, instead of twenty-one. 
And, minus, if you're doing minus ... one add, add minus one, something 
equals twenty, you go minus one add twenty equals, it equals nineteen. 
So you need to go minus one add twenty-one equals twenty. 
58 Tim: Are you convinced by that, Roksana? 
In choosing the impersonal 'you' in preference to T, the speaker has 'de-centred' and 
become, in some sense, detached from what s/he is asserting. Personal confidence - 
albeit tentative - in the general application of some process or proposition enables the 
speaker to offer it for others to appropriate. When Anna says [T1: 57] "you go minus 
one add twenty equals, it equals nineteen" it could be that she is sharing some kind of 
number line imagery that (she believes) should be accessible and convincing to others. 
In any case she is saying that "anyone can do this". 
Simon 
I began the first of three mathematical conversations with Simon with an enquiry along 
the lines "give me two numbers whose sum is ten". I usually begin a first year 
undergraduate course in Number Theory with the same question: intended, in that 
situation, to explore what 'number' means to these new students. After similar 
preliminaries with Simon, he proceeded to determine the number of ways that any 
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positive integer could be 'made' as a sum of two positive integers. It was many months 
later, following abortive trials with other tasks, that I decided to adopt'Make Ten' for 
the next phase (Chapter 5) of contingent interviewing with a larger sample of children. 
Simon progressed to consider making a given integer as a sum of three integers. First 
he worked on 20 and came to see that the number of ways is the 18th triangular 
number. (The details are in Appendix 3, transcript Sit. ) Picking up the conversation at 
that point: 
Sit : 205 Tim: Right. Suppose instead of twenty. right. I said how many different ways are 
there of adding up three numbers to make fifty. 
206 Simon: I'd do forty-nine times [pause] twenty-five. 
207 Tim: [pause] You'd better explain that. 
208 Simon: Um, no, I wouldn't. I'd do forty-nine times twenty-four. 
209 Tim: Explain it. 
210 Simon: Well, it's the triangular number of, em. it's the ... working out the triangular. 
number of ... the forty-eighth triangular number. 
211 Tim: Mm-hm. Why do you know that? 
212 Simon: I'm going on the assumption that it works the same for twenty. 
213 Tim: What happens with twenty? 
214 Simon: It, em, I found the triangular number for eighteen, because ... the second 
number before twenty. 
215 Tim: Right, right. So what you do with fifty, you say... 
216 Simon: Make, work out the triangular number forty-eight. 
217 Tim: Right. 
218 Simon: And to do that, I times it by ... so I do forty-eight times ... no, I do forty-nine 
times half of forty-eight, which is twenty-four. 
219 Tim: Right. Can you see why it's forty-nine times half of forty-eight? 
220 Simon: Yeh 
221 Tim: Why? 
222 Simon: Because, to work out a triangular number, you get the first and the last, 
and the second and that ... 
223 Tim: and multiply it by how much? 
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224 Simon: Um, the num... a half of the number... of.,.. half the number of numbers 
you've got. So it's like from nought to forty-eight, so half of that, cos you've 
only got half the numbers to work out. 
Observe in passing Simon's expression "it works" in Si1: 212, strongly reminiscent of 
Susie's use of 'it' to point to a general relationship or procedure. In 206-212 he uses 'I' 
to describe what he did for 20 and what he predicts for 50. Whereas I use the vague 
generaliser 'you' in 215, Simon persists with the personal 'I' in 218 to describe how he 
would calculate a particular triangular number. In 222 and 224, however, he adopts the 
pronoun 'you' himself: here he is formulating a general procedure for such a 
calculation, and explaining why it works - Gauss' method, in fact, which I had in effect 
introduced him to earlier, for the purpose of finding the 18th triangular number 
(Appendix 3, Sill 89-203). 
Susie 
My fifth and final conversation with Susie was memorable, and is reproduced in full in 
Appendix 3, S5. This indeed was Susie's 'Kye' (Brown, 1981). The remarkable 
mathematical content deserves more extended attention, which it receives in 
Appendix 2. In this extract, Susie is developing a highly idiosyncratic method of 
dividing 100 by various fractions, five-sevenths in this instance. 
S5: 62 Tim: OK. Now, you said that it wouldn't work for seven-ninths didn't you, this 
method. Right? Now, I'd just like you to write down five-sevenths, just here. 
63 Susie: I'm going to have to think though, very well. Um, I'll try ... [pause]. Ahh, of 
course ... [interrupted] 
64 Tim: You have a think while I push the door up. 
65 Susie: ... you can't ... I don't understand. It's definitely a hundred. So that means 
two ... Ahh, ahhh [big moment you've got two left, and you need five each 
time. So if you have two hundred ... um ... divided by five. How many times 
does five go into two hundred? Well, it goes into one hundred twenty times 
66 Tim: Mm-hm 
67 . 
Susie: Must go into forty times. So that's ... a hundred and forty. 
Notice how Susie's "I" [63,65] becomes "you" [65] after the "ahh" which seems to 
signify the moment of insight. 
Again, the pronoun 'you' is an effective and non-trivial pointer to a quality of thinking. 
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Susie's shift from No j'ou'signifies her reference to a mathematical generalisation. 
The generality expression "each time" occurs in [651 as part of an account that has the 
quality of a generic example, for the exposition of the division method that Susie is 
developing 
In my 25,000 transcribed words of mathematical conversations with 9-11 year-old 
children, 'you' is the most frequently-used word (744 occurrences), followed by 'and' 
(662), 'to' (400) and 'a' (394). In the "dividing by fractions' conversation with Susie 
above (2450 words), Susie and I each use 'you' forty times. Every time I use the word, 
I am addressing Susie, whereas she uses 'you' to address me only twice - once to 
make sure that she's not leaving me behind! 
S5: 187 Susie: And it has to be two hundred. So you would have two hundred [writes] 
divided by five. Do you understand that? 
188 Tim: Yes thank you. 
On the whole, Susie reserves 'I' to mark her feelings and beliefs, or accounts of her 
personal actions, whereas you' indicates a kind of detachment from her strategy and 
computational methods. 
The same 'personal versus general' markers are evident in the final example. 
Katy 
In an undergraduate supervision with me [NT7]. Katy is talking about her progress with 
a project on continued fractions: 
NT7: 17 Tim: And what have you proved? 
18 Katy: Um, I've proved that ... I think, now I want you to have a look at it, 'cos I'm 
not sure if it's right, but I did this [... ] yeah, I was trying to, I've had a look 
at, I said that, right, the root of A squared plus one is equal to A plus one 
over alpha, like we did before ... 
19 Tim: Oh yeah, yeah, yeah, goon, yes. 
20 Katy: Um, and it's also equal to A plus one over two A plus one over alpha 
because you can, because alpha goes on forever you can start it 
whenever you want. 
21 Tim: Umm ... yeah, go on. 
22 Katy: And so I put those two equal to each other. 
The occurrences of 'I' are all set within accounts of personal actions located In time 
ý4 
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and space. This is also true of the 'we' in Katy's first turn [18]. I suggest, however, that 
the'you's in her second turn [20] are located in some informal object language which is 
appropriate for the specification of procedures and algorithms - because 'you' is not 
any particular, actual person, rather it is anyone - which, of course, is why the pronoun 
functions as a vague 'generaliser'. 
SUMMARY 
My interest in pronouns in mathematics talk, and my observations about them in this 
chapter, derive from my belief in generalisation is the mathematical process par 
excellence. This conviction coincides with and relates to Mühlhäusler and Harry's view 
(1990, p. 58) of the primacy of the deictic role of pronouns. In this chapter, I have 
focused attention on pronouns in the mathematical discourse of novice users of the 
mathematical register. In particular I draw attention to: 
9 deictic use of 'it' to refer and point to mathematical concepts and generalisations 
which have not (or, for various reasons, cannot) be named in the discourse; 
" the pronoun 'you' as an effective pointer to a quality of thinking involving 
generality; the shift from 'V to 'you' commonly signifies reference to a 
mathematical generalisation. 
The use of 'it' as a conceptual deictic enables the pupil to say what s/he could not say 
otherwise, to draw attention to mathematical entities whose name s/he does not know. 
The notion of 'focus' as locus of attention (Moxey and Sanford, 1993, p. 58) is 
important here, for the teacher who is sensitive to the pronoun/focus connection can 
be made aware of the presence of a cognitive focus involving generalisation. 
The second person pronoun 'you' is a prevalent and effective pointer to generalities in 
mathematical discourse. This is perhaps especially true in children's discussion with 
their teachers, a context in which children rarely address the adult participant as 'you'. 
Like Delderfield's bank clerk (Chapter 3), pupils in mathematics classrooms need ways 
of distinguishing, for their audience, their experiences and feelings from detached 
observation and generalised objective comment. These two qualities coexist in 
mathematical activity, and both are necessary. 
It would be interesting to know how and when young children begin to use 'you' in this 
impersonal sense; I am not aware of anywhere that this question is addressed in the 
literature. [see Note 4.51 
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The study of generalisation continues in the next chapter, but the emphasis shifts to 
pupils' pragmatic means of conveying propositional attitude as they assert predictions 
and generalisations. 
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CHAPTER 5: HEDGES 
Policeman: How many times did you hit him? 
Ash: A couple of times maybe. 
(Casualty, BBC1 TV, 5th November 1994. ) 
Mathematics, viewed as a field of human endeavour, as opposed to an inert body of 
knowledge, offers considerable potential for intellectual risk-taking. To participate in 
this endeavour we are obliged to lower defences, and in speaking, to expose 
ourselves. Nothing ventured, nothing gained; encouraging pupils to take risks, in the 
form of making predictions and conjectures, might be expected to be a feature of 
effective teaching. At'low levels' of mathematical activity - recall of facts, rehearsal of 
algorithms - the risk is low, at least for pupils for whom a history of success has 
cultivated confidence. Not so, of course, for those who have suffered ridicule at the 
hands of insensitive teachers and inconsiderate peers. Mathematics holds an invidious 
reputation within the school curriculum, being associated with fear of error and 
consequent public humiliation. 
One common perception is that the questions teachers ask their pupils are not 
searchlights focused to reveal truth, but traps set to expose ignorance. Janet Ainley, 
studying children's perceptions of the purposes of teachers' questions, calls such uses 
'testing questions': 
Because testing questions are so common, particularly in mathematics where 
answers are seen as being clearly 'right' or'wrong', there is a danger that 
pupils may perceive all teacher questions in this way. Such a perception would 
inevitably be detrimental to attempts to encourage discussion, investigative 
work or problem solving in mathematics: pupils will feel that the teacher 
always knows the 'right answers to any questions she asks, and furthermore 
that the teacher is always judging pupils by the answers they give. It is not 
surprising that pupils are reluctant to risk giving 'wrong' answers in these 
circumstances (1988, pp. 93-94). 
From a broader perspective of social discourse, Labov (1970) comments that a 
question is normally deemed appropriate only when the enquirer meets certain speech 
act 'sincerity' conditions - including, in this case, that s/he doesn't know the answer, 
would like to know it, and has reason to believe the hearer is able to supply it. Labov 
shows that questions in classroom situations are exempted from these rules, and that 
the conditions governing appropriateness in the answers to such questions differ 
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accordingly. The default expectation of pupils is that 'teachers' questions' are what 
Labov and Fanshel (1977) call 'Requests for Display'. These differ from other 
questions in that the enquirer (A) already has the information sought in the question, 
and "the request is for B to display whether or not s/he has the information" (p. 79). 
Laurie Buxton has addressed the issue of success and failure in the mathematics 
classroom from the emotional perspective of the learner: 
Most classroom maths sets tasks, often with very clearly defined goals; 
whether they have been reached or not is seldom in doubt I... j This clarity 
tends to enhance the sharpness of emotional response. There is a nakedness 
about the success or failure in reaching a goal that evokes clearly defined 
emotions whose nature one cannot disguise to oneself. (1981, p. 59) 
Anne Watson recognises how, in time, this can generate inhibitions in pupils, who: 
are worried about being wrong and nervous about asking for help if "being 
wrong" and "needing help" have, in the past, been causes of low self-esteem 
by leading to ridicule, labelling or punishment. (1993, p. 6) 
This tendency is illustrated in the words of two 16-year-old girls (C and S) who had 
chosen not to continue mathematics studies at school. Here, they are interviewed by 
Susan Hogan, who asks about their experience of 'speaking our In mathematics 
classrooms: 
SH: And do you need to be confident in order to speak ... ? 
C: Yeah, because there were people in the class that were so good that you 
kind of ... 
S: ... thought well, they're gonna laugh at me if I get it wrong. 
(From a research student presentation at the Open University, 11th November 1995). 
Whilst Buxton speaks of nakedness, the word that comes to me is vulnerability. Not, of 
course, a state of being in danger of physical offence, but an exposure to intellectual 
injury. How odd, how unfair it is, that the 'crime' is cognitive, but the penalty affective. 
Extrinsic and intrinsic sanctions are associated with being wrong; it follows that there is - 
a high premium attached to being right, with insufficient acknowledgement by pupils 
and teachers that uncertainty is a common and valid, indeed an honest and 
honourable, state to be in. One could go further, and insist that uncertainty is a 
productive state, and a necessary precondition for learning. For once we believe we 
'know', we are no longer open to the possibility of further knowing. When mathematics 
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is coming into being in the awareness of an individual, uncertainty is to be anticipated 
and expected. This is the essence of Mason's 'conjecturing atmosphere'. 
let it be the group task to encourage those who are unsure to be the ones to 
speak first [ ... ] every utterance is treated as a modifiable conjecture! ' (1988, 
p. 9; emphasis in original) 
The absence of such an atmosphere in the experience of the students interviewed by 
Hogan (above) is evident: 
SH: Would you ever volunteer an answer in class [... ]? 
S: Yes, if it's something I definitely know the answer to I'll put my hand up and 
say the answer. 
SH: And if you're not sure? 
S: I don't -I wait for someone else. 
Yet, in the making and learning of mathematics, uncertainty ought to be expected, 
acknowledged and explicit. All learning - in the sense of coming to know something 
that was formerly unknown - involves some kind of act of commitment on the part of 
the learner. There are, for example, ample testimonies to excruciating reluctance to 
concede the invariance of the cardinality of small, finite sets (Fielker, 1993), as well as 
resistance to belief in Newton's second law of motion (Orton, 1985). It is also a 
different matter to assert your version of truth as opposed to assent to someone else's. 
To assent may, but need not, entail full commitment, whereas to assert is to commit 
oneself, and so to risk accusation of error. 
In particular, generalisation, as a manifestation of inductive reasoning, has been 
described (Chapter 1) as a kind of cognitive leap, embracing enthymematic premises 
that cannot be known to be true at the moment when a conjecture is made. To assert, 
to articulate such a conjecture is indeed a risky business. An investigational approach 
to learning - nurtured by the ATM in the 1960s, approved by Cockcroft in 1982 before 
being adopted and tamed by the GCSE examining boards - is by no means universally 
welcomed by pupils, many of whom feel that the risk involved is too high a price for the 
frisson of discovery. The articulation, the assertion of the predicting or generalising 
insight - making public what it is that one has 'seen' - can be shot through with 
uncertainty until it meets with approval: 
Investigations have to be 'managed' sometimes, as in 'I managed to solve the 
problem'. [... ] It is worth asking about students who have not managed their 
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anxiety. Managing an investigation certainly involves not only managing the 
technical and mathematical tools, but the affective components too. Solving 
problems and investigating situations (and even mastering conventional 
mathematics) are risk-taking activities and require courage as well as skill. It 
would be good if some writers (without being sentimental about it) would give 
some attention to these often unspoken aspects. (Wheeler, 1984, p. 25) 
In a quasi-empirical environment for mathematics teaching and learning, the process 
of 'coming to know' is an exhilarating ride - at times risky, infused with uncertainty, at 
other times replete with "approaching completeness" (Watson. 1995). In this chapter, I 
shall describe and analyse some ways in which uncertainty is coded In spoken 
language, with reference to a mathematical study carried out with children aged 
between 10 and 12. I chose to work with them on a task which required (amongst other 
things) prediction, generalisation and explanation. A linguistic class -'hedges' - of 
pointers to such moments of uncertainty will be identified. My aim is to draw attention 
to the presence of such hedges in pupils' mathematical discourse. and to analyse how 
speakers do things with them. 
METHOD 
The study described here arose from my interest In the language that children 
(specifically those in the 9 to 12 age range) use to invoke, describe and engage with 
the mathematical process of generalisation. In Chapter 4,1 reported how one articulate 
9-year-old girl, Susie, deployed the pronoun 'it' to refer to concepts and generalisations 
for which she had no name, or for which no received name existed. Another pronoun, 
'you', was shown to be associated with the enunciation of general procedures and 
relations. Subsequent extended mathematical conversations with Simon, aged 12, 
served to confirm these observations and develop my expertise as a 'contingent' 
interviewer. In this study, I moved from extended case study to replication of an 
'experiment' with a number of children. Intending to diminish the part I played in the 
discussion, I worked with ten pairs of children aged 10 or 11, for about 30 minutes with 
each pair, and encouraged some peer interaction on a common mathematical task. I 
did, however, remain as a participant, as opposed to a passive observer, originally so 
as to maximise their engagement with the mathematical task. [Note 5.11 Contrary to 
my original intentions, I ended up reflecting on the pupil-interviewer Interaction too. 
This experience parallels that of Paul Cobb and his collaborators (1992) as reported in 
their account of a teaching experiment with a class of second-grade children. 
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we initially took a radical constructivist position [... ] and focused almost 
exclusively on students' learning from a cognitive perspective. Only later did 
we widen our purview to encompass an interest in the teacher's learning and 
classroom social interactions, and begin to complement our initial 
constructivist position with constructs derived from symbolic interactionism [... ] 
and ethnomethodology. (p. 101) 
The interview technique which I deployed is a mildly restricted form of 'contingent 
questioning' (Ginsburg, 1981; 1983) which I described in Chapter 0. Recall two of the 
features of the contingent interview, a method which: 
" employs a task to channel the subject's activity; 
" has some degree of standardisation. 
Choice of task: I compiled a number of tasks and considered their competing merits in 
relation to certain requirements - the chosen task would be replicated with ten pairs of 
children, I could not ditch it mid-stream. It had to be accessible mathematically to most 
10-year-old children; have some intrinsic interest for the them; have definite potential 
BEADS 
There are some beads in a row like this: 
12345478910111213141316 
Some are white and some are black. 
Each bead has a number. 
Someone comes along and cuts the row of beads into threes, like 
this: 
ccc 
{S6 
and so on. 
I found three of these cut-up beads. 
They were like this: 
AIIII(I 
IWIDO 
T 
1. What number was this last white bead when the beads were 
in a long row? 
2. These aren't the first three beads, or the second three beads. 
Which group of three are they? 
Find as many different answers as you can. 
Figure 5.1 
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for stimulating prediction and generalisation; preferably be accessible in terms of their 
explaining their generalisations; and reasonably expect to lead to some worthwhile (if 
unpredictable) mathematical outcomes in about half an hour. 
The first such task that I trialled I call 'Beads'. The essence of the task Is shown in 
Figure 5.1. 
Trials with three pairs of children aged 10-11 indicated that it was an accessible task 
for them, and that one solution could be found fairly quickly. Unfortunately, however, 
they found it difficult to arrive at a second solution without a good deal of prompting 
from me. Consequently, my share of the 'conversations' was greater than I would have 
wished. Yet this was hardly a task where "a single instance" (Mill, 1873, see Chapter 
1) would be likely to be "sufficient for a complete induction"; no prediction or 
generalisation was possible without a second or third solution. It also proved 
impossible to arrive at a satisfactory termination of the conversation in half an hour. 
Whilst the task is apparently about something 'real', a mathematical analysis might 
describe it as an application of the Chinese Remainder Theorem for two linear 
congruences. The cognitive demands are indicated by the presence in the situation of 
'multiple interacting systems' - the need to hold in place and satisfy two competing 
requirements of a solution - which Lunzer (1978) identifies as requiring formal 
operational reasoning. It was the tendency of the children to neglect one of these 
competing requirements that necessitated my constant intervention for prompting In 
the discussion. After one session I explained what I was trying to do ("I'm Interested in 
the things people say when they're talking about maths") and asked what they thought 
about 'Beads'. Insiya evaluated the task as "Quite interesting, but quite difficult ... not 
too difficult". Sarah said "You'd have to do it with people who knew their three times 
table". 
In the end, I abandoned 'Beads' in favour of an easily accessed combinatorial problem 
which I call'Make Ten'. I have already described in Chapter 4 how this idea originated 
in my teaching and was piloted in one of my earlier weakly-framed conversations with 
Simon. 
Standardisation: The mathematical encounter with each pair of children was 
standardised to the extent that I intended each 'Make Ten' Interview to proceed 
proceeded in five 'phases' which I had planned in advance. 
I initiated each interview with the same conversational gambit [Note 5.21 -a 
combinatorial problem which will be familiar to primary school teachers, although its 
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potential as a starter for making generalisations may not. It begins with consideration 
of the number of ways that 10 can be 'made' as a sum of two 'numbers'. I did not work 
from a 'script', but the following opening (with two boys, Jubair and Shofiqur) is typical. 
[Note 4.2] 
T5: 1 Tim: Jubair, I'd like you to give me any two numbers that add up to ten. 
2 Jubair: Six add four. 
3 Tim: Six add four. Shofiqur? 
4 Shofiqur: Eight add two. 
5 Jubair: Five add five. 
6 Tim: OK, so you get the idea. Now what I want you to decide between you is. 
how many ways is it possible to do that? 
The next three exchanges were not at all typical, however: 
7 Shofiqur: [almost instantly] Nine ways. 
8 Tim: Nine ways. 
9 Jubair: No, ten ways. 
It was more usual for the children to list the possible sums, orally or on paper, and then 
to count them. Then I would say something like: 
Now just as you eventually decided about that question for ten, I'd like you to decide 
between you how many different ways are there of doing that for twenty? 
The first phase of the interview was planned to proceed as above with similar 
examples of listing sums and counting how many had been found. I would propose the 
numbers to be 'made' in this way, my choices depending on the children's earlier 
responses to my questions about'making' 10 and 20 - in particular, on the facility they 
displayed and whether reversals such as 2+8 and 8+2 were both counted. [Note 5.3 
summarises the mathematical consequences of such choices. ] The next phase would 
then involve my proposing a further target number - say 30,50 or even 100 - slightly 
out of the range of those already counted, and inviting a prediction of the number of 
ways this number could be made. 
T3: 60 Tim: OK. Now a funny question. Supposing the number now that I'm interested 
in is twenty-three? So you've got twenty-one add two, and so on. How 
many ways? 
61 Caroline: Twelve, would it? 
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62 Alex: Yeah, probably. 
63 Caroline: Twelve. 
64 Tim: What makes you think twelve Caroline? 
Subsequent phases, contingent on preceding ones, would involve my probing for the 
thinking behind this prediction (and possibly others) and discussion of perceived 'rules' 
- conjectures about what might happen with'any' number. For example: 
T4: 138 Tim: Right, OK. Is there a kind of rule that you could state generally, I mean 
supposing I now picked out any number ... you know like five hundred and 
thirty-seven or something ... and said how many ways can you make that 
from adding two numbers. How would you know what the answer was? 
139 Alan: Just take away one, and then you'll know how many you can get. It's the 
same here, ten, there was nine possibilities. twenty. there was nineteen 
possibilities, thirty-seven there was thirty-six possibilities. 
In some cases, we continued to test the generality of such conjectures. and tried to 
see why they might be true 'in general'. In practice, such proofs were always founded 
on the possibility of 'seeing the general in the particular' (Mason and Pimm, 1984), 
producing confident awareness of how things would be for any other particular, as it 
were. That is to say, the pupils explained their generalisations by accounts of generic 
examples (Chapter 1). One instance of this (a lengthier quotation from Alan and his 
partner Harry) is given at the end of this chapter. 
Restriction: In an extreme, weakly-framed form of contingent interviewing, no 
contribution is deemed irrelevant; the interviewer follows the thoughts of the 
interviewee and encourages him or her to develop them further. In this sense the 
subject determines the agenda and is free to deviate from it or to redefine it. My 
extended conversations with Susie and Simon were of this kind. The'Make Ten' 
interviews were intended to generate some data as a basis for prediction and 
generalisation. The interviews were contingent in the sense that the children were 
given freedom to decide what kind of sums would be eligible, and which sums would 
be counted as'different'. On the other hand, I expected to shape each conversation as 
indicated above, aiming for prediction and generalisation. 
The conversations were audio-taped and transcribed, providing a corpus of some 
24,000 words (both the children's and mine). 
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'MAKE TEN': FRANCES AND ISHKA 
The following extracts give a fuller picture of how conversations arising from the task 
developed. They are from an interview with two girls, Frances and Ishka, both about 
101/2 years old. The interview transcript is in Appendix 3, T6. Here, I have separated 
that transcript [T6] into five 'episodes' A to E. These 'episodes' are thus the realised 
equivalents of the planned 'phases' of the interview. For most of the interviews the 
phase-episode correspondence was fairly close. The episodes of T6 are summarised 
and illustrated by the following extracts. 
EPISODE A [71/2 minutes] In this phase I introduce the problem, that of making 10. 
The children list and decide 5 ways, allowing no reversals (decided by Frances). 
T6: 16 Frances: Four and six, five and five, six and ... oh that's the same. 
17 Ishka: Five ways? 
18 Frances: Maybe. 
19 Ishka: Mm, maybe ... I think ... 
20 Frances: What do you think? 
21 Ishka: We haven't had five five have we? 
22 Frances: We have! 
23 Ishka: Oh OK, erm... 
24 Frances: The others are like if you do six four, we've already done four six. 
25 Ishka: Mm [sighs] 
26 Frances: Shall we just say five ways? 
27 Ishka: There's about five. 
I then ask about making 20. They list and decide 10 ways. Finally, I ask about 
making 13; Ishka lists and decides 6 ways. 
EPISODE B [2 minutes] I begin by asking them to recall results so far. Then I ask 
about making 30, inviting an initial prediction. Frances predicts 15, Ishka agrees, 
and explains how her prediction relates to the earlier results. There is an air of 
plausibility rather than certainty in their attitude to Frances' prediction. 
T6: 105 Ishka: I think there'll be around ... 
106 Frances: Fifteen? 
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107 Ishka: Yup. 
108 Frances: Maybe? [ ... ] 
113 Ishka: Most of them are half or just about one away from ... [ ... J 
117 Tim: OK. Prediction of fifteen. Er, so ... lets just go back to what Ishka was 
saying. She was saying that In most cases it's about half. 
118 Ishka: Well, yes, 'cause ten was five. 
119 Tim: Right. [... ] 
120 Frances: Twenty was ten. [... ] 
123 Frances: Thirteen was about six. 
124 Ishka: But, erm thirteen was six. 
125 Tim: OK. 
126 Ishka: Although that Isn't exactly half. 
I proce ed to ask about making 100. Frances instantly answers'Ffty? *, Ishka agrees 
in a vague way, but conveys considerable uncertainty when pressed to commit 
herself to Frances' prediction. 
129 Frances: Fifty? 
130 Ishka: About fifty yeah. 
131 TIm: About fifty. Now are you saying about fifty. Ishka. because you're sort of 
playing safe or I mean do you really think It Is fifty? 
132 Ishka: Well maybe not exactly, but It's around fifty basically? 
133 Tim: OK. And Frances do you think It's exactly fifty or around fifty? 
134 Frances: Maybe around fifty. 
EPISODE C [3'h minutes] I return to making 30 - how sure are they that there are 15 
ways? 
135 Tim: OK. What about this prediction of fifteen for er thirty, was that around 
fifteen or exactly fifteen? 
136 Ishka: It's fifteen or around. 
137 Frances: Yes. 
138 Ishka: 'cause we can't be exactly sure until we've tried It, but ... 
The girls list and count 15 ways. 
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EPISODE D [1 1h minutes] Looking for some structure in the list for 30: 
194 Tim: [... ] you started at the top and went one, two, three, four, five ... can you 
notice something about these numbers that would immediately tell you 
there's fifteen without writing them all down? 
195 Frances: There's one to fifteen, so fifteen numbers? 
Then imagining what a list for 100 would look like: 
198 Tim: Right. If you did a similar listing for, um [... ] a hundred [... ] If you did a list 
like this and you started at ... what would be the two equal numbers at the 
top? 
199 Ishka: Fifty and fifty. 
200 Tim: Fifty add fifty, and then it would go forty-nine [... ] 
209 Tim: And how many numbers would there be in those, or how many ways would 
you have done it? 
210 F+I: Fifty. 
EPISODE E [4 minutes] 
Articulating general 'rules' for the number of ways: 
212 Ishka: So the even numbers are exactly half. 
213 Tim: Thais really good Ishka. 
214 Ishka: And the odd numbers are ... 
215 Frances: Are exactly half. 
216 Ishka: Are sort of, are one off ... that. 
Generic examples suggest proofs of the rules: 
244 Tim: Right, OK, I just wonder whether it's possible by writing down all the ways 
of getting, say, thirteen like this ... yuh? ... whether you could then see why 
it was half of the number before. [... ] 
245 Frances: Yes. 
246 Tim: Do you want to try it Frances? 
247 Ishka: So we start at half of thirteen. 
248 Frances: Half of thirteen would be ... 
249 Ishka: Six. 
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250 Frances: Six and seven. Six point five ... (laughs] 
251 Tim: You can't have six and a half and six and a haft. so what will you start 
with? 
252 Frances: Six and seven. 
We discuss why there must be six sums in the list: the Interview concludes. 
HEDGES AND UNCERTAINTY 
In time, and through discussion with others, I have become convinced of the 
significance of one particular surface-level feature of the data. This Is the children's use 
of the category of words which Lakoff named 'hedges' (Chapter 2) - examples of which 
include 'about, 'around', 'maybe', 'think', 'sort ot, 'normally', 'suppose'. '(not) sure', 
'(not) exactly'. The extracts from the interview with Frances and Ishka give an authentic 
and reasonably sequential picture of when and how they are used. Such words convey 
a sense of vagueness, at times of uncertainty -a state of mind which, as I have 
already observed, one would expect to prevail in a conjecturing moment. I shall also 
have something to say about the way that I too (as teacherlnterviewer) use hedges in 
the discourse. 
To speak (as I have) of using language to convey states of mind suggests intention on 
the part of the speaker, that the effect on the hearer is not just accidental. Human 
beings have a set of wants and needs to do with self-esteem that they seek to satisfy 
(for themselves or others) in interaction with others. Language use is one means 
toward that end. By this, I don't mean that speakers consciously choose words 
(including hedges) to achieve an effect - although some do - but rather that they have 
learned to use them for that purpose. In any case, I suggest here that conveying 
[implicating] uncertainty is the intended purpose, and not just the effect, of their 
hedging. 
Whilst the focus of this chapter is the nature and function of hedges in prediction and 
conjecturing activity, the use of 'Rounders' (a subset of hedges usually associated with 
lack of precision) such as'about, 'approximately' and so on is to be expected as a 
linguistic feature of estimation, as a device to Indicate that the speaker Is providing as 
much accuracy as is possible or appropriate in a given situation (Channell, 1994). 
Estimation, prediction and generalisation are all mathematical processes which, to a 
degree, involve some element of uncertainty. In fact, Clayton (1992) has studied 
estimation as a "risk taking" activity. In talk about mathematics, children may convey 
uncertainty with various degrees of subtlety, and with various pragmatic purposes, 
134 
through the use of hedges. Whether or not fear, anxiety and so on are present in those 
situations must depend on the spirit in which the mathematics learning takes place. 
This is to some extent determined and controlled by the teacher - by the way that s/he 
responds (language of word and body) to pupil's contributions. The willingness of 
schoolchildren to expose their thinking will depend on whether or not teacher and pupil 
share a belief or explicit agreement that they are working in a 'conjecturing 
atmosphere'. 
HEDGE TYPES IN MATHEMATICS TALK 
Each of the four categories of hedge introduced in Chapter 2 is in evidence in the 
Make Ten transcripts, and is associated with particular kinds of goals. Here I take a 
first look at the pragmatics of these categories in mathematics talk, with some 
examples from Make Ten. 
Plausibility Shields are typified by 'I think', 'maybe' and 'probably', as in this excerpt 
from the episodic overview of the Frances/Ishka'Make Ten' interview. 
T6: 16 Frances: Four and six, five and five, six and ... oh that's the same. 
17 Ishka: Five ways? 
18 Frances: Maybe. 
19 Ishka: Mm, maybe... I think ... 
A Plausibility Shield implicates (in the Gricean sense) a position held, a belief to be 
considered - as well as indicating some doubt that it will be fulfilled by events, or stand 
up to evidential scrutiny. It is a means of offering an idea without the obligation of 
commitment to its truth. 
The second kind, an Attribution Shield, implicates some degree, or quality, of 
knowledge to a third party. In the 'Make Ten' data there are relatively few Attribution 
Shields, and these tend to be used by me rather than the children, as a teacher-like 
device for meta-comment (Pimm, 1992) on the activity. Thus, with Kerry and Runa: 
T8: 176 Tim: OK. Um, how many ways would there be then for twenty-four? 
177 Runa: Twenty-four? Add? 
178 Tim: Same kind of thing, but with twenty-four. 
[Kerry is whispering, seems to be counting something] 
179 Runa: Um, nineteen. Nineteen ways. 
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180 Tim: Nineteen ways, says Runa. 
181 Runa: I just guessed. 
182 Tim: Kerry's still thinking. 
183 Kerry: Ten. 
Here, I use Attribution ("says Runa") in T8: 180 as a ploy for being non-committal about 
the contribution of one child, in order to obscure my evaluation of her answer (T8: 179], 
and to encourage the participation of the other child. 
The semantic effect of Approximators - the second major category of hedges - is to 
modify (as opposed to comment on) the actual proposition, making it more vague. It 
was observed in Chapter 2 that speakers make propositions vague In this way to fulfil 
all kinds of purposes (Channell, 1994, pp. 173ff), one of which is "giving the right 
amount of information" i. e. as much as Is needed in the context of utterance. For this 
reason, I might tell you that the time Is half past three (incidentally concealing the 
Approximator'about') when my watch says 152822. Another possible motive for 
being vague discerned by Channell (1990, p 98) Is "downgrading the Importance of { 
something so as to highlight something else". For example, the proposition 
The number of seconds in a year is about pi times ten to the power seven. 
deliberately sacrifices precision (which could be improved) in order to draw attention to 
a pleasing numerical coincidence. 'About', 'around, and'approximately' are examples 
of Rounders, which constitute the first subcategory of Approximator. Rounders are 
usually associated with estimation In the domain of measurements, of quantitative 
data. Association with prediction and generalisation does not readily come to mind, yet 
Rounders occur frequently in the Make Ten corpus, to qualify combinatorial prediction, 
as in Episode A with Frances and Ishka: 
T6: 26 Frances: Shall we just say five ways? 
27 Ishka: There's about five. 
and again, in Episode B 
T6: 105 Ishka: I think therell be around ... 
106 Frances: Fifteen? 
107 Ishka: Yup. 
Adaptors, such as'a little bir, 'somewhar, 'fairly', attach vagueness to nouns, verbs or 
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adjectives. The following examples are from the Make Ten interview with Jubair and 
Shofiqur. Shofiqur has just indicated what a list of ways of 'making' 20 would look like, 
and predicts 21 different ways. 
T5: 66 Shofiqur: ... It's just a bit the same, like this [indicating the list 
for 10]. 
67 Tim: So Shofiqur is pretty convinced that it's twenty-one. Right, are you 
persuaded by his argument? 
68 Jubair: Not really. 
69 Tim: Have a go at - I'm fairly convinced what you said Shofiqur, have a go at 
convincing Jubair that there are twenty-one ways. I mean, take it slowly. 
70 Jubair: Come on then! 
71 Shofiqur: I only took a guess. 
Adaptors suggest, but do not define, the extension of categories, concepts and so on 
(see how I just did it with 'and so on'). Thus, Shofiqur uses an Adaptor phrase 'just a 
bit' with respect to same(ness); I use two Adaptors here, 'pretty' and 'fairly', to 
suggest, first that Shofiqur's conviction, then mine, is not simple and unreserved, but of 
a fuzzy kind. 
A sift of the transcripts suggests that it is I, rather than the children, who make most 
use of Adaptors. Like Attribution Shields, and for similar reasons, I use them as a 
means of commenting on the children's contributions. Specifically, I use them to make 
indirect comments on their predictions, generalisations and explanations. 
The taxonomy provides a setting for studying the significance of the various hedges 
used in my Make Ten interviews. The framework is useful in making distinctions and 
providing starting points. Whilst the four categories of hedges are sufficient (in the 
sense that they embrace the hedges in my data), they are not disjoint. Bear in mind 
that in conjectural mathematics talk there is an affective subtext just below the surface 
of the propositional text. It is there because mathematics is a human activity: the 
participants care about the mathematics, but they also care about themselves, their 
feelings and those of their partners in conversation. In the next section I shall show 
how, on occasion, speakers use Approximators for Shield-like purposes. There is a 
good case, in fact, for speaking of shielding and approximating, to emphasise the 
effect of hedges in the context of use, as opposed to the identification of some rigid 
lexical categories. 
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PARTICULAR HEDGES IN MATHEMATICS TALK 
The children whom I interviewed were aged 10 or 11. and were being invited to make 
mathematical predictions and generalisations. With reference to the 'Make Ten' 
transcript data, my central claim will be that when they hedge, it is more often than not 
in order to implicate (in the Gricean sense) uncertainty of one kind of another. In other 
words, their hedges predominantly are, or have the same effect as, Plausibility Shields. 
Later, I shall suggest that Shields are deployed at significant and identifiable stages in 
the interviews. Furthermore, I will show that the teacherMterviewer (me) also hedges, 
but typically for different purposes. These teacher-like purposes - to which intentions, 
in this case, I have relatively direct access - will be considered from time to time. 
For the sake of maintaining coherence in the argument, whilst sampling from the data. 
I shall examine when and how particular hedges, or small groups of hedges, are used. 
'maybe', 'think' 
I have already observed that' maybe' and'think' are stereotypic Plausibility Shields 
which can successfully convey a speaker's lack of full commitment to a proposition 
under consideration. It is necessary here to give more detail from Episode A of the 
Frances/Ishka interview, for immediate and future reference. I had asked the two girls 
to come to an agreement about the number of ways of making 10. Their discussion 
proceeds: 
T6: 12 Frances: There's one and nine. 
13 Ishka: Yeah. 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
Frances: So that's one. Two and eight ... and then there's 
Fra & Ish: Three and seven. 
Frances: Four and six, five and five, six and... oh that's the same. 
Ishka: Five ways? 
Frances: Maybe. 
Ishka: Mm, maybe ... I think ... 
Frances: What do you think? 
Ishka: We haven't had five five have we? 
Frances: We have! 
Ishka: Oh OK, erm ... 
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24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Frances: The others are like if you do six four, we've already done four six. 
Ishka: Mm [sighs] 
Frances: Shall we just say five ways? 
Ishka: There's about five. 
Tim: Erm, I'd like you to be more convinced Ishka. I mean if it's about five then 
it's four or six or seven or whatever ... the number's sufficiently small that I 
think you should be sure one way or another. 
Frances: I think it's five ways. 
Ishka: But I'm sure. 
Tim: You are sure. 
Frances: Me too. 
Having enumerated five ways, Frances begins to repeat herself [T6: 16] - "oh ... that's 
the same". Rather, she offers me (and Ishka) the first insight into what sameness 
means to her in this context. She has an implicit criterion, which surfaces when she 
withdraws "six and ... ". Ishka evidently shares or accepts the view that reversals will 
not count separately, and she asserts [T6: 17] that there are five ways. 
The fact that Ishka's claim is tentative is indicated by rising intonation ("Five ways? "), 
which transforms her statement (that there are five ways) into a question. This is one 
of a number of instances (in Make Ten and elsewhere in my data) where it could be 
claimed that statements are hedged with rising intonation. Such prosodic hedges (the 
linguistic term 'prosody' refers to variations in pitch, loudness, tempo and rhythm) are 
effectively Shields. This issue is discussed again at the end of the next chapter. 
Frances [T6: 18] perhaps echoes Ishka's uncertainty; or perhaps she may feel that 
Ishka's answer is offered prematurely, before she has exhausted all the pairs she can 
bring to mind. In any case the pair now seem to have an understanding that it will be 
productive to assert their uncertainty, and reconsider the "five ways" claim. Ishka 
effectively conveys this [T6: 19] in the form of two Shields without a substantive 
proposition. Frances encourages her ("What do you think? ") to articulate her position - 
this is typical of a number of instances of apparent teacher-like behaviour by Frances 
in Episode A, at which phase of the interview she projects herself as the dominant, 
more confident partner. However, having encouraged Ishka, she is impatient at Ishka's 
next contribution, which only suggests that Ishka has forgotten what has already been 
listed. Frances indicates [T6: 24] that she is now satisfied that no further possibilities 
have been overlooked. [Note 5.4] There follows [T6: 26,27] an apparent reversal of the 
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earlier roles [T6: 17,18] of Ishka and Frances in relation to the claim that there are five 
ways. One each occasion one has sought agreement with a hesitant assertion that 
there are five ways; the other has given hedged assent - Frances with a Shield, Ishka 
with a Rounder. The second time [T6: 26,27], however, I Inferred that Frances was 
fully committed to the claim, whereas Ishka was not - "I'd like you to be more 
convinced, Ishka". I had, after all, introduced the dialogue cited above with a clear 
request for common consent: 
T6: 10 Tim: I'd like you two to agree between you ... Incidentally we'll adjust that 
[microphone] Frances so it's not quite so close. right. um I'd like you just to 
- yours Is fine Ishka - I'd like you two to agree between you, how many 
different ways there are of doing that. Right? Two numbers that add to ten, 
and I'll just be quiet for a moment. 
My repeated request for agreement is complied with by Frances and Ishka to a 
remarkable degree, certainly in comparison with most of the pairs I Interviewed for 
Make Ten. Ishka is not yet, however, prepared to concede unqualified agreement 
[T6: 27]. The function of her chosen hedge, 'about, will be considered later In this 
chapter. In any case, she has successfully implicated the fragility of her commitment, 
borne out by the fact that I press her quite explicitly on the matter of being (more) 
convinced, urging that she "should be sure". Frances responds with an apparently 
hedged (but see my discussion of the ambiguity of 'I think' later) Indication of where 
she stands. Ishka's response is unhedged, fully committed - but Is it genuine, or have I 
blackmailed her into renouncing doubt In order to please me? After all, what I have 
demanded is not 'the answer but for Ishka to be "more convinced". Of course, I really 
wanted both! I am at this stage of the interview encouraging the children to generate 
valid instances of a generalisation-in-waiting. That there are five ways of making ten is 
such an instance. I readily accept Ishka's assurance that she is "sure" without 
comment as to whether or not she is right. 
'Maybe' is a modal form which seems to be user-friendly, in that it is favoured by the 
children in comparison with the apparently synonymous 'perhaps' and 'possibly', which 
occur not once, in the children's speech or mine, in the whole corpus. The following 
transcript data illustrates the appearance of 'maybe' within hedged predictive 
statements: 
T9: 1 33 Tim: Alright um, supposing, we've done, we've done ten, twenty, thirty. sixteen. 
[... ] I'd just like you to sort of say how many you think there would be, say 
for the number twenty four. [... ] 
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136 Rebecca: [... ] twenty-two? No, not twenty-two ways. Twelve ways? [... ] 
140 Rebecca: Oh yeah, on the twenty there were more ways than the sixteen, so on 
twenty-four ... must be more then the twenty, 
because that was less, 
because it was a lower number. 
141 Tim: Right, how many more? 
142 Rebecca: I'm not sure. [pause] 
143 Runi: [whispers) Eleven and twelve, [inaudible, presumably "forty"] ways. 
144 Rebecca: Not forty, fourteen 
145 Runi: Yeah, that's what I was going to say 
146 Tim: Let's just see. Runi thinks maybe fourteen ways, and I think you 
suggested twelve Rebecca, yeah? 
147 Rebecca: Yeah. 
148 Tim: Um, what was your reason for suggesting twelve? 
149 Rebecca: Well, it was four off than twenty and then twenty-two [? twenty ... two] was 
two less than four so you've twelve. Have twelve because, if you had, 
twenty had ten ways and twenty four was four more than twenty then 
maybe it would be twelve because it's um ... half way in between. 
150 Tim: 'cos it's half way in between. OK. And what do you think Runi, are you 
saying it's four more, so it's four more ways? 
151 Run!: Yeah, that's what I was thinking of. 
When Rebecca explains her reason for suggesting twelve (as I put it), she seems to be 
reasoning that what happened in the increase from sixteen to twenty might happen 
again with a further increase to twenty-four. But, I argue, she is signalling an 
awareness that she might be jumping to conclusions by hedging [T9: 1491 "maybe it 
would be twelve". It is an honest and straightforward expression of doubt, as to the 
validity of the reasoning and the conclusion. By contrast, I double-hedge in [T9: 146 ] 
"Runi thinks maybe .. " as a device to cast doubt on Runi's unhedged - and incorrect - 
contribution ("fourteen ways") which is beginning to take over from Rebecca's 
interrupted - but correct - train of thought. We are some way into the interview, this is 
the fifth example I've asked them to consider, and I'm getting impatient. My reaction to 
Runi's off-course prediction is to undermine it by attributing doubt where there may 
have been none. Thus, my "Runi thinks ... " [T9: 1461 is intended to implicate "but that's 
only what Runi thinks". Furthermore, "Runi thinks maybe fourteen" was intended (now 
141 
I think about it) to convey "even though Runi said fourteen, she wasn't really sure 
about it, and you shouldn't be either". 
'Think'(usually'I think') is, in some respects, a straightforward hedged performative 
(Lakoff, 1973, p. 490); it appears to be the most frequently-deployed hedge in my 
transcripts. For example, in this extract, Alex rejects my prompt to list ways of making 
twelve, and goes straight for a prediction. When I appear to question it, she affirms, 
hedges, then revises. 
T3: 43 Tim: Any ideas about how many ways there would be say for twelve? For 
twelve you could have twelve ... 
44 Alex: (instantly] Six. 
45 Tim: Six ways? 
46 Alex: Yeah, I think so. Seven. Twelve add zero as well. 
There is, however, a potential ambiguity (Stubbs, 1986) associated with this, and with 
other 'private' verbs such as'believe', 'suppose' and so on. I would characterise the 
distinction as between epistemic and root meanings. Let me offer an example: 
1: 5.1 You could use calculus to find the minimum, but I think that completing the square would 
be more elegant. 
The ambiguity here concerns whether the 'parenthetical' clause (Lyons, 1977, p. 738) 'I 
think is being used to implicate: 
" an uncertainty (epistemic meaning) concerning the validity of the substantive 
statement (whether or not completing the square would be more elegant); or 
"a firmly-held position (root meaning) - that completing the square would indeed 
be more elegant - arrived at after consideration along with other tenable 
positions. That is, an assertion of what I judge to be the case. 
In speech, the intended force may be made more evident by the location of stress in 
the utterance i. e. "I think that... " for the epistemic meaning as opposed to "I think that 
... " for the root. 
The extracts which follow are from my interview with Anthony and Sam. In almost 
every case the stress is of the first (epistemic) kind. 
T7: 5 Tim: ... What I want you to do is to talk to each other and come to an agreement 
about how many different ways you can do it. OK? [... I And I'll just listen 
for a moment. How many different ways can you do that? 
142 
6 Anthony: Er, let's have a think ... Halves, um ... 
[end of first extract] 
T7: 43 Tim: Eleven. Is that all the ways do you [root stressjthink, or are there any 
more? [long pause] What do you think Sam? Do you think there's any 
more ways, or do you think that's all the possible ways of doing ... 
44 Sam: There's more. 
45 Tim: You think there's more? OK. What would, give me an idea of what another 
one might be, or what it might look like. 
46 Anthony: What about ... you can put quarters into ten parts and like that can't you. 
47 Tim: Mm ... 
48 Anthony: Well if we put them in about nine parts ... if it, all the way, keep doing that, 
you might end up to number ten. 
49 Tim: Are, right, um ... 
50 Anthony: If you started at one. 
51 Tim: Yeah. 
52 Anthony: And I got a bit less, bit less, bit less, bit less, about um, slowly get to 
number two. Keeps going round. Yeah? Would that work? 
53 Tim: Right, I think I get the idea. I mean can you sort of get us started, and we'll 
try and think it through together. [pause] Mm hm? 
54 Anthony: Let's have a think. [pause] 
55 Tim: Did you say we were dividing it up into ten? 
56 Anthony: Yeah. 
57 Tim: Right. So, what could one number be? 
58 Anthony: You could have it into eighths as well. 
59 Tim: Uh huh. 
60 Anthony: I've heard of eighths, um ... 
The i nterview with these two boys was unique in failing to develop a scenario for 
combinatorial ge neralisation. This was chiefly because Anthony proposed using 
fractions at a very early stage, and he then seemed driven by some irresistible internal 
force to consider denominators outside the scope of his competence. Matters were not 
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helped by the fact that Anthony had been diagnosed as having an aphasic language 
disorder; over the years he had become expert in manipulating adults by diverting 
away from questions or topics which he was unable to understand or cope with. One 
could view such strategies as a lack of awareness of the cooperative principles, in 
particular of the maxim of Relevance. An alternative interpretation would be that 
Anthony is expert at flouting that maxim for his own ends. Since Anthony was more 
assertive than Sam, and I wanted to allow the children to have a part in shaping the 
agenda (my contingent questioning), the discussion proceeded at times like a script 
from Monty Python's Flying Circus. 
In T7: 6 and T7: 54 Anthony is 'simply' stating his Intention to engage with a problem 
[T7: 6] or task [T7: 54]. Actually, on the evidence of the data, this is not at all typically 
childlike (to announce an intention to think). It is very much the mark of the confident 
adult who 'formulates' a conversation; that is to say, who describes some feature of 
aspect of the conversation within the conversation itself (Garfinkel and Sacks, 1970). It 
is the response of the person -a lecturer, for example, holding forth within their 
specialist field - to a question for which s/he does not have an instant answer. The 
announcement "I shall have to think about that" has the effect of: 
" flattering the one who asked the question: it suggests that the question is non- 
trivial, so that'even I', the expert, will need to pause for thought before I answer; 
" making space for the speaker to arrive at a response, either by recalling some 
information that is not at the forefront of her/his memory, or (more impressively) 
by the exercise of reason upon available information. I repeat because it is 
important, that in either case the thinking is, as it were, on display for public 
observation, or even public entertainment; 
" implicating uncertainty without undue discomfort. It is not uncommon for the 
presenter of a mathematics lecture (or lesson at any level) to leave unfinished the 
detail of parts of calculations or arguments in her/his prepared notes so that 
students may be sure to witness a public (if somewhat contrived) resolution of 
uncertainty. [Note 5.51 
With Anthony, however, what came across to me (and was later supported by 
information gleaned about his social strategies for coping with aphasia) was a 
plausible and well-used device for mimicking cooperative Intellectual effort, with the 
intention of retaining, or even gaining, the teacher's goodwill. Note that my first 'I think' 
in T7: 53 is epistemic, whereas the second is a proposal that we do some thinking. I 
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asked Anthony's class teacher what she made of his "let's have a think". She pointed 
out that successive teachers, concerned about his apparently erratic train of thought 
(and the psychologist's suggestion that he experiences difficulty in connecting ideas to 
form coherent thought-sequences), would repeatedly have offered him advice using a 
formula such as "Now think about it first, Anthony". Add to this the fact that this is 
mathematics and I am perceived as the teacher. The close, almost individual, attention 
I was giving to Anthony would be very familiar to him, as he was accustomed to having 
special, one-to-one support in recognition of his learning needs. It is likely that Anthony 
construes my questions as being of the'testing' kind (Ainley, 1 988), whilst I intend them 
to function as what Ainley calls'directing questions', to provoke the boys into thought 
about a problem. I shall not develop further here this mismatch of perception, but the 
issue is clearly one of very general relevance and significance. Anthony is likely to be 
skilled in eliciting clues from teachers as he navigates his way through the fog towards 
a response to their testing questions, to which they already know the answers. 
Anthony wants me to feed him some more clues. For example: 
T7: 52 Anthony: And I got a bit less, bit less, bit less, bit less, about um, slowly get to 
number two. Keeps going round. Yeah? Would that work? 
The problem is that (a) I was unaware, at the time of the interview, of his particular 
manipulative skills, and (b) he doesn't know I'm playing a interviewer's game called 
'contingent questioning'l Far from pulling him back on the rails when he wanders off, I 
tag along with him. Anthony seems to be manipulating the situation in order to delay 
genuine intellectual engagement with the problem posed. 
This throws up, in an urgent but rather unexpected way, a fundamental methodological 
issue, which is this: that there seems to be a problem with contingent questioning as a 
research strategy in the (hopefully unusual) circumstances described involving 
Anthony. Indeed, the problem may not be peculiar to research on human cognition by 
means of contingent questioning, although the outcome can be bizarre In that case. 
The methodology assumes that the response of the 'subject' to the researcher in the 
interview is authentic i. e. genuine, sincere and cooperative. In other words, the 
discourse is interpreted on the assumption that the spirit of the Grice's cooperative 
principle and maxims is being respected. If the subject is not constrained by 
cooperative norms, the assumption is false and the conclusions liable to be suspect. 
'about, 'around' 
Channell observes that 'about' and 'around' appear to be interchangeable 
Approximators, and that the first is more common in speech. I shall examine here their 
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use by three different children, in two extracts from the data. The first is with Harry and 
Alan. 
T4: 39 Tim: So how many ways is it Alan? 
40 Alan: Nine. 
41 Tim: Nine, right. [pause] What if instead of saying two numbers adding up to ten 
I said two numbers adding up to twenty? 
42 Harry: That would be about, yeah I think ... that would be eighteen 
43 Alan: (simultaneous) ... Eighteen ways. About eighteen probably. 
The second, from Frances/Ishka Episode B, includes use of 'around'. In fact, the 
pragmatic analysis of 'about' which follows could be applied equally well to 'around', 
and be illustrated from this extract and elsewhere in the corpus. 
T6: 129 Frances: Fifty? 
130 Ishka: About fifty yeah. 
131 Tim: About fifty. Now are you saying about fifty, Ishka, because you're sort of 
playing safe or I mean do you really think it is fifty? 
132 Ishka: Well maybe not exactly, but it's around fifty basically? t... 1 
134 Frances: Maybe around fifty. 
In each case a prediction is being made - the number of ways of making 20 [T4: 42, 
T4: 43] and 100 [T6: 130] - and each time the hedge is an Approximator (a Rounder, in 
fact) at the surface level. Channell (1994, p. 46) has found that respondents typically 
understand 'about n' to designate a range of possibilities, symmetrical about the 
exemplar number n. So the boys predict that the number of ways to make 20 Is in the 
region of eighteen, maybe more, maybe less. I suggest, however, that the deep level 
purpose and function of the hedge is Shielding against possible error in the cognitive 
basis of their prediction. This suggestion is supported by closer inspection of the data 
in context. Harry and Alan have already listed ways of making 10, and decided on nine 
positive integer possibilities, allowing reversals but not including zero as a summand. 
On being presented with the second problem (making 20) it was more common for 
children to list and count again, as Frances and ishka do in Episode A. 
Harry, however, is a confident boy. (Note 5.6J He is a risk-taker. and goes straight for a 
prediction for making 20, avoiding the tedium of listing and counting. The basis of 
Harry's prediction seems to be proportional reasoning (doubling) - there are 9 ways for 
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making 10, so there are 18 for 20. For fuller insight into Harry's thinking, his next 
contribution (following T4: 43 above) is: 
T4: 44 Harry: No I think nineteen. 
45 Tim: Eighteen, nineteen? 
46 Harry: I should write that again. [laughs] 
47 Alan: What's that? 
48 Harry: Up to twenty. 
[Harry begins a list 10+10,9+11,8+12] 
Later, and before the list is complete, he ventures 
76 Harry: I think that'll be nineteen. 
From the outset, then, Harry is uncertain as to whether the 'answer' to my question is 
18 or 19. We just don't know how he arrives at these two possibilities. If his prediction 
is an extension of his experience of making ten, then (as already noted) doubling 
would produce Harry's first prediction. A more detailed awareness of the nature of his 
list of ways of making ten (which I tried to prompt in the later episodes of some Make 
Ten interviews) could have led to the second prediction. The fact that he articulates it 
("No, I think nineteen") is all the more remarkable because his first, incorrect prediction 
is confirmed by Alan, albeit with something less than total commitment [T4: 43]. It 
seems, then, that Harry may be entertaining these two different predictions from the 
moment I ask about making twenty, and he seems [T4: 42] to be testing out the first 
possibility, not just for my consideration (and possibly Alan's) but also (perhaps 
especially) for his own: 
T4: 42 Harry: That would be about, yeah I think ... that would be eighteen. 
The effect of the initial hedging is to allow himself some space for further 
consideration, and to declare uncertainty in the assertion which completes the 
sentence. In the end he resorts to listing and counting, presumably since he lacks 
sufficient confidence in either of his predictions to choose between them when I ask 
him to do so ("Eighteen, nineteen? "). 
My conclusion is that the hedge 'about, although classified as an Approximator, is 
being used by Harry in T4: 42 principally to assist the communication of his 
propositional attitude; in particular, to serve Shield-like ends. Harry's attitude to his 
prediction, and my interpretation of it, is further reinforced by his use of the prototypic 
Shield'I think'. 
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Ishka implicates the same attitude with'about' in T6: 130. My next turn In that 
conversation is evidence that I (as interviewer) suspected this intention: 
T6: 131 Tim: About fifty. Now are you saying about fitty. Ishka. because you're sort of 
playing safe or I mean do you really think it Is fifty? 
What I infer from Ishka's 'about' [T6: 130J is not that she has approximated the actual 
number of ways to the 'round' number 50, rather that she is In possession of a 
generalisation, a conjecture which would lead to exactly 50 as prediction. Incidentally, 
it is normal practice to use round numbers as vague numerical reference points 
(Channell, 1994, pp. 78 ff. ); indeed, a round number on its own may serve as a 
rounder (i. e. without a prefix like 'about or'approximatel)('), as In, for Instance 
1: 5.2 A suit like that would cost you £300. 
The fact that round numbers are normally chosen with numerical Rounders [Note 5.7] 
is further evidence in support of my suggestion that Harry and Alan [T4: 42, T4: 43] are 
deploying 'about' as a Shield, and not as a Rounder. If their intention had been to 
approximate rather than to hedge commitment, then Channell's findings would led me 
to expect'about twenty' rather than'about eighteen'. 
My spoken contribution, then, in T6: 131 Is designed to test out ishka's commitment to 
50, asking "do you really think it Is". Again, my use of 'think' here Is In the root sense of 
'believe', and I strengthen the probe by the adverbial Adaptor hedge 'really'. The 
intended effect is to encourage her to make her position 'less fuzzy", as Lakoff puts it. 
Ishka's reply indicates her discomfort; she skilfully sidesteps my demand for 
commitment with a reply [T6: 132] which amounts to a virtuoso performance In hedging. 
Even Frances, who at that stage is displaying more confidence than Ishka (and less 
hedging), double-hedges her response [T6: 134]. 
'basically' 
This is an interesting and relatively unusual hedge, used by only 3 of the 21 children, 
and only on this one occasion [132] by Ishka. [Note 5.8] The word can function as a 
'bottom line' underpinning, synonymous with 'fundamentally, as In 
1: 5.3 John's problem is that he is basically lazy. 
It seems to have the effect, as used by the children, of qualifying the content of what is 
being said or claimed; thus, it acts as an Approximator. The following extract Is from an 
earlier, weakly-framed conversation with Simon (aged 123A). which turned out to be a 
forerunner of the'Make Ten' Task. Simon rapidly moved on from positive Integer pairs 
to decimals. After a while, I Intervened: 
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Sil : 15 Tim: What if I gave you one of the numbers, one point three recurring, what 
would the other number be? 
16 Simon: Em, eight point six recurring. 
17 Tim: Why? 
18 Simon: Because one point three recurring is basically a third ... 
19 Tim: You mean the point three ... 
20 Simon: ... point three recurring is basically a third, so you need ... well, the one, 
that's one, so to make it up to nine you add on eight, then you need 
another two thirds, which is point six recurring. 
21 Tim: If you have, um, point three and point six recurring, and you add them up, 
what do you get? 
22 Simon: Point nine recurring. Mmm - nearly one. 
23 Tim: Nearly one. 
24 Simon: Yes. 
25 Tim: Why nearly one? 
26 Simon: Because it's not, because point three isn't, it's just nearly a third. It doesn't 
quite get to the third. 
27 Tim: When it's point three recurring. 
28 Simon: Yeh. 
29 Tim: Oh, so point three recurring isn't really a third at all? 
30 Simon: Well. It's very nearly a third. 
31 Tim: Very nearly a third. 
32 Simon: Yeh. 
Simon's statement [Si1: 18, Sil : 20] that "point three recurring is basically a third" is not 
in fact an assertion of a fundamental (basic, so to speak) property of point three 
recurring. The adverb'basically' is being deployed as a hedge, a Rounder in fact, so 
that the force of the statement is much the same as that of "point three recurring is 
approximately a third", or perhaps "point three recurring is as good as a third", much as 
one would say "97% is as good as full marks". It is as near as makes no difference. 
Brown and Levinson include 'basically' in a list of a dozen 'Quality hedges' (1987, 
p. 167), most but not all of which are archetypal Rounders ('approximately', 'roughly'), 
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which "give notice that not as much or not as precise information Is provided as might 
be expected". 
Trace now the course of the above exchanges as the force of Simon's 'basically' is 
revealed in the questioning. My analysis goes like this: as it stands, Si1: 18 is 'incorrect' 
- not that the true/false dichotomy is very meaningful when applied to hedged 
assertions (Lakoff, 1972) - although the intention Is clear to me. In Si1: 20, Simon 
responds to my prompt to correct, or perhaps to clarify his statement in Si1: 18. In fact, 
he interrupts my prompt to self-correct and (re)states that "point three recurring Is 
basically a third". On the other hand, he completes the arithmetic in Sil 20 with "you 
need another two thirds, which is point six recurring'. Notice that there Is no 'basically' 
this time. I (in my role as interviewer) am aware that confusion about the value of 
infinite decimals is commonplace with students - of all ages. This is not intended to be 
a patronising remark, given the range of foundational (basic, even) issues which 
underpin any position on the matter (Comu, 1991). The Issue here Is the usual 
psychological and notational difficulties associated with equating an Infinite series (the 
decimal) with its sum (the fraction). My strategy, In order to ascertain where Simon 
stands in relation to these two recurring decimals - determined 'on the hoof as the 
"um" [Si1: 211 indicates - is to ask him about their sum. As I expect, his reply conveys 
his belief that the sum falls short of one. Asked to explain, Simon Is guarded but more 
explicit: 
511: 26 Because point three isn't, it's just nearly a third. It doesn't quite get to the third. 
I press the conclusion in Si1: 29, the "Oh" attempting to convey some neutrality, some 
surprise, so as not to put words into his mouth. But he remains uncertain, and unable 
to agree without qualification to the bald statement that "point three recurring isn't 
really a third at all". His reluctance to concede is marked by the maxim hedge Well, ' 
[Sil : 30] as he flouts the maxim of Manner, and arguably others besides I The whole 
exchange is marked by Simon's desire to be cooperative, yet true to himself, his 
beliefs, and his uncertainties. 
WELL': MAXIM HEDGES AND DISCOURSE MARKERS 
Carlson (1984, p. 37-38) analyses the occurrence of 'well' in dialogue in terms (inter 
alia) of failure to meet the demands of a question. Speakers tend to preface answers 
with a discourse particle such as 'well', to indicate some sort of insufficiency in the 
answer to be given (Lakoff. 1973). Examples given by Carlson (who is content to offer 
literature as pragmatic data) include the following from Agatha Christie (1977, p. 22) 
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Reflect a minute, Hastings. One can catch a murderer, yes. But how does one 
proceed to stop a murder? - Well, you, - you - well, I mean - if you knew 
beforehand -I paused rather feebly - for suddenly I saw the difficulties. 
The following fragment is extracted from Appendix 2: 
SO: 1 Tim: How many three-quarters are there in a hundred? 
2 Simon: Well, there are seven three-quarters in ten, remainder a quarter. 
In effect, 'well' acts as 'maxim hedge' in such instances (Brockway, 1981) - the speaker 
is serving notice to the hearer that the contribution about to come will in some respect 
fall short of the requirements of one or more of Grice's maxims. In these examples, 
adherence to the maxims of Manner (Christie) and Quantity (S0: 2) are in question. 
Perera (1990, p. 217-222) found that 'well' occurs the most frequently of eight 
"characteristically oral" constructions that she examined in the Fawcett corpus 
(Fawcett and Perkins, 1980) but she offers no pragmatic account for this observation. 
There is, however, quite a substantial body of literature on such particles (for example 
Wierzbicka, 1976; Carlson, 1984; Schiffrin, 1987; in addition to the work of Lakoff and 
Brockway); I am bound to draw on and illustrate it only sparingly and partially here. 
Wierzbicka analyses 'well' as a'pragmatic particle', a word whose function is to 
express a pragmatic meaning at minimal cost. She uses the term 'pragmatic meaning' 
to refer to factors of propositional attitude such as assumptions, attitudes and 
intentions. Considered against the backdrop of Grice's maxims, 'well' can frequently be 
argued to attach some vagueness to the speaker's compliance with one or more of the 
maxims. Indeed, this device is not uncommon in my Make Ten data: 
T10: 181 Tim: Thirty-nine ... why, how do you know that? 
182 Susan: Well, you've got the, you've got your, let me see, nineteen ways, and then 
you've got another set of nineteen ways going the other way. 
It could be argued that Susan can foresee rather a rambling account ahead, likely to 
violate the maxim of Manner. 'Self repairs' (false, starts, self-corrections) abound in 
T10: 182. This is commonplace (in the transcript data) when people are asked to 
supply a reason for a belief, or an explanation of some sort. In the example below, I 
am talking with Lucy and Rachel: I have introduced the conversation with my usual 
gambit, and whilst Lucy sets about listing ways of 'making' 10, Rachel quietly indicates 
that there will be ten ways. 
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T2: 14 Tim: So you're saying. Rachel, even before Lucy's written them all down, you're 
saying that there'll be ten ways. 
15 Rachel: Mm [in gentle confirmation). 
16 Tim: How did you know that. before Lucy had written them all down? 
17 Rachel: Well, because if you've got a number that adds up to ten. the, em, there's 
ten, and you've got all the others down below. You can only make ten 
ways to get up to ten. 
18 Tim: Do you understand that, Lucy? [Tim doesn't. Lucy nods]. I don't, you 
explain it to me. 
19 Lucy: Em ... well ... there's only ten ways to make ten. 
20 Tim: Well, I can see you've only, I mean you've written down ten ways. right, If 
you count them up there's one, two. three ... 
21 Lucy: ... and they're all different ... 
In T2: 16 I ask Rachel for an explanation: how did she know there would be ten ways 
before they were listed? The' well' with which Rachel begins her explanation gives 
notice that I shouldn't expect an account which is entirely clear or convincing. Next 
Lucy is put on the rack, asked to clarify Rachel's argument. In fact she is only able to 
restate the conclusion, and her 'well' is encased in hesitation. 
Brown and Levinson (1987, pp. 164-171) describe how some occurrences of hedges 
themselves (as opposed to discourse particles such as 'well', 'after all', 'anyway') may 
be interpreted as acting as maxim hedges. These hedges may do one of the following: 
9 emphasise that one or more maxim requirements are being met; 
T2: 193 Roksana: I do believe there are thirty-eight now. [maxim of Quality] 
" serve notice that (or indicate the possibility that) one or more maxim 
requirements are being flouted. 
T4: 99 Tim: You think it might be seventy-two. Harry? 
100 Harry: It's a wild guess, but I ... I'm not sure about that ... I think it will 
probably be an even number... most likely about that, because ... 
yeah, that Is quite likely. 
Harry's highly equivocal response flouts the maxim of Manner. The hedges 
simultaneously achieve that effect and point to it. 
A CA perspective on'weil': Adjacency Pairs 
An alternative, or complementary, way of understanding use of 'well' Is in terms of 
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preference organisation with respect to adjacency pairs. In Chapter 3, I described how 
dispreferred second turns are marked in various ways, including delays and prefaces. 
The use of 'well' to preface a reply to a request for information in the classroom can 
certainly be interpreted in this way. As Levinson (1983, p. 334) remarks, "The particle 
'well' standardly prefaces and marks dispreferreds". Some uses of 'well' in the 'Make 
Ten' corpus (and elsewhere in my data) can be seen to be of this kind. In the extract 
above with Lucy, my first part [T2: 18] is a invitation (to explain); Lucy's second part 
T2: 19 amounts to a refusal, or at least an inability, to accept the invitation. 
My response T6: 20 indirectly evaluates Lucy's 'explanation'; in this case the 
indirectness marks my redressive action in anticipation of a Face Threatening Act. 
For further evidence of the importance for pupils of 'weil' as a pragmatic particle, look 
back to the Frances/Ishka Episode B [T6: 118], also see Simon's utterance Sil : 30 
towards the end of the previous section. 
HEDGES: THE TAXONOMY REVISITED 
The account of hedges in mathematical discourse in this chapter is essentially that in 
my article (Rowland, 1995b) in which I accept without question the hedge taxonomy of 
Ellen Prince and her collaborators. However, I should like to offer here a slightly 
sharper [pragmatic, modal-oriented] cognitive and taxonomic view which, I believe, will 
provide a good conceptual basis for future discussion - in this thesis and elsewhere. 
Consider two main categories identified by Prince et al.: Shields and Approximators. 
These are illustrated by: 
1: 5.4 I think there are ten beans in the jar [Plausibility Shield] 
1: 5.5 There are about ten beans in the jar [Rounder-Approximator] 
In each case, a hedge fuzzifies the sentence: 
1: 5.6 There are ten beans In the jar. 
The statement 1: 5.5 is arguably true if the number of beans in the jar is in fact 11, 
whereas 1: 5.6 is not. [Note 5.9] These Approximators have truth-conditional semantic 
consequences in the way that they modify a sentence. One view (Sadock, 1977, 
p. 434) is that Approximators not only alter the conditions under which a statement is 
true, but, by virtue of their vagueness, they "trivialise" its semantics and so render it 
"almost unfalsifiable". (Note Sadock's own use of an Adaptor, making his own claim 
almost unfalsifiable. ) This is a semantic observation. A pragmatic perspective on the 
same claim, taking into account goals and intentions, ought to consider whether the 
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speaker intended it to have that effect, and if so, why. 
In contrast to Approximators, Prince of al. claim that 'Shields (... ) do not affect the truth 
conditions of the propositions associated with them' (op cam. p. 89). I suggest that, in 
fact, the function of a Shield is to transform a proposition Into a non-propositional 
speech act. The syntactic means of doing this Is the use of a hedged performative ('I 
think'), an adverbial preface ('probably', 'apparently) or some other fuzzy meta- 
linguistic device (see Stubbs, 1986 for others). The illocutionary force of such 
constructions is that what was an (unhedged) statement sheds its status as a 
proposition (subject to truth-conditional semantics) to become a conjecture. The crucial 
effect is that the speaker has less stake (or none) In the truth or falsity of the 
(unhedged) statement. 
For example, suppose I say: 
1: 5.4 1 think there are ten beans In the jar. 
I then carefully count the beans in the jar: there are indeed ten. This would be sufficient 
(irrespective of what I might believe about the number of beans in the jar) to render the 
statement 1: 5.6 true; but it does not render 1: 5.4 either true or false, since the 
conditions under which 1: 5.4 are true are strictly independent of the number of beans in 
the jar. They have to do with my beliefs, my propositional attitude. my state of mind. 
The pragmatic effect of 1: 5.4 is to implicate that the speaker doesn`t know exactly how 
many beans there are (since otherwise s/he would be violating the maxim of Quantity); 
that s/he entertains the possibility that there are ten; but that they are unwilling to be 
held to be committed to the truth of such an assertion. 
Consider once more: 
1: 5.5 There are about ten beans in the jar. 
Now Approximators are deployed (at times) precisely for the purpose of constructing a 
scenario within a proposition which is (almost) unfalsifiable. Why should a speaker 
want do that? One reason would be that s/he Is uncertain and does not wish to be 
seen to be committed to a straightforward proposition for fear of being seen to be 
wrong. As with the Shield, the illocutionary force of the statement Is conjectural. The 
suggestion of Prince et a/. that (p. 95) "Rounders do not reflect any uncertainty or 
fuzziness but are rather a shorthand device when exact figures are not relevant or 
available" is somewhat hasty; indeed, it Is ultimately untenable. 
There are, In effect, two parallel taxonomies of hedges: 
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A: Into lexical categories as specified by Prince et al. Thus, 'about' is (i. e. has the 
typical form of) a Rounder, and so on. 
B: Into the following two semantic categories, in parallel with that of modal verbs (as 
discussed in Chapter 3; see also Coates, 1983, pp. 18-22): 
Epistemic hedges- conveying a state of mind such as lack of knowledge, 
(un)certainty, (lack of) conviction, commitment, etc. 
Root hedges (after Coates, 1983, see below) - non-epistemic: for example, 
giving an appropriate degree of precision. A variety of pragmatic purposes 
(such as those listed in Channell, 1994) may motivate such a hedge, but 
displacement is not one of them. 
The essence of my argument in this section is exemplified by what I see as the two 
different pragmatic meanings of the Approximator 'about'. The first is epistemic, and 
occurs in my data in situations requiring prediction or generalisation, such as 
T4: 43 Alan: Eighteen ways. About eighteen probably. 
The pragmatic goal of 'about' is to implicate uncertainty, and to achieve protection 
against accusation of error by rendering the utterance unfalsifiable. 
The second is root, normally (but not necessarily) associated with estimation. In this 
dialogue, C is a confident 10-year-old girl, I an adult interviewer. 
M222: 1 I: 
2 C: 
3 I: 
4 C: 
5 I: 
6 C: 
Can you tell me how many sweets there are on the plate? 
[2 seconds] About twenty? 
Now, can you tell me how many sweets there are in the glass? 
11 second] Ten. 
And do you think there are exactly ten? 
Nol [laughs] not exactly. 
No counting was involved. The answers [2 and 4] are rapid estimates; her amusement 
in [6] makes this clear. The Approximator'about' is implicit in [4], ten being a'round' 
number (Channell, 1994, pp. 87-89). Here, the pragmatic goal is to meet cooperative 
requirements to do with Quality and Quantity - not to make claims in excess of one's 
actual knowledge, and to judge how much detail is required in a given situation. 
These matters will be considered more fully in the next chapter. The burden of much of 
this one has been that, in pupils' mathematics talk associated with predictions and 
generalisations, the semantic function of Approximators is usually epistemic. Similarly 
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(but not so frequently), the semantic function of a Shield may be root, e. g. the 'private' 
verbs 'think', 'believe', and so on (see the discussion earlier in this chapter). 
The epistemic/root approach encourages attention to the function of hedges 
irrespective of their form: it will also facilitate discussion in Chapter 6 of properties of 
hedges that have a great deal in common with those of modal verbs. 
HEDGES AND POLITENESS 
The use of hedges can often be seen as a means of redressing threats to 'face'. 
Consider, for example, the utterance: 
1: 5.7 I'm sort of hoping to get it finished by Friday. 
in which the speaker's commitment actually to finishing by Friday Is loose, and there is 
only the weakest sense of any kind of promise (a threat to negative face). This is very 
typical of use of epistemic hedges in 'Make Ten'. 
T9: 149 Rebecca: ... maybe it would be twelve because it's um ... half way inbetween. 
The epistemic modal 'would' and the epistemic hedge 'maybe' redress the potential 
face threat to Rebecca (in case it turns out not to be twelve). 
This is broadly consistent with my observation that I typically use hedges (Shields and 
Adaptors) in recognition of the face wants of the children, whereas they typically use 
Rounders and Plausibility Shields as epistemic hedges which render their conjectures 
almost unfalsifiable, in order to serve their own face wants. 
Students who, in their own perception, enjoy a more balanced power relationship with 
their tutor do in fact have a concern for his or her face needs. This was apparent In a 
small way with the ten- and eleven-year-olds when they felt they might be usurping my 
role as'teacher', and exhibited negative politeness. Here, for example, Caroline would 
like to explain something: 
T3: 53 Caroline: Um, can I ...? 
54 Tim: Oh yes, please Caroline. 
55 Caroline: Half of ten is five and we actually got five, but then we added on ten add 
zero, so it would be six. So, so far it's basically worked out half the 
number, and it's the same with the twenty, it's eleven because we've 
added on zero and twenty, and its the same with the sixteen. 
Caroline adopts the face-redress strategy of posing her offer in the form of a question, 
before giving an extended explanation. Note the relative absence of hedging in [55] - 
here she is not coming to know the matter she articulates; rather, she knows it. 
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THE ZONE OF CONJECTURAL NEUTRALITY 
In this chapter I have shown how children use Rounders and Plausibility Shields to 
implicate uncertainty, to insert some space between conviction and asserting a 
proposition. I suggest that that space, between what we believe and what we are 
willing to assert, deserves a name: I propose the 'Zone of Conjectural Neutrality' 
(ZCN). [Note 5.10] Even Rounders, such as'about', which syntactically attach some 
fuzziness to the proposition itself, are pragmatically deployed by the children to 
achieve Shield-like ends. This, and the forms of linguistic Shielding which I have 
discussed, have the effect of reifying the ZCN and thus distancing the speaker from 
the assertion that he or she makes. Whilst truth and falsity may be decided in the ZCN, 
a person may articulate a proposition without necessarily being committed to its truth. 
In such a cognitive and affective milieu, it is the proposition that is on trial, not the 
person. Whilst mathematical conjectures are formed as private, cognitive (perhaps 
inductive) acts, they are validated in public polemic of some kind. Moreover, the 
learner ideally participates in the discourse since, as Balacheff submits (1990, p. 259), 
children must take responsibility for the validity of their own solutions "in order to allow 
the construction of meaning". At the same time, a conjecture is not fixed and 
immutable, but modifiable. I am describing, of course, the quasi-empiricist approach to 
teaching and learning which I described in Chapter 2. I referred then to Dawson's 
(1991) account of a "fallibilistic way of teaching". 
A teacher who is functioning fallibilistically [... ] establishes a classroom climate 
in which an atmosphere of guessing and testing prevails, where the guesses 
] are subjected to severe testing on a cognitive rather than an affective level[... 
where knowledge is treated as being provisional. Because of the provisional 
nature of knowledge, pupils are encouraged to confront the mathematics, their 
peer group and, where appropriate mathematically, even their teacher. 
(Dawson, 1991, p. 197, emphasis added) 
Not only is uncertainty an intellectually tenable position, but the assertion of uncertainty 
draws the attention of the teacher to the existence of a ZCN, and thus opens up the 
possibility that s/he might provide for the student some cognitive 'scaffolding' (Wood et 
a!., 1976) to support, and perhaps transform that state. This seems to be what is 
happening to Harry here, in a final extract: 
T4: 128 Tim: How do you know there are forty-nine Harry? 
129 Harry: Well I am not completely certain actually, but I would expect it because 
if you start off with fifty and you do forty-nine add one, forty-eight add one, 
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but then you'd end up with one add forty-eight wouldn't you, so they 
always change... (... ] 
133 Harry: Forty-eight add two I mean. 
134 Tim: OK. And the last one In that list would be? 
135 Harry: One add forty-nine, so they'd all be ... [interrupted by Alan sneezing] 
136 Tim: How do you know that there's forty-nine different ways that you've listed? 
You started with forty-nine add one and you ended up with one add forty- 
nine. Now how do you know that there are forty-nine pairs In that list? 
137 Harry: Well there's fifty numbers, and you just, there's lots of ways because you 
just go forty-nine add one, forty-eight add two all the way down 'til you get 
to the one, but you can't do fifty add nought. so that will take away one 
which will make you with forty-nine. Fm quite certain about that. 
I shall return to further consideration of the ZCN in the final chapter. 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I have shown that the classification of hedges (due to Prince et al., 
1982) into functional categories is relevant and useful in the analysis of my task-based 
mathematical conversations with children aged 9 to 12, where children are being 
encouraged to predict and generalise. I have noted that: 
"I (as interviewer) exploit Attribution Shields and Adaptors, usually for teacher-like 
purposes; whereas 
" the children typically use Rounders and Plausibility Shields, and nearly always to 
implicate uncertainty, to insert some space between conviction and asserting a 
proposition. Furthermore, 
"I have proposed that the space between what we believe and what we are willing 
to assert be recognised, and that it be named the 'Zone of Conjectural Neutrality'. 
The purposes which speakers achieve by the use of vague expressions (Channell, 
1994, pp. 186-9) Include "displacement" (in case of uncertainty) and "self-protection" 
(a safeguard against later being shown to be wrong). Given the prevailing school- 
culture (maths is about right and wrong answers, and it Is much better to be right), the 
use of hedging is evidently deployed by many children as a Shield against being 
'wrong'. These Shields could be seen to act as linguistic pointers to intellectual 'risks', 
with attendant vulnerability. In principle, it would be preferable for students to know that 
being unsure is a genuine, valuable and creative option available to them. 
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CHAPTER 6: ESTIMATION AND UNCERTAINTY 
Tip number 448: Don't be afraid to say, "I don't know" 
(H. Jackson Brown Jnr., 1991: Life's Little Instruction Book. ) 
From time to time a pupil may feel obliged to make an assertion, perhaps in answer to 
a question, yet without certainty that what s/he is claiming is entirely accurate or true. 
The 10- and 11-year old children considered in the previous chapter had available a 
repertoire of hedging strategies for maintaining cooperative interaction whilst being 
appropriately vague, thereby conveying a lack of full commitment to the propositional 
content of their utterances. Further evidence of this capability in other students will be 
presented in the next chapter. When is this linguistic repertoire developed, and are 
there identifiable milestones on the way to confident mastery? 
It will be seen that the nature of the question to be addressed - the development of 
epistemic modal forms and hedges over the primary school years 4 to 11 - requires 
systematic collection of appropriate spoken language data from a representative set of 
children across that age range. The vague language studied so far in this thesis, with 
some two dozen children, arose in contexts where pupils were engaged in activities 
involving prediction and generalisation. This required extended, contingent interviews, 
in order to prepare the ground, i. e. the problem environment, for these mathematical 
processes to come into play. 
Much of Channell's recent book (1994) on the pragmatics of vague language is 
concerned with approximating quantities. The study reported in this chapter focuses on 
that dimension of vague language, specifically on estimation of the number of objects 
in a set. This choice of focus is partly for the sake of addressing what is perhaps the 
most obvious aspect of mathematical activity in which one would expect vague 
language to play a part. Moreover, it is possible in a short (5-10 minute) interview to 
present appropriate estimation tasks to children in a meaningful way, to obtain 
responses, and to follow up from a restricted menu of probes. It is therefore 
convenient, in designing an age-related study, to use estimation rather than 
generalisation tasks to elicit vague language when dealing with a pupil sample 
numbered in hundreds rather than tens. 
ESTIMATION 
In his recent thesis, Clayton (1992, p. 11) classifies the diffuse notion of estimation into 
three broad categories. 
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Computational estimation involves the determination of approximate (typically, 
mental) answers to arithmetic calculations e. g. 97s is roughly 100x3.1 or 310. Such 
competence is commended by the National Curriculum (DFE, 1995, p. 25) for the 
purpose of checking answers to precise calculations for their 'reasonableness'; pupils, 
however, seem to regard such checks as trivial or pointless (Clayton, op cit., p. 163). 
Quantitative estimation indicates the magnitude of some continuous physical 
measure such as the weight of a book, the length of a stick. 
Numerical estimation entails a judgement of'numerosity' " the number of objects in a 
collection. In principle, such a set could be precisely quantified by counting. In practice 
such a precise enumeration may be impracticable or simply judged to be unnecessary, 
excess to pragmatic requirement. 
Ellis (1968, p. 159) observes that counting may be considered to be a measuring 
procedure, but is unique in the non-arbitrariness of the unit of measure. Nonetheless, 
Clayton merges numerical estimation and quantitative estimation into one analytical 
category. This obscures the fact that there is sparse reference to numerical estimation 
in his literature survey (pp. 23.42). 
A surprising justification for this apparent omission emerges from a reading of Judy 
Sowder's review of research on estimation for the NCTM Handbook (1992). Sowder 
notes that "there simply is not a rich research base in estimation" (p. 372) and that 
most such research has been on computational estimation. Moreover, "Numerosity 
estimation has received the least research attention, and (... j the only two studies 
located combine it with measurement estimation" (p. 372). A close reading of her 
review suggests that one those two studies was reported in a short article - by Clayton 
himself - in Mathematics Teaching (Clayton, 1988). The numerosity component of the 
other (Siegel et a/., 1982) analysed estimation competence in terms of 'benchmarks' 
(known standards) and 'decomposition/recomposition' of a set in order to apply a 
benchmark together with a computation. A variety of estimation tasks (of quantity and 
numerosity) were presented to children aged between 7 and 14, and to a small sample 
of adults. The investigators found marked developmental differences in performance 
on numerosity items. Note that the number-estimation tasks (Judging from the 
examples given in the paper) seemed to involve quite large sets. Example: "Now many 
names on a page from the phone book? ". The significance of set size will be 
considered later in this chapter. 
The literature on estimation of quantities does indeed tend to be about estimation of 
measures. Nobody really knows why this portion of the physics curriculum (on 
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measurement) has been appended to primary mathematics in the UK. It seems to 
come down to Edith Biggs, Nuffield Maths (1960s style), practical work (a Good Thing), 
and the fact that measurement is self-evidently 'practical'. Janet Ainley (1991), setting 
out to investigate the mathematics in measurement, describes a staple-diet "estimate 
then measure" lesson with eight-year-olds. Reflecting on the lesson, Ainley comments 
(p. 70) on the peculiarity of estimating and then measuring. Clayton (op cit., p. 23, 
p. 158) independently agrees: 
Most estimation tasks in school require an estimate and then (almost 
immediately) a measure or calculation is made. Many colleagues have agreed 
with me when I have asserted that pupils often make their 'estimate' after they 
have measured or calculated showing their disregard for the estimation 
process. (p. 23). 
The behaviour of the children (in Ainley's account) certainly reinforces the Ainley- 
Clayton observation; some of them enter the measurement of another child for their 
'estimate' - it is, after all, so much more satisfactory if the two agree. On the other 
hand, measuring devices are calibrated discretely, whereas mass, length, time and all 
quantities derived from them are continuous. Thus, as Bright (1979, p. 581) observes: 
Every measurement is an approximation, or if you will, an estimate. 
Incidentally, Ainley concludes that: 
There is mathematics in measurement; but it does not happen to be in the bits 
which currently get given priority in mathematics lessons. (p, 76) 
The study to be presented in this chapter is concerned with children's estimates of 
numerosity, and their spontaneous production of vague language in articulating and 
discussing such estimates. Suppose, for example, that I ask a'phone-book question 
such as "How many words are there on this page? ". You (the reader) are likely to 
respond - perhaps from experience of reading essays or writing papers - along the 
lines "About four hundred". The hedged approximation in such a response can be 
accounted for by reference to one or more of the pragmatic goals listed towards the 
end of Chapter 2. 
The first of these goals (giving the right amount of information) accords with Grice's 
maxim of Quantity - "Let your contribution be informative but not too informative" - for 
cooperative interaction. The point is that, in saying or writing "About four hundred", you 
have judged that I don't much care whether there are actually 388 or 413 words on the 
page. 
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The fourth goal (covering for lack of specific information) could also account for the 
same hedged response. In this case, you actually don't know how many words there 
are, and can't be bothered to count them. At the same time, by saying "about 400" you 
do observe one of Grice's maxims of Quality - "Be truthful: don't say that for which you 
lack evidence". 
The last goal in Channell's list (protecting oneself against making mistakes, against 
accusation of error) is equally pragmatically plausible. For one consequence of the 
vagueness of the response is this: it would be very difficult for me to demonstrate that 
the claim contained in it was wrong. The hedge is epistemic, and works for the speaker 
because it effectively renders the claim unfalsifiable. 
MEASURING AND ESTIMATION IN SCHOOL 
Prince et al. (1982) and Channell (1985; 1990) have demonstrated how speakers and 
writers deploy hedges in order to fulfil a variety of goals. Their studies were mainly of 
adult academic and professional groups, such as doctors, copywriters, broadcasters, 
students of linguistics and economists. Both identify the prevalence of a protective 
purpose - the recognition of vulnerability and the consequent need to need to 'shield' 
oneself. I have already argued, in Chapter 5, that this need Is ever-present In public 
settings, usually schools, where pupils do mathematics. 
Ainley (1991, p. 70) says, en passant, of the estimation lesson she observed: 
It Is a relaxed lesson: estimates are meant to be wrong, so no one Is worried 
about failure. 
I know exactly what she means; the lesson is relaxed In the sense that it demands little 
of the children. But I'm not sure that these (or other) children have been let In on the 
secret that estimates are meant to be wrong; in any case, 'expected' would be more 
fitting than 'meant'. If too many of a child's estimates agree with the 'right' (i. e. 
measured) answers, then the teacher suspects foul play -a classroom form of Tiegen's 
paradox (Chapter 2) in that the child who is most accurate is deemed to be the least 
likely to have arrived at his 'estimate' by fair means. This is a strange mathematics 
classroom game, in which 'right' estimates are more likely to meet with the teacher's 
disapproval than plausible 'wrong' ones. That this Is not known to the children Is 
evidenced by the way many of them subvert the activity - estimate after measuring, not 
before. It is a first step on the rung of a ladder of innocent deceit: nearer the top Is the 
A-level science student who draws a straight line graph, then plots some points 
plausibly arranged either side of it, before finally tabulating his'experimental' results. 
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Of course it matters to the student and his teacher if the data do not fit the theory: 
'experimental error' tolerates only modest disturbances from the neat and tidy world of 
the model, the 'theory'. Notwithstanding a relaxed atmosphere in the classroom, I 
suggest that eight-year olds are worried about failure when they do estimate-and- 
measure in school. Not worried in a debilitating sort of way perhaps, but enough to 
want to fix the answers. 
Weiner (1972) identified a vicious circle in children's attitudes to estimation: poor 
estimators, not surprisingly, viewed estimation as "risky", avoided it, and remained 
poor at estimation. In any case, it may not be at all clear to such children (from their 
experience or from any words of the teacher) that estimation is something that they 
can get better at by practice. Clayton develops this affective theme in his thesis 
Estimation in Schools, in which he presents and studies estimation as a risk-taking 
activity. Transcripts of pupils performing estimation tasks were analysed to determine a 
(somewhat subjective) measure on a scale 1 to 10, of pupil confidence in the estimates 
they gave, using indicators such as "willingness to explain methods, general air of 
confidence". The judgement of confidence was irrespective of the suitability or 
accuracy of the estimate. Clayton's conclusion is that the boys in his sample were 
generally more confident than the girls. He followed up with a questionnaire to pupils in 
primary and secondary schools to assess attitudes to familiar risk-taking situations e. g. 
volunteering to answer a question in class. For the secondary pupils, a consistent 
pattern emerged in which boys were judged more confident than girls in such 
situations. For primary pupils the data were not so consistent or significant in this 
regard, but Clayton nevertheless concludes (p. 149) that "gender plays a strong role in 
pupils' willingness to engage in activities in school that involve risk". I shall return to 
this issue towards the end of this chapter, and muddy the gender water a little more. 
COUNTING 
The earlier question about the number of words on a page tacitly invites an estimate of 
numerosity - the cardinality of a discrete, finite set which, if an exact answer were 
required, could be counted. One of the tasks presented to children aged 4 to 11 in the 
present study was designed to offer the choice of counting or estimating a set of 19 
objects. Data on the methods used by those children who did opt to count was 
collected and coded in the course of the study. This counting data is a kind of by- 
product of the linguistic core of the data, but will turn out to have some relevance in 
interpreting the linguistic behaviour of these children who are presented with a 
mathematical task involving numerosity. 
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In the early years of schooling, children are explicitly and laboriously taught to count, 
but not to estimate, small finite sets. The process of counting has been minutely 
studied and analysed, notably in the USA, by Zaslavsky (1973), Gelman and Gallistel 
(1978), Stelle, von Glasersfeld, Richards and Cobb (1983), Steife and Cobb (1988) 
and Fuson (1988,1991). In essence, counting a finite set entails the matching of the 
elements of the set (in any order, but without repetition or omission) with a fixed set of 
words - number-names ('tags') - which must be produced for word-object matching in a 
canonical sequence. Thus, a set with n elements can be counted In nl different ways. 
Gelman and Gallistel (1978, pp. 77-82) Identify five organising principles In young 
children's counting: 
" the stable order principle - the tags must be drawn from a stably-ordered list; 
" the one-one principle - every item in a set must be assigned a unique tag; 
" the cardinal principle - the last tag used is the cardinality of the set; 
" the abstraction principle - the above principles can be applied to any collection; 
" the order-irrelevance principle - the order of enumeration does not affect the 
outcome of the count. 
Gelman and Gallistel conclude (p. 130) that the first three 'how-to-count" principles are 
learned in that order; for example, a child can reliably recite the list of number-names 
before s/he can assign them Injectively to a set of objects. Fuson questions the 
invariability of this learning sequence, finding that it depends on the size of the set to 
be counted. In particular, for sets of cardinality above 16, it Is the one-one assignment 
that causes most difficulty, and (not surprisingly) this Is especially the case when the 
set is disorganised rather than being presented In a row. 
Fuson also draws attention to the fact that when a person performs a count, they have, 
to find some way of coordinating the word-object correspondence, and that this Is 
achieved by two simultaneous kinds of pointing 'actions', or "indicating acts". First, the 
person doing the counting has to point systematically to the objects in some (complete, 
non-redundant) order. Secondly, and simultaneously, they must point (in the sense of 
drawing attention, at the very least their own attention) to the number-word which is to 
be matched with the objects as they point to them in turn. Fuson calls these two 
independent indicating acts'local correspondences'. Both must be one-one if the count 
is to succeed - "one word must correspond to one indicating act and one indicating act 
must correspond to one object" (Fuson, 1991, p. 31). The form of each of these 
indicating acts undergoes change with growing maturity, but invariably begins from an 
externalised paradigm - the earliest object-indicating act is achieved by touch: the 
word-indicating act is speech, specifically by counting aloud. The first is spatial-tactile, 
the second linguistic. It is as though nature had been careful to assign one task to 
each cerebral hemisphere. [Note 6.1 ] Between the ages of about 3 and 6, and beyond, 
each of the two pointing actions attenuate to internalised versions: 
Both action parts of counting immovable objects - pointing and saying number 
words - undergo progressive internalization with age. Pointing may move from 
touching to pointing near objects to pointing from a distance to pointing from a 
distance to using eye fixation. Saying number words moves from saying 
audible words to making readable lip movements to making abbreviated and 
unreadable lip movements to silent mental production of number words. 
(Fuson, 1988, pp. 85-6) 
The whole gamut of these'actions', the human repertoire of word-act-object 
associations, from touch-say to gaze-mute, was demonstrated in the data collected 
from these short interviews with 230 children aged 4 to 11. 
Ginsburg and Russell (1981) report that moves towards internalisation of counting 
actions result initially in reduced accuracy. Nevertheless, Saxe and Kaplan (1981) 
found that this loss of accuracy is recovered: six-year-olds in their sample were as 
accurate in counting an array that required an internal indicating act as in counting one 
for which external pointing could be used. Moreover, Briars and Fuson (1979, 
unpublished raw data, cited in Fuson, 1988) found that the external-internal 
progression will be reversed according to the requirements of the counting task; high 
school students counting large disorganised arrays first counted without pointing (with 
eye fixation), but then either spontaneously changed to pointing or did so when the 
experimenter observed that it was a hard task and "you don't need to do it in your 
head". 
Abutting and overlapping the teaching of counting (at age about seven), the activity of 
estimation - of lengths, weights, and so on - features strongly in the primary school 
curriculum, even though there may be little discussion of the process of estimation, 
and consequently little attention is given to developing techniques to Improve pupil's 
competence to make 'good' estimates (Ainley, 1991, p. 73). 
ENQUIRY FOCUS 
It has been suggested [Note 6.2] that when a teacher (or textbook, workcard, etc. ) 
asks "How many? ", young children (in the first two or three years at school) typically 
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receive the question as an invitation to count rather than to estimate. In the context of 
primary school mathematics, the suggestion is a very plausible one. Counting a small 
set may be regarded as a less risky enterprise than estimating its cardinality. If this is 
the case the young child's response to such a question Is less likely to be modalised or 
hedged than the older child's. Furthermore, the young child will not be able to hedge 
until s/he has learned how to achieve that effect with language. My expectation, then, 
is that modal forms and hedges will be relatively absent In mathematics talk In early 
childhood, and that one can discern progressive development of modal/hedging 
capability and use in individuals through the years of primary schooling. 
The aim of this enquiry was to examine the validity of this expectation, looking for 
trends in the responses of pupils across the 4 to 11 age-range, in the context of 
cardinal estimation activity. 
I have divided both modal forms (Chapter 2) and hedges (Chapter 5) Into two broad 
categories, labelled (in both cases) epistemic and root. The epistemic category 
contains instances of language use (modals or hedges) which encode and serve to 
convey the speaker's attitude to or confidence In what s/he is saying. The category Is, 
therefore pragmatically determined but, particularly for modals, there are semantic 
parallels i. e. what kind of modality (wish, conjecture, etc. ) Is it? The root category is, by 
definition, non-epistemic. A working test for a root modal or hedge might be that the 
speaker has little or no affective 'stake' In what s/he says. Thus. deontic modals (of 
obligation and permission) would normally be root. as would an Approximator-hedge 
that could be claimed to be motivated by concern to respect the maxim of Quantity. 
In this study, however, both modals and hedges will be identified In the first Instance by 
reference to their form rather than their pragmatic function. Hedges will be Identified as 
Approximators or Rounders, and modal language will be Identified entirely by the 
presence of modal auxiliaries. This is easily justified since modal verb moods and 
tenses (see Chapter 2) are marginal in modem English (Stephany, 1986, p. 385), 
especially in speech, and so the modalising function falls on modal verbs (auxiliaries). 
The adverbial modal forms such as 'possibly' and 'maybe' are In any case Included as 
hedges (Shields). 
It could be argued that every epistemic hedge Is In fact a modal use of language. The 
case is already made for adverbial Shields. Stubbs (1986, p. 18-19) clearly takes the 
Shields 'I thin k/believe/guess/etcJ that' and'It seems than to be modals when they 
release speakers from total commitment to propositions (i. e. when, In my terms, they 
are epistemic hedges) as opposed to when they are used to make statements about 
what Stubbs calls "private psychological states" such as dogmatic conviction. 
166 
METHOD 
The study was carried out in a 4-11 primary school. There were some 230 children on 
the school roll. Every child was asked the same three "How many? " questions in 
private, one-to-one interview. Details of the questions and related tasks are given 
below. The object was to test the expectation that the language of modality and 
hedging will be more commonplace among the oldest children (10-11) than the 
youngest (4-5), with some sort of continuum evident between these extremes. 
The fieldwork was carried out by a student assistant (the "interviewer") in the last 
month of the school year. The interviewer was well-known to both teachers and 
children in the school. The tasks had been piloted in another school so as to train the 
interviewer and refine the precise wording of the questions themselves. In their final 
form these were as follows. 
" Task 1: The interviewer produces a white plate on which 19 sweets have been 
placed so that each is visible. The sweets are similar in size and appearance to 
"Smarties". [Note 6.3] The child is asked, "Can you tell me how many sweets 
there are on the plate? ". [Note 6.4] 
" Task 2: The interviewer produces a high-quality colour photograph of a small 
glass containing 14 sweets. These almost reach the rim of the glass. The child is 
asked "Can you tell me how many sweets there are in the glass? " 
" Task 3: The interviewer shows the child two thin plastic tubes (both are about 25 
mm in diameter and 10 cm high). One contains 10 sweets, the other 20. The 
interviewer says "There are ten sweets in this tube (indicates). I know that, 
because I counted them when I put them in. Can you tell me how many sweets 
there are in this (indicates the other) tube? " 
The materials used are shown together in the Plate overleaf, although the materials for 
each task were produced in turn by the interviewer as they were needed. 
Why choose these particular three tasks? The point about the first is that the child can 
actually count the sweets if s/he chooses to do so, but may also make a reasonable 
estimate if s/he so chooses. The actual number is a determinate and accessible 
quantity; the child must decide whether it is required, and be aware that estimation is 
an option. Before I piloted this task, I had considered some numerical variation for the 
youngest (age 4-5) children, placing just 9, or even 6, sweets on the plate. At the same 
time, I had a preference for keeping the task constant across all the age groups, 
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otherwise it would be possible to account for differential responses by the fact that 
they had been given different tasks. Early years teachers with whom I discussed this 
dilemma advised in favour of fewer sweets with the youngest children (having In mind, 
I suspect, the limitations of the few rather than the capabilities of the majority). I had to 
have good grounds for believing that the enumeration by counting of 19 sweets would 
be an accessible option for the four- and five-year-olds in the sample. Whether the 
count was accurate was, for the purpose of the study, Immaterial. Gelman and 
Gallistel's study gives evidence that: 
4- and 5-year-olds can [assign tags to items) for set sizes up to 19 [... j young 
[meaning 3-year-old] children do not treat set sizes in excess of 5 as 
undifferentiated beaucoups. (p. 111). 
In the event, both the pilot and the survey-proper vindicated not giving the youngest 
children an 'easier' task. I was concerned, too, that if a child could'see' how many 
sweets there were by direct perception - exact enumeration without the need to count 
is called 'subitising' in the literature (Jensen et aL, 1950) - then the issue of estimating 
would not arise as an option. 
The second task was designed so that the precise number of sweets in the glass was 
indeterminate. It can not reliably be determined by counting, since not all of the sweets 
are visible in the photograph. Some kind of estimate Is therefore necessary, and some 
degree of uncertainty is likely to be present in the situation, although the estimate may 
be guided by a count of the sweets visible In the photograph. Uncertainty may be 
lessened by naive interpretation of the two-dimensional Image, Le. failure to realise 
that some sweets which were present In the glass are not part of the photograph. 
Similarly, in the third task, the precise number of sweets cannot be determined by 
counting, since not all are visible on the outside of the tube. A handful of the 230 
children tipped out the contents of the tube and counted them that wayl However, the 
height of the sweets in the second tube, relative to the first, Is a possible guide to the 
number in it, given the fact that there are ten In the first In this case, then, estimation 
may be guided by an elementary form of proportional reasoning, namely doubling 
(Hart, 1979. p. 99). An alternative perspective on this strategy would be to view it as 
'regular decomposition/recompositlon' (Siegel eta!., 1982, p. 213). The contents of the 
second tube are decomposed into samples, each estimated to be the size of the given 
'benchmark i. e. the contents of the first tube; the two samples are then recomposed 
and the answer computed. The interviewer sought to understand whether any such 
strategy and inference was a factor, using probes such as "How did you know that? ". 
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Tasks 2 and 3 were essentially intended to "block" (Laborde, 1989, pp. 33-4) the 
possibility of complete solution by counting, in order to introduce an element of 
uncertainty and a need to estimate. All three tasks bore some superficial similarity to 
the numerosity tasks in the study of Siegel and his collaborators: their stimuli were all 
physical props or photographs, and their questions were of the form'How many X's are 
there in/on this Y? '. The essential difference is that in their study the problems were 
presented as estimation tasks. The children were told that they were to be asked to 
make estimates, and were given a short account of what estimation is (p. 215). In the 
present study, it was up to the children to decide that they might estimate, or to infer 
that it would be necessary to do so. 
RESPONSES AND CONTINGENT QUESTIONS 
For all three tasks, each child was asked to say how many sweets there were 
(respectively on the plate, in the picture, in the second tube). Two kinds of response 
were categorised as 'Marked': 
" those responses which conveyed vagueness through specific linguistic hedges - 
I think there are ten', 'About ten', and so on; 
" vague statements of possibilities or conjectures, conveyed with modal auxiliaries 
e. g. "it might be ten". 
The label 'Marked' and derivative forms will consistently be highlighted in this chapter 
with a capital letter as a reminder of its current, if interim, technical meaning referring 
to the two itemised response-types. Hedges and modals will be described jointly as 
Markers. Children using Markers will be described as Marking, and so on. As already 
noted, no distinction was made in the data-collection phase between epistemic and 
root Markers. The pragmatic purposes of particular occurrences will be considered, 
however, at a later stage. 
If one of these two kinds of Marker was spontaneously present in the initial response of 
the child, the interviewer noted it and moved on to the next task (or concluded the 
interview). Such a spontaneous hedge or modal was denoted a'primary' Marker. If, on 
the other hand, the primary response was un-Marked (e. g. "There are nineteen" or 
simply "nineteen"), the interviewer would ask a supplementary question, "Do you think 
there are exactly nineteen (or n)? ". This was partly intended to probe the child's 
commitment to their un-Marked answer; at the same time, my intent was to see 
whether the children who did not use Marked language spontaneously could be 
encouraged to do so, thereby revealing that they knew how to do so. If this second 
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question provoked a Marker in the child's reply, then this secondary Marker was 
recorded. Thus, for each of the three tasks, primary and secondary Markers were 
mutually exclusive. 
DATA 
The interviewer prepared a response proforma (Figure 6.0) with a sheet for each child 
which he completed during the course of the interview. Every interview was audiotaped 
and a quarter were videotaped: the recorder was set up in advance of each session 
and just left running. Therefore, it was possible to return to the tapes. If necessary, to 
check the proformas and to study prosodic and other nuances of the children's 
responses. Along with hedges and modal auxiliaries, the interviewer recorded a 
number of other features of the response on the proforma. Most field-names on the 
proforma are self-explanatory. The 'Soundtrack' field contains (for many, but not all of 
the children) a digitised sound sample (copied from the audio or video recording) of 
Marked language. 
The records of the children's responses, as entered on the proforma, were entered 
onto a database ('Data Power', Iota Software, 1994). The software enabled the usual 
data-interrogation methods. Most of the data relevant to this paper are shown in Table 
6.1, which gives the number of occurrences of all Markers, separated Into four age 
bands (see below). These same data are displayed in the bar charts in Figures 6.1 to 
6.4. Occasional reference will be made to Table 62, which separates the same Marker 
data into finer categories, corresponding to three ability groupings (to be explained 
later) for each age-band. 
Before proceeding to identify some trends apparent from the graphs, I shall comment 
on the rationale for the organisation of the data In the Tables and Figures. 
Compulsory education in England and Wales is organised In chronological 'Years', 
normally beginning (in the absence of Nursery classes) at age four or five with 
between one and three terms in Year R (for'reception'). The youngest children in 
Year 1 will be just five at the beginning of the academic year, the oldest nearly seven 
at the end. The 'Primary' phase of schooling covers Years R to 6. 
In the Primary school which participated in the study, all children have three terms in 
Year R. The number of children in each school 'year' (and present for the interview) 
varied from 23 (Year 5) to 45 (Year R). The results on Marking are presented here in 
four year-bands rather than seven individual years. The bands are: 
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St Luke's C. P. School Research: June 1994 Ref. No: 
Class: Gender: Year: L-ý 
Age: DecimAge: Ability Level: 
H 
Band: 
Question 1: Can you tell me how many sweets there are on the plate? 
Count: 1 Number: Soundtrack: 
Aloud: Rising Intonation: 
FN 
Hesitation: Response Length: ýý, ModalQ 
Primary Hedge: 
Exactly: 
Secondary Hedge: 
Question 2: Can you tell me how many sweets there are in the glass? 
Count: Number: Soundtrack: Rý, ý 
Aloud: 1-1 Rising Intonation: 
Hesitation: ýý Response Length: Modal) 
Primary Hedge: 
Exactly: I 
Secondary Hedge: 
Question 3: There are 10 sweets in this tube. 
Can you tell me how many sweets there are in this tube? 
Count: Number: Soundtrack: 'r 
Aloud: Rising Intonation: 
Hesitation: Response Length: Modal[] 
Comparison of Tubes: 
Primary Hedge: 
Exactly: 
Secondary Hedge: 
Figure 6.0 
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Table 6.1: MARKERS ACROSS 7 SCHOOL YEARS IN 4 BANDS 
TASK 1 Primary Markers - Task 1 Secondary Markers - Task 1 All Markers - Task 1 
Year No. No. °k of Year No. S of Year No. % of Year 
R 45 4 9% 1 2% 5 11% 
1 and 2 70 1 1% 4 6% 5 7°6 
3 and 4 65 1 2% 7 11% 8 12% 
5 and 6 50 3 6% 10 20% 13 26% 
TASK 2 Primary Markers - Task 2 Secondary Markers - Task 2 All Markers - Task 2 
Year No. No. % of Year No. S of Year No. % of Year 
R 45 4 9% 1 2% 5 11% 
1 and 2 70 1 1% 4 6% 5 796 
3 and 4 6 6 9% 12 18% 18 28% 
5 and 61 50 14 28% 10 20% 24 48% 
TASK 3 Primary Mar kers - Task 3 Secondary Markers - Task 3 AU Markers - Task 3 
Year No. No. % of Year No. % of Year No. % of Year 
R 45 1 2% 3 7% 4 9% 
1 and 2 70 4 6% 4 6% 8 11% 
3 and 4 65 17 26% 10 15% 27 42% 
5 and 6 50 11 22% 18 38% 29 58% 
ALL TASKS Primary Markers - Tasks 1-3 Sec'dary Markers - Tasks 1-3 All Markers - Tasks 1-3 
Year No. No. %of Year No. %of Year No. S of Year 
R 45 7 16% 3 7% 9 20% 
1 and 2 70 5 70/6 11 16% is 21% 
3 and 4 65 20 31% 24 37% 33 51% 
5 and 61 50 19 38% 25 150% 37 746 
Tad. 62: MARKERS BY ABILITY LEVEL ACAOSS 7 YEARS IH 4 BANDS 
TASK 1 Prmwy Marw . Task 1 S eoorwry Mrka " rk 1 Al Merke " as k1 
Year LA MA UA LA */. LA MA %MA UA %UA LA %lA MA %MA UA %UA LA %LA MA %MA UA %UA 
R 7 20 18 0 0% 1 5% 3 17% 0 0% 0 0% 1 e% 0 0% 1 5% 4 22 
1-2 15 33 22 1 7% 0 0% 0 0% 2 13% 2 0% 0 0% 3 20% 2 0% 0 0% 
31 18 29 18 0 0% 0 0% 1 6% 0 0's, 3 t0% f 2? fý 0 0% 3 10% 6 2BX 
S8 16 16 18 0 0% 1 6% 2 11% 2 13% ] 19% 5 28% 2 12. f 25% 7 39% 
58 98 76 1 2% 2 2% 6 8% f 7% 6 8% t0 *3% 6 91. 10 107V 18 211 
TASK 2 Flurry Marker - Tuk 2 S eoordry 4rkr - 1W 2 Al Mrken - Taak 2 
Year LA MA UA LA %LA MA %MA UA WUA LA %1A MA %MA UA %UA LA %tA MA %MA UA %UA 
R 7 20 18 0 0', L 2 10% 2 11% 0 0% 0 0% 1 0% 0 0% 2 t0% 3 17X 
1-2 15 3 0 0% 1 3% 0 0% 1 7% 1 3% 2 9x 1 7% 2 6% 2 8% 
34 18 0 0% 4 14% 2 11% 2 I1% 7 24% 3 17% 2 11X 11 38% 6 28% 
5-6 16 2 12% 7 44% 5 28% 25% 1 ITS 5 28% 6 37% 6 1 58% 
56 E 2 4% 14 14% 9 12% 7 12x 9 v% 11 14% 9 18% 23 23% 20 2E% 
TASK 3 Primary Masker " Task 3 6--dry aüi 3 Al Mak«s " Tas k3 
Year LA MA UA LA %L/º UA %UA LA %1A NA %MA UA %UA LA '. LA WA %MA UA %UA 
R 7 20 18 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 3 17% 0 0% 1 5% 3 17% 
1-2 15 33 22 0 0% 
2 
2 9% 7% 1 ? fý 2 9t; 1 7% 3 9% 4 10% 
3-4 18 29 18 3 17% 3 17% 0% " 14% 6 28% 4 229 16 62% 6 44% 
5.6 6 16 18 0 0% 6 3J% 6 31% 8 J7% 7 39% 6 31% 12 75% 13 
66 98 78 1 13 5% 11 11% 7 12X 11 11% 1) 22X 11 2D'>L Ji J2% 26 37% 
AL L TASKS Prknuy Marker " Take 1-3 Seoa+dry Marter " TWa 1-3 11 A/ Maur. " Tarts le 
Year LA MA UA LA %LA MA %MA UA %UA LA %LA MA SMA UA %UA LA %LA MA %MA UA %UA 
R 7 20 18 0 0% 2 10% 5 28% 0 0% 0 0% 3 17% 0 0% 2 1094 7 39% 
1-2 15 33 22 1 7% 2 6% 2 9% 4 Z7% 3 9% 4 *8% 6 33% 5 15% 6 23% 
34 18 29 18 3 17% 13 45% 4 22% 2 11% 13 46% 9 60% S 29% 17 68% 11 61% 
5-6 16 1B 18 2 129E 8 50% 9 50% 8 50% 7 44% 10 66% 9 6E% 12 75% 16 891. 
56 98 76 8 111 25 28% 20 28% 14 25% 23 2 1. 28 34% t9 34% 30 375 38 51% 
LA : lower abEMy band MA : rtrdde abwv bard UA : Uppw abd*y bend 
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Year R: the first full year in the school, the oldest child being at most 5 
years 9 months at the time of the interviews. 
Years 1 and 2: 'Infants', aged between 5 years 9 months and 7 years 9 months. 
Years 3 and 4: 'Lower Juniors', aged between 7 years 9 months and 9 years 9 
months. 
Years 5 and 6: 'Upper Juniors', aged between 9 years 9 months and 11 years 9 
months. 
In interpretive discussion of the data, these four bands, these phases of primary 
schooling, will be located against a background of institutional expectations and 
indices of arithmetical success within those phases. One felicitous consequence of the 
bandings is to achieve statistically-viable group sizes, and a degree of numerical parity 
between them (in fact, the sub-population sizes are 45,70,65,50). The numbers of 
children giving a Marked response to each question are presented in the graphs 
(Figures 6.1 to 6.4) as percentages of the number in each band, so that comparisons 
between the bands may be made. 
One feature of the graphs should be noted: that for each of the Tasks 1 to 3 (Figures 
6.1 to 6.3), primary (spontaneous) and secondary (provoked) Markers are mutually 
exclusive. Therefore, the respective (dark and pale) columns may be validly stacked, 
the sum being the total number who Mark their response to that question. Figure 6.4, 
however, gives the size of the union of the sets (for primary and secondary Markers) in 
the first three graphs, and so the primary and secondary categories (unions) are no 
longer exclusive - it would be possible, for example, for a particular child to be 
recorded as primary on question 1 and secondary on question 3. Therefore the 
columns have not been stacked, but are displayed as three non-additive bars. 
With one exception, the intention is to make comparisons (in the next section) across 
bands for each task (Figures 6.1 to 6.3) or for all tasks (Figure 6.4) rather than to 
compare task with task. The graphs have been scaled individually with this purpose in 
mind. 
Occasional subsequent reference will be made to the additional data, tabulated in 
Figure 6.2 but not presented in the Figures 6.1 to 6.4. This was related to the 
attainment of the children in the domain of whole number concepts, categorised as 
below average/ average/ above average for their school year. 
This assignment was entrusted to their class teachers, and the decision to delegate it 
to them was a deliberate one, in recognition of their deep knowledge of the children 
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whom they had taught daily for a whole school year. I regard this as more subjective 
but more reliable than a spuriously objective measure of attainment obtained, for 
example, from a Standard Attainment Task level. I gave no guidance about the 
proportion of children to be placed in each category. The relatively greater willingness 
of the teachers of the oldest (10- and 11-year-old) children to use the extreme 
categories presumably reflects their perception of their pupils' attainment as realised 
(or not) rather than potential. For understandable converse reasons perhaps, the 
Year R teachers proved reluctant to place their four- and five-year-olds in the lower- 
attaining category. 
Table 6.2 re-presents the Marker data contained in Table 6.1, broken down into the 
three ability groupings for each age-band, labelled lower (LA), middle (MA) and upper 
(UA). Samples at the ability extremes were relatively small in each age-band, but any 
notable differences in Marked language between ability bands will be noted in the 
commentary which follows. 
OBSERVATIONS 
My observations here are restricted to some trends and features evident in the graphs. 
In particular: 
1 The cumulative (stacked) Marked responses on Tasks 1 and 2 show a drop from 
the first band (Y R) to the second (Yi -2) with consistent increases thereafter. 
2 This cumulative decrease over the first two bands (Tasks 1 and 2) is the result of 
very clear decreases in primary Marking between those bands. 
3 With regard to secondary Marking only (Tasks 1 and 2), there is a consistent rise 
from band to band over the whole age range. 
4 Likewise, on Task 3, the trend (minor inconsistencies apart) is of consistent 
increase with age. 
5 Figure 6.4 indicates a greater tendency towards secondary Markers rather than 
primary ones in the last three bands (Y1 to Y6), but for the reverse in the 
youngest (Y R). 
6 Taking Figures 6.1 to 6.3 together (but noting that the vertical scales are 
different): for the children in the last three bands (Y1 to Y6) there is an increasing 
tendency to Mark the response to each task in turn i. e. more Mark their response 
to Task 3 than that to Task 2, and responses to Task 2 are more Marked than 
those to Task 1. Again, this trend is not evident in the youngest group (YR). 
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A Note on Secondary Marking 
I have already observed that, for any one of the three tasks, primary and secondary 
Marking are mutually exclusive, and that this justifies the accumulation of 
corresponding frequencies in the data and 'stacking' of the corresponding columns in 
the bar charts. In reading the data, however, it should be borne in mind that secondary 
Marking is conditional on absence of primary marking. Consider for example the 
results on Task 2: in Years 3 and 4, the 18% secondary Markers are drawn from the 
91 % non-primaries, and so represent 20% of those who could have given secondary 
Markers. Whereas in Years 4 and 5, the 20% secondary Markers are drawn from the 
72% non-primaries, and so represent 28% of those who could have given secondary 
Markers. In this sense, the increase (adjusted to 40%) in secondary Marking between 
the third and fourth bands is even greater than the 'raw' percentages suggest (10% 
unadjusted). The same conclusion applies to the increase in secondary Markers from 
the second band to the third on Task 2, and indeed to Task 1 across the last three 
bands. This 'conditional adjustment' has the opposite effect between the first (YR) and 
second (Y1,2) age-bands with regard to Tasks 1 and 2, because there is a sharp 
decrease in primary Marking between these bands, leaving a larger sub-population 
available for secondary Marking. For both Tasks, however, the increase in secondary 
marking is equally dramatic, and the inference of a consistent upward trend 
(Conclusion 3) remains valid. 
INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORK 
It is reasonable to suggest that, in a broad sense, the data obtained from the tasks and 
interviews support the expectation (stated as an a priori conjecture earlier in this 
chapter) that ability to use linguistic Markers, and the tendency to do so, develops with 
age - at least over the years of primary schooling. It would not be a gross over- 
simplification, then, to say that the upward trends in the graphs point to the conclusion 
that children learn (or acquire increasing facility) to use vague language in order to 
convey attitudes and points of view, in particular uncertainty, in the primary years. 
I shall proceed to propose a socio-linguistic developmental Interpretative framework 
which would account for the upward trend, and which might also accommodate the 
unanticipated initial drops (from band R to band 1-2) noted above In Observations 1 
and 2. 
I suggest that the modal and hedging linguistic behaviours of the children In each band 
are related to three fundamental developmental dimensions. 
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1 The child's developing 'apprehension' of school - of the roles of the players 
(particularly teachers and their pupils) in the school situation, and the way that they 
relate to each other in learning situations. By 'apprehension' I mean the totality of 
factors such as: her (or his) perception of her role; how s/he construes (make sense of) 
a social environment which may have much in common with the home (e. g. being 
protected and cared for), but which evidently differs from the home in many respects 
(e. g. the number of individuals in a confined space, the relentless succession of tasks 
offered). Learning these and other essential differences between home and school is 
part of what Berger and Luckmann (1967) call 'secondary socialisation'. Primary 
socialisation takes place in the home, before school, when the family is the world, and 
reality is circumscribed by the child's experiences within the family. This reality is 
internalised and contributes to the child's sense of self in relation to a very small 
number of intimately-close significant others. 
Secondary socialisation involves "the internalisation of institution-based sub-worlds [... ] 
the acquisition of role-specific knowledge" (ibid., p. 158). On going to school [Note 6.5] 
the child must learn how to become a pupil, one of many in a class, as distinct from "a 
certain mother's child". The internalisation which is part of secondary socialisation is 
weaker than that which takes place in primary socialisation; the child cultivates (some 
better than others) the art of 'role-distance', such that s/he is not wholly caught up in 
the identity which the institution imposes on them, but is able to distance themselves 
from it (and indeed, to question it) and perceive their role and that of others is a 
detached, formalised way. In particular, the child: 
apprehends his school teacher as an institutional functionary in a way he 
never did his parents, and he understands the teacher's role as representing 
institutionally specific meanings [... ] Hence the social interaction between 
teachers and learners can be formalised. The teachers need not be significant 
others in any sense of the word. They are institutional functionaries with the 
formal assignment of transmitting knowledge [... ] the consequence is to 
bestow on the contents of what is learned in secondary socialisation much 
less subjective inevitability than the contents of primary socialisation process. 
(ibid., p. 161) [Note 6.6] 
These factors contribute to the child's view of how s/he (and others) are 'positioned' 
within the institutional 'practices' (Walkerdine, 1988) which characterise schooling. In 
comparison with the integrated and deeply-embedded primary world of the home, in 
which the child is totally immersed, the world of school is more distant, more utilitarian, 
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more manipulable (Woods, 1980, p. 13). 
2 The child's developing (confidence in his or her) ability to produce desired 
behaviours within a variety of school practices. Such behaviours include an 
appropriate response to one's name at registration; reading aloud a limited passage of 
a book to an adult, with accuracy and minimum delay; giving 'correct' answers to 
questions (particularly arithmetic ones) to which the enquirer already knows the 
answer (Ainley, 1988, pp. 93-4; Walkerdine, 1988, pp. 54-5 and pp. 89-92). [Note 6.7] 
In particular, in the narrow context of the tasks presented to the children in this study, 
the child progresses over the first few years of schooling from a position where 
counting is a significant challenge, as far as accuracy is concerned, to one where it is a 
routine if necessary chore. I shall return to this matter later, with appropriate evidence. 
3 The child's developing awareness of modal concepts and command of modal 
language. Hypothetical reasoning is, in the classical Piagetian formulation of cognitive 
development, a distinguishing hallmark of formal operational thinking. Such an account 
would essentially rule out modal concepts for most children in the primary years. 
In their account of the growth of possibility notions, Inhelder and Piaget conclude: 
Compared to pre-operational or intuitive thought, concrete operational thought 
is characterised by an extension of the actual in the direction of the potential. 
[... ] [However] the role of possibility is reduced to a simple potential 
prolongation of the actions or operations applied to the given context [... ] They 
do not consist of imagining what the real situation would be if this or that 
hypothetical condition were fulfilled, as they do In the case of the adolescent. 
(Inhelder and Piaget, 1958, pp. 248-51) 
Pidrrault-Le Bonniec (1980) states the Piagetian position in a way which conveniently 
relates to the second and third three tasks in the study, suggesting (p. 76) that only at 
seven or eight years do children begin to have some idea of undecidability, and that 
the ability to reason from hypotheses is not acquired until age eleven or twelve. This 
would be likely to depend, however, on the extent to which the child's thinking was 
embedded in some real or familiar context (Donaldson, 1978, p. 76) 
Moreover, Pidrrault-Le Bonniec (op. cit. ) has identified the presence and development 
of 'pragmatic modality' in young (age 3ý/2 to 6) children - evidenced by the ability to 
assess what could, or could not, be made with a given set of materials. The combined 
picture, then, is of a development of modality from actions to perceived realities, and 
thence to imagined worlds. This corresponds to and is consistent with the finding that 
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modalised utterances in early English child language predominantly express deontic 
meanings (actions related to obligation and permission); for example, 'can', 'could' and 
'may' are used for action-oriented possibility, 'can' being significantly more prevalent 
than 'may' (Wells, 1979; Stephany, 1986, p. 390). The first epistemically modalised 
statements in pre-school children tend to occur about six months later than deontic 
meanings (Stephany, p. 396), but are still extremely rare in comparison. 
Some insight on the development of Marked language in the early years of schooling is 
possible by sifting the results of a large-sample study of infant (age five to seven) 
vocabulary (Edwards and Gibbon, 1973) for the following data. 
At age 5+, 'think' is present in the vocabulary, with lowish frequency index (FI) 0.3. 
(See Note 4.6 for the definition of FI). 'May' and 'might first appear (in the Edwards 
and Gibbons sample) at 6+, with Fl 0.46 and 1.53 respectively, with 'think at 0.64. 
'Perhaps' does not appear until age 7+, with low Fl 0.18; by this age the Fis of 'may' 
and 'might have roughly doubled in comparison with those at 6+, and that of 'think' has 
risen to 3.7. 'Maybe' does not appear in the data. [Note 6.81 
This is broadly consistent with data from a corpus of 250,000 English words spoken by 
American adults (Howes, 1966), which contains 66 occurrences of 'may', 102 of 
'might', 139 of 'maybe' and 1034 of 'think'. 
Whilst Approximators'about and 'around' are present in the infant corpus, the 
Edwards and Gibbon word-count must surely include non-hedging uses (such as "I'll 
tell you about my cat". and "Is mummy around? ") and the FI values have little 
relevance here. Nor, for that matter, is 'think only used epistemically, as a 
commitment-marker; adults, certainly, may use it in root form to make direct reference 
to cognition (as in the imperative "Think before you speak". ) 
Against this three-dimensional background I propose the following developmental 
narrative; the objective is to account for the trends in the data by reference to the 
interpretive framework that I have sketched. 
INTERPRETATION OF THE DATA 
The account of changes in Marked language and performance in the primary years 
(age four to eleven) is presented below in terms of three developmental phases, which 
I have termed Initiation; Suspicion; Approximation and Protection. These phases will 
be briefly characterised, then illustrated by extracts from the 230 task-based 
interviews. 
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Year R- Initiation. 
In this first phase, the child's apprehension of school is relatively naive, and adult 
behaviour - questioning in particular - is taken at face value, without suspicion. 
Counting is a relative novelty, and the child is aware that her/his performance is 
sometimes faulty; this is hardly surprising, given the complexity of the process, as 
analysed by Gelman and Gallistel, Stelle et al. and Fuson. Whilst the task of 
enumerating 19 items may be accessible to a Year R child, a teacher will alert the child 
even when the count is substantially competent yet not entirely accurate; because 
accurate counting is a major goal, a targeted skill, in this phase of schooling. 
Moreover, Gelman (1977) suggests that only about one five-year-old in six can 
accurately enumerate a set of 19 items, given one minute to do so. In this sample of 
Year R children, it was actually one in five. The child (Year R) may well wish, therefore, 
to acknowledge to the interviewer, (as a primary Marker) some doubt about the answer 
s/he gives. In almost every case this is achieved with the plausibility Shield'I think', 
with just a few epistemic modals, 'may', 'might and 'maybe'. The child's Marking can 
be understood as straightforward cooperation, in effect observing the maxim of Quality 
is met, or serving notice that it may not have been met (Brown and Levinson, 1987, 
p. 164). 
Tasks 2 and 3 are invariably approached by attempting a count of the sweets that are 
visible in the picture/the tube. Proportional reasoning (Task 3) and attempts to 
compensate for the possibility of hidden sweets (Task 2) are rare. The Piagetian 
caricature would suggest that the request by the interviewer for the number of sweets 
was accepted as achievable rather than a 'trick question about something 
indeterminate or hypothetical. 
It was the case that two-fifths of the Year R children who had (in advance) been 
informally assessed by their teachers as "above average for the year" with regard to 
whole number concepts, were recorded as giving a Marked response, whereas only 
two "average" and no "below average" Year R children used any Markers. This is not 
easy to interpret; it could mean that the lower attainers prefer not to draw attention to 
their uncertainty, or lack the linguistic means to communicate it. Perhaps they want the 
confidence to discuss their answer with the interviewer, or even lack awareness of its 
unreliability. 
In each of the following transcripts, 'I' is the interviewer, 'C' the child. 
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Example 1: Boy aged 5: 9 [M391 
The young boy in this transcript uses Marked language fluently. 
M39: 1 I: Can you tell me how many sweets there are on the plate? 
[C counts aloud, points to each sweet in turn, takes 17 sec to reply] 
2 C: One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, 
thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, nineteen, twenty, 
twenty-one, twenty-two, .. twenty-three, .. twenty-four. 
3 I: Twenty-four? Do you think there are exactly twenty-four? 
4 C: Maybe not. 
5 I: Why do you say that? 
6 C: Because I might have counted two double. 
7 I: [indicating photo] Right, now, there are some sweets In the glass. Can you 
tell me how many sweets there are in the glass? 
[C counts aloud, touches the sweets in the photo, takes 6 seconds to reply] 
8 C: One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine. 
9 1: And do you think there's exactly nine? 
10 C: I don't know, maybe there's one more, because I don't know if I counted 
that one. 
11 I: OK. Now, before we went into assembly I put ten sweets In that tube, so I 
know there are ten sweets in there. Can you tell me how many sweets 
there are In that tube? 
[C counts aloud, touches the outside of the tube, no comparison of the 
tubes, takes 22 sec to reply] 
12 C: One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, 
thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, nineteen, ... 
twenty, twenty-one, twenty-two, twenty-three, twenty-four, twenty-five. 
13 I: Twenty-five. And do you think there are exactly twenty-five? 
14 C: Maybe not because there's so much. 
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The "How many? " question is received by this boy as a straightforward invitation to 
count. He has command of the stable-order principle [M39: 2], but applying the one-one 
principle to a disordered set of this size presents difficulties for him. He does not touch 
the sweets one by one, but points to them -a partial internalisation. His ability to 
partition the set (Gelman and Gallistel, 1978, p. 77) into counted and to-be-counted 
subsets is faulty and he knows it is sometimes faulty [6]. In fact, he has double- 
counted three of the sweets. His awareness of the same difficulty, with partitioning, 
prompts his Marked response [10] to Task 2. In this case he is suspicious of omission 
whereas before it was duplication. For Task 3, his order-stability in reciting the 'tags' 1 
to 25 is once again faultless; he expresses his uncertainty in his answer with the same 
epistemic hedge [ 14]'maybe' (not). The meaning behind his voluntary explanation 
"because there's so much" is unclear, but could suggest a tacit estimate of some sort 
which does not accord with his count. Alternatively, he may in effect be acknowledging 
that he regularly makes a partitioning error when the set to be counted is as large ("so 
much") as this one. 
In each case, he applies the cardinality principle unerringly. In fact, his competence on 
the first and third tasks confirms Fuson's ordering of mastery of the principles for sets 
of this size. What is very clear from this transcript is that he takes a face-value view of 
the interviewers three questions, that he counts rather than estimates, but that he is 
quite uninhibited about notifying the interviewer that his (the child's) answers may be 
unreliable. His attitude is something like: "That's what I make it but I know from 
experience that I may have made an error. That's simply the way things are when, like 
me, you're a novice at counting". 
Years 1 and 2- Suspicion. 
The child's apprehension of school includes the sense of being scrutinised by curious 
adults, of the existence of 'testing' questions. S/he is now expected to enumerate small 
sets routinely, and has built on this for the purposes of addition and subtraction of 
whole numbers. The result is a manifest reluctance to use primary Markers in 
response to the first two tasks (perhaps because "he wants to know if I can get it 
right"), but the interviewer's probe ("Exactly? ") may release an acknowledgement of 
uncertainty, using the same Plausibility Shields (predominantly'I think' with a few 
'maybe's) as the Year R child. The more subtle linguistic ability to use Approximators 
as epistemic hedges, for self-protection by vagueness, has not yet been developed. 
Task 3 may seem bizarre, quite unlike routine practical or text book counting exer- 
cises; it gives rise to more hedged responses, though not in the low attainers, who are 
most likely to hedge on Task 1- like the younger, higher-attaining Year R children. 
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Example 2: Boy aged 7: 5 [reference number 55] 
The transcript is chosen for absence of Marked language. 
M55: 1 I: Can you tell me how many sweets there are on the plate? 
[C counts aloud, touches each sweet, takes 23 sec to reply] 
2 C: [quickly] One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, 
twelve, thirteen, .. oh, (restarts counting, now slower, placing sweets on 
the table whilst counting] One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, 
ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, 
eighteen, nineteen. 
3 I: And do you think there are exactly nineteen? 
4 C: What? 
5 I: Do you think there are exactly nineteen? 
6 C: Er.. [pause, then recounts into hand] One, two, three, four, five ... One, 
two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen, 
fourteen, fifteen, sixteen, seventeen, eighteen, nineteen. 
7 I: So do you think there are exactly nineteen? 
S C: Yes. 
9 I: Right ... can you tell me how many sweets there are in the glass? 
[C turns over photo to try and see the "back" of the glass; counts aloud, 
takes 20 sec to reply] 
10 C: Ohl One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven. ... one, 
two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, eleven, eleven. 
11 I: And do you think there are exactly eleven? 
12 C: Yes. 
His first recount [M55: 2] is presumably a self-correction after he suspects that his 
partitioning has gone wrong. There is no problem with the order of the tags, and the 
count is in fact accurate. The interviewer's probe [3,6] is immediately taken to be a 
suggestion that he has mis-counted. Instead of hedging, he re-counts the set [6]. The 
185 
indeterminacy of the number of sweets in the glass is either not perceived or not 
acknowledged [12]. Again, he counts the (visible) sweets unprompted. 
This child's uncertainty, his sense that he may make mistakes when he counts, is not 
conveyed in Marked language, but by his inclination to re-count. His approach to Task 
3 (below) is much the same, until he admits some (unspecified) diff iculty. 'Can't' [14] is, 
of course, a root modal associated with capability. The interviewers prompt [15] 
precedes proportional thinking and an un-Marked response. 
13 I: Now, I counted some sweet Into here, and I know there are 10 sweets in 
there [... J Can you tell me how many sweets there are in that tube? 
14 C: One ... two ... three ... four... can't do this) One, two, three, four, five, six, 
seven, eight ... one, two, three, four. five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten ... 
nine, ten ... eleven ... one, two ... I can't figure it out right. 
15 I: How many do you think there are? [pause] There are ten in there OK [... ] 
We know that there are ten in there. 
16 C: I know that ... [compares tubes without counting] ... twenty. 
17 I: Why do you think that? 
18 C: Because it's half. 
19 I: OK. Excellent [... ] 
Years 3 to 6- Approximation and Protection. 
There is developmental continuity within this phase rather than qualitative change. The 
account which will follow characterises a child who has moved some way along that 
developmental continuum. In fact, the 'low ability' children in this phase used Markers 
consistently less (significantly less on Task 3) than their higher-attaining peers - in 
many respects their response was more like that of the younger, higher-attaining Year 
1-2 children. 
The child has a well-developed apprehension of her role in the practice of education. 
She realises that teachers'- including researchers' - questions about mathematics are 
usually not simple requests for information (Walkerdine, 1988, p. 61). Indeed, she may 
have become quite expert at eliciting from the teacher the very Information that she 
(the child) was originally asked to produce, or an easier question with the same answer 
(MacLure and French, 1980). This kind of pupil behaviour is a parody of 'thinking', a 
strategy with a long pedigree: 
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Each time I had to think of a question easier and more pointed than the last, 
until I found one so easy that she would feel safe in answering it [... ] In fact, 
she was not even thinking about it. She was coolly appraising me, weighing 
my patience, waiting for that next, sure-to-be-easier question. I thought, 'I've 
been hadl' The girl had learned how to make all her previous teachers do the 
same thing. (Holt, 1969, p. 38) 
On the other hand, the child is confident in her ability to count; of the 108 Year 3 to 6 
children who did choose to count the 19 sweets in Task 1, about two-thirds did so 
accurately, and four-fifths of the remainder obtained 18 or 20. If such a child does in 
fact count the sweets in Task 1, then a primary Marker is unlikely. On the other hand, 
she may judge that the interviewer is not interested in the precise number of sweets on 
the plate, and offer a primary Marked estimate (there is a corresponding rise in the 
fourth band), or a response which is tagged (by intonation) with a question mark. 
She recognises that some quantities are indeterminate; on Tasks 2 and 3 s/he will 
realise, despite the awareness of 'testing', that the interviewer cannot sensibly expect 
her/him to give precise answers to these "How many? " questions. If his/her first 
answer is un-Marked - as if s/he were guessing how many sweets in a jar at a fete - 
she will readily admit to uncertainty when asked if that answer is exact. S/he may 
recognise the proportional reasoning Task 3 for what it is, and (correctly) have some 
confidence that there are exactly 20 sweets in the second tube. This is strongly 
reminiscent of many eleven-year-olds involved in Assessment of Performance Unit 
practical testing, who were very resistant to the notion that a 20 gram weight was being 
counterbalanced by 21 (rather than 20) plastic tiles (Joffe, 1985, p. 21 A). These pupils 
tended to 'demand a recount' in order to obtain the preferred 'round' answer. At the 
same time, however, Clayton (1992) observes that pupils will frequently actually avoid 
round numbers when asked to estimate numerosity. He calls this tendency the 'jelly- 
baby effect: 
Guess the number of jelly-babies in the jar and whoever is closest, wins the 
prize. Some pupils appear to believe that the person in charge would not have 
a'round' number of jelly-babies so they guess a number close to but not 
exactly the round number. (p. 117) 
At the same time, s/he has developed competence to deploy Approximators such as 
'about (as well as modal auxiliaries) as epistemic markers, to introduce vagueness for 
protective purposes. 
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Example 3: Boy aged 8: 1 [reference number 165] 
M165: 1 I: 
2 C: 
3 I: 
4 C: 
5 I: 
6 C: 
11 I: 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
C: 
I: 
C: 
I: 
C; 
I; 
18 C; 
Can you tell me how many sweets there are on the plate? 
[C points to each sweet, counts silently, takes 19 sec to reply] 
Nineteen. 
Do you think there are exactly nineteen? 
Yes. 
And how do you know that? 
I counted up in twos. 
OK. Can you tell me how many sweets there are in the glass? 
[C points to sweets, counts silently, takes 20 sec to reply] 
Ten. 
Ten. And do you think there are exactly ten? 
No 
No? Why not? 
Mm ... 'Coz there might be some more at the other side. 
I've put ten sweets in this tube here OK ... can you tell me how many 
sweets there are in that tube? 
[C touches (turns tube), counts silently, compares tubes, takes 31 sec to 
reply] 
About twenty-one. 
Quite confident of his internalised count of the sweets, he has no cause to Mark his 
responses [2,4,6] to Task 1. On the other hand, the indeterminacy of Task 2 gives 
rise to the secondary epistemic modal 'might [161. His approach to task 3 Is cautious 
and unhurried. The interviewer judged that some comparison was made between the 
tubes and hence that there may have been some proportional inference. The eventual 
answer [18] includes an Approximator 'about'. It is not possible to judge from the 
transcript whether this hedge is epistemic or root. The actual estimate of 21 (which is 
not a'round' number) appears to be an instance of the 'jelly-baby effect' Influencing the 
choice of estimate. 
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Example 4: Girl aged 10: 6 [reference number 222] 
1 I: Can you tell me how many sweets there are on the plate? 
[C doesn't count, takes 2 sec to reply] 
2 C: About twenty? 
3 I: Now, can you tell me how many sweets there are in the glass? 
[C doesn't count, takes 1 sec to reply] 
4 C: Ten. 
5 I: And do you think there are exactly ten? 
6 C: Nol [laughs] not exactly. 
7 I: Why did you say that? 
8 C: 'Coz it's not actually ... it doesn't look like ten ... well I just guessed. 
9 I: OK. Now, I've put ten sweets in this tube ... can you tell me how many 
sweets there are in this tube? 
[stares, compares tubes, takes 1 sec to reply] 
10 C: Twenty. 
11 i: And do you think there are exactly twenty? 
12 C: About twenty-five ... or twenty. 
13 I: And what makes you say that? 
14 C: 'Coz it looks like half, twice as much as In there. 
This pupil approaches each task with mathematical confidence and social maturity. On 
the video she looks relaxed, at ease with the interviewer. She knows exactly when an 
estimate will suffice and, indeed, when nothing else is possible. For Task 1, she 
instantly judges that an estimate will meet the requirement of the maxim of Quantity. 
Her Approximator qualifies a suitably round number [2] with the force of a root hedge 
(as if to say "This is as much as you need to know"). She just laughs at the suggestion 
that her vague use of ten [4] as a 'cognitive reference point (Rasch, 1975) should be 
taken to be anything other than an approximation. For Task 3, she is explicit that 
proportional reasoning is the basis of her rounded estimate. 
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Her response [12] to the interviewer's probe [111 needs closer examination. Channell's 
analysis of the approximator form n or m (1994, pp. 53-58), drawing on Crystal's book 
on intonation (1969), reveals a subtle prosodic distinction between a binary alternative 
and a vague range of alternatives. Consider the difference between the two following 
questions (scenario: parent to child about to go on a school trip): 
1: 6.1 Will you need five or ten pounds? 
[meaning: which of two bank notes shall I give you? ] 
1: 6.2 Will you need five or ten pounds? 
[meaning: is that the kind of amount you'll need? ] 
The semantic distinction is achieved by prosodic marking of the questions. In the first 
case, the two alternatives (five, ten) are both stressed and nuclear (i. e. have maximal 
prominence). In the second, five or ten is a single, unstressed tone unit and pounds is 
nuclear. Channell also points out that, for the approximative use of n or m, n must 
always be less than m. This is not the case in [M222: 12]. Sure enough, replaying the 
videotape of the interview confirms that the alternatives twenty-five, twenty, are not 
parts of a single tone unit in the utterance. They are quite separate, the first being 
stressed slightly more than the second. The impression conveyed Is that she considers 
revising her estimate (to 25, the next 'round' number in this range) but changes her 
mind perhaps on grounds of comparison and proportional reasoning. 
GENDER DIFFERENCES 
An expectation that girls/women hedge more than boys/men is commonplace (Lakoff, 
1975). This expectation is related to a supposition that males are more assertive and 
confident than females in a number of social situations. Clayton (1992) identifies 
estimation as a risk-taking school activity, and concludes that boys, on the whole, 
approach it with greater confidence than girls, markedly so in the years of secondary 
schooling. Insofar as modals and hedges can achieve a measure of protection for the 
speaker against accusation of error, one might expect some tendency for the girls in 
the whole-school study to use these Markers more than boys in their responses to the 
three tasks. 
The data from this experiment do not, in general, bear out that expectation. It turns out 
that one-fifth of infant (4-7) boys used some Marked language, as did one-fifth of infant 
girls (but see below). For junior (7-11) children, the proportion was three-fifths for both 
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boys and girls, with 41 % of boys Marking one or more responses (n=1 25) and 41 % 
girls (n=105) over the whole school population. 
Suspicious that such a global report on gender differences (or the lack of them) may 
overlook some fine distinction, I submitted the data to a number of tests for differences 
of a more detailed nature. Expecting to find differences, if there were any, among the 
junior pupils, I concentrated my efforts on the 115 pupils in Years 3 to 6. Once again, 
the proportions of boys and girls exhibiting the linguistic behaviour were much the 
same in every case. For example: 
Giving at least one primary Marked response: Boys 36% Girls 31% 
Giving at least one secondary Marked response: Boys 42% Girls 43% 
Giving at least one Marked response to Tasks 2 or 3: Boys 56% Girls 57% 
The only significant gender difference which I have uncovered from the data concerns 
the proportions of boys and girls in Year 1 and in Year 2 who give at least one Marked 
response: 
At least one Marked response (Year 1): Boys 11% Girls 33% 
At least one Marked response (Year 2): Boys 30% Girls 7% 
The fact that the bias is reversed from Year 1 to Year 2 obscures the difference when 
the Infant data is considered as a whole. (The Year R data is more balanced with 
some bias towards Marked language in boys. ) The clear bias in Year 1 and the reverse 
bias in Year 2 stands out as the only significant gender difference that I was able to 
detect, yet I am unable to account for it. Given the improbably sudden switch of bias, 
and given the numbers of pupils involved in each year (Y1: n=39; Y2: n=31), I am 
inclined to advocate a replication of the study with children of this age before asserting 
any firm gender-specific conclusions. Clayton's findings would lead one to expect that 
gender differences in Marked language might become more evident in the years of 
secondary schooling (after age 11). 
MODAL AUXILIARIES 
The term 'Marked' has been introduced to include modal auxiliaries and hedges. 
Initially, hedges were to have been the sole focus of study, but the epistemic 
similarities between modals and hedges motivated the inclusion of modal auxiliaries. 
The two classes of language clearly overlap in adverbial forms such as'possibly', 
'maybe'. Only 19 children in the sample of 230 used modal language that was not also 
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recorded as a hedge. These 19 were predominantly in the third age-band (Year 3 and 
4) and in nearly every case the modal verb used was 'might'. The sole exception was a 
girl in Year R, aged 51/2, judged to be mathematically 'above average', who made a 
fully internalised count of the sweets in response to each task (with no external 
manifestation of the two 'local correspondences'). Her eventual answer to each of the 
three "How many? " questions was itself marked as a question with rising intonation, 
but with no secondary hedge on the first two tasks. For the third she gave the answer 
23, and in reply to the prompt "Do you think there are exactly twenty-three", she 
answered, "There may be one or two more", with prosodic marking indicating 
epistemic approximation. 
Of the remaining 18, all of whom used 'might', the following are typical: 
"I might have counted two double". (Year R boy, Task 1) 
"There might be some more". (Year 1 girl, Task 2) 
"There might be some more on the other side". (Year 3 boy, Task 2) 
"There might be less". (Year 3 boy, Task 3) 
"it might not be doubled". (Year 4 girl, Task 3) 
It is interesting to note that, whereas occurrences of 'may' and'might' were rare, in 
every case they arose as secondary Markers, in response to the interviewer's prompt: 
the examples above convey this reactive uncertainty well. 
The adverbial hedge/modal 'maybe' is also used by 13 children (3 of whom also use 
'might'), and is more evenly distributed over the age-range in the school. 
PROSODY 
A decision (arguably a conservative one) was made not to record as a hedge a third 
type of response, namely uncertainty expressed in assertions which are offered as 
questions, usually through rising intonation (such as "Twenty? "). I am acutely 
conscious that such responses are contenders for inclusion, as Shields. Stubbs (1986, 
p. 21) observes that tag questions "allow statements to be presented as obvious, 
dubious, or open to challenge". What is true in this respect of explicit tags (such as "..., 
isn't it? ") must also be true of tacit, prosodic tag questions. 
Of the 230 children in the sample, 52 gave numerical answers marked by rising 
intonation; of these 30 Marked one or more of their responses in some other way 
which was included in the analysis. The remaining 22 remain outside the modal/hedge 
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consideration of this study. The oldest year-group (Year 6) accounts for none of the 22, 
who are fairly evenly distributed across the earlier Years R to 5. It might be interesting 
to include these in the 'Marked' category and re-analyse the data, but I would not 
expect this to significantly affect general trends given the conspicuous rise in Marked 
responses in the fourth band (Years 5 and 6) under the operational definition used in 
the study. 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter, I have attempted to interpret and to impose some rationale onto the 
data obtained from short, task-oriented interviews with the entire pupil population of 
one primary school. I began with the expectation that the data would support a 
hypothesis that the ability to use linguistic Markers, and the tendency to do so, 
increases consistently through the primary years. These Markers (hedges and modal 
auxiliaries) serve epistemic and root purposes, conveying either the speaker's 
uncertainty or their awareness that an estimate was appropriate (in fact, essential in 
the case of the last two tasks). The outcome of the study includes an account of some 
developmental aspects of conveying uncertainty in mathematics, including social 
aspects which would account for a dip in unprompted Marked language shortly after 
the child's initiation to schooling. 
I have argued, mainly in Chapters 1,2 and 5, that in the context of mathematical 
activity, uncertainty is a normal state, potentially a creative one. A creative objective for 
teachers could be to recognise it and work with it (as well as with their own 
epistemological and pedagogical uncertainties) rather than to seek - in the short term, 
at least - to deny or eliminate it. In conclusion, it is only proper, and it is certainly 
appropriate, to admit to some uncertainty about the account I have given, and to seek 
resonance (or correction) by offering it for inspection. Some words of Valerie 
Walkerdine convey my own position: 
"These thoughts are speculative, but I suggest that it is in this direction that 
our analysis should go if we are to understand more fully the responses given 
by children. " (1988, p. 59) 
Whilst it is clearly the case that the use of Marked language has, in some sense, to be 
learned, it is not so clear how that particular linguistic competence is acquired, a 
competence that includes a modal dimension which lies at the core of the 
communication of propositional attitude. The unexpected outcome of this particular 
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study, in the context of estimation activity, is that children may be socialised into 
suppressing this aspect of their linguistic competence until they discover, or assert, 
that - in some mathematics classrooms at least - it is alright to be wrong. 
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CHAPTER 7: PRAGMATICS, TEACHING AND LEARNING 
Language which fulfils a genuine need... will ultimately find an audience ... to 
whom it is not obscure. (J. F. Wallwork, 1969) 
This is the last chapter in which I will introduce new empirical transcript data. Whereas 
the data in the earlier Chapters 4 to 6 are unified personally by informant (e. g. Susie) 
or thematically by phenomenon (e. g. hedges), those to be presented and considered 
here are more diversified in origin and nature. There is another important distinction: 
whereas the data in the earlier chapters were collected in the course of research 
interviews, the data presented here are transcripts of a variety of teaching and learning 
situations. 
The plan of the chapter is as follows: 
(I) to explain the formation and work of an 'Informal Research Group' of school 
teachers which I convened to consider and act on my earlier research findings on 
vagueness in mathematics talk, and to provide further data for my consideration; 
(II) to apply the complete linguistic toolkit that has been assembled to the analysis of a 
number of 'Cases' - transcripts or fragments - demonstrating further the role of 
vagueness in mathematical discourse by reference to a variety of episodes in teaching 
and learning. These cases come from a number of sources, principally the Informal 
Research Group. Additional data, collected but unused in this thesis, are listed in 
Appendix 1. 
THE INFORMAL RESEARCH GROUP 
For about four years I pursued my thoughts and enquiries for this thesis in relative 
isolation; at least, in the isolation of the 'ivory tower' community of academic 
researchers, research seminars and conferences. My experience of sharing my ideas 
in that community had been sufficiently encouraging (and corrective) for me to gain in 
confidence about my methods and my findings, that I wanted next to share them with 
schoolteachers. My expectation was that teachers preoccupied with the administrative 
and managerial demands of daily classroom teaching would be looking for some 
relevance in my work to their day-to-day concerns. 
On 23rd February 1994 I gave a research presentation (Midland Mathematics 
Education Seminars) at Warwick University. After the seminar, Leone Burton 
encouraged me to convene a group of schoolteachers and to share my findings with 
them. In the Autumn, I broadcast an invitation to primary and secondary 
schoolteachers (direct-mailed with the College INSET programme) to join an "Informal 
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Research Group" which I would convene early in 1995 to consider aspects of language 
and mathematics. About a dozen teachers indicated interest. I wrote to them: 
Many thanks for expressing interest in joining the small Informal Research Group which I 
plan to convene next term. 
As the flier indicated, the focus for the research is on linguistic pointers to uncertainty in 
the learning of mathematics. My methods to date have involved recording and 
transcribing "mathematical conversations" with children, individually or in pairs. Such 
conversations have focused on problem solving or open-ended tasks of various sorts, 
where uncertainty can be raised by the need for prediction or generalisation. Another 
area of uncertainty - more restricted and more fully researched - has to do with 
estimation. Words and phrases such as around, about maybe, I think are Indicative of 
uncertainty, and are used in different ways to serve a variety of purposes for the pupil. 
Some literature from linguistics can be applied to understand how this works i. e. has the 
desired effect on the hearer. 
Within the informal group i should like to share my findings to date, and in time to 
encourage group members to collect further examples of the same kind of language in 
mathematics classroom. Such examples might be generated in individual or small group 
discussion with you, or in whole-class discussion. One of the things we can do in the 
group is to propose and consider suitable tasks, having prediction and generalisation in 
mind. The important factor would be that your examples are collected in the context of 
"normal" classroom teaching. 
The group was self-selecting. This is not to claim that it was in any sense 
representative of some 'generality' of schoolteachers, but nor was it was selected by 
me to be cooperative or compliant. In the event, it was certainly affirmative as to the 
value of the work that I was engaged in. 
Three evening meetings of the group took place in January-February 1995. About 
eight teachers attended each meeting. At these gatherings I gave an account of my 
principal method, contingent interviewing, illustrated by transcripts of my mathematical 
conversations with children. I went on to explain how I believed that hedges were an 
important tool in the children's linguistic repertoire, principally as a Shield (epistemic 
hedge). I distributed some papers for further reading. These were Ginsburg (1981), on 
clinical interviewing; a draft of Rowland (1995), the forerunner of Chapter 5; and 
Rowland (1 994a), which I later developed into Chapter 6. Finally, we discussed 
possibilities for tasks that would be an appropriate basis for mathematical 
conversations between them and their pupils. They then undertook to carry out, record 
and transcribe such conversations before our next meeting. Two members of the 
group opted out at this stage. Six came to a Saturday morning preliminary 'reporting 
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back' session in March, and again to a further meeting on a Saturday morning in June, 
by which time their transcripts were ready. I hope that some jointly-authored 
publication will come out of the work of the group, and have encouraged members to 
write in preparation for it. 
One aspect of this group, which delighted and surprised us all, was the age-range 
spread which it represented - from a reception class teacher to someone teaching A- 
level students in a sixth-form college. One member of the group was in her first year of 
teaching, two in their third, and the others had been teaching for some years. We 
rapidly discovered that the language of classroom mathematical discourse provided a 
focus for our discussion and close attention, a focus that facilitated and energised 
mutual effort and understanding. Indeed, the shared cross-phase dimension added 
greatly to the interest of the work of the group. Remarkably, no contribution seemed 
irrelevant to the professional concerns of all group members. For me, this was in 
pleasing contrast with much of the subject-content based INSET I have been 
'contracted to deliver' over the last five years, where many teachers seem to judge 
relevance in terms of the text of the latest National Curriculum programme of study for 
mathematics at their own key stage. 
Equipped with my eclectic set of approaches to discourse, I now proceed to 
examination of eight'cases'. The teachers featured in the first five cases are members 
of the Informal Research Group. Some cases are based on quite lengthy transcripts, 
and my consideration is forced to be selective since each transcript could be the basis 
of an extended analytical essay. My purpose here is to give a demonstration of the 
linguistic methods and evidence of consistency with the observations from my own 
contingent interviews with children, as presented in the earlier chapters. 
CASE 1: HAZEL 
Hazel is a primary school teacher in her third year of teaching. In the transcript (IRG3) 
she is talking with two ten-year-old girls in her class, Faye and Donna. Hazel indicates 
that "both are able mathematicians who often work together". 
The conversation is an exploration of the difference between b2 and ac, where a, b, c 
are consecutive terms of an arithmetic sequence. It falls into four episodes: 
Episode 1: Investigation of the case when the common difference is 1 [IRG3: 1-61] 
Episode 2: Investigation of the case when the common difference is 2 [IRG3: 62-105] 
Episode 3: Investigation of the case when the common difference is 3 [IRG3: 106-120] 
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Episode 4: Search for a higher-level expansive generalisation (Harel and Tall, 1991: 
see Chapter 1) which includes the three generalisations arrived at inductively in the 
previous episodes as special cases [IRG3: 121-160]. 
First, observe that in every case Hazel's instructions and requests to the two girls are 
presented as indirect speech acts, for example (there are many): 
17 Hazel: Shall we try it out and see what happens? Do you want to each choose 
your own set of consecutive numbers? 
66 Hazel: Right would you like to try out with ten, twelve and fourteen one of you and 
the other one can try another jump. 
130 Hazel: Can you tell me what the difference in the answers of the two sums that, 
the two multiplications you're doing would be when you have a difference 
of four between each number? 
IRG3: 17 and 66 are on-record FTAs, with redressive action ('orders' presented as 
questions) with regard for the children's negative face, as Hazel imposes on their 
personal autonomy of action. These are conventionally polite, indirect speech acts (like 
"Can you pass the salt, please? ). She believes that the investigation will be a 
worthwhile, educative experience for them with a potentially stimulating outcome. 
Nonetheless she recognises the risk-taking which is inherent in her quasi-empirical 
approach, and that she requires their cooperation as active participants in the project 
as they generate confirming instances of generalisations-to-come. In [17] she says 
"Shall we try it out? ", the plural form including and identifying herself as a partner in the 
enterprise. In [130] she probes for a prediction (related, possibly, to an as-yet 
unarticulated expansive generalisation) and realises the threat to the girls' positive face 
- what if they fail to make a correct prediction, will their reputation as "good 
mathematicians" be dented? [130] respects their positive face, and the indirect modal 
form redresses the on-record FTA. The form of her question - "Can you tell me ..? " is 
precisely that which I chose for the whole-school developmental study. [Note 6.4] 
Quasi-empirical teaching, inviting conjectures and the associated intellectual risks, is 
unimaginable if the teacher is not aware of the FTAs that are likely to be be woven into 
her/his questions and 'invitations' to active participation. Redressive action dulls the 
sharp edge of the interactive demands that this style places on the learner. For Hazel, 
notwithstanding her authority in her own classroom, the indirect speech act has 
become a pedagogic habit, which even extends to non-cognitive requests: 
41 Hazel: Would you like to go and get one [a calculator] Donna? 
Children are likely to be less sensitive, to be more direct: 
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42 Faye: Get two. 
The children make frequent use of Shields as epistemic hedges. Early in the 
conversation Faye [IRG3: 9] observes a difference of 1 between 10x12 and 112. 
Somewhat precipitately, perhaps, Hazel asks: 
10 Hazel: One number difference ... do you think that will always happen when we 
do this ... ? 
Faye readily agrees, but Hazel, perhaps realising that she has not probed but has 'led 
the witness' seems to want to give them more of an option to disagree. 
12 Hazel: What makes you think that? Just 'cos I asked it ... or ...? 
Donna gives hedged agreement [14], and Hazel invites her [15] to account for her 
provisional belief. 
14 Donna: I think so. 
15 Hazel: Why? 
Arguably this is a tough question - to account for a belief that one is not really 
committed to anyway. Donna's justification [161 is phenomenological rather than 
structural. 
16 Donna: Well if um ... if it's after each other like ten, eleven, twelve ... um ... 
it will be 
one more because it's one more going up. 
It is the basis of a subsequent expansive generalisation at the beginning of Episode 2. 
62 Hazel: Okay. Right, what would happen if you had numbers that jumped up in two 
instead of one, so you had ten, twelve and fourteen? 
63 Faye: I think the answer is a two number difference. So two. 
64 Donna: Yeah, yeah. So do I. 
The substantive proposition in [63] - that there is a two number difference - is, in fact, 
false. By prefacing it with an epistemic hedge, Faye marks her utterance as a 
conjecture and withholds commitment to it. 
Returning to Episode 2: Hazel encourages the children to try out two more examples 
with three consecutive integers. They obtain a difference of 1 in each case and Faye 
[27) aff irms her belief (unhedged) that, as Hazel puts it [26], "that will always happen". 
26 Hazel: Do you think that will always happen then? 
27 Faye: Yes. 
28 Hazel: How can you say for certain'cos you've only tried out three examples? 
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When pressed by Hazel to account for her belief [33J, Faye attempts a start 
("Because ... ") and then backs off [34]: 
33 Hazel: ... why do you think that 
for certain? 
34 Faye: Because ... well, 
I don't know for certain but I think... 'cos the numbers that 
we've done are quite close to the first ... 
Abandoning her attempt to respond to Hazel's request for an explanation, Faye's "well" 
[34] is a maxim hedge; she realises that her reply will not be fully cooperative. She 
cannot sustain the suggestion that she is certain, and is obliged to refuse Hazel's 
request. Her reply (a second part pair) is dispreferred in relation to Hazel's first part, 
and is marked by hesitation (Chapter 5). Indeed, her subsequent "the numbers that 
we've done are quite close to the first... " is vague, hedged with an adaptor ('quite') and 
violates the maxims of Quantity and Manner. Her "well" suggests that Faye had 
foreseen the inadequacy of her explanation. 
Donna offers a brief diversion: 
35 Donna: I don't think it will happen if you do like eleven, fourteen, twenty-two. 
36 Hazel: But you're talking about the one that... If you always have a set of three 
consecutive numbers will it work? 
Her "like eleven, fourteen, twenty-two" is a delightful example of a vague generality (in 
the sense of Peirce, 1934: see Chapter 2). It is the interpreter's task to determine what 
it points to, what is included by it. It is difficult to judge how Hazel interprets it, except 
that she takes it to exclude "three consecutive numbers" - and perhaps this is precisely 
what Donna intended to convey through her example. Evidently 'consecutive' is a 
useful but neglected item in the mathematical lexicon. 
As in my conversations with Susie (Chapter 4), the pronoun 'it' is deictic in [35] and 
[36], anaphoric in fact, and co-referential with an earlier demonstrative pronoun 'that': 
26 Hazel: Do you think that will always happen then? 
Again, 'it' [35,36] (and 'that [26]) has no conventional name, but Hazel, Donna and 
Faye tacitly understand its deictic referent -a proposition which Hazel has come 
closest to articulating, much earlier in the conversation. 
10 Hazel: One number difference ... do you think that will always happen when we 
do this where we've got three consecutive numbers and we multiply the 
two end ones ... and then in the middle? 
Faye brings the discussion back on course with a request for a crucial experiment 
(Balacheff, 1988: see Chapter 1). 
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38 Faye: I'd like to try it out in the hundreds. 
Donna's choice for the experiment seems to be guided by Hazel: 
39 Hazel: [to Donna] You want one difference between each of those. If you're going 
to start with a hundred you could have a hundred and one, a hundred and 
one and a hundred and two. Would you like a calculator ...? 
Faye's independent choice of "any old" set (Hardy, 1940, p. 106) of three consecutive 
integers - 110,111,112 - becomes apparent later [60]: 
51 Faye: I still get one number different. 
52 Hazel: So that ... so do you ... will it always work d'you think? 
53 Faye: Yeah ... I think. 
54 Hazel: How can you be sure? 
55 Donna: Umm 
56 Faye: [laughing] Well ... 
57 Hazel: Are you sure? 
58 Faye: Well not really, but ... 
59 Donna: Quite yeah. 
60 Faye: I think so. Yeah quite sure. Because it has worked because we've done 
ten, eleven ... Well I've done ten, eleven, twelve, nine, ten, eleven which 
are quite similar and then I've jumped to, um, um ... a 
hundred and ten, a 
hundred and eleven, and a hundred and twelve. It's quite a big difference. 
So yeah? 
61 Donna: Yeah so do I. 
By this stage Hazel seems reluctant [52] to influence their commitment to the 
generalisation (the'it' that'always works'). Faye's intellectual honesty is very evident 
here. Her crucial experiment [60] provides another (presumably weighty) confirming 
instance of the generalisation [511 yet her assent to it is still hedged, partial [53]. One 
senses that Hazel has created, or nurtured, a Zone of Conjectural Neutrality (ZCN, 
Chapter 5) in which Faye understands that it is the conjecture ('it always works') which 
is on trial, not her. She is free to believe or to doubt. Nevertheless, her 'well's [56,58] 
indicate dispreferred turns; she senses, perhaps, that it would be easier if she agreed, 
that agreement would better respect Hazel's positive face wants - for Hazel would gain 
satisfaction from Faye's coming-to-know. At the end of Episode 1 she goes some way 
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towards agreement [60], affirming in the end that she is "quite sure" i. e. even more 
sure than might be expected, the Adaptor "quite" making things "less fuzzy" (Lakoff, 
1973, p. 471). She proceeds [60] to reflect in detail on the variety of evidence which 
she has assembled, to account for her willingness to make the enthymematic leap into 
the unknown. Donna is apparently something of a passenger compared with Faye. 
I conclude this selective study of Hazel's transcript by considering Episode 4, which 
opens as Hazel invites the two girls to "recap" on their generalisations to date: 
121 Hazel: Okay. So if you recap. Would you like to start from the beginning and tell 
me what the difference is when you've got a jump of one, what the 
difference is in the answers. When youve got a jump of two what the 
difference is in the answers. 
122 Faye: Okay when you've got a jump of one the difference in the answers is one. 
123 Donna: When you've got a jump of two the answer... the difference in the answer 
is four. 
124 Faye: And when you've got a jump of three the difference in the answer is nine. 
The children observe that each difference is a square. [125-129] Next, Hazel invites a 
prediction: 
130 Hazel: Can you tell me what the difference in the answers of the two sums that, 
the two multiplications you're doing would be when you have a difference 
of four between each number? 
131 Donna: Twenty ... twenty-six 
132 Hazel: You think twenty-six Donna. What do you think Faye? 
Hazel's response [132] to Donna's prediction (incorrect as it happens) is of interest to 
me since I observed the same linguistic behaviour in myself (Chapter 5) - the use of an 
attribution Shield to sustain the involvement of the other child. In this case Donna 
corrects herself, and Faye agrees - 
133 Donna: [interrupts] no sixteen. 
134 Faye: Sixteen, yeah sixteen. 
Donna's error [131 ] was perhaps computational (42 = 26) rather than algebraic (the 
difference is 42). 
Next, Hazel invites predictions for differences of 5 and for 6. Donna and Faye give 
responses of 25 and 36. Hazel moves to the expansive generalisation [146-155] 
156 Hazel: What's the pattern then? Can you sort of explain the pattern for me? 
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157 Faye: Okay, if the difference between the numbers you have to begin with ... um 
... is, if you times that by, if you multiply that by itself it will make the 
difference between the two answers that you get. Yep? 
158 Hazel: You agree? 
159 Donna: Yeh. 
160 Hazel: Right, well done. 
The FTA inherent in the request for "the pattern" [156] is softened by the modal form 
("Can you? ") and the hedged performative ("sort of explain"). Faye obliges with an 
account [157] which is characteristically extended, indicating a confident exposition of 
secure knowledge. It is hesitant only because she begins by reifying a variable - "the 
difference between the numbers you have to begin with" - but she must then cope with 
the burden of the English language, as opposed to symbolic algebra, to say what she 
wants to say about a function of that variable. 
On a number of occasions (e. g. [156] and notably [83]), Hazel asks "why? " and 
requests "explain" with regard to generalities. For the most part these questions and 
requests seem to require descriptions of regularities rather than fundamental accounts 
of their causes. These two girls might well respond intellectually to some generic 
example or geometric model of the situation in Episode 1. But taken as a whole, the 
transcript is pure delight, a fine example of quasi-empirical teaching and learning, 
supported by a skilful and sensitive teacher. 
CASE 2: ANN 
Ann is an experienced primary school teacher. In the transcript (IRG2) she is talking 
with Charlie, a ten-year-old boy in her class. Charlie's mathematical attainment is 
judged by Ann to be below average for his age. 
The conversation is essentially an exploration of residue classes modulo n. Charlie will 
share sweets among people to see how many are left over. Ann has prepared a 'table' 
on squared paper: she has written 2.3, ... 12 along the top (for sweets) and down the 
left-hand edge (for people). 
Ann begins by asking Charlie to share 2,3,4,5 sweets among two people (herself and 
Charlie), and explains how to enter the number "left over" in the table. Her instructions 
are indirect speech acts, presented in modal interrogatory form: 
9 Ann: Can you put one in that square because you have three sweets and two 
people so you have one left over. Can you share these out now? Four 
sweets. Are there any left over? 
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10 Charlie: No. 
Charlie has done the'practical work' sharing out up to five sweets, and has entered 
0101 in the first row. He spontaneously predicts the next two (perhaps he lacks his 
teacher's patience? ): 
16 Charlie: This is probably going to be nought. one, nought, one, nought, one . 
17 Ann: Think it is? 
18 Charlie: Yes. 
He shields his prediction [16]; Ann picks up the hedge and asks how confident he is - 
her'think' [17] is more root than epistemic. In fact, Charlie is sufficiently confident 
[20,221 to extend the table without recourse to further sharing of sweets: 
19 Ann: Would you like to put it in before I give any more sweets out? 
20 Charlie: Yes. 
Evidently Charlie would "like to", but Ann is uneasy: 
21 Ann: Are you that confident? 
22 Charlie: Yes. 
23 Ann: Go on then. Put them in. [Pause for Charlie to put in the numbers] 
Ann's next instruction is thinly veiled by conventional indirectness: 
23 Ann: Shall we check to make sure? 
The "we" [23] expresses the teacher's solidarity with the child in the activity, and 
compounds the impossibility of Charlie's refusing the'invitation'to "make sure". 
Refusal is clearly dispreferred and would offend the teacher's face wants - both 
positive (she is a partner in the activity and is suggesting a check) and negative (she is 
the teacher, he the pupil). Charlie checks his prediction, and Ann moves on to three 
people: 
23 Ann: This time there are three people. Three people, if I get two sweets, can 
they have one each? 
24 Charlie: Yes. 
25 Ann: There are three of us remember. 
26 Charlie: I mean, no. 
These four turns, frozen in text, illustrate how transcripts can be used to reflect on 
classroom interaction and to develop questioning styles. Ann's question [23) Is 
presented as a binary option - "can they? ", yes or no?. Her response to his answer is 
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neither confirming nor neutral, and leaves him in no doubt that he is being corrected. 
Naturally, he changes his answer. There is no evidence in the transcript as to whether 
or not he changes 'his mind'. 
Ann, who donated the transcript, might use it to consider alternative ways to [23] of 
formulating the question. A number of possibilities come to mind - why the "I", which 
requires Charlie to put himself in her position?; who are the three people (a ruler is 
adopted later)? But in particular, it may be more effective in achieving intellectual 
participation from Charlie if it is not presented to him as a two-way choice, but in a 
more open ("Wh-? ") form such as "What would happen if you ... ", or indirect variants 
such as "What do you think would happen if you ... ". Such a form would also be likely 
to elicit a more extended reply, with greater potential for insights into Charlie's personal 
construction of the situation. No entries are made in the table below the leading 
diagonal (i. e. one sweet each, none over), yet it is worth considering the fact that there 
are sweets'left over' when there are fewer sweets than people, and that the 
corresponding entries would maintain the cyclic regularity of each row. The question 
[23] "Can they have one each? " focuses on the quotient (which is irrelevant to the 
modular regularity) rather than the remainder. As Paley observes (1981, p. 218), "The 
tape recorder trains the teacher not the child". 
Under Ann's guidance, then, Charlie enters 0,1,2 in the row for three people. Again 
he spontaneously suggests (with the same Shield "probably") an extrapolative 
extension of the data, but this time he seems to be caught up in the rhythm of the 
language more than the logic of the situation: 
38 Charlie: Probably going to go three, four, five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten. 
This time Ann patiently encourages him (with the conspiratorial "Let's") to test his 
prediction: 
39 Ann: Let's try it and see. [Counted out 6 sweets. ] How many left over? 
40 Charlie: None. 
41 Ann: [Counted out 7 sweets] 
42 Charlie: One. 
43 Ann: Fine. [Counted out 8 sweets] 
44 Charlie: Two. 
Now she invites him to generalise: 
45 Ann: Right. Now can you tell me how the numbers are going to go? 
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46 Charlie: Nought, one, two, nought, one, two, nought, one, two. 
The practical work with the sweets is emphasised (laboured? ) as [47-50] Charlie is 
directly instructed to "Share out and see" for 9 sweets. He counts out the 10 sweets 
without attempting a prediction; suspecting, perhaps, that he will have to do it in the 
end anyway. The only sense-making that is legitimised is in terms of the algorithmic 
manipulation (sharing) of the embodiment. 
47 Ann: What's the next number going to be? 
48 Charlie: Nought. 
49 Ann: Share out and see. Well done! What about the next number? [Pause while 
Charlie counts out sweets. ) 
50 Charlie: One. 
There is evidence in the transcript that, despite the practical work, Ann is directing 
Charlie's thinking towards the patterns of numbers on the table rather than the sweet- 
sharing. Is the 'train spotter's paradise' in sight? (Hewitt, 1992) 
55 Ann: Right. Look at that and can you tell me what Is going to happen on the next 
line? [sharing between four people] 
56 Charlie: Mmm. I think we will get a three instead of a nought. [he is apparently 
referring to the second zero in 012012, since he writes 012301230 below] 
And again, later: 
63 Ann: We have five people now. Where are you going to start on our table? 
64 Charlie: There. (at (5,5)] 
65 Ann: What do you think the pattern is going to be in the numbers? 
66 Charlie: Two, three, one, nought, two, nought, one I think. 
67 Ann: Write it down there to remind you. Why do you think it's going to be that? , 
68 Charlie: Could be nought, one, two, three, four. 
69 Ann: Put that number down as well. So could be nought one two three four. 
Let's try and see. 
Charlie hedges (66] or modalises [68] his pattern predictions, which are still insecure 
[66]. Ann's enquiry in [67] is the first of only two 'why? questions in the whole 
transcript, and this one causes Charlie to self-correct. 
Ann's use of pronouns frequently associates herself with Charlie's progress in quite a 
personal way: 
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77 Ann: All right. You do that line for me. Well done. 
79 Ann: We put a nought when there is nothing left over, didn't we? 
The 'we' traps Charlie into complicity (Chapter 4) with Ann. At the very end, Ann 
assesses, with further reference to 'me' and now 'us', whether Charlie has understood - 
or at least remembered. 
88 Ann: So can you tell me what the nought means? What is it telling us? 
89 Charlie: That, um, you can share them out and have the right amount. 
I suggest that Charlie's'you' is not, however, addressing Ann (recall, from Chapter 4, 
that pupils rarely address their teachers directly in mathematical discourse), but an 
indication that he is articulating a generalisation, that he can be detached about the 
significance of the zeros. 
The general purpose of the activity is very nice, very significant - the least positive 
remainder is less than the divisor. If Charlie stays the mathematical course, he may 
realise in ten years time that he has been investigating the Division Algorithm! I 
suspect that relatively few primary teachers would realise the potential of this activity, 
nor, perhaps, predict how demanding it would prove for Charlie. On the evidence of the 
transcript, Ann has judged that Charlie will need a good deal of guidance and practical 
support as he works through the investigation. The same evidence suggests that Ann's 
attention is on his practical performance rather than his cognitive structuring and his 
propositional attitude - the way he construes the patterns in relation to the sweet- 
sharing and the strength or fragility of his conviction. There is no sign of examination of 
conjectures in the ZCN. She seems to find it hard to release him from the practical 
task, from dependence on her as teacher and even from obligation to her as'partner'. 
CASE 3: JUDITH 
Judith is a 'newly-qualified teacher in an 11-16 secondary school. The transcript she 
has prepared (IRG5) is the most extensive of those donated by the IRG members - 
about 3000 words. In the transcript she is talking with Allan, an "average" Year 9 (age 
13-14) pupil. 
The conversation (which must have lasted about 45 minutes) concerns the problem of 
drawing line segments between pairs of dots in a plane array of some sort (usually 
regular). What is the least number of segments necessary so that they form a 
continuous line connecting all of the points? 
It falls into five episodes: 
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Episode 1: Investigation of a 3x3 square array [IRG5: 1-491 
Episode 2: Prediction and verification for a 4x4 array: expansive generalisation for 
square arrays to include 3x3 as a special case [IRG5: 50-93] 
Episode 3: Prediction, verification and expansive generalisation for rectangular arrays, 
including squares as special cases [IRG5: 94-151J 
Episode 4: Consideration of triangular arrays: reconstructive generalisation (Hare) and 
Tall, 1991: see Chapter 1) based on number of dots in the array which includes the 
three generalisations arrived at inductively in the previous episodes as special cases 
[IRG5: 151-160] 
Episode 5: Search for regularity in the sequence (of numbers of line segments) for - 
triangular arrays - arithmetic sequence of differences (IRG5: 160-264J 
The episodic overview immediately reveals the richness and cognitive complexity of 
the layers of generalisation that are built up in the first four episodes. The first of these 
begins: 
Judith: OK, Now. Here is the investigation, so you can read it. Draw a three by 
three dot grid. Start anywhere you like. Draw a continuous line that goes to 
every dot. Yeah? 
Notice that we have entered the culture of the post-Cockcroft secondary school -'doing 
an investigation' (Love, 1988, p. 250). In contrast to the examples from primary 
schools, the investigation is presented to Allan in a written format. This may reflect 
Judith's inexperience (it feels 'safer'), but in any case it is how investigation 'starters' 
are normally presented to secondary school pupils, for GCSE coursework and the like. 
Judith makes reference to the rituals of 'doing an investigation' culture on several 
occasions in the interview: 
88 Judith: So if you were doing an investigation what would you write down for me? 
160 Judith: So ... what would you write down it you were doing an investigation? 
130 Judith: ... if you did it three, four, five, six it might be easier to see patterns, do you 
not think? Do you do tables when you do investigations ... ? 
Judith exploits the familiarity of the investigation 'write up' to encourage Allan [88] to 
articulate his thoughts, and with some success: 
89 Allan: I'd write ... that the pattern is ... if you ti-, times both, if you square the side, 
the side, and um, you minus one, you'd be th', the amount of dots you., it 
you went round the dots it'd be the same answer. 
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Allan's approach to speech as imagined writing seems to assist him in assembling his 
thoughts, and he gives (with a few false starts) a relatively formal account of a 
generalisation. Presumably oral 'reporting back' (Pimm, 1992, pp. 68-72) is not part of 
the practice of school investigations with which Judith expects Allan to be familiar, 
since it would otherwise be a more natural point of reference for him. Writing is, on the 
whole, more dense, more formally structured than speech (Perera, 1990; Brown and 
Yule, 1983, p. 15), and Allan still has need of the informal generaliser 'you' to formulate 
his rule. 
To return to Episode 1: Allan is quite relaxed and competent in the use of epistemic 
hedges: 
11 Judith: OK, Do you think you're going to be able to do it in less than ... that? ... 
nine? 
12 Allan: Maybe, yeah. 
12 Judith: Maybe. 
13 Allan: Maybe. 
14 Judith: OK, so you're not ... 
15 Allan: Not positive, but I am ... 
16 Judith: OK [pause] Top right [pause] Are you thinking about where to go next? 
Judith gently echoes [13] and explores [15] his uncertainty; her interruption [17] 
relieves the tension but cuts off the flow of data from the informant. Before long he has 
'done it with eight line segments (starting with a corner dot), but he remains tentative 
[24,30]: 
24 Allan: Still eight again so probably the most is eight. 
25 Judith: You mean the least? 
26 Allan: Yeah, the least, sorry. 
27 Judith: Thars alright. 
28 Allan: Yeah. 
29 Judith: OK, so do you think starting not in the comer could get you eight as well? 
30 Allan: Um, possibly, yeah. [pause] 
His doubt appears at first to be well-founded: 
40 Allan: So it don't work from the middle at all, really, because it's uh, because you 
have to go in and out again. 
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41 Judith: Dyou think? Are you sure? 
42 Allan: Because what you have to do, you have to go, from the middle you have to 
go all the way round and you go into one and come back out again, but if 
you do it from, like we'ave did from exactly, exactly in the middle. 
Allan's utterance [40] provides examples of procedural deixis ('it don't work) and the 
generaliser'you'. I would argue that his 'really' [see also IRG5: 56 and 2171 is a hedge 
on his claim that'it don't work', much the same as 'basically' (Chapter 5). Judith tests 
his claim [411 in the ZCN, and Allan responds with an extended, if somewhat 
incoherent account, making heavy use of the generaliser 'you'. I am reminded of one 
particular moment when Susie 'explained' to me with a long, rambling and quite 
incomprehensible speech [S1: 30] to which, completely lost, I weakly responded "So 
what did you do next? " in the hope of some behavioural clue. Judith's next turn (42] 
has some of that 'lost' quality: 
43 Judith: Try that then. [pause, Allan draws a route from the middle] 
In fact, Allan finds the counter-example to his own argument: 
44 Allan: Yeah, made eight as well from the middle. 
Judith now needs to know quite where Allan stands at this stage. She uses the 'if you 
were doing an investigation' strategy to ask for a summary progress report: 
45 Judith: OK. So what do you think? [pause] So If I wasn't talking to you and you 
were just doing the investigation yourself, what would you be thinking? 
46 Allan: I'd be thinking that the most possible um way uh of getting, of getting, 
getting the least is that it only started from the middle going right round, 
going right round or going, going from one comer but you can't do it in the 
middle, middle between two comers. 
47 Judith: OK. 
48 Allan: And also the least is eight. 
She invites Allan (ushering in Episode 2) to determine where the investigation will go 
next - 
49 Judith: Alright then, so what're you going to do now? 
50 Allan: I'll try a, um, four by four grid. 
- but once he has decided, she explores - with an indirect request [51 ] for a prediction - 
whether and how his thinking is becoming structured, whether he has any generalised 
overview of the problem. 
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51 Judith: Right. Can you make any predictions before you start? 
The indirectness softens the force of the FTA and his hedged prediction [54] suggests 
that he may have formed a generalisation from the single 3x3 instance. 
54 Allan: The maximum will probably be, er, the least'll probably be 'bout fifteen. 
The epistemic adverbial Shield 'probably' is reinforced with the Approximator-hedge 
'(a)bout'. This is an interesting use of an epistemic Rounder (Chapter 5), repeated later 
by Allan (below) in [73]. Incidentally, it is plausible, but unlikely in my view, that'fifteen' 
is being used as a'round number' (Channell, 1994, pp. 87-89), and an Approximator in 
its own right. Judith wants to explore the thinking behind the prediction: 
68 Judith: So why did you predict fifteen? 
69 Allan: Uh, because I thought there might be a pattern between ... if there was um 
a certain amount of, um ... if it's three by three say ... 
70 Judith: Uh-hum. 
71 Allan: if you ti-, three times three is actually nine. 
72 Judith: Uh-hum. 
To begin with, Allan is struggling; perhaps the linguistic struggle is the manifestation of 
a metacognitive struggling to recover or construct the reason for his prediction. His 
overture ("I thought there might be") is uncommitted. At first he finds it helpful to 
illustrate [69,71 ] with the 3x3 example, rather than to articulate the generality. Judith 
waits; her interventions [70,72] are absolutely minimal. She says just enough to 
assure Allan that she is listening, like a counsellor listening to a client. She is soon 
rewarded with an explanatory outpouring, punctuated with the impersonal 'you': 
73 Allan: But as, if you went round all the dots, it would only come to about, if you 
did it once it would come to on-, uh less than nine, 'n' you got, uh, 
because, because there's o-, there's only... 'cause you only have, y- ... 
you can miss out a line exactly, 'cause y- you can miss out a gap, c- 
'cause you um, y'd'ave to go all the way round the whole dots. 
So what, asks Judith [74], are the significant generalising features of this 3x3 
example? What does the generalisation look like? [761 
74 Judith: OK ... So why did that make you say fifteen?. 
75 Allan: Because uh, f- for the same reason, 'cause if you um w- tried to go round 
the whole all the dots you'd get sixteen but if you just did it once all the way 
round the dots but missing out gaps you'd still come to uh, you just minus 
one basically and just ... 
211 
76 Judith: So what would happen in some other squares? 
77 Allan: Probably if you minus one from the s-, if you square the number you'd 
probably find that if it was actually, if you minus one from that you'd 
probably find that that would be the answer to the ... 
The most refined 'algebraic' account that Allan is able to develop [771 is divorced from 
the dots and the gaps. It is an algorithm, albeit a highly ("probably") tentative one. I'm 
still here, says Judith [78]: 
78 Judith: OK. 
79 Allan: ... to how many dots there are, to how many times you 'ave to go round the 
dots 
80 Judith: OK. Now do you want to try one, or are you certain of that? 
Judith's question [80] seems to present Allan with a genuine option. It really is a 
genuine question rather than an indirect instruction. The 'or is explicit. There is no 
obvious preferred response. Contrast it with Ann's earlier (Case 2): 
IRG2: 23 Ann: Shall we check to make sure? 
In fact, Allan goes on to say that he is not certain, and tries out the 5x5 array. 
I have examined less than one third of the transcript; 15 minutes talk perhaps. My 
purpose in studying these transcripts was to look in them for the linguistic features that 
I had identified in my own conversations with pupils, and for some validation of the 
conclusions I had reached about the pragmatic function of vague language. It was not 
my intention to say what was 'good' or'bad' about the teaching, but the analysis 
inevitably puts into sharp relief those aspects of practice which support or negate a 
conjecturing atmosphere - assuming that that is what is wanted. In that respect, 
Judith's instincts are remarkably true. 
CASE 4: RACHEL 
Rachel is in her third year of teaching. She works at a sixth form college with a strong 
academic reputation. Rachel interviewed two pairs of 18-year-old students, all 
following an Advanced Supplementary (AS) course in mathematics. [Note 7.11 
The students were presented with the following investigation (in written form). 
You need to climb a staircase with n steps. You are allowed to go up the steps 
taking either 1 or 2 steps at a time. In how many ways can you go up n steps? 
As an extension consider being able to take 1,2 or 3 steps. 
. -, 
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in the first transcript supplied by Rachel (IRG6A), the two informants, Juliette and Di, 
are described as bright students who work well together in class. In the event, both 
gained A grades in the AS examination. Rachel begins by checking that the task is 
clear. 
IRG6A: 1 Rachel: So, do you think you understand what it means? 
The drawn-out form of her question ("So, do you think... ") could indicate that she is 
conscious that she might be thought to be patronising these able students. Juliette 
clarifies the task, seeking confirmation with the tag-question "can't you? " [3,7] 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Juliette: So you can have a combination of ones and twos, can't you? 
DI: It's going to take n steps or n over two steps. 
Juliette: Or a combination. You could look at ... 
Di: You could take n as being one. [writing table] x, y 
Juliette: If n is two, you could do either two steps or one, can't you? n equals three 
... [writing down 2 1,1 2] 
Does it count if you do two and one and one and 
two? 
Rachel: Yes, they're different. 
In [3,5] and throughout the interview, Juliette freely uses 'you' for generalisation and/or 
detachment. Di quickly goes into 'investigation mode' with a table of (x, y) values. 
Juliette clarifies the rules on 'sameness' ("Does it count..? ") and Rachel adjudicates 
[8]. "Does it count? " seems to be a standard legitimation enquiry, just as "It works" is a 
standard procedural generalisation. By [10] Di has made a (false) prediction of four 
ways for four steps: 
10 Di: Yeah, [writing out an (x, y) table] so you have one, one; two, two; three, 
three; so four is four. 
Her prediction is not marked in any way as regards uncertainty. What is the interviewer 
- also, here, the teacher - to do? 
11 Rachel: I think maybe you need a few more before you can generalise. 
The double plausibility Shield [11J is, of course, play-acting on Rachel's part. Rachel 
wrote a reflective account of her two interviews after she had transcribed them 
(Williams, 1995) and comments: 
I feel I have to interrupt and prompt her to consider a few more cases. In 
retrospect, perhaps I should have waited to see if Juliette did that. 
Soon, the two students are working on the case n=5: 
213 
18 Juliette: ... Two, one, one, one, one, two, one, one, one, one two, one (more 
writing]. That's it. So, we've got one, two, three, five, eight and now you're 
going to get twelve. 
19 Rachel: Why? 
20 Juliette: It's a series. You add one. You had one. that's that's ... you had one. Oh, I 
don't know. 
21 Rachel: Yes, yes, you add one. 
22 Juliette: You add one, then you add two, then you add four, the interval between. 
No, that's right now. It's something to do with the series It goes up with. 
23 Rachel: Mmm. 
[I wonder whether'had' in [20] should be transcribed as'addi 
This time it is Juliette who is misled to a faulty prediction (12 ways for 5 steps) by an 
alternative regularity [22] in the first few terms. Again, her prediction [18] is unhedged. 
She freely decentres with 'you' [18,20,22]. Note that "we've* got one, three, five etc. 
(actual data) whereas "you're" going to get twelve (prediction). Finally "I" don't know (a 
personal epistemic state). Rachel asks for an explanation [19], which is taken to be a 
request for an account of the perceived regularity [20]. Rachel enthusiastically 
encourages [21 ] Juliette's faltering start which seems to be based on addition. The 
continuation [22] perpetuates the faulty prediction, but is not committed to it. Rachel's 
response [23] is minimal (c. f. Judith, IRG5: 70,72]. She writes (Williams, 1995): 
Juliette has the right sort of idea [22J and says "It's something to do with ... " 
but she will not commit herself. I am trying hard not to interfere and biting my 
tongue with "Mmm". 
In the end Di is surprised to find more ways than Juliette had predicted [31] and Rachel 
can restrain herself no longer: 
31 Di: [counting all the combinations] ten, eleven, twelve, thirteen [delighted/ 
puzzled] 
32 Rachel: That's all right. 
33 Juliette: [puzzled] That's O. K? 
Rachel's comment: 
I had to confirm that she was correct [32], I couldn't bear the uncertainty and 
wanted them to know they had got to the correct number of ways. Looking 
back it would have been better to let them sort it out. (ibid. ) 
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Rachel brings out another affective dimension in the conjecturing atmosphere. The 
pupil is required to take risks, but the teacher may have to "bear the uncertainty" when 
she judges that the pupil must resolve it him/herself. That is not to say that the teacher 
cannot participate in the ZCN, but her/his role may be best restricted to a light, indirect, 
linguistic scaffolding. 
The two students are hooked onto familiar sequences (arithmetic, geometric) and are 
somewhat inflexible in their search for regularity in the (Fibonacci) sequence 1,2,3,5, 
8,13 ... In the end, Rachel finds it hard to allow them to flounder: 
35 Juliette: Times two, no, no direct ... no common difference no common ratio. 
36 Rachel: But when you were doing your thing of adding on each time it worked. 
Well ... 
I sense that I am hesitant in letting them search too long for a solution and that 
I assume they want to get to the answer quickly. I am in some way anxious 
that it is taking them a long time, but in interrupting, I interrupt interpreting 
conversations they could have in getting to the answer ... 
I was anxious that it should work and I think that bright students should be 
able to get to the answer without too much difficulty. I did have expectations of 
the students ... 
I felt that their knowledge got in the way of their intuition. They felt that the 
question should fit into an arithmetic or geometric progression type question. 
I felt that I intervened too quickly and didn't let them struggle enough. Perhaps 
I was more nervous of the tape than they were - this was my first interview. 
(ibid. ) 
In her second interview (IRG68), Rachel discussed the same problem with Clare and 
John. Rachel judged Clare to be the more able of the two students; she later gained an 
A in the AS examination, John a C. She takes the lead in the conversation, and soon 
arrives at and articulates the Fibonacci 'rule'. 
14 Clare: So that gives us two, five, eight. You just add on the previous number. 
Prompted by Rachel, she predicts and verifies the next term, 13. 
15 Rachel: Do you want to check it then? What would you predict the next one would 
be? 
16 Clare: Hmm, thirteen. 
There is no evidence of an attempt to account for the observed and confirmed 
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regularity, and no enquiry as to John's commitment to it. They move on: 
19 Rachel: O. K. So try this one then. If you could take one or two or three steps. 
Before long, Clare articulates and revises a provisional generalisation, based on the 
first three terms of the sequence : 
25 Clare: Do the next one then, four. It's squared, so it'll be nine. Probably. No, that's 
double two, you double then ... 
Clare is resourceful in generating conjectures for 'the pattern' on the basis of the data 
available; thus, with the terms 1,2,4,7 she ventures: 
30 Clare: All right then, you add up all the numbers before. 
31 John: Seven. 
32 Clare: So the next one will be fourteen, maybe? Three, seven, fourteen. Do you 
think maybe you just add, mm, no, it doesn't work there. O. K. 
The provisional status of the generalisation [301 only becomes apparent in the Shields 
[32] that she uses when she applies the rule to predict the next term (1+2+4+7=14). 
Very soon she modifies the rule - it is not clear from the transcript whether they find 
that there are in fact 13 ways for 5 steps: 
36 Clare: Add the previous three, because when you had two steps you added the 
previous two numbers and then you have three steps. you add up the 
previous three numbers. 
This generalisation is expansive insofar as Clare relates it to the 'rule' for "two steps". 
The "because" refers to the form of the generalisation rather than to any underlying 
reason. There is no linguistic sign of uncertainty at this point. 
Perhaps because of Rachel's recognition of the face wants of her students, and her 
desire for and expectation of their success, she seems to have difficulty in allowing 
them to struggle. There is a hint of bravado in the three female students' approach to 
the problem, without much linguistic evidence of uncertainty. Perhaps, without being 
pressed to consider proving their inductive conjectures, the problem is not in fact much 
of a threat to their mathematical self-esteem. John's contribution to the conversation is 
marginal, dealing with minor clerical and arithmetic matters. His turns are brief, and 
give little information about his propositional attitude. 
CASE 5: SUE 
Sue, an experienced teacher, works with the reception class In a primary school. She 
provided transcripts (IRG1A-D) of four short interviews with four-year-old children. 
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A: Rebecca, aged 4: 8 
B: Jane, aged 4: 8 
C: Anna, aged 4: 3 
D: Jason, aged 4: 11 
The task in each case was as follows. 
Sue placed five plastic 'people' on the floor, and asked the child how many people 
there were. Next, she asked the child how many more people would be needed to 
make ten. In two cases she then asked how many more would be needed to make 
twenty. 
I shall consider the interviews together with reference to some common features. 
Some of these confirm my observations about Year R children (under 'Initiation') in 
Chapter 6. 
(i) Adult behaviour and questions are taken at face value, the child is naively 
cooperative, and simply acknowledges her/his ignorance [D10], error [C4] or 
uncertainty [C8,10] for what it is: 
D9 Sue: How many more do we need to make twenty? 
D10 Jason: Umm, don't know. 
C2 Anna: [pause] Umm ahh one, two, three, four. 
C3 Sue: Four, you think? 
C4 Anna: No, one, two, three, four, five. 
C8 Anna: One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, umm, nine, I think we need 
nine more. 
C9 Sue: You need nine more? 
C10 Anna: I think so. 
Like Jason, Jane knows her limitations, and it does not appear [810] to be a face- 
threatening issue for her. 
B9 Sue: How many more do you think we'd need to make twenty? 
B10 Jane: I don't know. I can't count up to twenty. Only my sister can. 
(ii) Nevertheless, Sue is frequently indirect in her instructions to the children. In the 
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later meetings of the IRG it was very apparent that Sue wanted to create and sustain a 
conjecturing atmosphere in her classroom, one in which the children knew it is Wright 
to be wrong'. Thus, her first question is direct in every case, presumably because it is 
the bread-and-butter of the reception class - 
C1 Sue: Right Anna, how many people are on the floor? 
- whereas the next question, which she suspects (with good cause) will challenge them 
is twice endowed with a Shield, and always with 'we' for solidarity: 
C5 Sue: How many more people do you think we need to make ten people? 
Her first question [C1 and see 131 and D1 below] is in every case heralded with an 
utterance initiator "Right" (three times) or "OK" (once). This interests me because I 
know (from transcripts) that I use 'right a great deal. On reflection, I suggest that 'right' 
and 'OK' have three distinct pedagogic functions. The first (that identified above) is to 
indicate boundary points in a'lesson; such markers (which also include 'now', 'now 
then' and 'well') are called 'frames' by Sinclair and Coulthard (1975, p. 22), who 
observe that they initiate a teaching 'unit' in which they are typically followed by a 
meta-statement of some kind. For example: 
1: 7.1 Right, we're going to start with a quiz today. 
The second function is a minimal interjection into a pupil's account of something (an 
explanation, for example) or attempt to formulate such an account. It assures the main 
speaker (the pupil) of the listener's attention. See particularly Case 3 and Case 8 for 
examples. The third function, as a statement-tag, is to seek approval (pupil use) or to 
seek assurance of agreement or comprehension (see also Note 7.2) 
In the two cases where the child incorrectly assesses the size of the initial set, Sue 
counters with the Attribution Shield "you think", which I have noted (Chapter 5) as a 
feature of my teacher-strategy. For example (to Rebecca): 
A7 Sue: You think six. How many more people do you think we would need to 
make ten? 
(iii) It is very clear that (see Chapter 6), for three of these four Year R children, a "How 
many? " question triggers a count. The reaction is almost Pavlovian: 
B1 Sue: Right Jane, how many people are there ? 
B2 Jane: One, two, three, four, five. 
D1 Sue: O. K. Jason, how many people have we got here? 
218 
D2 Jason: One, two, three, four, five. 
Examples of the same phenomenon are recorded elsewhere (e. g. Walkerdine, 1988, 
p. 106). The response to the stimulus question "How many ... " is a recitation out loud of 
the 'standard number word sequence' (SNWS - Stelle et aL, 1993 p. 25) of 'numerons' 
or counting 'tags', but there is no external evidence that the child has mastered the 
cardinal principle (Chapter 6), that the last tag used is the cardinality of the set, in 
evidence of which 
[... ] the child must be able to pull out the last numeron assigned and indicate 
that it represents the numerosity of the array. (Gelman and Gallistel, 1978, 
p. 80) 
There may, of course, be prosodic features of the children's counts that "pull out" the 
last number in the recitation, but this is not indicated in the transcripts. 
(iv) Lack of mastery of the cardinal principle may be related to the non-standard 
response of Jane and Anna to the "How many more? " question. 
B3 Sue: How many more people will we need to make ten? 
B4 Jane: (pause] Umm, six, seven, eight, nine, ten. 
85 Sue: Right, do you think you could find some people to make ten? 
B6 Jane: Just yellow ?. 
B7 Sue: I don't mind. You can have whatever colour you like. 
B8 Jane: One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight [pause to rummage] and a 
yellow one [puts down two more ] ten. 
Jane's response [B4] is to extend the recitation of the SNWS beyond the point she had 
reached ("five") to "ten". The purpose of Sue's contingent question [B5] seems to be to 
discover whether Jane will match the five numerons ("six" to "ten") with five people. In fact 
Jane legitimately interprets [B5] as a request to get a new set of people to "make ten". 
Anna does offer a prediction - unhedged - [C6], adds about the right number to the 
original set of people, but suggests (Shielded) that the cardinality of the union is 
answer to the 'more' question. 
C5 Sue: How many more people do you think we need to make ten people? 
C6 Anna: Three. 
C7 Sue: Three? Do you want to find out? [Anna adds more people]. Now how many 
have you got now? 
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C8 Anna: One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight. umm, nine, I think we need 
nine more. 
Similarly, Jason's response to "How many more do we need to make twenty" (IRG1 D) 
is to count (with an unstable SNWS) to twenty. 
Despite Sue's experience as a teacher of young children, these responses surprised 
her. She wrote (personal communication): 
I found I had made assumptions about their basic mathematical language. We 
have taken a great deal of trouble (we use Ginn reception maths teacher's 
book and ideas of our own) to teach the children what they will need (... ] but 
many did not understand "more" for example. 
The problem probably originates in the particular precise and situated meaning of 
'more' and'How many more? ' in the social practice of school arithmetic (Walkerdine, 
1988, pp. 22-27). Walkerdine notes that, in the child's home, 'more' is associated with 
"food regulatory practices" (p. 26), so that (for example) the opposite of 'more' is not 
'less', but something like'no more' or 'enough'. 
Rebecca is something of an exception in these four interviews. She is alone in not 
being kick-started into a vocal count by the initial "How many? " question. She either 
estimates or internalises the SNWS (the transcript does not reveal which): 
Al Sue: Right Rebecca, how many yellow people are there here? 
A2 Rebecca: Umm, six. 
There is evidence that this is in fact an estimate, in that she twice (subsequently) asks 
Sue whether she should count [A6,10] and, moreover, that she can count small sets 
accurately. She appears also to estimate how may more are needed to make ten. 
A4 Rebecca: Umm, two more. 
AS Sue: Two more? Do you want to try that then? 
Sue is correcting Rebecca by repetition of her answer (Drew, 1981 p. 252), inviting her 
self-correction. The transcript notes that Rebecca selects three people. Sue continues: 
AS Sue: Right, how many people are there now? 
A6 Rebecca: Ten. Shall I count them and see? 
A7 Sue: That's a good idea. 
A8 Rebecca: One, two, three, four, five, six, seven ... [pause] shall I do some more 
along there? 
Rebecca's seems to make more conventional sense of the 'How many more? " 
question. On the other hand, Sue does not press her for an answer to it. 
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Al o Rebecca: Shall I count them and see again? [Sue smiles] One, two, three, four, five, 
six, seven, eight, nine and ten. 
Al 1 Sue: Thank you Rebecca. 
In later meetings of the IRG Sue has commented on her growing awareness of the 
need to use language which emphasises the autonomy of the young children whom 
she teaches. In effect, she wants to equip them with 'basic' arithmetic knowledge and 
competence, but wants them to retain responsibility for sense-making and validating 
their solutions to problems. Yet sense-making in school mathematics is not solely a 
matter of private interpretation within some absolute, secure reality of 'real' objects 
('people' and the like); it is also one of of linguistic enculturation, of initiation to a 
discursive practice (Walkerdine, 1988, p. 128). 
CASE 6: THE PUBLIC LECTURE 
This case is not so much a conversation but an example of a ritual mathematical 
monologue - the lecture. I propose merely to set the scene, to present some of the 
data and typographically highlight some relevant features. 
Each year, Christ's College, Cambridge, elects a Lady Margaret Fellow, a'visiting 
scholar' whose academic expertise may be in any area. In return for the year's 
fellowship, the Lady Margaret Fellow must deliver one public lecture "for a general 
audience". Last year, unusually, the fellow was a mathematician - Professor Herbert B. 
Keller of the California Institute of Technology. 
The title of his lecture, given on 2nd February 1994 was: "How many lattice points lie in 
a circle? ". Essentially, the area of a convex region of the plane is roughly equal to the 
number of lattice points (of a square grid) which lie inside it. Therefore a first 
approximation to the answer to the question (the lecture title) is nR2 where R is the 
radius of the circle. If the error E(R) in this approximation is of the order of Re (so that 
E(R)=kR°) for some 0, what bounds can be put on the exponent A? 
The data which follow were all spoken by Prof. Keller. 
From the preamble: 
At the Isaac Newton Institute in July last year, Andrew Wiles reported on his almost- 
proof of Fermat's Last Theorem. 
Surface tension sort of holds the water drop together. 
It turns out that the differential equation is the same -a form of hand-waving -I could 
tell you but ... 
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Into the substance of the lecture: 
From numerical studies, a sample with R<1800 suggests that R'h is better than Rya 
So this suggests that R around 108 is needed to show that 8<0.6 
Hedging is most apparent in Prof. Keller's necessarily unprepared answers to 
questions after the lecture proper: 
Half is still a lower bound, but it Isn't so apparent that 7/11 (due to Iwanec and 
Mazzecci 1988) is still an upper bound. 
The envelope suggests that q<0.575 
don't think that he (G. H. Hardy, 1915) got the conjecture from looking at Bessel 
functions. 
I think that's what led to the conjecture" 
I don't think that's been observed yet. 
We might be able to show that, by accumulating jumps, we could make the bound 
rigorous. 
The significance of the vague language used here by this 'expert' mathematician is that 
it is not perceived as a deficiency, either or language or comprehension, but as an 
acquired expertise, enabling him in each assertion to be as precise as he chooses. 
CASE 7: OPEN UNIVERSITY VIDEO 
Debbie teaches in a primary school in Suffolk. She was one of a number of teachers 
filmed by the Open University production team for course EM236. By a nice 
coincidence, Debbie was also one of the seven teachers whom I had observed five 
years earlier in a study of the introduction of CAN (a calculator-aware component of 
the PrIME project) in Suffolk in 1986-87. At that time she was a newly-qualified 
teacher. When I interviewed her for the study, she considered that the Investigative 
approach to teaching and learning, which was central to CAN "fits in comfortably with 
what I was doing before" (Rowland, 1994b, p. 34), although she recognised that she 
was giving children more thinking time, "waiting, prompting if necessary, but not telling 
them" (p. 35). 
In the Video Debbie is working with a group of six children whose age (unspecified) 
appears to be about 7 or 8. The children are considering the number of unit cubes in 
'cross' formations made with cuisenaire rods. 
Her questioning is frequently but not invariably indirect, for example: 
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EM1: 1 Debbie: What sort of shape would you call that? Kathleen [C4]? 
9 Debbie: Could you tell me what the ninth one would look like? 
44 Debbie: Okay, can you tell me how many cubes you'd need then? 
She invites the children to extrapolate the sequence of geometric formations [9] and to 
compute the numbers of unit cubes in them. 
22 Debbie: The ninth cross you've made, how many little cubes would you need to 
make that? 
26 Debbie: Michael agrees, right, how many little cubes to make the thirty-seventh 
one? 
[22] exemplifies the tension between composing sentences with correct syntax ("How 
many little cubes would you need to make the ninth cross? ") and the desire to present 
the item which is to be the chief focus of attention of the audience (here, the ninth 
cross) without delay in the sentence. [Note 7.3] This point is discussed further in Case 
8. In this case the use of an anaphoric demonstrative pronoun "that" becomes 
necessary; the pronoun is co-referential with the object of the subordinate clause 
which has been highlighted at the beginning of the sentence. 
In Chapter 5,1 noted my own tendency to use attribution hedges (such as "Frances 
thinks that... ") to sustain the intellectual involvement of other children at particular 
moments in the conversation, particularly when one pupil has given "the answer" to a 
question. Debbie uses the same linguistic strategy, but more as a device to side-step 
evaluation of their answers and suggestions: 
20 Debbie: Now you think that's the ninth one. If the box only had hundreds of these 
little white cubes in, how many would you need to use to make the second 
one? 
[26] has the same quality, in that Debbie is the chairperson for the discussion, ensuring 
that the state of play is understood by all, the views of all are heard and considered: 
38 Debbie: Is that the thirty-seventh one, Alex? 
39 C3: It is. 
40 Debbie: Alex doesn't look convinced. 
The girl C5 displays competence in the use of marked language - hedges and modal 
forms - when the children are asked how many unit cubes there would be in the thirty- 
seventh cross. This is an object which they must conceptualise first and construct later 
as a conservative extrapolation of the smaller, more tangible formations. 
223 
26 Debbie: Michael agrees, right, how many little cubes to make the thirty-seventh 
one? 
27 C?: Oh! 
28 C5: More than a hundred I should think. 
C5 seems to be offering a vague estimate of the kind of size she would expect, and the 
estimate is appropriately hedged. She gives further emphasis to the hypothetical 
nature (Coates, 1983, p. 5) of her estimate with the modal'should'. The modal-hedge 
combination "I should think" is doubly cautious, and unusual for such a young child - it 
does not occur anywhere in the Make Ten data. 
Later, the two girls mis-calculate the number of unit cubes; C5 indicates her lack of full 
commitment, again with an epistemic modal [46]: 
46 C5: It might be ... 
47 C5&6: A hundred and seventy-nine. 
48 Debbie: How did you get that? 
49 C5: Well ... 
[laying out a limb with three 1 Os) one, two, three ... [lays a 5] thirty- 
five [lays two Is] thirty-six, thirty-seven. 
C5's "Well" in [49] suggests a possible Quality hedge i. e. they didn't in fact get their 
(erroneous) answer by laying out the cross in Cuisenaire. When they do. C5 counts the 
tens, then the fives, then the twos, and correctly computes four thirty-sevens. 
The nature of the learning here does not involve the children in making inductive 
conjectures or enthymematic leaps. The sequence of 'crosses' considered (at Debbie's 
suggestion) is interesting - not so much consecutive as recursive (2, f(2)=9, ff (2)=37, 
fff(2)=149). Debbie is focusing the children's attention on the geometric generalisation 
in the form of the crosses - four arms of equal length, with an additional unit at the 
centre. Cl gives evidence of having made this generalisation. 
45 Cl: Oohhh! ... four times thirty-seven, no ... yeah. Four times thirty-seven. 
Well, almost... 
54 C2: You didn't count the one in the middle. 
55 C5: Oh yeah! 
Paul Cobb and his collaborators provide a brief but pertinent discussion of the 
teacher's role in classroom conversations in which he or she participates, appearing 
inevitably as an authority figure, yet having come to that interaction with commitment to 
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a constructivist theory of knowing. 
One feature of the teacher's active and demanding role is therefore to facilitate 
mathematical discussions between students while at the same time acting as 
a participant who can legitimise certain aspects of their mathematical activity 
and sanction others. In doing so, the teacher ideally provides a running 
commentary on the students' constructive activities from his or her vantage 
point as an accultured member of the wider community [... ] in a 
communicative context that involves the explicit negotiation of mathematical 
meanings. (1992, p. 102) 
A significant factor in the above teaching sequence (Case 7) is Debbie's avoidance of 
both legitimising and sanctioning, her refusal to assume the role of truth-assessor, 
insisting rather that the children take responsibility for the validity of their own solutions 
"which must occur in order to allow the construction of meaning" (Balacheff, 1990, 
p. 259). 
CASES: JONATHAN 
My last case study concerns Jonathan, who was an undergraduate mathematics/ 
education student. Half of the four-year course that he was following involves the 
academic study of mathematics, and one of his third-year options was a'paper' in the 
Theory of Numbers. The paper is assessed by a three-hour examination and two 25- 
hour'projects'. Students choose their projects from a menu of seven starting points, 
and are normally given two one-to-one 'supervisions' on each project. I tape-recorded 
supervisions with a number of students, and selected one (Appendix 3, NT4) with 
Jonathan for analysis on account of its mathematical and linguistic richness. 
Jonathan came to see me at 9.15 on the last Monday morning of the Lent Term of 
1995. The appointment had been made at the conclusion of our previous supervision 
meeting a week earlier. For this project, Jonathan had been working on the problem of 
finding the number of integer solutions of x2+y2=n modulo a prime, p. At a previous 
supervision he had discussed the cases n=0,1 with me, including a proof for the case 
n=0. Since then he had generated some data for n>1. 
The conversation was about 45 minutes long; the transcript [NT4] can be separated 
into five episodes: 
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Episode 1: Recall of the previous supervision, including a sketch of the proof of a 
theorem about the number of solutions when n=0 [NT4: 1-73] 
Episode 2: Elaboration of the proof, guided by Tim [NT4: 74-135] 
Episode 3: Jonathan talks about the case n*0 [NT4: 136-156] 
Episode 4: Discussion of particular values of n*0; when n is a quadratic residues 
mod p; proof that the number of solutions is the same for all such n [NT4: 157-208] 
Episode 5: Jonathan's proof that, for all n*0, there are p+1 solutions if pE3 mod 4, and 
p-1 solutions otherwise [NT4: 209-240] 
Much of the generalising, the forming of conjectures, had taken place at the previous 
supervision. The process most to the fore in this encounter is proof. Jonathan's ideas 
are mostly skeletal, in need of detail, and my role (as I perceive it) is to provide some 
scaffolding around the construction of the details. 
First, I need to ascertain what the conjectures are, and what progress Jonathan has 
made with the proofs. There is discomfort in the transcript as Jonathan is submitted to 
cross examination. Indeed, a hallmark of the whole transcript is hesitation on the part 
of both speakers, both of whom frequently seem to find it difficult to 'spit it out'. 
1 Jonathan: Well, I had a bit of a bash this time with the theory. 
2 Tim: Right.. we're talking about x squared plus y squared equals n ... 
3 Jonathan: Yes 
4 Tim: Yes, yes ... um, can you ... did we discuss equals zero last time? 
5 Jonathan: It ... came up, yes. 
6 Tim: Right ... you'll forgive me, but I've discussed the same/ 
7 Jonathan: /yeah (yes)/ 
8 Tim: question with one or two people. 
9 Jonathan: Yes, and ... that ... that I'm quite ha ... well, fairly happy with the argument 1. 
can put for that one. 
10 Tim: [rising pitch] Alright. 
11 Jonathan: That's, that's, that's the happiest argument that I ve got (laughs). 
My laboured formulation [4] of Jonathan's progress indicates my embarrassment [6] 
that my recall is uncertain. It is a "deferential use of hesitation and bumbliness" (Brown 
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and Levinson, 1987, p 187) which shows my reluctance to reveal to Jonathan that my 
memory of our last supervision has merged with that of similar conversations with 
other students. I try to redress the FTA with a request for acquittal [6]. Jonathan [9] 
stumbles over his words as he asserts that has a proof for the case n=0, and hedges 
his satisfaction ("quite/fairly happy") with his argument. 
I urge Jonathan to state the theorem for n=0, and, after two or three attempts, he tells 
me that there is just one solution (x=y=O) when p=3 mod 4, and 2p-1 solutions when 
p=1 mod 4 [NT4: 12-27]. At this point (for I, the analyst of this conversation, have 
particular access to the intentions of one of the participants) I wonder whether we'll 
ever get around to the proof, and am anxious that Jonathan be aware of the 
significance of pall mod 4 relative to the theorem he has enunciated. In retrospect, I 
should have asked him to elaborate his argument first - once again, "the tape recorder 
trains the teacher". My intervention [28] is an imposition on him, since he has told me 
he has "an argument"; reluctance to perform the FTA is evident in the hesitation [28] 
which has no fewer than six false starts, as I search in vain for a way of not telling him 
the significance of the value of p modulo 4. The best I can manage is to avoid telling 
him which case is which! 
28 Tim: OK, OK. And, I mean, can I, 1 think, I just want to ask, does it hinge on the 
fact that in one case minus one is a quadratic residue and in the other 
case it isn't? 
29 Jonathan: [pause] Um ... well, yes [coughs] ... sort of. Um, I mean /it's, yes there's 
one/ 
30 Tim: /[laughs] Would/ you like to rehearse the argument with me, or ... 
31 Jonathan: Well [coughs], yeah (yes), I'll come back to that bit about the quadratic 
residue bit. Um, but for where it's equal to one mod four ... 
32 Tim: Righ 
The "well" that initiates Jonathan's response [29] seems to be a hedge on the maxim of 
Quality. After coughs and pauses, the best he can claim is "sort of". I soon realise the 
futility of this 'beating about the bush' and invite Jonathan [30] to tell me his argument, 
but still redressing face (his) by giving the option ("or') so that consent is not the only 
preferred response. He accepts the alternative, realises that this might disappoint me 
and challenge me in my role as supervisor. So although his answer (31] to my question 
[30] is (for the moment) "no", he presents it as "yes", appropriately marked by a hedge 
on Quality ("Well"). Thus, he asserts his right to present his argument in the way he 
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chooses, but bears my prompt [28] in mind and eventually responds to it [39] 
39 Jonathan: Um, and then, if p is congruent to one [pause] we've then got ... p minus, p 
minus one is a quadratic residue of that. 
40 Tim: Indeed; or minus one. 
41 Jonathan: Whichever way. So that gives us. um, one squared and p minus one 
squared, so we've got another pair of solutions. 
42 Tim: Umm ... you don't quite mean that do you? I mean. you mean. what you've 
got, one squared and whatever gives you p minus one ... 
43 Jonathan: Oh, yes, so .. 
44 Tim: ... when it's squared. Right, /OK/ 
Jonathan's account here is presented throughout in first person plural form rather than 
the more usual colloquial second person "you". The 'we's and'us's run through his 
explanation [NT4: 33-41 ]. This is, of course, the classical means of rhetorical distancing 
[Note 4.3], typically used by writers and speakers in formal mathematical discourse 
(Pimm, 1987, p 67). Jonathan is a sufficiently sophisticated (or encultured) 
mathematician to deploy it. At the same time, he may be wanting to include me, to take 
me along with his account. I recall that this was typical of his oral contributions in 
lectures, if I posed a question to the class. As one of the most able mathematicians in 
his year group, his accounts would be in terms of 'we'. I sensed, in order to include the 
rest of the class in his insight. 
As undergraduate mathematics students go (at least, the ones I have worked with over 
the last fifteen years), Jonathan is reasonably articulate when talking about 
mathematics. Yet in [41 ] he fails to say precisely what he intends to convey, and I am,, 
left to fill the gaps in the elided statement [39] ("mod 4" should follow the first "one") 
and to appreciate that the demonstrative pronoun "that" Is co-referential with "p". The 
ambiguity in [411 is sufficiently serious that I feel that I have to clarify the meaning by 
correcting him. The consequent FTA [42] is redressed with the usual hesitation, 
hedging and indirectness ("you don't quite mean that do you? "). 
Among the linguistic (as opposed to affective) barriers that stand between students' 
ideas and their articulation, two seem to be paramount. The technical language of the . 
mathematics register seems at first to belong to the teacher; students must be enabled 
to inherit and appropriate it for themselves. One technique with which I have recently ' 
begun to experiment (in the teaching of Number Theory) to enable this appropriation is 
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to make strips of paper with one 'technical term' on each. Examples include 'perfect 
square', 'quadratic residue', 'Euler's criterion', 'primitive root, 'discriminant. From time 
to time (at suitable points in the course) the strips are randomly distributed to the class. 
Each student is given a few minutes to construct a sentence such as '2 is a quadratic 
residue mod 17' which includes the technical term on their strip of paper. They then 
speak their sentence to the class. Definitions (which could be found and quoted from 
notes) are not allowed, neither are meta-sentences such as "I never could understand 
quadratic residues"I The effectiveness of this technique is currently under review. 
The second barrier, especially in discussion, is the syntax of 'proper' mathematical 
sentences, which rarely matches the cognitive production of elements of the sentence. 
Thus, in [41 ], Jonathan is conscious that 1 and p-1 are quadratic residues ('squares') 
modulo p when p-1 mod 4. Whereas 1 is equal to the square of itself and therefore 
serves for 'x', p-1 is not. The degree of detachment necessary, to hold the fragile 
mathematical idea in mind whilst the sentence is assembled with the correct syntax, is 
considerable, 
Soon, it becomes apparent that Jonathan's argument, with which he is only "fairly 
happy" [9], is incomplete. 
47 Jonathan: And, then there's this pairing thing .. 
48 Tim: Yeah? 
49 Jonathan: Which ... that's the bit I can't, I'm not ... able to explain. I can't, I'm not, 
I 
can't say why they pair off, like that. Um, but then(? ) we've got, um, p 
minus one over two pairs [number of q. r's mod p] [inaudible] 
50 Tim: Oh, p minus one over two squares. 
51 Jonathan: Yes. And so, so you get [long pause] yes, sorry, yes that's it. And they add 
up to give p each time, these two .. these pairs of squares .. 
52 Tim: Yes 
53 Jonathan: So you've got p there, nought. 
54 Tim: [pause] Um, [hesitant] that's an absolutely fine... um, I mean, let's think, 
we're talking about when p is congruent with one mod four here, aren't 
we? 
Jonathan identifies the gap in his argument, which is to show that, when p=1 mod 4, 
the quadratic residues can be always be paired to give sum zero. In [54] 1 'formulate' 
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the conversation, in the sense of Garfinkel and Sacks (1970) described in Chapter 5- 
"we're talking about... " - and try to insist in the formulation that these are his ideas 
("you're saying"), not mine: 
58 Tim: So you're saying .. um, um .. I'm trying to think of something that isn't 
[equal to 13] ... well, no, let's have something fairly straightforward. If you 
do two squared you get four, yeah? 
59 Jonathan: Right. 
60 Tim: And you're saying that in fact, um. thirteen minus four, or something 
congruent to that, minus four, mod thirteen, is always - in fact it's nine ... 
61 Jonathan: Yes. 
62 Tim: ... three squared - is always there. So you're saying, in that case, there 
always happen to be pairs that add to ... 
63 Jonathan: Yes. 
I then acknowledge the gap in the argument, redressing the FTA with a positively- 
hedged compliment "that's absolutely right" [64, c. f. 54]. Jonathan's response 
indicates, for the first time, his discomfort. The gap in the proof is now exposed, and he 
can offer no resolution to the problem. 
64 Tim: OK. I mean, can you take it any further than there. I mean you're 
absolutely right. How can you take it any further than "there always 
happens to be"? 
65 Jonathan: No, I'm stumbling on this, but this Is, this Is the the bit that, It's sort of an 
assumption I have to make (exhaled laugh] to go through this, and I 
66 Tim: OK 
67 Jonathan: ... I can't ... 
68 Tim: OK 
69 Jonathan: I can't ... and I know... or, I don't know ... from looking at the ones that are 
congruent to three, mod four.. 
70 Tim: Yes 
71 Jonathan: ... that there's not a constant adding up, for the pairs, so I can see that the 
two .. 
72 Tim: Right. 
73 Jonathan: ... they really do separate, but I can't explain, why they separate. 
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The exhaled laugh [65], like the cough, indicates Jonathan's uneasiness. He must 
make an assumption to "go through this". "This" is deictic, its referent an argument, 
hopefully not an ordeal. I adopt the minimal response strategy [66-72] (see Case 3: 
Judith) in the hope that he might be holding something back. But in this case there is 
no insightful outpouring from Jonathan. Rather, he insists that he "can't explain" [73]. 
My next turn [74] somewhat apologetically initiates Episode 2 and my explanation. 
74 Tim: OK. Well, I'd like to take you a bit further down that road, because I think 
you'll be quite pleased when you see it. OK? 
75 Jonathan: Right. 
76 Tim: I'm just wondering whether to talk about thirteen, or something that's less 
obvious. You know, 'cos (because) [laughs]... 
77 Jonathan: Oh dear [laughs], is thirteen obvious! [laughs] 
78 Tim: No, no, no, I mean, um, an argument can be more forceful when you can't 
just - other than the numerical calculations - say "Well, obviously". Yes? 
79 Jonathan: Yes. 
In [76,78] I formulate the account which will follow. Since Jonathan was preparing to 
be a teacher, I was explicit about the pedagogical strategy that I was about to choose, 
i. e. the use of a generic example [78]. 
We are less than a third of the way through the transcript. 
I find, looking back at the text, that I was at pains to affirm Jonathan's achievements - 
which are significant, especially towards the end of the transcript. At the same time I 
have to correct errors and suggest approaches to proofs - not least because this was 
Jonathan's last supervision with me, and he was about to write up the project report 
over the Easter vacation. The elements of a polite contest can be seen in Episode 3 
(reproduced below [136-156]) - compliments given [144,150,152] and accepted [153], 
Jonathan maintaining his approach, refusing sometimes to take the route I am 
suggesting [137], asserting his achievements [145,147]. 
136 Tim: OK, OK. [pause] So which then brings us, I guess, back to x squared plus 
y squared equals one, does it? 
137 Jonathan: Uh, yes. Yes. That's a very intriguing way of ... well, actually no, I went on 
to do something else first. 
138 Tim: Ah? 
139 Jonathan: Of x squared plus y squared equals n mod p, but n not being zero and 
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having a particular value. 
140 Tim: OK. 
141 Jonathan: Um, having found out how many solutibhs there were for that ... 
142 Tim: 'cos (because) originally you took it to be anything other than zero ... 
143 Jonathan: Yes. 
144 Tim: Which actually is not without Interest, if I may say so. 
145 Jonathan: No, I think I did go on to show, um ... 
146 Tim: I mean, now you know how many solutions there are for zero, you can say 
precisely how many there are for not-zero [laughs] 
147 Jonathan: Yes, that's basically what I'd donel [laughs] 
148 Tim: OK. 
149 Jonathan: p squared and taken away how many other bits there are ... 
150 Tim: Excellent. 
151 Jonathan: ... so I've done that. 
152 Tim: Yes, that wraps up quite nicely too. 
153 Jonathan: Yes, that was very satisfying, actually. 
154 Tim: Yes. I think it's just a nice coincidence that you've two p minus one 
solutions, and when you subtract that from p squared, you get a perfect 
square ... 
155 Jonathan: Oh, yes ... 
156 Tim: p squared minus two p plus one is a. an algebraic square. 
The encounter certainly had its lighter moments, such as when Jonathan pays me a 
compliment (in that he recognises my own mathematical sense of curiosity) which I 
gratefully accept, and he immediately eases my embarrassment (young students 
hardly ever praise their lecturers; doubtless they lack the confidence to do so) by 
teasi ng me for my untidiness: 
203 Tim: Can I tell you that I don't know the answer to this [both laugh]. I mean 
simply because I've not allowed myself to think about it ... 
204 Jonathan: Yes, very restrained of you. [both laugh]. As soon as I'm out of that door 
you'll be going ... [inaudible beneath Tim's laughter] 
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205 Tim: Nice of you to suggest it. Um ... 
206 Jonathan: Anything to put off sorting through that pile of papers) [gestures to Tim's 
desk] 
207 Tim: [laughs] Dead right! 
In the fifth and final Episode of the conversation Jonathan surprised and delighted me 
with a proof which involves a neat combinatorial argument. I begin the episode by 
suggesting [209] that he will find the proof too difficult. Jonathan's reply is dispreferred 
[210] and the FTA is marked and redressed by the three false starts. I realise that 
have underrated him [211]. 
209 Tim: You know the other thing that, um, you haven't proved - but in a way I don't 
feel to desperate about it because there's quite a lot around here for you to 
write up - is ... is why there are ... one more or one less than p solutions to 
x squared plus y squared equals one, in every case. 
210 Jonathan: Ah well, ah, that's, I'm coming on to that bit ... 
211 Tim: Ah, right! Sorry.. 
212 Jonathan: I had to backtrack to get to that. 
213 Tim: Oh, right. OK, OK. 
His proof [NT4: 215-234] is perfectly sound. Jonathan sketches it sufficiently for me to 
know how it is structured, and that it achieves the desired conclusion. [Note 7.4] It 
rests in part on one of Jonathan's earlier theorems, the one that I had rather loftily 
consented [144] to be "not without interest". 
Nonetheless Jonathan is quite diffident about his proof, and Shields himself [216] with 
some language reminiscent of the visiting scholar (Case 6) - "arm waving", "sort of 
proof" c. f. 'hand waving', 'almost proof': 
216 Jonathan: Um ... I'm can then get back to some serious arm waving here and ... and 
go back to my sort of proof of why there are x ... there are p plus one or p 
minus one solutions. 
This is his proof, and its generality here is marked with "you" [218,220], whereas he 
uses the expository "we" [224,226] to refer back to results agreed earlier in the 
conversation. 
218 Jonathan: And, basically, um, you say how many ... you take your mod, number ... 
219 Tim: Right.. 
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220 Jonathan: And you work out how many possible pairs you can come up with ... 
221 Tim: [hushed] Right ... 
222 Jonathan: And ... whatever that was, p squared ... 
223 Tim: OK. 
224 Jonathan: We already know how many... solutions there are - for p congruent to one 
or congruent to three mod four- how many solutions there are for ... x 
squared plus y squared is congruent to zero [pause] 
225 Tim: [hushed] Yeah ... 
226 Jonathan: So we can get rid of those for starters. And then we know that all the 
solutions that are left are divided up evenly between each of the other 
numbers ... 
My response was little short of ecstatic: 
227 Tim: Ohh, that's very nice. [Jonathan laughs]. Oh, well donel 
233 Tim: Oh, well done, well done. Yes ... [laughs] [... ] 
234 Jonathan: I didn't know if that was the way you were thinking of ... 
235 Tim: That's very nice indeed. 
I urge him to write it up without delay; Jonathan responds that he has done so already. 
241 Tim: Right. Well, I would suggest you rush away and write all this down. 
242 Jonathan: [laughs] Well, I wrote it all down yesterday, that ... that particular bit.. 
Both turns [241,242] are affronts to 'face' (my imposition, Jonathan's refusal), and both 
are redressed in the same way, with "Well". There is some new work here, he 
acknowledges: 
244 Jonathan: ... so it's just the, um, it's the pairing up of the quadratics when it's 
congruent and ... that tidying up of the, er, x squared 
And so the supervision concluded: 
247 Tim: Rush away and write it up. 
248 Jonathan: Yes, before I forget itl 
249 Tim: [laughs] OK. Well that was a good way to start the week. 
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Jonathan did indeed write it up, and submitted his report, neatly word-processed, on 
time at the beginning of the Easter (Summer) Term. I read it and awarded 16 marks 
out of 20 (14+ is First Class). My co-examiner in the Faculty of Mathematics, on 
reading the script, remarked how much Jonathan must have enjoyed this project, and 
I happily accepted his proposal to upgrade the mark to 18. 
One month into that Easter Term, on 16th May 1995, Jonathan took his own life, alone 
in his house in Cambridge. He was a complex person, one who was more comfortable 
giving than receiving. Yet his innermost feelings he reserved for himself. I imagine that, 
for Jonathan, life posed a number of threats and challenges, and that, in the end, he 
did not believe that he could face all of them. 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter I have examined a number of mathematical teaching and learning 
situations. I had no part in or control over any but the last of these pedagogic episodes, 
but have used them to validate the claims I arrived at and set out in earlier chapters. 
These claims concern the many ways in which indirect and vague language are used 
to support interaction in the mathematics classroom, and serve the interactional and 
transactional intentions of teachers and students. I have shown that the linguistic 
phenomena which I had identified in my own research-oriented, contingent interviews, 
are also present in these pedagogic encounters. I have shown how these phenomena 
assist the definition and interpretation of the propositional attitude of speakers 
(students and teachers) and the dynamics of respect and politeness in a conjecturing 
atmosphere. In particular, I have identified in these eight episodes: 
" the deictic function of pronouns 'it' and 'you' for generalisation 
" the subtle use of indirect speech acts for the redress of threats to 'face' 
" the occurrence of hedges and modal forms, mainly implicating uncertainty 
" reification of the Zone of Conjectural Neutrality in a conjecturing atmosphere 
More generally, I have demonstrated the possibility of insight into mathematical 
interaction by means of pragmatic analysis of discourse. In the interests of careful 
interpretation - so that it might be something more than "a matter of guesswork" -I 
have applied the full range of the pragmatic analytical methods which I reviewed in 
Chapter 2. Classroom talk about mathematics is both transactional and interactional. 
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Interpretation of the interactional component of such talk requires attention to a wide 
range of human sensibilities and pragmatic goals. 
In the final chapter I shall conclude with some remarks concerning the value of this 
study for my own understanding, together with some proposals for application. 
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CHAPTER 8: SUMMARY AND REVIEW 
So what did we learn? (Margaret Thatcher, 1983). 
Wisdom is the principal thing; therefore get wisdom: and with all thy getting get 
understanding. (Proverbs 4: 7) 
In this thesis, I have taken the position that, when people talk about mathematics, they 
use language as a means of satisfying a number of communicative 'wants'. My data is 
drawn almost entirely from expert-novice conversations, and my conclusions apply, in 
the first instance at least, to such discourse contexts. Broadly speaking, 
communicative wants in mathematics talk are of two kinds. 
The first kind is cooperative and cognitive, stemming from a desire to share 
mathematical ideas - to give and receive insights, knowledge and understanding. It is 
associated with transactional functions of language. This giving and receiving is not 
one-way information traffic, flowing from teacher to pupil. The teacher needs to know 
what the pupil knows, what kind of knowledge s/he has constructed. My transcripts 
amply demonstrate the willingness of pupils to supply such information, and on 
occasion the pleasure they derive from doing so. 
The second kind is of a more general, social character, to do with establishing and 
sustaining social relationships. It is associated with interactional functions of language. 
In the case of mathematics talk, language must frequently serve the cause of respect 
and defence of 'face'. This is to be expected as a consequence of the asymmetry of 
the power relation in the expert-novice conversation, since the novice anticipates that 
the expert will evaluate her/his assertions. As I have observed in Chapter 5, the line 
between truth and error is perceived to be particularly sharp in mathematics in 
comparison with other subjects at school and college. But this is not only a 'problem' 
for novices. Experts, too, recognise the boundaries - albeit fuzzy boundaries - of their 
expertise, and use language to convey uncertainty to their audience when they make 
judgements and predictions on matters on or beyond the boundary. 
OUTCOMES 
My aim in this work has been to highlight and analyse some of the ways that 
participants in mathematics talk use language to achieve their communicative and 
affective purposes. In this thesis, I have exposed and analysed the communicative 
competence [Note 8.1] of pupils in the use of mathematical meta-language, especially 
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the goals they achieve through the use of various kinds of vague language. In this 
research, my attention has focused on the following topics and issues: 
" the use of pronouns by novice speakers of mathematics; 
" the function of hedges in the communication of propositional attitude; 
" the construct which I have called The Zone of Conjectural Neutrality; 
" the development of the language of modality over the years 4 to 11; 
" the use of vague and indirect language by teachers in interaction with pupils; 
" pragmatic interpretation of transcripts of mathematics talk. 
In this chapter, I shall recapitulate some of these matters, and review the potential for 
more general classroom application. I conclude by identifying areas for further 
research. 
PRONOUNS 
In the study of reference vagueness in the use of pronouns in mathematics talk 
(Chapter 4), the pupils' deictic intention is principally cognitive - pointing to concepts 
and generalisations - rather than affective. The significance of the teacher's Ve' has 
previously been considered by Mühlhäusler and Harre (1990), who propose that its 
function is commonly manipulative (spurious solidarity); also by Pimm (1987), who 
argues that its function is authoritarian (appeal to unnamed expert support). I have 
shown that he pupil's 'if and 'you' are equally vague in terms of intended referent, but 
are not related to the teacher-pupil power imbalance. I have argued for a strong 
association between their use and reference to concepts and generalisations. Given 
the importance of these referents for mathematics teaching, the significance of this 
connection can hardly be over-stated. 
The use of'it' as a conceptual deictic enables the pupil to say what s/he could not say- 
otherwise, to draw attention to mathematical entities whose name s/he does not know. 
In terms of the'two language levels' analysis presented in Chapter 3, this pronoun 
(typically as object of the verb 'to do') is added to the object language as a vague 
variable. The notion of 'focus' as locus of attention is important here, given the claim of 
Moxey and Sanford (1993, p. 58) that "pronouns are good for referring to things in 
focus [... ] ease or acceptability of pronominal reference can be used as an index and a 
probe for the state of focus". In the first instance, the teacher who is sensitive to the 
pronoun/focus connection can be made aware of the presence of a cognitive focus 
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such as a generalisation - recall Susie's "times can do it can't it, and add, and take ... 
no, takeaways can't do it". This teacher-awareness opens up the possibility of further 
investigation of that focus through appropriate, contingent questioning. 
This questioning could be of two kinds, which might be called conspiracy and 
confrontation. The conspiratorial approach is for the teacher to take up and use 'it in 
the discourse as though her/his 'it' were intended to be co-referential with the pupil's. 
For example, "Why can't takeaways do it, then? " would enable the confirmation or 
formation of hypotheses about the referent on the basis of further information about 'it' 
- rather like a game of 'twenty questions', the only question not permitted is the name 
of the mystery object. Confrontation, on the other hand, amounts to an'on record' 
request for the object to be revealed. For example, "Wait a minute, what is this 'it 
you're talking about? ". Clearly the choice of the conspiratorial or the confrontational 
approach must depend on a range of contextual and inter-personal factors, and there 
is scope for some research here. My default choice would always be conspiracy, but 
that reflects my preference for the avoidance of on-record FTAs in the absence of 
detailed knowledge of the pupil/student. 
In Chapter 4, I discussed how'you' serves as a pointer to a generalised procedure or 
relationship. The subtle shift from 'I' to 'you' to mark a tendency towards speaker 
detachment is an important cognitive indicator. Oscillation between first and second 
person pronouns indicates a switch between action and knowledge, possibly with 
regard to different processes or generalisations. 
The 'I' -'you' contrast could be related to the process-object distinction (Sfard, 1991); 
the detachment associated with the conception of a mathematical notion as an object 
independent of the action of the speaker is marked by 'you'. [Note 8.2] The pedagogic 
significance of the pupil/student's use of 'I' or 'you' might be in the recognition of a pre- 
or post-objective cognitive state with regard to the mathematical notion being 
discussed. There is far greater ambiguity in the teacher's use of 'you' in that s/he may 
either be addressing the pupil (meta-language) or referring to a mathematical notion 
(object language). In practice the referent is pragmatically determined, and/or 
determined by tense and mood. (I shall not develop that thought here, but compare 
"How do you find the area? " with "How did you find the area? " and "How would you 
find the area? "). My data suggests that pupils hardly ever use 'you' to address the 
teacher in mathematical conversations. 
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MODALITY, HEDGES AND INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS 
Hedges encode vagueness in mathematics talk, related to imprecision or uncertainty of 
speaker commitment. Whereas Shields clearly belong to the meta-language of 
mathematics talk, Approximators affect to supplement the object language and 
confuse its truth-conditional semantics: this perception is the motivation of Lakoff's 
classic 1973 paper on the logic of fuzzy concepts. In the end, a pragmatic analysis of 
hedges is more fruitful for the purposes of mathematics education. 
Having identified hedges and epistemic modal forms as a feature of mathematics talk 
in a conjecturing atmosphere, much of the discussion of their use in Chapter 5 focused 
on the pragmatic goals achieved by speakers, as analysed by Channell. These 
purposes include covering for lack of specific information and expressing politeness. In 
these pragmatic terms, the following important differences between pupil and 'teacher' 
were identified. 
Essentially, pupils use epistemic hedges to shield themselves from accusation of error; 
the most subtle form of this is the epistemic use of Approximators, so as to render a 
statement "almost unfalsifiable" by trivialising its semantics (Sadock, 1977, p. 437). 
The development of this aspect of communicative competence (hedging), vital for 
protection of 'face' and the communication of propositional attitude in the mathematics 
classroom, is traced and interpreted in Chapter 6. 
Teachers, on the other hand, may use hedges as a tool of pedagogic strategy, 
weakening the force of an assertion (her/his own or that of a pupil) in order to sustain 
the engagement of (other) pupils, emphasising their responsibility for the determination 
of validity. At the same time, teachers use epistemic hedges and modal forms to 
perform indirect speech acts in interaction with pupils, particularly in order to present a 
request (for information) as a question (default illocutionary force of the interrogative 
form) e. g. "What do you think this shape is called? ", or "Can you tell me the mean of 
these four numbers? ". The purpose of these indirect speech acts is to alleviate the 
illocutionary force of an act that could lead to 'loss of face' if the pupil cannot supply the 
'answer'. 
The application of these findings to the teaching of mathematics is probably easier to 
state than it is to put into practice. The possibility of active construction of knowledge 
from reflection on experience is at the heart of a constructivist view of learning. Such a, 
view puts an onus on the teacher to try to understand the form, content and robustness 
of that knowledge, as an observer of and participant in pupils' mathematical activity - 
240 
an "accultured" participant, moreover, who "can legitimise certain aspects of their 
mathematical activity and sanction others". (Cobb, 1992, p. 102) For this reason, 
amongst others, it is desirable that pupils regularly articulate their constructed beliefs, 
or construct them through articulation, in the hearing of their teacher. Such a self- 
constructed belief may be fragile; in particular, any inductive conjecture would be 
expected to be. The burden of the affective baggage associated with mathematics in 
school then necessitates that the pupil articulate the belief whilst distancing her/himself 
from full commitment to it. That is to say, they must convey their propositional attitude 
to the substance of their assertion. The rich variety, in some cases the subtlety, of 
hedges and modal forms deployed by pupils for this purpose is evidence of this affect- 
oriented dimension of pupils' communicative competence. These Markers are linguistic 
pointers to uncertainty and attendant cognitive vulnerability. The teacher's subtle task 
at such moments is to facilitate the de-personalisation of the assertion, as a 
preliminary to'legitimising' or'sanctioning', by ensuring that it be located in the Zone of 
Conjectural Neutrality. This will be discussed further following the next section. 
My comment about the relative ease of stating such a policy as opposed to 
implementing it is based, in part, on my own experience over the last two years. These 
proposals are no quick fix for teachers, and in any case presuppose a quasi-empirical 
approach to mathematics learning. As Piaget said with reference to clinical 
interviewing, sensitivity to epistemic Markers in mathematics talk also "can only be 
learned by long practice". Despite my awareness of the form of such Markers, the 
difficulty (for me, when teaching) is in attending to the linguistic details of a'lesson' 
whilst being fully engaged with the mathematics. This difficulty is clearly related to one 
of Hewitt's pedagogic aphorisms: 'The amount of attention available to us is finite and 
limited" (1994, p. 69). In particular, I suggest that it is difficult, if not impossible, without 
"long practice", to attend to two demanding things simultaneously. If the level of 
demand of one task can be reduced by 'automation' (as in 'being on auto-pilot) as a 
result of familiarity, thereby markedly reducing its attention requirement, then 
simultaneous performance may be possible (e. g. taking in the news on the car radio 
whilst driving on an open road). Perhaps some aspects of mathematics teaching can 
be automated in this way, but I don't know; my preference for some time has been for 
'contingent lessons' in order to avoid the tedium of automation. 
It would, I imagine, be equally tedious (in the classroom) to be continually and 
consciously preoccupied with certain syntactic features of speech ("that was a 
subordinate clause"), even those thought to have particular pragmatic significance. 
Nevertheless, I have made some progress in achieving the automation of sensitivity to 
241 
Marked language. Within the last year, in a lecture to first year students in a course on 
Mathematical Processes, I 'invited' them to evaluate a2+b and b2+a when a+b=1. An 
inductively-based conjecture was proposed and proved by the students. Various "what 
if? " variants followed e. g. if a+b=10, is there another "interesting" function of a, b, 
symmetrical on the given subset? What if a, b are complex numbers and a+b=1 ? The 
algebraic requirements of the proof indicated that we could go further. What if a and b 
are 2x2 matrices? There was a few moments' pause, then Verity spoke: "Would they 
have to add up to the identity or something? ". In that moment I recognised the question 
as an indirect speech act, asserting a tentative belief, further shielded by the vague 
completer "or something" working as an epistemic Adaptor. I was very aware of the 
significance of what she had said, yet my attention had been on the mathematics until 
that moment. It was the first time that I suspected that attention to a restricted range of 
lexical pointers (pronouns and hedges, for example) could be automated "by long 
practice". If teachers can be attuned to such pointers to propositional attitude, yet more 
work is needed on the guidance of appropriate teacher behaviours when a the use of 
these pointers is noticed in the mathematics classroom. 
THE ZONE OF CONJECTURAL NEUTRALITY 
In introducing the construct of the ZCN in Chapter 5,1 described it as a space between 
what we believe and what we are willing to assert. This is, of course, a somewhat 
metaphysical construct, and deserves a name only if it captures something of didactic 
significance. 
Now, the issue central to the notion of ZCN is summarised in the question "Where are 
pupils' conjectures located? Who is responsible for them? " The default position must 
be that a conjecture belongs to the one who utters it. If the conjecture is asserted with 
conviction (better still, if it is subsequently validated as true), then this is not an 
affective problem. But if a conjecture is offered tentatively, then it is better that it be 
located somewhere neutral before it is tested, in order that there be some real 
prospect of Dawson's promise (1991, p. 197) of "testing on a cognitive rather than an 
affective level". I emphasise again, that this is in defiance of the cultural norm that the 
pupil is judged to be 'right' or'wrong' rather than the 'answers 'true' or 'false'; that it is s/. 
he who is on trial, not her/his beliefs. 
This is at the heart of pupils' communicative competence in the use of Marked 
language in the assertion of conjectures. The forms of linguistic shielding which I have 
discussed have the effect of reifying the ZCN and locating the conjecture in it, thus 
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distancing the speaker from the assertion that he or she makes. A Plausibility Shield 
such as'I think, 'maybe', 'perhaps' does this (being a hedged performative, a speech 
act) in a very direct way, because the marker of propositional attitude lies outside the 
statement that follows it. Epistemic Approximators (such as 'about' in "there are about 
fifteen ways") are more subtle: they do not require the speaker to disown her/his 
conjecture, but they do make it almost unfalsifiable. Whilst subtle, this is less than 
helpful since a consequence of its vagueness is that, strictly speaking, it can neither be 
validated nor modified. The conventional force, however, is clearly to present the 
conjecture as fallible, possibly in need of modification. 
The teacher who recognises the epistemic force of a Marked conjecture has the option 
of assisting its placement in the ZCN. One way to do this might be to write it on the 
'blackboard' and say something like "OK, let's take a look at this conjecture", possibly 
without reference to the one who proposed it or constant application to him/her for 
arbitration or interpretation. Another way is to form small discussion groups which then 
tend to assume some corporate ownership for the conjecture and their findings about it 
when reporting back to the class. I sometimes 'return' a conjecture, or an agreed 
modification of it, from the ZCN back to its originator when the "severe testing" is over; 
I do this, for example, by marking its changed status with reference to the conjecture 
as 'theorem' (sometimes 'lemma') and naming it Yuko's Theorem or Tom's Theorem. If 
Fermat and Langrange merit such attribution, then so do Yuko and Tom. 
The term 'conjecture' may suggest the cognitive outcome of an extended investigation, 
but it could be simply the answer to a teacher's question. "Is 91 a prime number? ". 
"How many non-isomorphic groups are there of order 8? ". By default, the one who 
answers the question 'owns' the answer and is subsequently right or wrong. One way 
of trying to bring the answer into the ZCN before it is spoken is to pose the question as 
an indirect speech act. "Can you tell me if 91 is a prime number". As I have observed 
(Chapter 3) the illocutionary force of the indirect act is achieved by the modal auxiliary, 
which questions one of the felicity conditions (ability to comply) of the direct request for 
information. Another, rather different technique, is to pose questions as statements 
(with the tacit or explicit "Discuss"). Thus, "91 is not a prime number". Or by attribution: 
"My neighbour says that 91 is a prime number". The conjecture then goes straight into 
the ZCN; at the very worst, only the teacher (or his neighbour) are 'wrong' if the 
statement turns out to be false. But this technique has limitations, and cannot help with 
extended enquiries "in which a conjecture is created, tested and proved, or refuted and 
modified" (Dawson, ibid. ) 
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In a conjecturing atmosphere, a pupil may articulate a conjecture without necessarily 
being committed to its truth. Both the pupil and the teacher may influence the 
relocation of the conjecture from the pupil to the ZCN. The conjecture is then tested, 
modified or rejected in the ZCN. In such a cognitive and affective milieu, it is the 
proposition that is on trial, not the person. The ultimate goal, for the fallibilistically 
committed teacher, would be for the class to understand that this is the case. 
VALIDATION AND CLASSROOM APPLICATION 
In our first three evening meetings, the eight regular members of the Informal 
Research Group were exposed to the linguistic framework and most of the findings 
reported in Chapters 5 and 6, set in the context of contingent questioning and the use 
of transcripts to interpret classroom interactions. The next two meetings were given to 
feedback and study of the transcripts that six members of the group had made of their 
own tape recordings. The discussion included general consideration of the benefits (if 
any) of attention to vague aspects of mathematics talk in the classroom. Four of these 
teachers (Judith, Rachel, Sue and Hazel) responded to my request for written 
reflections. This was a formative experience for all of us, and was insufficiently focused 
to enable adequate evaluation of my proposals for application of this research. 
Five of the transcripts considered in Chapter 6 were donated by members of the IRG. 
In each case, I sent the donor a copy of my analysis of their transcript (i. e. the relevant 
section of Chapter 6) inviting them to correct and/or comment on it, and asking their 
permission to include it. Four of the five replied. Apart from one or two minor 
corrections (such as the age-range of Judith's school), these four were happy that my 
interpretation of their transcript concurred with their recollection of their interaction with 
the pupil(s). Hazel's comment was typical: 
In reference to the draft chapter that you sent me, I agree with all that was 
written and am happy for all of it to be included. I particularly agree with two 
points that you made in the second page [etc. ] 
I also took it as positive that six teachers, representing four phases of schooling from 
4 to 18, gave up three evenings and two Saturday mornings to be involved in the group 
(not to mention recording and transcribing interviews with children, some of them 
lengthy texts). Their incentive appeared to be intrinsic interest and/or a sense that this 
might have potential for the improvement of mathematics teaching and learning in their 
classrooms. 
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In terms of the specific focus of the group on vague language, it appeared that the 
phenomenon of hedges was one that they could readily identify. It was also the only 
one. This may relate to my earlier comment about the difficulty of attending to 
language in the classroom as distinct to attending to the business of teaching 
mathematics. It may equally well reflect the thrust of my exposition to the group, which 
did not attempt to embed hedging within speech act theory and presented it more in 
phenomenological terms. Nonetheless, informal feedback suggested that these 
teachers had been sensitised - or believed that they had been - to the use of hedges 
by children as an indicator of propositional attitude, principally of uncertainty. It was not 
always clear what they then did with that knowledge, although Hazel wrote (personal 
communication) that: 
I am now more aware of the effect of using vague language in the classroom 
so I can use it in a positive way. [... ] My knowledge of hedges has helped me 
to spot that some some statements made by children are less certain than 
they appear. [... ] I can then respond to them at an appropriate level. 
Sue had developed the task which was the basis of her transcribed talk (five people, 
how many more are needed to make ten? ) into one which began with (say) eight 
people, then seven, six, and so on, so as to offer some potential for the child to predict 
and generalise. She had also begun to work on the way she presented questions (in 
effect, as indirect speech acts) to the four- and five-year-olds in her class, searching 
for ways that would convey her attitude that their answers were modifiable conjectures. 
Sue wrote (personal communication) that: 
thinking about this project [IRG] has influenced the way I have spoken to the 
children -I have only tried a small group with [the] second exercise but when I 
do I feel I shall find a few more "I think"s and "shall I try"s [... ] when maths 
becomes sums which are right or wrong we stifle some children's embryonic 
sense of pattern in number and their enthusiasm for investigation. 
Perhaps Sue has come closest (not only in this quotation) to articulating an 
understanding of the significance and possible application of the work of the IRG with 
regard to the communication of propositional attitude in a conjecturing atmosphere. 
Not surprisingly, the focus on vague language was often obscured by other, equally 
important insights into teaching and learning in their classrooms which the teachers 
gained from recording and transcribing their interactions with pupils. Judith wrote that 
"This [taping and transcribing] was an insight for me into the level of my own pupils' 
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understanding, and into some of their idiosyncrasies of thinking". One specific 
instance, mentioned in Chapter 7, was Sue's realisation that her intended, restricted 
meaning of 'more' was widely misunderstood by young children. 
Rachel listed a number of general conclusions and questions which arose from her 
study of her transcripts, including the following: 
" The conversation is very dependent on the rapport between child and interviewer. 
" Does the nature of the conversation change after a number of interviews? 
" Is there a danger of the interviewer becoming familiar with the child's way of 
thinking and then beginning to interpret for them? 
" Traditionally maths has been an exception to the use of children's talk as a 
vehicle for learning mathematics. Maths has a symbolism which seems 
formidable. Perhaps this has caused some teachers to base their language work 
on the transmission and use of symbols and on learning the formal, spoken 
vocabulary. 
" Students often discuss things in lessons with me and each other and then say 
"But how do I write that down? " 
" Maths is a precise subject - is uncertainty valid? 
"I am impatient that they should get to the correct answer. 
"I wonder what the students would gain from listening to the tape? 
(Williams, 1995) 
A comment made by Judith was illuminating. She remarked, in discussion, that the 
work on vague language had been "really interesting" but that she did not think that it 
was useful, she couldn't see how she could use it. Hazel and Rachel (three-year 
veterans of teaching) responded - with all kinds of redress of FTA - that they did feel 
that it was useful to them as teachers, and that Judith's perception may be due to her 
inexperience as a teacher. They recalled that they had been preoccupied with 
preparation and classroom management in their first year or so of teaching, and only, 
recently had been in a position (having automated at least some aspects of their 
teaching? ) to think about fine-tuning their interaction with pupils. Judith listened to this 
suggestion and agreed that it was a possible explanation. Sue and Ann (the real 
veterans) wisely withheld comment. 
At that time I had not analysed Judith's transcript [IRG5]. What is Interesting, in the 
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light of Judith's honest perception, is the richness of her conversation with Allan in 
terms of mathematical process (see Chapter 7: Case 3) and her skill in creating and 
sustaining a conjecturing atmosphere. It hardly matters, for her, that she is not (yet? ) 
able to 'use' language in an analytical way to achieve or develop what she already 
does intuitively. Some time later, Judith attributed her good 'instincts' to the influence of 
a particular Cambridge University tutor on her PGCE course: 
I myself was trained to look beyond language to meaning - whether I was 
creating an environment where students were free to make decisions and 
predictions, to make mistakes and correct them ... (personal communication). 
In retrospect, more systematic data collection from the Informal Research Group would 
have been useful, not to say preferable. This is particularly the case in the area of 
classroom application of my basic research on linguistic pointers (especially pointers to 
uncertainty). My limited success in obtaining evaluation data was not for lack of trying. 
In practice, I was totally dependent on the goodwill of the members of the group, since 
their only incentive to participate at all was personal and professional interest. Despite 
the fact that I set out a 'contract for participation in the group at the beginning 
(attendance, supplying a transcript, contributing to a publication), I was in no position 
to enforce it. What I could, and should, have done was to arrange one-to-one 
interviews with the six teachers who contributed transcripts of their talk with pupils. 
Nevertheless, the IRG was valuable in its affirmation of the relevance, to their 
classrooms, of my research on aspects of vague language. 
INTERPRETATION OF TRANSCRIPTS OF MATHEMATICS TALK 
Much of the data in this thesis have been transcripts of people talking about 
mathematics in pedagogic or quasi-pedagogic situations. My interpretivist position 
denies the possibility of 'knowing', in any pure and absolute way, what a given 
utterance 'means'. The interpretation of the meanings and motives of others entails 
incorporating the evidence of the text into one's view of the world, the actors in the 
interaction, and one's knowledge of their situation. It is a constructive act of meaning- 
making for the analyst, whose 'reading' of a particular utterance must be made to fit, to 
be consistent with, the way that they construe the utterance in its context. 
Moreover, the analysis of mathematical interaction must be more than the 
interpretation of individual utterances; it must account for how the discourse is 
sustained as a social event. The participants in the conversation must make such 
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interpretations of mathematical and social meaning in the moment, within the 
conversation itself, to make an interactive contribution to it. The task of the analyst, in 
this fullest sense, is to give, with all possible skill and integrity, an account of the record 
of the conversation, transformed and preserved in the transcript. Such an account is a 
'story' which need not claim to be true, but can endeavour to contain some truth about 
what it might be like to talk to someone -a teacher, a child, a student, a friend - about 
mathematics. How it feels to ask a question, or to be asked for an answer; how it is 
possible to say what you know, and how it feels when you do; what it's like when you 
know but don't know how to say it. 
Perhaps, as Leech suggests (1983, pp. 30-31), interpreting an utterance is ultimately a 
matter of guesswork, but that does not mean that one guess is as good as another. 
I have shown that the pragmatic approach to discourse analysis offers a way of setting 
about this business of interpretive guesswork in a responsible way. 
FURTHER RESEARCH 
Some questions which have emerged from this research indicate the need for further 
research which would occupy a continuum from the basic to the applied. 
My study brought to light some gaps in corpus-based research on child language. The 
wealth of research in language development tends to focus on the first three or four 
years of life, for the good reason that development is most dramatic In that period. 
Another reason is that children are most available for researchers to observe (not 
uncommonly their own children) before they begin school. This bias is also reflected in 
CHILDES, the largest electronic text corpus of child discourse available (MacWhinney, 
1991). This poses some problems for comparing the mathematics talk of 
schoolchildren with home talk or any other kind of talk. CHILDES does, however, 
include the Fawcett corpus [Note 4.5] of the spoken language of 92 children aged 
between 6 and 12. A project comparing Marked language in this corpus with that in my 
own would be of considerable value and interest. 
Teachers' use of questions as indirect requests is of interest, not least because the use 
of the device is (I imagine) almost invariably unconscious, and because it varies in the 
practice of any individual teacher and in extent from person to person. This is evident 
in the I RG transcripts. There is also variation in the form of the indirectness itself. 
Study of this as a phenomenon (a linguistic regularity) and as a pragmatic device 
(related to context and goal) would be illuminating. 
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Rachel's questions included the possibility of referring the evidence ("the tape") back to 
her students. A similar idea had occurred to me: what might the children and students 
whom I recorded say, in retrospect, about instances of vague language that I brought 
to their attention? It would be naive to suppose that they would then provide me with a 
reliable account of their goals; I anticipate that answers would contain a fair amount of 
hedging! Moreover, 'romancing' is a tendency and a temptation in the face of such 
introspective recollection. But it would have some value for triangulation purposes, and 
a pilot study would certainly be worth trying. 
Are there linguistic pointers to ideas and attitudes in mathematics talk in addition to 
those identified in this study? There is scope for a fresh reading of Stubbs' programme 
(1986) and further scrutiny of my corpus with this question in mind. Intonation is one 
obvious suggestion; this would require a return to the tapes and a more sophisticated 
coding of the transcripts. 
As regards further working with teachers on classroom application, some philosophical 
commitment (albeit tacit) would, I believe, need to underpin working on classroom 
behaviour. A necessary preliminary to directing attention to linguistic matters would be 
to work, over a sustained period of time, on the teaching styles associated with quasi- 
empiricism. Working with other teachers, I would want to look at some of the the 
writing of Polya and Lakatos, Dawson and Mason. I believe that we should need to 
grapple with the ZCN. That we would benefit from reading the work of Paley on the 
refinement of practice through the study of audiotape, videotape and transcripts. The 
IRG provided sufficient evidence for me to begin to believe that such a programme 
could work, at least with some teachers - especially given some incentive for those 
teachers, principally the availability of time. 
SUMMARY 
In this concluding chapter, I have summarised the outcomes of my research in relation 
to the aims that I set out at the beginning, and indicated some areas for further 
research. The main findings, reported in earlier chapters and reviewed above, can be 
summarised as follows: 
1 Novice speakers of mathematics are able to make skilful use of the pronouns 'it 
and 'you' to point to mathematical concepts and generalisations, and to indicate 
detached generalisation by a subtle shift from first person to second person 
pronouns. The details of the associated study are reported in Chapter 4. 
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2 Hedges (Chapter 5) play an important part in the communication of propositional 
attitude, and this is of vital importance in the formation and articulation of 
predictions and generalisations. 
3 In a conjecturing atmosphere, associated with fallibilistic teaching and learning, 
epistemic hedges implicate uncertainty. The Zone of Conjectural Neutrality is a 
pedagogical concept, capturing the idea of an idealised space in which tentative 
conjectures might ideally be tested. 
4 The language of modality, and of hedges in particular, develops in a more-or-less 
consistent way over the years 4 to 11. Whilst some children develop the root 
sense of approximators, for most children such hedges are deployed in the 
institutional (school) setting to protect against accusation of error. 
5 These interactional dimensions of language are present across a wide age-range 
of pupils and students in discourse with their teachers. Teachers make skilled 
and frequent use of indirectness to sustain the involvement and self-esteem of 
their pupils. 
6 The linguistic framework introduced in Chapter 2 has considerable potential for 
pragmatic interpretation of transcripts of mathematics talk. Conversation analysis 
offers somewhat different analytical perspectives on such data, the potential of 
which is touched on but not fully explored in this thesis. 
What began as a study of the mathematical thinking of primary school children has 
become a way of looking at ways of learning and styles of teaching through the 
particular perspective of vague language. What stands out from this pragmatic analysis 
is that vagueness is not a deficiency, but an essential ingredient of communicative 
competence in mathematical interaction. In a conjecturing atmosphere, vague 
language is the means by which to say what you want to say, and as much as you 
wish to commit yourself to, in the context in which you speak. In that sense, everyone 
who teaches and learns mathematics in social situations could benefit from learning 
how to recognise such vagueness, and how to use it. 
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FINAL REMARKS 
I conclude with some reflections on the process of writing which I have been engaged 
in, and my awareness of my own development as researcher and teacher. 
ON WRITING 
The process of writing has created the conditions under which I could think most 
lucidly and most freely. A conventional perception is that one 'has' the idea before 
committing it to 'paper'. This has often been the case; the ideas 'come' as I travel alone 
in the car, or when I lie awake at night. But the very act of writing seems to channel the 
energy, to focus the concentration. Thus, a great deal of synthetic sense-making 
occurs whilst one is actually sitting to write. The word-processor allows the notion that 
these ideas are provisional, that the commitment (to RAM and disc) is not irrevocable. 
Indeed, that the products of one's sense-making are modifiable conjectures. 
Others have commented on their awareness of the interaction between thought and 
writing. Describing his earliest experiences as a researcher, Jean Piaget wrote: 
But for lack of a laboratory and guidance [... ] the only thing I could do was to 
theorize and write. I wrote even if it was only for myself, for I could not think 
without writing - but it had to be in a systematic fashion as if it were to be an 
article for publication. (1 952a, p. 241) 
The "as if it were" is a luxury that academics can rarely afford in the 1990s. 
Nevertheless, I found the incentive to publish parts of my research in advance of the 
assembly of the thesis entirely beneficial in a formative sense. As Dave Hewitt so 
succinctly puts it, 
I write in order to learn. (1988, p. 61) 
Reflecting in her doctoral thesis on 'the researcher as writer, Rita Nolder wrote: 
Writing went hand-in-hand with analysis - my own perception is that the 
physical act of writing (... ] actually stimulates the process of analysis. (1992, 
p. 136) 
It is clear that the act of 'writing up' a thesis, or 'writing down' ideas, is not purely a 
communicative act, for the benefit of some supposed audience. It may also be a 
creative act, for the enlightenment of the writer. It was also for me, a selective and 
cathartic one. 
The bulk of my writing-up took place between April and August 1995. It was intensive. 
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What I discovered, or re-discovered, during this quite pressured period of writing is the 
function of writing as a filter, a process of selection. There is a strange psychic 
phenomenon which seems to be a commonly-experienced result of intensive writing. 
This is heightened sensitivity to the issue under consideration. At times, it seemed that 
whatever I read in books and newspapers, things that I heard on the radio, things that 
people said - almost everything seemed to confirm, to illuminate, to link in with the 
matter that I was working on. On the whole, this is a good thing, but not necessarily so. 
It can be overwhelming, and confuse the task of selecting and editing. It is, I suppose, 
a kind of 'high', with the dual possibilities of fresh insight and poor judgement. Some- 
times I wrote all day, suspecting but not yet knowing that nothing that I was producing 
that day would survive the tests (or the maxims) of quality and relevance. to make it to 
the final document. But I could not make that decision until it had been written. 
This was particularly and painfully true of Chapter 2, which has little in common with 
the first draft. I became knowledgeable about philosophical aspects of vagueness 
which had no place in the thesis. At one point, sensing my dismay at the prospect of 
'wasted' effort, my external supervisor, Margaret Deuchar offered me one of the gems 
of advice I received about thesis-writing, when she reassured me: 
"It's good to know some things that aren't in your thesis". 
Writing performed for me another, therapeutic function. This thesis has been a long 
time coming. I don't like missing deadlines, especially those I suggest to myself, and 
this work is about 24 years overdue. At one time, it might have been an undertaking in 
Mathematical Logic. In 1980, I decided that it would be In Mathematics Education. In 
1990, I started. In the meantime, my head became filled to capacity with the debris of 
things that might have been part of a thesis - not this one, but a thesis from a different 
time. One of the functions of writing was to purge myself of the ideas left over from all 
the unwritten theses; to see those ideas written down, and then to let them go. 
Early in 1995, just before the intensive period of writing, I solicited any relevant advice 
that my friends and colleagues might care to offer me. Not much of it was memorable 
or particularly useful. Some words of a colleague, Chrissie Poulson, are an exception. 
"Your thesis doesn't have to be your last word on the subject. " 
This was a constant reassurance towards the end of the main writing period. The 
process of selection which I have described is also one of omission. Some of what is 
omitted is simply not good or not relevant; a great deal more is either not yet known or 
not yet ready to be written. 
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MARKED PERSONAL 
The cliche says that one of the main outcomes of research is change to the 
researcher. I recognise in myself some professional integration and personal 
rehabilitation achieved through the preparation of this thesis, and conclude with some 
thoughts about that. 
In 'writing up' this thesis, I ended up making more reference to my own work than I had 
intended. To some extent this self-reference furnishes a documentary trace of changes 
in myself. Some of these changes occurred over a long time, others are quite recent 
changes in my own interpretation of matters pertaining directly to this thesis. 
Underpinning and perhaps surmounting all else that I have learned in recent years is 
enhanced understanding of the way I teach, insight into how I might develop that way 
for myself - for my own satisfaction and enjoyment, as well as for the benefit of my 
students. 
I began, in the preface, by identifying a period of time when my pedagogic beliefs were 
in flux. The outcome (by no means achieved in vacuo) was personal commitment to a 
teaching style which I characterised in terms of problem posing and solving, interaction 
in student pairs or small groups, formation and public articulation of conjectures by 
students, and class discussion. This is fine for courses on problem solving or 
mathematical processes; but my major self-imposed challenge and effort as a lecturer 
for the last decade has been to deploy this style for the teaching of mainstream 
mathematics topics. I have not always found it easy to communicate or rationalise my 
conviction or my style to my students except by example; it is important that I should, 
since they, in turn, will become teachers. It has even been difficult, at times, to share 
my conviction with some of my colleagues; they are not a captive audience for my 
example, such as it is. 
Rene Thom has asserted that: 
whether one wishes it or not, all mathematical pedagogy, even if scarcely 
coherent, rests on a philosophy of mathematics. (1973, p. 204) 
have discovered a rationale for my pedagogic conviction in my study for this thesis; 
principally, but by no means exclusively, in the work of Polya and Lakatos. This assists 
me in naming and understanding what I try to do. This knowledge may assist in the 
articulation of the theoretical underpinning of the way I aspire to teach. It clarifies and 
gives analytical substance to the fallibilist approach to teaching which I had begun to 
develop empirically and intuitively. If research is to result in the gaining of wisdom as 
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well as the acquisition of knowledge, then that knowledge must be embedded in a 
philosophy. It is from such a bedrock of personal meaning that knowledge, and 
wisdom, perhaps, can be communicated and shared - in faith and lovingness. 
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FOOTNOTES 
CHAPTER 0 
0.1 Amazingly, amongst some 10 million words of scientific, epistemological and psychological 
prose (and, for good measure, a "philosophical novel" written at the age of 20), Piaget 
wrote very little autobiography, of which only 20 pages (Piaget, 1952a) are available in 
English. 
0.2 In fact, Ginsburg is comparing the dimensions of three related 'protocol' procedures: talking 
aloud (without interviewer intervention), verbal clinical interview and revised clinical 
interview. He argues that clinical methods are best suited to the requirements of cognitive 
research involving children, and my list focuses on the characteristics of verbal clinical 
methods. 
0.3 It is supremely ironic that the APU - the very unit which had the capability to monitor 
national 'standards' of pupil performance under the National Curriculum - was wound up by 
the British government in 1988. 
0.4 The term 'frame' is used differently in discourse analysis, to mean an assimilative cognitive 
structure, something like Piaget's 'schema'. See Brown and Yule (1983, pp. 238-41). 
0.5 This stronger framing was also pragmatically expedient, in that these particular interviews 
were conducted, not by me, but by an assistant. Even allowing for some training and a dry- 
run pilot study for this stage, the assistant lacked substantial experience in the art and 
technique of clinical interviewing, and could not be expected to make sound, 
instantaneous, judgements of a contingent nature. The fact that he frequently did was a 
bonus. 
0.6 I should point out that this is not a theological statement, quite the contrary. Whilst human 
beings are capable of 'insight', any ultimate meaning of things is bound to be a mystery to 
finite intelligences. In other words, I do subscribe to St. Paul's belief that "we see through a 
glass, darkly". (1 Corinthians 13: 12) 
0.7 I take it as read that detachment is necessary in the interpretation of phenomena in the 
Interest of scientific Integrity. My point (and Atkinson's) here Is that analytical detachment 
(i. e. In Isolating salient components of data) must be consciously exercised by the observer 
who is a'member of the tribe' which is the object of study. 
0.8 Saran's phrase "spiral-like research process" is a confirming echo of some methodological 
ideas that I presented three years ago (7th November 1992) at a Mathematics Education 
Research Day at the Open University. Having described what I saw as some significant 
features of my data, I wrote "If, then, there is to be validation of the conjectures so 
generated, It must be as a consequence of more detailed analysis of the same (generative) 
data. This begins to suggest a spiral programme of generative and validating activity - 
rather like the evaluation-action-evaluation spiral which characterises action research". 
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0.9 At first I dismissed this interest in my contribution to the transcribed conversations, 
believing that study of children is the key to the improvement of mathematics education. I 
haven't changed my mind about this. 
CHAPTER 1 
1.1 The first task is adapted from ATM (1967, p. 52), having also been adopted by the 
Assessment of Performance Unit (Foxman at al., 1982, pp. 102-111). It is an incridibly rich 
'starter' for investigation, and i keep returning to it for work with students. The second task 
is more mainstream; see Fletcher, 1969, pp. 275-81. 
1.2 Mathematicians are programmed to associate 'induction' with Proof by Mathematical 
Induction, but I am speaking of induction here as a scientist would, in relation to discovery 
or invention. As I noted in Chapter 0, Peirce uses the word 'abduction' with similar 
meaning. Despite my appreciation of Peirce's maverick genius. I shall not adopt his term. 
1.3 Whewell's personification of the characters Induction and Deduction (like the characters of 
Bunyan's Pilgrim's Progress) is delightful; it is as though they are two characters inhabiting 
the mind of the scientist. It is gratifying to note, moreover, that, Whewell, Master of Trinity 
College, does not conform to the stereotype and make Induction female (illogical, Intuitive, 
uncertain, apt to lead, to seduce her companion, capable of error) and Deduction male 
(logical, secure, the steadying influence on his partner). In Whewell's time, it was taken for 
granted - certainly in Cambridge - that only men "did" science anyway, so It Is all the more 
surprising that both characters are female ("She bounds to the top" ... "solidity of her 
companion's footing"). 
1.4 The formulation [0] is a standard way of presenting inductive inference, and clearly well- 
suited to questions such as: is every daffodil yellow? In which case F Is the set of daffodils 
and G the set of all yellow things. (A subset such as the set of yellow flowers also suffices). 
If I inspect, say, ten daffodils (or even, with Wordsworth, a host of them), and find that each 
is indeed yellow, then I am likely to reason inductively that every daffodil Is yellow. Whilst 
[Q] seems to embrace a great many mathematical questions and propositions, it Is not 
immediately clear that every mathematical question which might be answered by inductive 
methodology is necessarily of the form [0], which is posed In terms of class Inclusion. Nor 
is it clear that every conjecture which arises from inductive methodology is of the form [Q] 
(or, to be precise, a claim that every F Is Indeed a G). It seems particularly Important to see 
whether the conjectural products of paradigm Investigations such as Tasks 1 and 2 are 
accommodated by the Q-formula. A possible solution Is as follows. In the case of Task 
(investigation) 1, the product Is a mapping g: N -" N; in fact. g(n)"2^-1, but that is a detail. 
What is essential is the claim (conjecture): 
[C] for all ntN, the number of partitions of n is in fact g(n). 
Now, let F be a set of integers, each of which is the numbers of partitions of some positive 
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integer n. Formally, F={r(n): neN} where r(n) is the number of partitions of n. Further, let G 
be the image of N under the mapping g i. e. G=g(N) or {g(n): neN}. The inductive conjecture 
C includes the claim that every F is a G, but C is much more specific; given any member x 
of F, C not only asserts that x is to be found amongst the elements of G, it actually 
specifies which element of G is to be identified with x. This, of course, is what mappings 
do, and it does appear to be a particularly demanding form of inductive reasoning, both in 
conception and in confirmation. 
Task 2 (Reflections) can more easily (at one level) be cast in the mould of [0], taking F to 
be the set of all composites of ordered pairs of plane reflections (in intersecting lines) and 
G to be the set of all rotations. Specifying precisely which element of G is to be identified 
with any given element of F requires the definition of a function t: LxL --*E where L is the 
set of lines in the plane and E is the Euclidean group of plane isometries. 
1.5 The function f(x) is said to be a generating function of the sequence a(n) if, in the power 
series expansion of f(x), the coefficient of x^ is a(n). Euler'knew' the generating function for 
E(n)-O(n) only as an inductive conjecture, and makes much of this status in the memoir. 
He had inferred it himself inductively; it fell to others, later, to give a deductive 
demonstration, and to name it Euler's Theorem. A rare case, in Number Theory, of correct 
attribution! See, for example, Burn (1982, pp. 142-143). The Lemma concerning E(n), 
O(n), combined with some formal manipulation of generating functions, leads on to Euler's 
Identity (Niven and Zuckerman, 1980, p. 274): 
p(n) - p(n-1) + p(n-2) - p(n-5) - p(n-7) + p(n-1 2) + p(n-1 5) - p(n-22) - p(n-26) + p(n-35) + 
p(n-40) - ... taking, if necessary, p(O) to be 1. 
which now entirely resembles his "law" for a(n) 
CHAPTER 2 
2.1 The point is actually more subtle than Freudenthal suggests, in that the encyclopedia entry 
is not guilty of inappropriate precision, but of non-standard use of 'rounders' - see 
Chapter S. Freudenthal's intended point was nicely made in a gardening feature some 
years ago in the Cambridge Evening News, presumably 'updated' from an older source. 
Describing how to make some structure or other it advised: "Use a piece of wood about 
7.62 cm wide". More recently, a Boots home-brew kit has instructed me to "add 907 grams 
(2 lb) of white, granulated sugar". 
2.2 This view derives, of course, from the philosophy of Plato. Use of the name 'platonism' to 
describe a philosophy of mathematics is due to Paul Bernays (1935). 
2.3 Hedges which make things less fuzzy include, for example, 'true', as in 'You're a true 
friend'. Such hedges appear to make, no contribution to the study of vagueness: except 
that there are circumstances where one suspects that their use is to counter uncertainty. 
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2.4 Taken out of the context from which it arose, Lakoffs choice of the word 'fuzzy' In his 
definition of 'hedge' seems somewhat self-consciously colloquial In a careful and rigorous 
academic paper. The choice is, without doubt, a tribute to Zadeh who chose (somewhat 
self-consciously? ) to use 'fuzzy' in preference to the philosophically standard 'Vague'. 
Along the way Zadeh considered and rejected 'cloudy' (Kosko. 1994, p. 145). Evidently, in 
the definition of 'hedge', 'fuzzy' may be taken to be synonymous with 'vague'. 
2.5 An example which comes to mind, deeply embedded in the language of Number Theory, is 
'perfect square', meaning the square of an integer. Since In non-analytical Number Theory 
one is only dealing with Integers anyway, the hedge 'perfect' Is superfluous. It fact, its 
inclusion regularly confuses students, who ask me whether a perfect square must also be 
a perfect number (equal to the sum of its proper divisors); In which case there would be no 
'perfect' squares ... 
2.6 For let j denote Jack and let R, H be the sets of Rich and Handsome people respectively. 
Then, given that m(R, j) - 0.7 and m(H, j) - 0.4, it follows that m(R', J) -1 -m(R, j) - 0.3. 
Hence m(R'uH) - max{0.3,0.4} - 0.4. Now Rr, H' - (RLH)', and so m(Rr, H j-I -(R'uH) 
1-0.4 = 0.6. 
2.7 Briefly, the paradox asks the question: if single grains are removed one at a time from a 
heap of sand, at what point is it no longer a heap? An alternative formulation concerns a 
hairy man losing single hairs from his head; when is the man bald? The sorites paradox is 
important insofar as it appears to have identified, for western thought, a philosophical issue 
which potentially permeates all of life. A resurgence of interest in the sorites in modern 
times is evident (Russell, 1923; Goguen, 1969; Rolf, 1981; Sperber and Wilson, 1986b; 
Burns, 1991; Kosko, 1994; Williamson, 1994). 
2.8 The expression derives from Bar Hillel's caveat (1971, p. 405) 'Be careful with forcing bits 
and pieces you find in the pragmatic wastebasket Into your favorite syntactico-semantic 
theory. It would perhaps be preferable to first bring some order Into the contents of this 
wastebasket". 
CHAPTER 3 
3.1 The reference i: n. m indicates that, whilst the suggested utterance is intended to be 
plausible, it is invented (the mth such in Chapter n) for the purpose of exposition or 
clarification. The issue of the validity of such intuitive data is discussed later in this chapter. 
3.2 Anaphora and deixis are not necessarily mutually exclusive: Levinson (1983, p. 67) gives 
the example 
I was bom in London and have lived there ever since. 
In which 'there' is co-referential with 'London' (anaphora) but also locates (deixis) the 
utterance outside London. The deictic effect is achieved by the tacit choice of 'there' rather 
than 'here'. 
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3.3 I adopt a linguists' convention to use capital letters for Quality, etc. to mark the maxims. 
The esteem in which Grice's theory of implicature Is held is indicated, in my view, by a 
number of attempts to revise an 'improve' it by proposing more economical alternatives. In 
particular, Horn (1984) has just two principles: 'Q' comprises Quality with the'not too little' 
component of Quantity, and 'R' is 'not the too much' part of Quantity with Manner and 
Relevance. Sperber and Wilson (1986a) are more radical, proposing that a super-maxim of 
Relevance, along with a concept of 'mutual manifestness', subsumes them all. I judge that 
what Grice's original formulation lacks in economy is compensated for by its transparency, 
and prefer to adhere to it for my exposition here. 
CHAPTER 4 
4.1 The role of the pronoun 'it' was the sub-plot of a paper (Rowland, 1991) given at the first 
British Colloquium for Mathematics Education in Loughborough, and later the major theme 
of an article (Rowland, 1992a). This chapter is a revision and extension of that article. 
4.2 This and all subsequent references to extracts from transcripts is by (a) transcript code, 
e. g. S2 for the second interview with Susie (see the list of transcripts in Appendix 1) and, 
where appropriate (b) speaker 'turn' (e. g. 32), or a range of turns (e. g. 23-42). 
4.3 On the other hand, Wales (1980, p. 33) accounts for the prevalence of 'we' in scientific 
discourse in terms of the egocentric force of pronouns in English. Thus, the choice of We' 
in preference to 'I' is made in order to achieve rhetorical distancing of the speaker/writer 
from the content of what s/he says/writes, to achieve muted egocentricity. 
4.4 The value of counting particular words in transcripts is limited, but electronic text storage 
now makes such counts both possible and relatively quick. 
4.5 A more recent corpus, but not yet analysed in the way that I need, is that collected by 
Robin Fawcett and Michael Perkins in South Wales in the late 1970's, published in Fawcett 
and Perkins (1980). It consists of 65,000 words In 184 files, involving 92 children aged 
between 6 and 12, electronic versions of which have recently become available. Each child 
was recorded once in a play session and once In an interview. There could be 
considerable potential in a project which sifts the Fawcett and Perkins corpus for 
vocabulary and aspects of vague language, since it would provide a useful baseline for 
comparison. 
4.6 The 'popularity index' used by Edwards and Gibbon Is defined to be the product of the 
percentage of children In the sample using the word and the average use per child In the 
sample e. g. if precisely half of the children in the sample used a particular word, and each 
of them used it just once, the FI would be 25 (50 x 0.5). At age 7+ the highest popularity 
indices were found to be 3667 ('and'), 2968 ('the'), 2349 ('a'), 2330 ('i'), 1915 ('to'), 943 ('it'), 
913 ('is'), 889 ('my'), 842 ('go'). 
For future reference, note that you' has index 102 at 7+ and is ranked 53rd. Not 
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surprisingly there is a meteoric rise in the use of you' from 5+ (index 2.7) to 6+ (51) to 7+ 
(102); the ascent of you' in the rankings over the same period is less marked (122nd to 
56th to 53rd). Whilst Howes does not give a ranking for 'you', a cursory inspection of his 
(alphabetical) word frequency list suggests that it is in the first ten for adult spoken 
language. 
4.7 For comparison, I have consulted adult language data from the Lancaster-Oslo-Bergen 
(LOB) project (Hofland and Johansson, 1982) and Howes (1966). The LOB corpus is about 
1 million words of written language from 15 categories of British sources (fiction, 
newspapers etc), all published in 1961. Howes' corpus consists of 250,000 words spoken 
by american adults. The relative frequency and ranking in the LOB corpus of the thirty 
relevant words in the LOB corpus is shown in Table 4.2. Howes does not list rankings, but 
relative frequencies are shown in the table together with rankings of the thirty words 
among themselves. 
As I have remarked, the LOB and Howes data are from adult sources and must be used 
with caution in the present context. In fact (Table 4.2) they support the general conclusion 
that one would not expect 'it' to occur nearly as frequently as'the', 'and' and'to' (ranked 1, 
2 and 4 in both sources). Howes also indicates that 'I' Is generally much more prevalent 
than 'it' in (adult) spoken language, although not surprisingly the reverse is the case in 
adult writing (LOB). 
4.8 Susie's use the deictic'it'to refer to things she cannot name has a parallel in concern for 
proprriety in adult social practice, giving rise to deictic reference to semi-taboo topics, c. f. 
the car sticker "Windsurfers do it standing up", and numerous variants. The double 
entendre is achieved by the exploitation of vagueness. 
4.9 Susie's use of'real'to mean *whole' is quite a discussion starter. It Is certainly reminiscent 
of Kronecker's famous remark ("Gog made integers, all else is the work of man"). and calls 
to mind her comments about "the mathematics" being invented. 
4.10 Quoted from the second iteration (DES, 1991) of the Mathematics National Curriculum for 
England and Wales. The third, post-Dearing version (DFE, 1995) has in its Level 5 
description for Number and Algebra (p. 33): "They check their solutions by applying 
Inverse operations or estimating .. ". 
4.11 Vestiges of the singular 'thou' survive in speech In northern England, and non-standard 
English Includes plural forms of 'you' in various dialects e. g. y'all' (USA) and 'you'se' 
(Ireland). 
CHAPTER 5 
5.1 Pimm (1987, p. 52) observes that "transcripts of actual classes regularly indicate little 
verbal interaction between pupils themselves (particularly about mathematics)". I had in 
mind that this frequently Is the case; this is not to accept that it has to be the case, but to 
260 
recognise that it was not my aim (in this research) to attempt to change classroom culture. 
5.2 I intend the word 'gambit', as I use it in this chapter, to mean little more than an opening 
move. Each of these interviews cannot, however, be viewed as a contest, In the way that 
chess is. On the other hand, I am deliberately setting out to manoeuvre the children into 
situations where they make predictions and generalisations. Insofar as they may be 
reluctant to do so, it could be seen as a sort of contest. There is imbalance of strength on 
both 'sides' - only I know the purpose of the game, but I am at their mercy in that they have 
the power to give or withhold the cognitive and linguistic behaviours I am setting out to 
provoke. Pimm (1987) associates the word 'gambit', in teacher questioning, with the 
possibility of sacrifice. In my case, this Is appropriate to the extent that, in allowing the 
children some measure of control (over interpretation of the offered task), I may lose 
control of the direction of the Interview in terms of engagement with certain mathematical 
processes. 
5.3 Let n be a positive integer and f(n) be the number of pairs (a, b) such that a+b=n, where a, 
b belong to a set A of 'numbers'. If (b, a) is taken to be distinct from (a, b) (unless a-b) and 
A is the set N- {1,2,3, ... } of natural numbers, then f(n)=n-1: if A also includes zero then 
f(n)=n+1. If, however, (a, b) is always identified with (b, a), and A=N, then f(n)=Yin when n is 
even, and' (n-1) when n is odd. With zero included in A these become 1/2n+1 and '/2(n+1) 
respectively. Of course, if A includes the set of integers, then f(n) is not finite. 
5.4 The use of a linguistic formula such as'like, if you do'to refer to a general relation or a 
general process - in this instance additive commutativity, or symbolic reversal - by means 
of an Instance of that relation/process, is commonplace. It Is an instance of the power of 
the generic example (Mason and Pimm, 1984; Balacheff, 1988; see Chapter 1) to evoke 
well-founded confidence in a related generality. See also the discussion of 'you' in 
Chapter 4. 
5.5 These three points are the outcome of personal reflection, but the first two turn out to be 
remarkably similar to paraphrases (Wierzbicka, 1976, p. 330) of 'well' as W hesitation 
noise'. Such behaviour need not be associated with uncertainty, and it is perhaps tempting 
to dismiss some hedging behaviour as nothing more than prevarication. On the other hand 
such a judgement may be precipitate, given the extensive analysis by linguists of the 
pragmatic function of members of the class of semantically-vacuous 'discourse markers' 
such as 'well', 'oh' and 'you know' (Brockway, 1981; Schiffrin, 1987). 
5.6 Harry had recently transferred to the state-maintained school from a famous independent 
preparatory school. Transfer documents from the prep. school gave little indication of 
Harry's actual attainment, but did observe that "Harry is the only boy in his form who has 
not obtained his own copy of the Odyssey". This remark could be interpreted as a 
revelation of Harry's independence of thought and action, and of his willingness to take 
risks. In any case, such comments assist those who inhabit different cultures (including the 
majority of English people) to understand what really matters in the great English 'public' 
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(meaning 'private') schools. Harry's apparent negligence with regard to the classics, unlike 
other manifestations of his independent spirit (or indolence), proved not to disadvantage 
him at his new school. 
5.7 But not invariably. Here (noted December 1994) Mark is asking his mother, Judy, about a 
Christmas present for his grandfather: 
Mark: How much do you think a Ruth Rendell book will be? 
Judy: About four ninety-nine. 
5.8 Children seem to latch onto their preferred hedges. Whilst 'basically' is rare in my data, 
see, for example, Maher et al. (1994, pp. 213-4), where the use of 'basically' by the boy 
Alan is striking, and very much consistent with the analysis I give for Simon. 
5.9 A strict truth-conditional interpretation of the sentence 1: 5.16 would be to say that it makes 
a statement which Is true provided the number of beans In the jar Is at least ten. A 
standard pragmatic view, however (Levinson, 1983, p. 106) is that a person uttering 1: 5.16 
impiicates'ten and no more' because the hearer expects adherence to the maxim of 
Quantity. In everyday discourse, the pragmatic interpretation is assumed; Indeed I suggest 
that the truth-conditional interpretation would be considered rude or ostentatiously 'clever. 
There is an analogy with the truth-conditional Interpretation of the question "Would you like 
tea or coffee? " which admits the answer "Yes". 
5.10 My choice of the name 'zone of conjectural neutrality' for this space between articulation 
and belief was (somewhat tongue-in-cheek) inspired by Vygotsky's term 'zone of proximal 
development' for the gap between what a learner can do alone and what s/he can achieve 
with 'expert' assistance. The two zones are quite different, of course. I note with interest, 
however, that Hewitt (1994, p. 64) gives the name'neutral zone' to a region which contains 
the collection of sensory stimuli ("offerings") from which a student selects a subset for her/ 
his attention. 
CHAPTER 6 
6.1 van den Brink (1984) argues that the linguistic component, which he calls 'acoustic 
counting', develops and functions in young children quite independently of any reference to 
objects. He shows, moreover, that acoustic counting is free of some of the constraints of 
conventional 'quantity counting'. 
6.2 I am grateful to Heather Cooke for articulating this suggestion, at a research seminar on 
vague quantitative language, given by Joanna Channell at the Faculty of Mathematics, 
Open University, Milton Keynes, on 14th June 1993. 
6.3 The use of actual Smarties was vetoed by the interviewer, on the grounds that Smarties 
are a product of Rowntrees, which is a division of Nestle, which in turn is the subject of a 
boycott intended to reverse the company's promotion of baby milk products in the Third 
World. 
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6.4 In the pilot study these and other forms of the questions were trialled. Notably the form 
"How many sweets do you think ...? " was trialled, despite unease that it might prompt a 
bias towards "I think ... " responses. In the event, there was no evidence from the trial to 
suggest that it did have that effect. Nevertheless we made the decision to reject "... do you 
think... " formulations; not to have done so would have invited accusation of a biased 
design, whether or not this would be justified. We also considered simply asking "How 
many sweets are there ..? ", but rejected it without trial on the grounds that it came over as 
too direct, somewhat aggressive and "testing". Only later did we rationalise the guidance of 
our intuition in preference of presenting the question as an 'indirect speech act' - see 
Chapter 7 (Politeness, and Casel: Hazel). 
6.5 The social and economic structure of Britain has significantly changed since the publication 
of Berger and Luckmann's account. There are certainly home environments to be found in 
Britain in the 1990s which do not offer the same secure and cosy base for primary 
socialisation as the stereotype described by Berger and Luckmann. Furthermore, the 
processes of secondary socialisation may begin before formal schooling in other 
environments such as a child minder's home or a playgroup. I also observe here that the 
role-distance which distinguishes secondary from primary socialisation, may be applied by 
the adolescent individual back to the home situation, requiring a re-definition or re- 
negotiation of their place within the home. 
6.6 Reference to teachers as'functionaries' is quite shocking. In many countries they are 
literally that in the sense that they are civil servants. Perhaps the epithet is now largely 
apposite and deserved in England and Wales, since the State has assumed such tight 
regulation of the government of schools and even of the curriculum. Teachers (like 
milkmen) have been cast in the role of delivers of a product. The protests of the teaching 
profession have been (with some notable exceptions) barely audible; silent compliance is 
what one would expect of functionaries with no personal stake in the process which they 
are employed to assist. 
6.7 Walkerdine (1988, pp. 89-92) points out that the form of the pedagogic discourse between 
mothers and their children, and that between teachers and their pupils, is remarkably 
similar, and that both frequently use pseudo-questions. She argues, however (and I am 
obliged to curtail some profound exposition) that teachers are principally observers, 
operating within a testing regime, whereas mothers are participants In the activities which 
are the discourse contexts. 
6.8 Again, a study of the Fawcett corpus (Fawcett and Perkins, 1980) might produce a more 
definitive account of age-related differences in the use of the Markers under consideration. 
CHAPTER 7 
7.1 Advanced Supplementary (AS) courses have about half the content of an Advanced level 
course, with the same academic rigour. The majority of students following the course at 
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Rachel's college are very able, and studying three full A-level courses in addition to the 
AS, but a few may choose AS mathematics because they doubt their ability to do well in a 
full A-level mathematics course. 
7.2 Within his novella Poor Koko (Jonathan Cape, 1974). John Fowles considers a burglar's 
frequent use of 'right' as a statement-tag (as in the exchange "I have very little with me" - 
"Then you won't miss it, right? "). Fowles comments: 
"It ['right'] may grammatically be more often an ellipsis for 'Is that right? ' than for 'Am I 
right? ' - but I am convinced that the psychological significance is always of the latter kind. It 
means in effect, I am not at all sure that I am right ... the thing it cannot mean is self- 
certainty". 
7.3 This is an example of stylistic transformation of the basic grammatical structures of 
sentences, in this case called 'fronting a subordinate clause object' (Leech, Deuchar and 
Hoogenrad, 1982, p. 128). 
7.4 Jonathan's proof proceeds as follows. There are p2 ordered pairs of elements mod p; the 
cases p=4k+1 and p=4k+3 are then dealt with separately. In the first case there are (by 
Jonathan's first theorem) [NT4: 156] (p-1)2 pairs with x2+y2 not equal to zero. Moreover, the 
number of solutions of x2+y2=n is the same for each n [NT4: 157, proved in Episode 4], and 
n takes p-1 distinct non-zero values. Hence the number of solutions for each non-zero n 
must be p-1. 
The case when p=4k+3 similarly concludes with dividing p2-1 by p-1 to show that there are 
p+i solutions for each n. 
CHAPTER 8 
8.1 The Chomskyan notions of linguistic competence and performance - the first associated 
with knowledge of a system of rules, the second with the production of actual utterances - 
are loosely related to the Saussurian terms langue and parole. The distinction is 
complicated by the subsequent introduction of the term 'communicative competence' 
(Bernstein, 1971 b, p. 146), which has a contextual dimension, and subsumes social 
aspects of language behaviour and awareness of communicative constraints. Further, a 
notion of 'pragmatic competence' has also been pro posed. 'Communicative competence' 
seems to presuppose some awareness in the speaker, albeit tacit, of how to use language 
for a given purpose in a given context, and that is what I intend the term to mean when I 
use it. 
8.2 Sfard's process-object formulation also nicely embraces the notion of'it' as a conceptual 
deictic, when she writes: 
Seeing a mathematical entity as an object means being capable of referring to it as if it 
was a real thing (Sfard, 1991, p. 4, emphasis added). 
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SUSIE 
Code Interviewer Child Age Date (YearMonthDay) 
Si Tim Susie 9 910422 
S2 Tim Susie 9 910429 
S3 Tim Susie 9 910513 
S4 Tim Susie 9 910520 
S5 Tim Susie 10 920115 
SIMON 
Si0 Tim Simon 11 9009 
Sit Tim Simon 12 911226 
Si2 Tim Simon 12 911229 
Si3 Tim Simon 12 911231 
BEADS 
1311 Tim Inciya/Sarah 11/11 920303 
MAKE TEN 
T1 Tim Roksana/Anna 11/10 920612 
T2 Tim Lucy/Rachel 10/10 920617 
T3 Tim Alex/Caroline 10/11 920708 
T4 Tim Harry/Alan 10/11 920708 
T5 Tim Jubair/Shofiqur 11/10 920708 
T6 Tim Ishka/Frances 10/10 920716 
T7 Tim Anthony/Sam 11/11 920716 
T8 Tim Runa/Kerry 11/11 920716 
T9 Tim Rebecca/Runi 10/11 930316 
T10 Tim Susan/Shahnaz 11/11 939316 
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WHOLE SCHOOL AGE-RELATED STUDY OF'MARKERS' 
M1-45 Mark Various 4: 7 to 5: 9 9406/07 
M46-114 Mark Various 5: 10 to 7: 9 9406/07 
Ml 15-180 Mark Various 7: 10 to 9: 9 9406/07 
M181-230 Mark Various 9: 10 to 11: 9 9406/07 
DONATED BY MEMBERS OF THE INFORMAL RESEARCH GROUP 
IRG1A Sue Rebecca 4: 8 9503 
IRG1 B Sue Jane 4: 8 9503 
IRG1 C Sue Anna 4: 3 9503 
IRG1A Sue Jason 4: 11 9503 
IRG2 Ann Charlie 10 9503 
IRG3 Hazel Faye/Donna 10/10 950317 
IRG4 Kevin Andrew/Matthew 10-11 9503 
IRG5 Judith Allan 13-14 9505 
IRG6A Rachel Juliette/Di 18/18 950308 
IRG6B Rachel Clare/John 18/18 950308 
UNDERGRADUATE NUMBER THEORY PROJECT SUPERVISIONS 
NT1 Tim Lorna 21 950306 
NT2 Tim Caroline 21 950307 
NT3 Tim Nicola 21 950307 
NT4 Tim Jonathan 24 950313 
NT5 Tim Lorna 21 950313 
NT6 Tim Claire 21 950313 
NT7 Tim Katy 21 950314 
NT8 Tim Nicola 21 950314 
NT9 Tim Claire 21 950317 
NT10 Tim Caroline 21 950320 
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DIVIDING BY 3/a: SIMON AND SUSIE 
Oh dear white children casual as birds, 
Playing among the ruined languages, 
So small beside their large confusing words. 
[W. H. Auden, Hymn to St. Cecilia] 
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He who seeks for methods without having a definite problem in mind seeks for 
the most part in vain. 1st November 1995 
(David Hilbert, Bulletin of the American Mathematical Society 8, p. 444) 
I prepared the essay in this appendix in the course of thesis-writing; it seemed to spill 
off the pen as I concluded Chapter 4. I place it here because it addresses, not my 
eventual research question, but my original one: to access and describe children's 
cognitive frameworks and private mathematical constructions. 
Everyone - almost everyone - agrees that our goal is the study of the 
mathematical mind in action. (Ginsburg, 1981, p. 4) 
Onslow (1991), writing about "real world" representations of abstract mathematical 
symbolism, analyses students' approaches to the problem 10 = 1/2 presented in and out 
of context. He comments that this is 
A question which often provides some indications as to how a person has 
learned mathematics. (p. 33) 
My interest was in how pupils bring and apply the framework of knowledge that they 
possess, in the solution of non-routine problems. The problem in this case can be 
represented as 100 + 3/4. I judged that the two children, Simon and Susie, would find a 
presentation such as "How many lots of three-quarters are there in a hundred" 
perfectly comprehensible but fairly demanding. I avoided any context (such as how 
many 75p bottles of coke you can buy for £100) partly because the context can be 
patronising, transparently spurious; but mainly because any context imposes part of 
the imagery that the student draws on to represent and solve the problem. 
SIMON 
The following vignette from 1990 predates my systematic collection of mathematical 
conversations. Simon, my son, was 11 1h at the time. 
SO: 1 Tim: How many three-quarters are there In a hundred? 
2 Simon: Well, there are seven three-quarters in ten, remainder a quarter. 
3 Tim: How many? 
4 Simon: No ... there are thirteen, remainder a quarter. Is that right? 
5 Tim: How did you get it? 
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6 Simon: Thirteen threes are thirty-nine, so there's a quarter left. [Pause] Thirteen 
times ten is a hundred and thirty. A quarter times ten is two and a half. 
Two and a halfs into three quarters goes three times remainder a quarter. 
So it's a hundred and thirty-three remainder a quarter. 
7 Tim: [genuinely unsure] Are you sure that's right? 
[Simon finds a calculator and keys in 100=0.75. Gets 133.3333333 on the 
display. ] 
8 Simon: That means a hundred and thirty-three and a third. 
9 Tim: Why a third when you said remainder a quarter? 
10 Simon: Dunno. [goes away] 
11 Tim: [3 minutes later) A hundred and thirty-three and a third lots of what? 
12 Simon: Oh, the third is a third of three-quarters, so its a quarter. [looks quite 
pleased]. 
The problem is presented in terms of 'quotition' (that is, separation into an unknown 
number of parts, each of a given size; this is contrasted with 'partition', meaning 
separation into a given number of equal parts, of unknown size). Simon's approach is 
strategic, local, and uses his place-value knowledge, implementing the identity 
ab-x=a(b-x). He decides that it will be easiest first to find how many three-quarters 
there are in 10. After an initial error is corrected in response to my prompt [S0: 3], he 
arrives at 13, "remainder a quarter". He doesn't actually tell me how he 'got' it [5]; 
instead, he demonstrates [SO: 6, to the pause] by multiplication that his answer is 
correct, recognising that'how many 3/4 are there in' and 'multiplying by 3/' are inverse 
functions. A plausible guess at how he (eventually) arrived at 13 is that he represented 
10 as 40 quarters, then partitions 40 into 3 equal parts. 
The calculator enables him to demonstrate that he knows the decimal equivalent of 3/a, 
and that'how many 3/4 are there in' is formally modelled by division by 3/4. His mental 
calculation [6] of 13 remainder 1/4 (in effect modulo 3/4) multiplied byl 0 is fluent - it 
leaves me standing, in fact [7]. With my prompt [11] he reconciles (makes sense of ) 
the calculator display with his mental calculation. His cognitive style is structural, 
algebraic; the structure holds the problem together whilst he deals with the component 
parts of it, finally synthesising a solution. 
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SUSIE 
At my fifth and last transcribed interview [Appendix S5] with Susie, I posed the same 
problem. She was just 10 at that time. I judged that Susie, like Simon, would find the 
problem non-trivial but accessible. 
I referred to my last transcribed interview with Susie: in fact I had interviewed her just 
before the Christmas holiday, and come away very excited about her way of dividing 
by fractions. Unfortunately the tape recorder had failed. I audio-taped a memo 
recording, as faithfully as I could, the course of events in the interview. I returned a 
month later, levelled with Susie about what had happened, and explained that I would 
ask her some of the same questions again, but that she should not go out of her way 
to repeat what she had said previously. I was aware, however, of her excellent recall of 
our conversations from week to week and that she would be likely to draw on what she 
remembered. It really didn't matter either way. As before, I began the interview with 
questions intended to probe her perception of fractions. 
S5: 1 Tim: Right, I want you, to start with Susie, to explain to me what you mean by 
three-quarters. 
2 Susie: Well, if you have one thing, whole thing, and you cut it in half, and then the 
two bits in half again, and take away three of them, and take away one of 
them, the three left are three-quarters. 
3 Tim: What about five-sevenths? 
4 Susie: Well once again, if you cut a cake like that, [draws] cut it into seven equal 
pieces, it has to be equal ... 
5 Tim: has to be equal pieces ... 
[Here Susie comments on the fact that this is more difficult to draw] 
10 Susie: It has to be equal, so if you take away two of those pieces you've got five 
left. 
I shall return to the significance of this in a moment. Following the preamble, I quickly 
got to the point: 
S5: 11 Tim: Right. Right. Now the next thing I want you to think about is, how many lots 
of three-quarters are there in a hundred? 
12 Susie: How many lots of three-quarters are there in a hundred. 
13 Tim: Yes. 
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14 
15 
16 
Susie: Well ... oh I begin to remember what it was I did. 
Tim: OK. 
Susie: Em, I think what I did, it, wasn't it ... a take away or add sum ... how many 
lots of three-quarters ... Yes, I remember, I remember. I think what I did is 
have one hundred, add ... what was it? ... oohhh ... It's impossible to third it 
-a hundred, you need a third of a hundred. So that must be [writes] three 
... thirty-three point three recurring 
[writes 33.3r, changes r to R] I'll put a 
capital R for that because that [r] means remainder. Ah, so if you add 
those two together, together, it should be one hundred and thirty-three 
point three recurring. 
In [14] Susie presumably refers to the fact that I had asked her the same question a 
month ago. Susie's account [16] agreed with my recollection of the method she had 
used a month earlier. To find how many 3/4 there are in 100, she adds to 100 a third of 
100. My attempt to find out why she believes (with good cause) that it works does not 
meet with success. 
17 Tim: Right, so it's a hundred and thirty-three point three recurring. Now what I 
actually asked you, right, was how many lots of three quarters in a 
hundred. And what you've done is to take a hundred, and then a third of a 
hundred, and add it on. Now, can you explain to me how that tells you how 
many three-quarters there are in a hundred? 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
Susie: Well, it doesn't tell me. I actually have worked that out quite a long time 
ago; worked that out, I did. It hasn't ... I did actually do some maths and 
worked it out that way [inaudible]. I did try doing it that way, and then tried 
doing it another way. It worked, but the other way I had was too difficult, so 
I just stuck to this way. 
Tim: When did you work out this other way? 
Susie: I can't remember ... well ... 
Tim: You can't remember. 
Susie: No. 
In fact I had had no more success before Christmas. As an example of probing, 
contingent questioning for the purpose of cognitive research, it is no paradigm. I am 
still unclear about much of what she is saying in [18]. What exactly did she work out 
"quite a long time ago"?. Is she referring to our conversation last month? What was 
this other way? Invert and multiply? It seems that she had not been taught that method 
at school. In any case, it had been clear in December that Susie was devising and 
294 
adapting her current method as we spoke, and (having found how many 3/a in 100) it 
had been her spontaneous but provisional suggestion that she could try something 
similar with four-fifths. This time, when I gave the lead, she was less tentative. 
23 Tim: OK. What about, how many four-fifths in a hundred? 
24 Susie: Four-fifths. It's correct, isn't it? [refers to 1 33.3R written) 
25 Tim: Oh yes, that's correct. 
26 Susie: Em, that was three ... what was that again? 
That was three-quarters. 
27 Tim: That was three-quarters in a hundred, now were talking about four-fifths. 
28 Susie: That must be a fourth, this must be a fourth of it ... mmm ... a fourth of a 
hundred [pause] 
29 Tim: A fourth of a hundred. OK, so what have you got? 
30 Susie: One hundred and twenty-five. 
31 Tim: OK. Describe what you do again. Just describe. 
32 Susie: I just had the hundred, and then I had one fourth of hundred, and added 
them together. 
Before long Susie has explained that the method won't work with seven-ninths 
because "it has to be one different" [S5: 361. Her division of 100 by 6 (for six-sevenths) 
is a virtuoso performance [Appendix S5: 44-63]. In effect, she writes that half of 
33.333... is 15+1.5+. 15+. 015+ ... (half of each 3); adding the units, tenths, hundredths 
and so on she gives 16.6666... "And it will continue happening. Six and carry five, six 
and carry five ... ". So there it is: recurring decimals are convergent infinite series. 
Next, I challenge her to expand the schema. No problem: 
S5: 62 Tim: OK. Now, you said that it wouldn't work for seven-ninths didn't you, this 
method. Right? Now, I'd just like you to write down five-sevenths, just here. 
63 Susie: I'm going to have to think though, very well. Um, I'll try ... [pause]. Ahh, of 
course ... [interrupted] 
64 Tim: You have a think while I push the door up. 
65 Susie: ... you can't ... I don't understand. It's definitely a hundred. So that means 
two ... Ahh, ahhh [big momenll you've got two left, and you need five each 
time. So if you have two hundred ... um ... divided by five. How many times 
does five go into two hundred? Well, it goes into one hundred twenty 
times ... 
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66 Tim: Mm-hm 
67 Susie: Must go into forty times. So that's ... a hundred and forty. [... ] 
69 Susie: That's a two difference. 
She articulates and extends the generalised process (by now consistently deploying 
'you' as vague generaliser): 
89 Susie: The next one, when you have two difference, you have to do two hundred 
divided by that, the number, and add a hundred to the equals. 
90 Tim: Right, add a hundred to the equals. 
91 Susie: And with three you have to do three hundred divided by whatever is the 
top number. 
How does Susie conjure up these algorithms, progressively adapted for increasingly 
general application? I did have a hypothesis in the interview, but failed to elicit a direct, 
confirming account from Susie by contingent questioning. I believe, however, that there 
is indirect evidence, consistent with my hypothesis, as follows. I surmise that Susie 
takes a global view of the division problem, in which she first imagines one three- 
quarter part of each of the 100 'things'. I don't know what her things are. My 
corresponding image would be a long thin rectangular strip, standing on a 'base' 100 
units long, with 3/4 of the height blocked out, or shaded. 
Thus, 100 "lots of" 3/4 accounts for 3/4 of the whole. The remaining 1/4 is one third of the 
shaded part. Addition of one third of the part already accounted for will complete the 
whole. The essence of the imagery is the perception of the fraction (3/4) in relation to 
the complement (1/4) which is one-third its size. 
Pirie, Martin and Kieran (1994) asked three categories of students (school and 
university) a set of six (written) questions about fractions, including: How would you 
explain 3/4? Pirie and her collaborators describe four "major images" which emerged 
from the questionnaires: 
1. Division: a quantity divided by a quantity. 
2. Part of a whole. 
3. A number of some sort. 
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4. A way of writing: a number over another number. 
I suggest that Susie's image conforms to none of these stereotypes, being crucially a 
part-complement image. I believe that this perception was conveyed and reinforced by 
Susie in three recorded utterances: 
(i) in the 'rulers' episode described earlier. Describing a tenth: 
If you have ten, and you take away nine ones, you have just the one left ... 
it's because you take away a ninth ... no, nine-tenths. So there's one-tenth 
left. 
For Susie, a tenth is the remnant when nine-tenths is taken from the whole. 
(ii) during the interview S5 itself, when at the beginning she described three quarters in 
the clearest part-complement terms. 
S5: 2 Susie: Well, if you have one thing, whole thing, and you cut it [in four] and take 
away one of them, the three left are three-quarters. 
(iii) again in S5 she is consistent in conveying this part-complement representation in 
drawings and in her choice of words. 
S5: 3 Tim: What about five-sevenths? 
10 Susie: It has to be equal, so if you take away two of those pieces you've got five 
left. 
Each fraction is constructed by removing its complement from the whole. Evidence 
presented by Maher et aL (1994 can be interpreted to suggest that other pupils make a 
similar construction of fractions. Fourth grade children were asked to place some 
fractions on a number line. One child, Alan, wrote one-third at both the one-third and 
the two-thirds positions on the [0,1 ] interval. 
To conclude interview S5, I challenged Susie to adapt her method to divide by 
improper fractions, such as five-thirds. It was just an idea, speculative. She rose to the 
challenge heroically [Appendix S5: 158-190], this time subtracting a fifth of 200 from 
100. Presumably she perceives five thirds as having a complement of negative-two 
thirds within the whole, and hence the need to trim away the excess two-fifths (from 
100 lots of five thirds). She kindly enquires of me 
187 Susie: ... Do you understand that? 
To be honest, my answer, "Yes thank you" was a terse response to being patronised! 
Yet her apparent sense of superiority was not out of place. My understanding was 
operational, instrumental, whereas I knew that hers was relational. 
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SUMMARY. 
Both Simon and Susie achieve novel and effective solutions to the quotition problem 
with fractional parts. Their cognitive styles and approaches are radically different, 
however 
Simon's solution exploits his secure sense and command of the structure of the 
elements of the problem and he confidently navigates his way through it. At any time 
he needs only to attend to a 'local' problem; the algebra will keep the rest'on hold' and 
ensure successful synthesis of the solution. 
Susie brings unusual but powerful fraction imagery to create a global, gestalt overview 
of the problem and a highly idiosyncratic solution. She quickly perceives the possibility 
of reconstructive generalisation (Harel and Tall, 1991) and she is able to adapt her 
method to a solve a comprehensive class of related problems. 
Whilst the data from these particular interviews are rich in the cognitive contrasts they 
offer, such cognitive insights and conjectures were commonplace during my 
mathematical conversations with children and students. 
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APPENDIX 3 
SELECTED INTERVIEW 
TRANSCRIPTS 
Sit Simon 
S5 Susie 
T6 Ishka and Frances 
IRG5 Allan 
26th December 1991 
15th January 1992 
16th July 1992 
May 1995 
NT4 Jonathan 13th March 1995 
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BLANK IN 
ORIGINAL 
TRANSCRIPT Sit: SIMON 26th December 1991 
Simon, my son, was aged 12 years 9 months. 
1 Tim: I'd like you to give me two numbers that add up to ten. 
2 Simon: Four and six 
3 Tim: Two other numbers? 
4 Simon: Five and five 
5 Tim: Any others? 
6 Simon: Three and seven, two and eight, one and nine. That's it. Well, there's 
nought point five and nine point five, and eight point five and one point five. 
7 Tim: Right, you've gone from whole numbers to decimals. 
8 Simon: Yes. 
9 Tim: OK. What other sorts of decimal answers could there be? 
10 Simon: Em, what harder, like more decimal places? 
11 Tim: Whatever you think? 
12 Simon: Em, nought point two five and nine point seven five. 
13 Tim: Right. 
14 Simon: And five point five and four point five, like that. 
15 Tim: What if I gave you one of the numbers, one point three recurring, what 
would the other number be? 
16 Simon: Em, eight point six recurring. 
17 Tim: Why? 
18 Simon: Because one point three recurring is basically a third ... 
19 Tim: You mean the point three ... 
20 Simon: ... point three recurring is basically a third, so you need ... well, the one, 
that's one, so to make it up to nine you add on eight, then you need 
another two thirds, which Is point six recurring. 
21 Tim: If you have, um, point three and point six recurring, and you add them up, 
what do you get? 
22 Simon: Point nine recurring. Mmm - nearly one. 
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23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
43 
Tim: 
Simon: 
Tim: 
Simon: 
Tim: 
Simon: 
Tim: 
Simon: 
Tim: 
Simon: 
Tim: 
Simon: 
Tim: 
Simon: 
Tim: 
Simon: 
Tim: 
Simon: 
Tim: 
Simon: 
Tim: 
44 Simon: 
45 Tim: 
46 Simon: 
47 Tim: 
Nearly one. 
Yes. 
Why nearly one? 
Because it's not, because point three isn't, it's just nearly a third. It doesn't 
quite get to the third. 
When it's point three recurring. 
Yeh. 
Oh, so point three recurring isn't really a third at all? 
Well. it's very nearly a third. 
Very nearly a third. 
Yeh. 
What about point six recurring? 
Very nearly two thirds. 
So really, when you add them up, you don't get ten. 
You just get nearly ten. 
How nearly? 
Um, point six and point three added together, that close. 
(laughs) But you don't get exactly ... 
... exactly one. 
OK, you've given me so far decimal numbers that add up to ten, and whole 
numbers that add up to ten. Are there any other sorts of answers that you 
could give me? 
Minus numbers. 
Can you give me an example of that? Remember that you've got two 
numbers that add up to ten. 
Add up to ten. Minus five and minus eight. No, they don't. No. Minus five 
and minus eight? 
Minus five and minus eight add up to ten? 
Yes. 
Can you explain that to me? 
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48 Simon: No they don't. Don't ... 
49 Tim: Why not? 
50 Simon: Dunno. I did them two weeks ago, but I've forgotten. 
51 Tim: Well, if you have minus ... 
52 Simon: Minus two and minus eight is minus ten. 
53 Tim: OK, but suppose you want them to add up to ten. 
54 Simon: Dunno. 
55 Tim: Would it help to write it down? 
56 Simon: Think so. No, I've forgotten. 
57 Tim: Write down the whole numbers you know .... 
58 Simon: Ah, ah, two add minus twe.... add twelve. 
59 Tim: Minus two add twelve. 
60 Simon: Yes. 
61 Tim: OK, why did you suddenly think of that? 
62 Simon: Um, because adding is going up towards north and then onwards. So 
minus two is two away from nought, and then ten up to ten. 
63 Tim: OK, so what if you had minus five as one of your numbers? 
64 Simon: Fifteen. Fifteen add minus five. 
65 Tim: OK. So you've got decimal numbers, some negative and positive numbers, 
whole numbers, positive numbers. Anything else? 
66 Simon: Fractions? 
67 Tim: Fractions. Can you give me an example? 
68 Simon: Um, seven and one fifth and two and four fifths. 
69 Tim: Right [pause]. Suppose you just take the whole number ones. Can you ... 
you gave me for example four and six, and then five and five, at the 
beginning, and now we're only taking positive numbers. How many 
different solutions are there? 
70 Simon: Five ... no, six. 
71 Tim: Six. OK. Are you counting two and eight and eight and two as being the 
same or as different? 
303 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
Simon: 
Tim: 
Simon: 
Tim: 
Simon: 
Tim: 
78 Simon: 
79 Tim: 
80 Simon: 
81 Tim: 
82 
83 
84 
Simon: 
Tim: 
Simon: 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
Tim: 
Simon: 
Tim: 
Simon: 
Tim: 
Simon: 
Tim: 
Simon: 
Tim: 
94 Simon: 
The same. 
The same. OK. 
Otherwise there's twelve. [pause] No, eleven. 
Why did you change your mind? 
Because five and five is the same as five and five. 
OK. Suppose you count two and eight and eight and two as different; then 
you're saying there's eleven ways? 
Yes. 
If instead of numbers adding up to ten ... supposing I'd said numbers 
adding up to fifteen ... 
Two numbers adding up to fifteen? 
Two numbers adding up to fifteen, whole positive numbers. How many 
answers would there be to that? 
Um [pause while he writes]. Sixteen. 
Sixteen ways. What have you written there? 
One to fourteen, two thirteen, three twelve, four eleven, five ten, six nine, 
seven eight, eight seven. So that's the boundary. So those numbers and 
then nought and fifteen. 
Oh, you're counting nought and fifteen? 
Yes, otherwise there's fourteen ways. And fifteen with nought. 
Wait a minute, when you said that for ten there were eleven ways ... 
That was including nought and fifteen and fifteen and nought. No, nought 
and ten and ten and nought. 
I mean, are you going to count that or not? 
Yes. 
OK. So there's sixteen ways for fifteen if you count nought and fifteen. 
And fourteen ways if you don't. 
Right, shall we decide whether we're going to count nought and the 
number or not. 
You decide. 
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95 Tim: You want me to decide. 
96 Simon: I think we should. 
97 Tim: You think we should. Alright then, we'll include it. It doesn't matter to me. 
Um, suppose instead of fifteen I said sixteen. How many ways would there 
be? 
98 Simon: Um, seventeen, I think? 
99 Tim: Why do you think that? 
100 Simon: Because the other ones, for ten and fifteen, there's been one more. 
101 Tim: There's been one more. 
102 Simon: Yes. 
103 Tim: So for a hundred there would be how many ... 
104 Simon: A hundred and one. 
105 Tim: A hundred and one ways, right. Now that worked for the others, are you 
sure it will work for these other ... say sixteen or a hundred or whatever. 
106 Simon: [sneezing fit] Um, no. 
107 Tim: Would you like to think about a reason as to why it might work? 
108 Simon: [pause] No, can't... 
109 Tim: Well, could you have a go at talking me through what it would be like, if 
you were to work out all the ways for twenty, and see whether that 
suggests why it is in fact twentyone. You can write them all down if you 
want, but it might be better if you didn't. 
110 Simon: Yeh (writes 0-20, like that]. Twenty, it's like going up a scale from nought to 
twenty. Like the left hand number goes from nought to twenty, and there 
are twentyone numbers inbetween nought and twenty. 
111 Tim: Inbetween. 
112 Simon: No, including. 
113 Tim: Right. 
114 Simon: So you've got twentyone possibilities, cos the other [inaudible]'s going in 
the other direction. 
115 Tim: Right, right. And what If I'd said adding up to a hundred? 
116 Simon: The same. There are, between nought and a hundred, there are a hundred 
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and one ... well, including a hundred, and that goes in both directions. 
117 Tim: So what's the rule, with any number? 
118 Simon: It's that number, plus one. 
119 Tim: Right, and you're sure about that. 
120 Simon: Yeh. 
121 Tim: OK. 
122 Simon: Or, if you don't include nought, minus one. 
123 Tim: Oh, it's one less if you don't include the number? Why one less? 
124 Simon: Because you're getting the numbers between nought and that number, and 
its always n [enn] minus one. If you have, if seventeen's your number, then 
you do, you go, the numbers between nought and seventeen, there are 
sixteen of them, and then it's one to sixteen and then one to sixteen, going 
down and up. So there are only sixteen numbers. 
125 Tim: Yeah. I suppose it's a bit, is it a bit funny counting like twenty and nought 
and nought and twenty. I suppose it's no different from counting one and 
nineteen and nineteen and one, is it. 
126 Simon: No, I don't think so. 
127 Tim: Right. Let's um, try now, um, this problem. 
128 Simon: Right. 
129 Tim: The basic problem is, I'd like you to give me three numbers that add up to 
twenty. 
130 Simon: One, two and seventeen. [writes] 
131 Tim: OK. And again we're allowing different orders, OK? 
132 Simon: What do you mean? 
133 Tim: Well, like seventeen, two and one, they'd all be different. 
134 Simon: Yeah. 
135 Tim: Yeah? 
136 Simon: Yeah. 
137 Tim: Right, now give me another one. 
138 Simon: One, three and sixteen. [writes] 
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139 Tim: 
140 Simon: 
141 Tim: 
142 Simon: 
143 Tim: 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
153 
154 
155 
156 
Simon: 
Tim: 
Simon: 
Tim: 
Simon: 
Tim: 
Simon: 
Tim: 
Simon: 
Tim: 
Simon: 
Tim: 
Simon: 
157 Tim: 
158 Simon: 
159 Tim: 
160 Simon: 
Right. Another one? 
One, four and fifteen. [writes] 
OK. You've written one, fourteen and fifteen. [Simon corrects] You want 
three numbers that add up to twenty. Right? 
Mm. 
Do you think you can work out how many different ways there are of doing 
that? 
Um ... 
Do you want a bit of time to think about that? 
Yeah, please. [pause] Can I have one number included twice? 
Yes. 
Is like one, eighteen, ones different from one, one, eighteen? 
Say that again, please. 
One ... 
Oh, one, eighteen, one ... 
different from one, one, eighteen? 
Um ... well, let's say 
it is, yes. 
Right. [pause. Simon writes 5-14,6-13,..., 9-10,10-9] 
Explain to me what you're doing at the moment. 
Um, I'm just working this out because if I have one at the beginning, then 
I'm working out the number of ways that you can have for the other two 
numbers. 
OK, and how many is that? 
Eighteen. Or, of course, there's nought. One, nought, nineteen, which 
makes it so there are twenty different ways of doing it. 
OK. [pause] As we're trying to make it clear that there are three numbers 
here, I think if we have one of them nought It might just complicate things. 
So I suggest that we don't include nought on this occasion. 
Alright, OK. So I've got eighteen possibilities for that. So I've got eighteen 
for one [inaudible] and eighteen for the other. I wouldn't include twenty 
would I, as one of my first numbers, cos I can't have twenty, nought, 
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nought. 
161 Tim: Right, OK. If you start with one then you've got eighteen possibilities. 
162 Simon: So two's going to have either six.. sixteen or seventeen. I'll check that. 
[writes 2-1-17,2-2-16,315,4 14, ... ,9 9] One seventeen, two sixteen, ... 
[mumbles]. One, two, three, four, five, six, seven, eight, ... [counts under his 
breath] ... sixteen, seventeen ways instead of eighteen. So if two has 
seventeen, three's going to have sixteen. So that's just like that, isn't it. So 
if one has eighteen, then two's going to have seventeen, and three sixteen 
and four fifteen. So shall I work that out? 
163 Tim: Mm-hm. 
164 Simon: Urn, it's just one add two add three add four add five addsix add seven add 
eight add nine add ten add eleven, and twelve, thirteen, fourteen, fifteen, 
sixteen and seventeen. And eighteen. 
165 Tim: And eighteen [inaudible] 
166 Simon: Yeh 
167 Tim: Right. Urn... 
168 Simon: There's triangular number eighteen. 
169 Tim: Yeh ... pardon? 
170 Simon: There's tri... eighteenth triangular number. 
171 Tim: [laughs] Eighteenth triangular number, OK. You said it's one add two add 
three and so on. Where would you get one? I mean, you said that if you 
start with one you get eighteen ways; when would you get one way? 
172 Simon: Um, good point. Eighteen doesn't count then, cos that's going to have to 
be nineteen and one and nought. 
173 Tim: [pause] No, nineteen wouldn't ... 
174 Simon: count ... 
175 Tim: count ... 
176 Simon: as the first number. 
177 Tim: Mm-hm. 
178 Simon: So it's eighteen is one and one, so that eighteen has one ... 
179 Tim: Right, OK. 
180 Simon: and seventeen has two. So I'm just going to write this out. 
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181 Tim: OK. 
[pause wh ilst Simon writes 18-1,17-2, ..., 9-10] 
182 Simon: Yeh, so it goes from one to twenties (?? ), so it's the triangular numbers 
from one to eighteen. 
183 Tim: Right. Can you work out the eighteenth triangular number? 
184 Simon: Yeh. It will take a bit of time. 
185 Tim: How would you do it? 
186 Simon: Add one and two and three and four and so on. 
187 Tim: OK. Suppose instead of doing all that ... it will take a bit of time, OK? ... 
188 Simon: Yeh, I'm sure there's a quicker way of doing it. 
189 Tim: Well, imagine all the numbers from one to eighteen, right? 
190 Simon: Yeh 
191 Tim: Now add the first and the last. 
192 Simon: Eighteen and one. 
193 Tim: Yeh 
194 Simon: Nineteen. 
195 Tim: Now add the second and the ... penultimate. 
196 Simon: Two and eighteen, which is twenty. 
197 Tim: No, you're adding the first and the last ... 
198 Simon: Yeh 
199 Tim: and then the second and the ... 
200 Simon: Oh. two and seventeen ... is nineteen. So its nine nineteens. 
201 Tim: OK. 
202 Simon: Nine nineteens [writes in column format] are a hundred and seventy one. 
Is that right? 
203 Tim: Right, yeh, good. Brilliant. 
204 Simon: So there are a hundred and seventyone different ways of adding like the 
numbers between one and nineteen together, one and eighteen together, 
to make twenty. 
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205 Tim: Right. Suppose instead of twenty, right, I said how many different ways are 
there of adding up three numbers to make fifty. 
206 Simon: I'd do fortynine times [pause] twentyfive. 
207 Tim: [pause] You'd better explain that. 
208 Simon: Um, no, I wouldn't. I'd do fortynine times twentyfour. 
209 Tim: Explain it. 
210 Simon: Well, it's the triangular number of, em, it's the ... working out the triangular 
number of ... the fortyeighth triangular number. 
211 Tim: Mm-hm. Why do you know that? 
212 Simon: I'm going on the assumption that it works the same for twenty. 
213 Tim: What happens with twenty? 
214 Simon: It, em ,I found the triangular number for eighteen, because ... the second 
number before twenty. 
215 Tim: Right, right. So what you do with fifty, you say ... 
216 Simon: Make, work out the triangular number fortyeight. 
217 Tim: Right. 
218 Simon: And to do that, I times it by ... so I do fortyeight times ... no, I do fortynine 
times half of fortyeight, which is twentyfour. 
219 Tim: Right. Can you see why it's fortynine times half of fortyelght? 
220 Simon: Yeh 
221 Tim: Why? 
222 Simon: Because, to work out a triangular number, you get the first and the last, 
and the second and that ... 
223 Tim: and multiply it by how much? 
224 Simon: Um, the num... a half of the number ... of ... half the number of numbers 
you've got. So it's like from nought to fortyeight, so half of that, cos you've 
only got half the numbers to work out. 
225 Tim: Right. What if, um - that's good -I mean [afterthought] do you want to work 
out fortynine twentyfours? 
226 Simon: No. 
227 Tim: No? OK. Um,... 
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228 Simon: Yeh, I will. 
[Simon draws up a 2x2 grid with 24 on top and 49 down the I. h. side] 
229 Tim: That's a whacky way of doing it. 
230 Simon: To do that, I need to put two noughts in that way [writes 800]. Two's are 
eight, fours are sixteen [enters in grid] 
231 Tim: Who showed you that way? 
232 Simon: You did. 
233 Tim: Did I? [laughs, Simon laughs] Damned good way! [fits of laughter] 
234 Simon: I need to put in the nought here, don't I? 
235 Tim: Mm-hm. Careful now, that's forty, right, so forty fours is ... 
236 Simon: Oh, so forty times four is a hundred and sixty. 
237 Tim: Mm-hm 
238 Simon: So nine twos is a hundred and eighty. 
239 Tim: Mm-hm 
240 Simon: Four nines are thirtysix. So I've got eight hundred [writing in column for 
addition] one sixty, one eighty, thirtysix. Add six, six, six and eight's 
fourteen, seventeen, and eight, nine ten eleven. One thousand one 
hundred and seventysix. 
241 Tim: OK, very good. You know, you said when you do, like the fortyeighth 
triangular number, you ... well, you explained what you did, OK? 
242 Tim: Supposing you wanted to work out the, em, the fifteenth triangular number, 
right? Could you apply the same method to that? 
243 Simon: Not totally. 
244 Tim: Explain why. 
245 Simon: Because you'd get to, um, seven and ... yes, you could. 
246 Tim: Why, explain what you're thinking. 
247 Simon: I was thinking that you'd get to seven and a half and seven and a half, and 
it wouldn't work. But it would. 
248 Tim: Why? 
249 Simon: No, no ... 
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250 Tim: What do you do? 
251 Simon: I was thinking that you go one and fifteen, and two and fourteen, and ... 
252 Tim: so you're going for sixteen all the time 
253 Simon: Yeh, and three and thirteen, 
254 Tim: yes 
255 Simon: two and ... four and twelve, five and ten - no, five and eleven 
256 Tim: Mm-hm 
257 Simon: six and ten, seven and nine 
258 Tim: Yeh. 
259 Simon: Eight and, you're stuck there. 
260 Tim: Yeh 
261 Simon: So it's eight and a half ... seven and a half and seven and a half. You'd get 
stuck with one of the sixteens. You get an eight left over. 
262 Tim: With fifteen you get an eight left over in the middle. 
263 Simon: Yeh 
264 Tim: Yeh 
265 Simon: So ... 
266 Tim: So what would you do? 
267 Simon: You do, em, half of fifteen which is seven and a half. So you do, you saw 
(?? ) those two numbers, you saw the two whole numbers [inaudible] 
below. Seven you times by sixteen. 
268 Tim: Right 
269 Simon: and then you'd add the eight on the end. 
270 Tim: You do seven sixteens and add eight. 
271 Simon: Yeh 
272 Tim: Yeh 
273 Simon: That right? 
274 Tim: Yeh, well it sounds ... yes, yes. 
275 Simon: Seven sixteens are ... [writes in column format] um [mumbles] seven, six 
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sevens are fortytwo. Hundred and twelve add eight is hundred and ten. 
Hundred and twenty [laughs]. 
276 Tim: Right, so it gives you a hundred and twenty. 
277 Simon: Yeh 
278 Tim: Now, the ... the precise rule that you had before that worked, em, ... 
279 Simon: That's for even numbers. 
280 Tim: That's for even numbers. 
281 Simon: Yeh. 
282 Tim: and that was, you take half of the number, yeh? 
283 Simon: Yeh 
284 Tim: so in this case that would give you seven and a half. 
285 Simon: Yeh 
286 Tim: Yeh. Would that actually work in this case, with this odd number? 
287 Simon: Not sure. 
288 Tim: Well, work it out. What have you got to work out? 
289 Simon: Seven point five times fifteen. 
290 Tim: [pause] Fifteen? 
291 Simon: No, sixteen. 
292 Tim: Right, [inaudible] work that out. Do it on there. 
[Simon writes 16 7.5 in vertical format] 
293 Simon: [mumbles] I'm not totally sure how you do point fives, but ... do one seven 
is seven ... 
294 Tim: Do you want a calculator? 
295 Simon: Yeh [pause whilst one is found] 
296 Tim: Right, you're doing sixteen times seven point five. 
297 Simon: Yeh, sixteen times seven point five ... yeh, that works as well, anyway. 
298 Tim: So it [rule] works, even when it [number] is an odd number. 
299 Simon: Yeh 
300 Tim: By the way, the seven point five, you could just call seven and a half, 
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couldn't you? 
301 Simon: Yeh 
302 Tim: Right 
303 Simon: Yeh 
304 Tim: What's seven and a half sixteens? 
305 Simon: Oh, sixteen times seven, add eight. 
306 Tim: Mm-hm [Simon laughs]. So its [answer] the same. Right. 
END OF SESSION 
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TRANSCRIPT S5: SUSIE 15th January 1992 
Susie's 10th birthday was 24.12.91. I had interviewed her on Friday 13th December 1991, but 
unfortunately the tape recorder had failed. I returned a month later, explained what had 
happened to Susie, and that I would ask her some of the same questions again, but that she 
should not consciously attempt to recall what she had said, but to say what she thought now. 
1 Tim: Right, I want you, to start with Susie, to explain to me what you mean by 
three-quarters. 
2 Susie: Well, if you have one thing, whole thing, and you cut it in half, and then the 
two bits in hall again, and take away three of them, and take away one of 
them, the three left are three-quarters. 
3 Tim: What about five sevenths? 
4 Susie: Well once again, if you cut a cake like that, [draws] cut it into seven equal 
pieces, it has to be equal ... 
5 Tim: has to be equal pieces ... 
6 Susie: Yes, it does, so that's hard [to draw], I can't do that, so I'll just do it as close 
as I can. 
7 Tim: Right. 
8 Susie: I can't [inaudible: "that's roughly seven"? ] 
9 Tim: Right 
10 Susie: It has to be equal, so if you take away two of those pieces you've got five 
left. 
11 TIm: 
12 Susie: 
13 Tlm: 
14 Susie: 
15 Tim: 
16 
Right. Right. Now the next thing I want you to think about is, how many lots 
of three-quarters are there in a hundred? 
How many lots of three-quarters are there in a hundred. 
Yes. 
Well ... oh I begin to remember what it was I did (reference to 13.12.911 
OK 
Susie: Em, I think what I did, it, wasn't It ... a take away or add sum ... how many 
lots of three-quarters ... Yes, I remember, I remember. I think what I did is 
have one hundred, add ... what was it? ... oohhh ... It's impossible to third it 
-a hundred, you need a third of a hundred. So that must be [writes] three 
... thirty-three point three recurring [writes 33.3r, changes r to R] I'll put a 
capital R for that because that (rI means remainder. Ah, so if you add 
315 
17 Tim: 
18 Susie: 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Tim: 
Susie: 
Tim: 
Susie: 
Tim: 
Susie: 
Tim: 
Susie: 
Tim: 
Susie: 
Tim: 
Susie: 
Tim: 
Susie: 
33 Tim: 
34 Susie: 
those two together, together, it should be one hundred and thirty-three 
point three recurring. 
Right, so its a hundred and thirty-three point three recurring. Now what I 
actually asked you, right, was how many lots of three quarters in a 
hundred. And what you've done is to take a hundred, and then a third of a 
hundred, and add it on. Now, can you explain to me how that tells you how 
many three-quarters there are in a hundred? 
Well, it doesn't tell me. I actually have worked that out quite a long time 
ago; worked that out, I did. It hasn't ... I did actually do some maths and 
worked it out that way [inaudible]. I did try doing it that way, and then tried 
doing it another way. It worked, but the other way I had was too diff icult, so 
I just stuck to this way. 
When did you work out this other way? 
I can't remember... well ... 
You can't remember. 
No. 
OK. What about, how many four-fifths in a hundred? 
Four-fifths. It's correct, isn't it? [refers to 133.3R written] 
Oh yes, that's correct. 
Em, that was three ... what was that again? That was three-quarters. 
That was three-quarters in a hundred, now we're talking about four-fifths. 
That must be a fourth, this must be a fourth of it ... mmm... a fourth of a 
hundred [pause] 
A fourth of a hundred. OK, so what have you got? 
One hundred and twenty-five. 
OK. Describe what you do again. Just describe. 
I just had the hundred, and then I had one fourth of hundred, and added 
them together. 
Right. What sort of ... can you give me another example of how many lots 
of something In a hundred, that you could do that way. 
Well, you could, there, It's a fact you can, could not do the same way with 
... seven... ninths 
[writes 7 9] 
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35 Tim: You couldn't do the same. Why not? 
36 Susie: Because it has to be one different. Like with this one [3/4] it was one and 
that one [4/5] was one. 
37 Tim: Has to be one difference. OK. 
38 Susie: Yes, just one number, three, three-quarters [writes 3/4 and indicates 3,4]. 
39 Tim: One difference between which numbers? 
40 Susie: The number of them and the quarter. And it has to be the smaller one to 
the number. 
41 Tim: Right, [cough] could you, um, work out how many lots of six-sevenths 
there are in a hundred? 
42 Susie: Ah [inaudible] 
43 Tim: Six-sevenths, how many in a hundred? 
44 Susie: Now what's a sixth of a hundred? Mm [pause], yes, I know a third of a 
hundred is that [indicates 33.3R] 
45 Tim: Thirty-three point three ... 
46 Susie: Yes, but it can't, um, a sixth will be half that. 
47 Tim: Right, a sixth of a hundred will be half of that, yes. 
48 Susie: So what's half of three. Ah, one ... 
49 Tim: Can you work it out up here? [away from written 33.3R] 
50 Susie: No, I'm working out this, so I can ... I will put it up there when I've worked it 
out. I need just to be close up there, which will help me work it out. 
[Susie writes 15 beneath 33, crosses out 5 and replaces with 6, writes 5 beneath . 3R - 
later changes that to 6 too] 
51 Susie: So, do you know why I carried five into that? I had that one, and I had a 
half, so that I had that. Why I'm moving in this way, it's a bit different. In a 
normal adding sum you move the other way [Je right to left rather than the 
left to right here] 
52 Tim: I'm not clear what you're doing Susie, you're working out a half of thirty- 
three point three recurring ... 
53 Susie: So I worked out, three, I was half three, one fif... is one point five ... 
54 Tim: That's half of three, yes. 
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55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
Susie: 
Tim: 
Susie: 
Tim: 
Susie: 
Tim: 
Susie: 
Tim: 
63 Susie: 
64 
65 
Tim: 
Susie: 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
Tim: 
Susie: 
Tim: 
Susie: 
Tim: 
Susie: 
Tim: 
Susie: 
74 Tim: 
So I just moved, put the five there. But now what I do Is half that ... six ... 
Er, wait a minute, where did the six come from? You had ... 
I had five [from 15], and I have one of those [from 1.5], and then we carry 
the five ... over to there. And it will continue happening. Six and carry five, 
six and carry five, so it must be [pause] sixteen point six recurring. 
Sixteen point six recurring. OK. 
Which is one hundred and sixteen point six recurring. 
And that was how many six-sevenths in a hundred, wasn't it? 
Yes. 
OK. Now, you said that it wouldn't work for seven-ninths didn't you, this 
method. Right? Now, I'd just like you to write down five-sevenths, just here. 
I'm going to have to think though, very well. Um, I'll try ... [pause]. Ahh, of 
course ... (interrupted] 
You have a think while I push the door up. 
... you can't ... I don't understand. It's definitely a hundred. 
So that means 
two ... Ahh, ahhh [big moment) you've got two left, and you need five each 
time. So if you have two hundred ... um ... divided by five. How many times 
does five go into two hundred? Well, it goes into one hundred twenty times 
Mm-hm 
Must go into forty times. So that's ... a hundred and forty. 
One hundred and forty. OK. That's for five-sevenths. 
That is a two difference. 
Right, that's a two difference. So, can you show me how you'd do that, 
say, for five-eighths? How many lots of five-eighths in a hundred? 
[mumbles, inaudible, then] six, seven, eight, so that's three difference. 
Yeah. So what do you do? 
Ah-ha. One hundred [writes 100], that's three hundred divided by five 
[writes 300=5 below]. Which is sixty [writes 160] 
So it's one hundred and sixty. OK. Can you explain ... you've obviously got 
a rule that depends on the difference. Right? Now supposing you've got 
some fraction, it's something over something else, right? 
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75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
Susie: 
Tim: 
Susie: 
Tim: 
Susie: 
Tim: 
81 Susie: 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
Tim: 
Susie: 
Tim: 
Susie: 
Tim: 
Susie: 
88 Tim: 
89 Susie: 
90 Tim: 
91 Susie: 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
Tim: 
Susie: 
Tim: 
Susie: 
Tim: 
Susie: 
I don't know what you mean. 
Right, well like five-eighths is five over eight. 
Yes. 
Now supposing you've got a fraction generally, that's some number on top 
of something else 
Yes. 
And I say to you, how many lots of that in a hundred? Explain to me what 
your method is. 
Well, if you have one, one difference, you just take a hundred and add a 
third, or whatever it is on the next number above ... to the hundreds ... well, 
a hundred. 
Right. 
So you would have a hundred and - for three-quarters -a third of a 
hundred ... 
Am-hm 
... and add them together will make the answer. 
Am-hm 
And so with anything, well, just take the top one, and third it, or eighth it, or 
whatever the top one, whatever the top number is, adding a hundred to it. 
Right. 
The next one, when you have two difference, you have to do two hundred 
divided by that, the number, and add a hundred to the equals. 
Right, add a hundred to the equals. 
And with three you have to do three hundred divided by whatever is the 
top number. 
With three what? 
Divided by whatever the top number Is. 
Yes, when you say With three... " 
That's difference. 
Oh, with a three difference. OK. And with a four difference? 
It would be four hundred divided by the top number. 
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98 Tim: OK. [pause] 
99 Susie: Add a hundred always. 
100 Tim: Last time when we talked about this [34 days earlier] ... 
101 Susie: Yes 
102 Tim: ... you suddenly said something about 
four-fourths, as far as this rule was 
concerned. 
103 Susie: Four-fourths. [pause] Must be a hundred. 
104 Tim: How does your rule ... 
105 Susie: It's very simple. When you get nought difference it means you add nothing 
to a hundred. 
106 Tim: OK. Now here's a slightly strange one I want to ask. You know we've done 
three-quarters or five-eighths ... [interrupted] 
107 Susie: Well we've actually, another thing that might work, if you did it with fifty, for 
instance, all that happens with one difference is, you do ... say three- 
quarters .. 
108 Tim: Yes 
109 Susie: all you do is have a third of fifty ... 
110 Tim: Right 
111 Susie: err ... add fifty. So you just have the number it Is add, er, it's [inaudible] a 
hundred. [not clear what she means here] 
112 Tim: Oh I ... 
113 Susie: So with three it would be ... um... one hundred and fifty, three fifties you 
see, with three difference between the numbers. See? 
114 Tim: No, say that one again. 
115 Susie: Well, suppose you had ... um... I'll do five ... and we'll say eighths [writes], 
three difference. 
116 Tim: Right. 
117 Susie: How you would work that out, Is fifty, three fifties because of the difference 
118 Tim: Right, yes. 
119 Susie: One hundred and fifty, and that divided by the top number, which Is five. 
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120 Tim: Right, yes, yes, I get it, I get it. And that would be, that's how you do it with 
a hundred [points] and that's how you do it with fifty. 
121 Susie: Yes 
122 Tim: And with any number you do something like that? 
123 Susie: Yes. 
124 Tim: OK. Now - can I borrow your pencil? - so you've got a rule that works for 
five-eighths, OK 
125 Susie: Yes, well any, any equal at all. 
126 Tim: Sure, sure. 
127 Susie: Any one at all. 
128 Tim: Or three-quarters, or whatever. 
129 Susie: Yes, but I have not got a rule for ones like ... it is a lot harder to have ones 
like ... [writes 4/3] that. 
130 Tim: Ah, that's exactly what I was going to ask you! [Susie laughs]. You've 
written down four-thirds. 
131 Susie: Yeah. 
132 Tim: So the question is, how many lots of four-thirds are there, OK? 
133 Susie: Yeah. In, in a ... 
134 Tim: Well, let's say in a hundred, shall we? 
135 Susie: Yeah, um, now... 
136 Tim: Can I just ... 
137 Susie: Now, I think what you do is, now you do a takeaway. I think, I ... I don't 
know. So what you have is a hundred, take away a fourth, twenty-five, 
equals seventy-five. I think that probably will be the answer. 
138 Tim: OK 
139 Susie: I think so. Or it might be thirds. I'm not sure which it is. It would be possible 
to work it out in thirds wouldn't it? 
140 Tim: Which thirds? 
141 Susie: I'm not quite sure whether you either do it with the top number or the 
bottom number. 
142 Tim: Which did you do it with before? 
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143 Susie: The top number. 
144 Tim: So that would seem to be ... 
145 Susie: Seventy-five [writes] 
146 Tim: Right, right. Can we just check one thing? If I say "How many lots of, em, 
four-fifths are in a hundred? ", and you get a hundred and twenty-five, 
alright? Would you expect the answer to be more than a hundred, if you're 
dividing by four-fifths? 
147 Susie: I would have expected it to be less? 
148 Tim: Why? 
149 Susie: Because, this is more than one [indicates 4/3] 
150 Tim: Ah, with this one you'd expect it to be? 
151 Susie: Yes. 
152 Tim: Is that right? 
153 Susie: Yes. 
154 Tim: So you're dividing by more than one, so you'd expect an answer less than 
a hundred? And you've got seventy-five 
155 Susie: Yes 
156 Tim: which is less than a hundred. So that's good. 
157 Susie: That could be. 
158 Tim: I've just had a thought, Susie, of something you could try. What about, 
you've done, you've tried your rule for four-thirds, right. Try it for two over 
one. 
159 Susie: Two over one. 
160 Tim: How many lots of two over one... 
161 Susie: That's easy, fifty. 
162 Tim: Right. 
163 Susie: Because the one is whole. 
164 Tim: Right. 
165 Susie: So It's just two, so it's half of a hundred. Yep, I've worked that out, just like 
that. 
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166 Tim: Good. Now what about this method that you're using here. 
167 Susie: I don't know. 
168 Tim: Well, what would you actually do? 
169 Susie: I could work at these, two over one, I know the answer of that, see if it 
worked out like ... that way. 
170 Tim: Well, try it this way and see if you get the right answer. 
171 Susie: So that's a hundred [writes 100-50] take away -I know this must be fifty - 
so that must be correct. 
172 Tim: That's correct. And why did you take away fifty? 
173 Susie: Because that is a half of [points to 100] 
174 Tim: Right. So that... 
175 Susie: That [points to 75], that I think is correct. 
176 Tim: You now believe the seventy-five is correct. OK. [pause] What about, lets 
say now ... try this one. One hundred divided by five-thirds. 
177 Susie: One hundred divided by five-thirds [sighs]. Right. See, this one you added 
it. I can't understand that. That one's harder. Ahh, Ahh, oh, yes, you would 
have twice as much for the difference, won't you. So that's ... so suppose 
we had five-thirds [writes 5/3]. Want five-thirds. You would have to take a 
hundred ... 
178 Tim: Yes. 
179 Susie: Take away ... um, a fifth of two hundred. 
180 Tim: Right. 
181 Susie: It would have to be two hundred, because of the amount in ... 
182 Tim: Because of the ... 
183 Susie: The space in here [points to 5/3]. 
184 Tim: The space of two. 
185 Susie: Yeah. It shouldn't... it's not really a space of two, it's a space of one. The 
space. 
186 Tim: Right. 
187 Susie: And it has to be two hundred. So you would have two hundred [writes] 
divided by five. Do you understand that? 
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188 Tim: Yes thank you. 
189 Susie: And then you have two hun ... one hundred would be ... that's forty. That 
equals forty. So take away forty [writes] equals ... sixty. 
190 Tim: Brilliant. 
END OF SESSION 
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TRANSCRIPT T6: ISHKA and FRANCES 16 July 1992 
lshka is 10 years 6 months and Frances 10 years 3 months. Frances' family lives mostly in 
Japan. She is fluent in both English and Japanese. Frances had previously attended the school; 
on this occasion the family were "visiting" Cambridge for a month. 
1 Tim: OK. I'll explain to you what we're going to do. Erm, there's a pencil and 
some paper to write on if you want to but just for the moment I'd like you, 
Ishka, to tell me any two numbers that add up to ten. 
2 Ishka: Five and five [laughs] 
3 Tim: Five and five. Frances? 
4 Frances: Er [laughs] Nine add one. 
5 Tim: Nine add one. Some more? 
6 Ishka: Seven add three. 
7 Frances: Six and four. 
8 Tim: Right. Now what I want you to do ... you know we could go on doing that 
until we've used them all up .... 
9 Frances: Yeah. 
10 Tim: I'd like you two to agree between you ... incidentally we'll adjust that 
[microphone] Frances so it's not quite so close, right, um I'd like you just to 
- yours is fine Ishka - I'd like you two to agree between you, how many 
different ways there are of doing that. Right? Two numbers that add to ten, 
and I'll just be quiet for a moment. 
11 Ishka: Er ... 
12 Frances: There's one and nine. 
13 Ishka: Yeah. 
14 Frances: So that's one. Two and eight ... and then there's 
15 F+Ishka: Three and seven. 
16 Frances: Four and six, five and five, six and... oh that's the same. 
17 Ishka: Five ways? 
18 Frances: Maybe. 
19 Ishka: Mm, maybe ... I think .... 
20 Frances: What do you think? 
325 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
36 
37 
38 
39 
40 
41 
42 
Ishka: We haven't had five five have we? 
Frances: We have! 
Ishka: Oh OK, erm ... 
Frances: The others are like if you do six four, we've already done four six. 
Ishka: Mm [sighs] 
Frances: Shall we just say five ways? 
Ishka: There's about five. 
Tim: Erm, I'd like you to be more convinced Ishka. I mean if it's about five then 
it's four or six or seven or whatever ... the number's sufficiently small that I 
think you should be sure one way or another. 
Frances: I think it's five ways. 
Ishka: But I'm sure. 
Tim: You are sure. 
Frances: Me too. 
Tim: OK. Don't play with the [microphone] wire, OK. Erm, right so for ten there's 
five ways ... incidentally you discussed or mentioned as to whether four 
and six, and six and four were going to be different, yup? ... and are you, 
you've decided, have you, that you're going to count them as the same? 
Ishka: Yeh. 
Frances: Yeh. 
Tim: Yeh? OK. Right, I should now like you to consider the same problem, only 
this time we're going to consider the number of different ways of making 
twenty. Right, so, I mean let's just get started. Ishka, give us, give me any 
two numbers which add up to twenty. 
Ishka: Fifteen and five. 
Tim: OK ... and Frances? 
Frances: Ten and ten. 
Tim: So you understand the problem, and again I'd like you to agree how many 
ways are there to do that. 
Frances: So ... there's one and nineteen. 
Ishka: There's .... 
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43 Frances: .... two and eighteen, three and 
44 F+Ishka: seventeen 
45 Frances: Four and sixteen ... 
46 Ishka: Yup. 
47 Frances: Five and fifteen, six and ... six and fourteen. 
48 Ishka: Yup. 
49 Frances: Seven and thirteen. 
50 Ishka: Mm. 
51 Frances: Eight and twelve. 
52 Ishka: Yeah. 
53 Frances: Nine and eleven, ten and ten, so that's ten ... and there's eleven and nine. 
54 Ishka: Mm. 
55 Frances: Twelve and eight or have we already done [inaud] ten ways? 
56 Tim: You're discounting those are you Frances because you've already got 
them? Is that ... you went on to eleven and nine, and twelve and eight and 
so on. OK. So ten ways? 
57 Ishka: Yup. 
58 Tim: And you were counting them on your fingers? Yeh? 
[laugh from Ishka] 
59 Tim: OK. Um ... would it be fair Ishka to say that Frances did most of the work 
on, on that one, yeah? ... so I'm gonna give you another one and see if you 
can do most of the work on this, but make sure that Frances agrees with 
what you're doing. Erm, I'd like to know how many different ways there are 
of making the number, er, thirteen ... thirteen. 
60 Ishka: Thirty? [emphasises the y] 
61 Tim: Thirteen. [emphasises the n] 
62 Frances: Thirteen? 
63 Ishka: Yup ... thirteen. Erm, there's ten and three, twelve and ... one, elevep and 
two... shall we write them down so we don't forget them. 
64 Frances: So yes. What did you say? 
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65 Ishka: Well there's... 
66 Tim: You can start again if you want, right. 
67 Ishka: Twelve and one. 
68 Frances: Mm? 
69 Ishka: Twelve and one, eleven and two, nine and four, um, ten and three ... no 
we've had that. 
70 Frances: No we haven't. 
71 Ishka: Yeh. 
72 Frances: You forgot to say the three that's all. 
73 Tim: [laughs] You added a three onto the ten you'd already written down! Yes, 
OK. 
74 Frances: OK. 
75 Ishka: And then, erm, eight and ... nine and five ... no not! [sighs] ... nine and ... 
76 Frances: You already did nine. See, nine and four. 
77 Ishka: Oh yeah, er... oh yeah I was doing eight and what was it, um, eight and 
five. 
78 Frances: OK. Next? [Frances assumes the "teacher/listener" role] 
79 Ishka: Seven and six. 
80 Frances: Seven and six, yes. 
81 Ishka: Um ... 
82 Frances: Er, is that all? 
83 Ishka: I think so. 
84 Tim: Can you think of any others Frances? No? 
85 Frances: They would be the same. 
86 Tim: So how many have we got? 
87 Ishka: One, two, three, four, five, six. 
88 Tim: OK, so for the number thirteen there are six ways. 
89 Ishka: Yes. 
90 Tim: Let's just remember what we got for the others. For ten there was ... 
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91 Frances: We got 
92 F+Ishka: five. 
93 Tim: For twenty? 
94 Frances: Ten. 
95 Tim: And for thirteen? 
96 Ishka: Six. 
97 Tim: OK. Now ... supposing I said, um ... this is the same question right? ... how 
many different ways are there of finding two numbers that add up to, but 
this time I'll say, um, thirty. 
98 Frances: Thirty? 
99 Tim: Thirty, three zero. OK. 
100 Frances: Yup. 
101 Tim: But instead of going through them as you did before and counting them up, 
I'd like you to make, er, if you like, a prediction as to how many you think 
there'll be. 
102 Frances: OK. 
103 Tim: Mm-hm. 
104 Frances: Thirty. 
105 Ishka: I think there'll be around ... 
106 Frances: Fifteen? 
107 Ishka: Yup. 
108 Frances: Maybe? 
109 Ishka: Fifteen because ... 
110 Tim: Did you ... 
111 Ishka: that's half and 
112 Tim: Ah hah. 
113 Ishka: Most of them are half or just about one away from ... 
114 Frances: Six and ... thirteen. 
115 Tim: That's, that's er, that's, that's ... your prediction's thirty? [misheard] ... and 
Ishka's Is ... 
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116 Frances: I mean fifteen. 
117 Tim: [laughs] OK. Prediction of fifteen. Er, so ... lets just go back to what Ishka 
was saying. She was saying that in most cases it's about half. 
118 Ishka: Well, yes, 'cause ten was five. 
119 Tim: Right. 
120 Frances: and /twenty was ten/. 
121 Ishka: [almost simulltaneous] /and then ... twenty was /ten. 
122 Tim: Yes. 
123 Frances: and /thirteen was about six/. 
124 Ishka: /but, erm thirteen /was six. 
125 Tim: OK. 
126 Ishka: Although that isn't exactly half. 
127 Frances: But that would be six and a half if it was equalled. 
128 Tim: OK, what about, erm - I'll choose an outrageous one now - what about if 
we did it for a hundred ... numbers that add up to a hundred. How many 
ways? 
129 Frances: Fifty? 
130 Ishka: About fifty yeah. 
131 Tim: About fifty. Now are you saying about fifty, Ishka, because you're sort of 
playing safe or I mean do you really think it is fifty? 
132 Ishka: Well maybe not exactly, but it's around fifty basically? 
133 Tim: OK. And Frances do you think it's exactly fifty or around fifty? 
134 Frances: Maybe around fifty. 
135 Tim: OK. What about this prediction of fifteen for er thirty, was that around 
fifteen or exactly fifteen? 
136 Ishka: It's fifteen or around. 
137 Frances: Yes. 
138 Ishka: 'cause we can't be exactly sure until we've tried it, but ... 
139 Tim: OK. It might be an idea then to ... I mean, that isn't too big to just check 
them Is it. Yeah? Would you like to have a go between you? Either write it 
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down or say them or whatever you want, OK? 
140 Ishka: OK so ... 
141 Frances: Who's going to say half? [writes "prediction 15"] 
142 Ishka: Are we doing fifteen? 
143 Tim: We're doing, you're doing numbers that make thirty. 
144 F+Ishka: Thirty. 
145 Ishka: OK so that's fifteen and fifteen. [F writes 15+15] 
146 Frances: Fifteen and fifteen. 
147 Ishka: Er, 
148 Frances: Let's go down. 
149 Ishka: OK. Er, fourteen and sixteen. 
150 Frances: Yes [F continues the list] 
151 Ishka: Thirteen and seventeen. 
152 Frances: Yes. 
153 Ishka: Then, er, fourteen and ... 
154 Frances: You already did fourteen. 
155 Ishka: Oh yeah. Um, twelve and [sighs; pause] 
156 Tim: What will it be Frances? 
157 Frances: Eighteen. 
158 Tim: OK. 
159 Ishka: So twelve and eighteen. Um ... 
160 Frances: Eleven and? [the 'teacher again] 
161 Ishka: Eleven and nineteen. 
162 Frances: Good. Ten? 
163 Ishka: And twenty. And um?... 
164 Frances: Nine? 
165 Ishka: And twentyone. 
166 Frances: Eight? 
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167 Ishka: And twentytwo. 
168 Frances: Seven? 
169 Ishka: Twentythree. 
170 Frances: Six? 
171 Ishka: Twentyfour. 
172 Frances: Seven, eight, er, five? 
[Tim laughs] 
173 Ishka: And twentyfive. 
174 Frances: [sighs] Four? 
175 Ishka: Twentysix. 
176 Frances: Three? 
177 Ishka: Twentyseven. 
178 Frances: Two? 
179 Ishka: Let's see ... and twentyeight. 
180 Frances: One? 
181 Ishka: And twentynine. 
182 Frances: Good. 
[They count how many pairs there are] 
183 Ishka: One, two. 
184 Frances: One, two, three, four, [and up to] fourteen, fifteen. So we were right. 
185 Tim: So it's exactly fifteen, yup. Incidentally ... oh, just a tiny little thing Frances - 
when you do your sevens, you write them and then cross off a little bit at 
the beginning. Why do you do that? 
186 Frances: Oh er, I kept doing it the Japanese way because I got used to doing it the 
Japanese way because I've lived In Japan. 
187 Tim: Yeah, but I think, I mean I think that's alright, don't you Ishka? 
188 Ishka: What like that? 
189 Tim: That little bit on the seven. 
190 Ishka: What you mean like this? [draws it] 
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191 Frances: Yes. 
192 Tim: Yeah. 
193 Ishka: Well I usually, I either do my sevens like that, like that ... 
194 Tim: All different ways, yeah. I think it's not a problem Frances, that's all I'm 
saying. Yeah, yeah. Um, now, you know when you'd written them all down 
you counted, you started at the top and went one, two, three, four, five ... 
can you notice something about these numbers that would immediately tell 
you there's fifteen without writing them all down? 
195 Frances: There's one to fifteen, so fifteen numbers? 
196 Tim: OK. The left hand column starts with one and goes up to fifteen yup? OK. 
197 Frances: Otherwise sixteen would be the same as si ... as fourteen and sixteen. 
198 Tim: Right. If you did a similar listing for, um, let's say ... because we asked 
about, we thought about a hundred didn't we? - and how many ways there 
were of doing that. If you did a list like this and you started at ... what 
would be the two equal numbers at the top? 
199 Ishka: Fifty and fifty. 
200 Tim: Fifty add fifty, and then it would go fortynine ... 
201 Frances: [sighs] fortynine fiftyone, fortyeight fiftytwo. 
202 Tim: And so on? 
203 I+Frances: Yup. 
204 Tim: And the last one would be? 
205 Frances: One. 
206 Tim: Right. 
207 Frances: /One and ninetynine/. 
208 Ishka /A hundred, no, ninetynine/. 
209 Tim: And how many numbers would there be in those, or how many ways would 
you have done it? 
210 F+Ishka: Fifty. 
211 Tim: OK? So you, now you know it's fifty, it's not about fifty, OK? 
212 Ishka: So the even numbers are exactly half. 
213 Tim: That's really good Ishka. 
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214 Ishka: And the odd numbers are ... 
215 Frances: Are exactly half. 
216 Ishka: Are sort of, are one off ... that. 
217 Tim: Er, say what you ... I know what you mean. 
So like with thirteen it's ... 
218 Ishka: Like with thirteen it was six, in half ... 
219 Tim: Mm hm. 
220 Ishka: So it couldn't be exactly because it was odd. 
221 Tim: Right. 
222 Ishka: So they went to twelve, which was the one underneath and split that in 
half. 
223 Frances: er, so do you mean that twelve ... is six and six, so do you mean like if it's 
twentynine or thirteen, if the, if it's an odd number, they have ... they have 
more odd numbers than the e ... even numbers? Is that what you mean? 
224 Ishka: I'm not really sure what you mean. [laughs] 
225 Tim: Well suppose take, take your ... 
226 Frances: Suppose, if there's um thirteen, so there's .... one, two, three ... [counts 
under her breath, whilst making 13 pencil tally marks] ... thirteen ... if it's 
like this ... 
227 Tim: Mm hm. 
228 Frances: This is, these are ... odd [indicating alternate tallies 1st, 3rd etc] and these 
[others] are even, so you mean that there're more odds than there're 
evens. Mm? If it's, if thirteen is ... [sighs] ... If the number is an odd number 
do you mean that there's, there would normally be more odd numbers than 
evens? 
229 Ishka: I don't know. 
230 Tim: Do you understand, Frances is saying that if you take all the numbers from 
one up to thirteen, yeah? And if you look at all those numbers one, two, 
three, four, five, up to thirteen, there's more odd numbers In that list than 
even numbers. How many more Frances? 
231 Frances: Erm, normally one more. 
232 Tim: Normally one more. [laughs] Can you think of an example where it's not 
exactly one more? 
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233 Frances: Hmm ... 
234 Tim: No, nor can I! But if I said with a number, erm, twentythree, OK? - how 
many ways of making it from adding two numbers? 
235 Frances: [whispers] twentythree, twentythree. Errm ... 
236 Ishka: Eleven? 
237 Tim: Eleven. How did you get that Ishka? 
238 Ishka: Well, um, from when we done thirteen if we take one down which is, 
twenty ... [swallows] 
239 Frances: Two. 
240 Ishka: Two, then split that in half. 
241 Tim: Right. 
242 Frances: Twentytwo divided by two is eleven. 
243 Ishka: Yeah that's it. 
244 Tim: Right, OK, I just wonder whether it's possible by writing down all the ways 
of getting, say, thirteen like this ... yuh? ... whether you could then see why 
it was half of the number before. I don't know, do you think it might be 
possible? 
245 Frances: Yes. 
246 Tim: Do you want to try it Frances? 
247 Ishka: So we start at half of thirteen. 
248 Frances: Half of thirteen would be ... 
249 Ishka: Six. 
250 Frances: Six and seven. Six point five ... [laughs] 
251 Tim: You can't have six and a half and six and a half, so what will you start 
with? 
252 Frances: Six and seven. 
253 Tim: Six and seven. Mm hm. Want to write it down? [F begins list] And the next 
one? 
254 Frances: Five and eight. 
255 Tim: We can already see why it must be now, can't we. 
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256 Frances: [mumble] Four plus nine, three plus ten, two plus eleven, one plus twelve. 
257 Tim: OK, so it's six yeah? 
258 Ishka: Yeah. 
259 Tim: And it's not se ... why didn't we write down seven and six 
260 Frances: Because if you wrote seven and six it's just this turned the other way 
round. 
261 Tim: So there's no point on putting it down. Yeh? 
262 F/Ishka: No. 
263 Frances: This is just ... [draws arrows transposing 6,7] 
264 Tim: OK, OK. Thank you very much we've finished then. 
END OF SESSION 
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TRANSCRIPT IRG5: ALLAN May 1995 
Allan is an 'average' Year 9 (13-14 years) pupil in an Essex comprehensive 11-16 
school. Judith is in her first year as a teacher. She was a member of the IRG, and 
dona ted this transcript. 
1 Judith: OK, Now. Here is the investigation, so you can read it. Draw a three by 
three dot grid. Start anywhere you like. Draw a continuous line that goes to 
every dot. Yeah? 
2 Allan: Yeah. 
3 Judith: This one is nine units long - one, two, three, four, fiv, e six, seven, eight, 
nine. 'K, no diagonals. Find the shortest possible line on a three by three 
grid. Investigate for larger squares. Right, so how are you going to start 
off? 
4 Allan: Em ... [pause] 
5 Judith: What are you thinking? (pause] 
6 Allan: Well first I'm going to find a suitable starting position on the grid. 
7 Judith: OK. [pause] So you're starting in the comer, are you? 
8 Allan: Yeah, I'm gonna start in the top left-hand comer. 
9 Judith: So tell me why you thought that you would start in the top left-hand comer. 
10 Allan: Well, it seems a reasonable spot because um, from the top left-hand 
corner it'd be quite easy to go right round, like nine dots and try-, and get 
to a, and get to all the corners, quite easily. 
11 Judith: OK, Do you think you're going to be able to do it in less than ... that? 
... nine? 
12 Allan: Maybe, yeah. 
13 Judith: Maybe 
14 Allan: Maybe 
15 Judith: OK, so you're not... 
16 Allan: Not positive, but I am ... 
17 Judith: OK [pause] top right [pause] Are you thinking about where to go next? 
18 Allan: Yeah 
19 Judith: So how many is it? 
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20 Allan: eight 
21 Judith: OK, do you think that's the shortest from starting in the comer? Try another 
one. 
22 Allan: Yeah I'm (indistinguishable mumble) [pause] 
23 Judith: ' many? 
24 Allan: Still eight again so probably the most is eight. 
25 Judith: You mean the least? 
26 Allan: Yeah, the least, sorry. 
27 Judith: That's allright. 
28 Allan: Yeah. 
29 Judith: OK, so do you think starting not in the corner could get you eight as well? 
30 Allan: Um, possibly, yeah. [pause] 
31 {start speaking together} 
32 Judith: Pardon? 
33 Allan: 'got a problem with one of the corners, (mumble) dots. 
34 Judith: Why was it you said you'd got a problem with one of the comers? 
35 Allan: I missed out one of the corners. 
36 Judith: Oh right. [pause] 
37 Judith: ' many was that? 
38 Allan: That'd be nine. 
39 Judith: Yep. So what are you going to try now ... or what do you think? 
40 Allan: So it don't work from the middle at all, really, because it's uh, because you 
have to go in and out again. 
41 Judith: D'you think? Are you sure? 
42 Allan: Because what you have to do, you have to go, from the middle you have to 
go all the way round and you go Into one and come back out again, but if 
you do it from, like we 'ave did from exactly, exactly in the middle 
43 Judith: Try that then. [pause] 
44 Allan: Yeah, made eight as well from the middle 
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45 Judith: 
46 Allan: 
47 
48 
49 
50 
51 
52 
53 
54 
55 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
Judith: 
Allan: 
Judith: 
Allan: 
Judith: 
Allan: 
Judith: 
Allan: 
Judith: 
Allan: 
Judith: 
Judith: 
Allan: 
Judith: 
Allan: 
Judith: 
Allan: 
Judith: 
Allan: 
Judith: 
Allan: 
Judith: 
Allan: 
OK. So what do you think? [pause] So if I wasn't talking to you and you 
were just doing the investigation yourself, what would you be thinking? 
I'd be thinking that the most possible um way uh of getting, of getting, 
getting the least is that it only started from the middle going right round, 
going right round or going, going from one corner but you can't do it in the 
middle, middle between two corners 
OK 
and also the least is eight 
Aliright then, so what're you going to do now? 
I'll try a, um, four by four grid. 
Right. Can you make any predictions before you start? 
Um 
Or ... 
The maximum will probably be, er, the least'll probably be 'bout fifteen. 
Right. And anything else you're going to notice? 
Uh.. no, not really 
OK [pause, Allan tries] 
So what was that? 
fifteen 
Can you do it in less? 
I'll give it a go. [pause] I done it in fourteen. 
Count again 
fifteen 
So why did you ... so do you think your prediction was right? 
Yeah 
Are you sure? 
Yeah. 
So why did you predict fifteen? 
Uh because I thought there might be a pattern between ... if there was um 
a certain amount of, um ... if it's three by three say 
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70 Judith: Uh-hum 
71 Allan: if you ti-, three times three is actually nine 
72 Judith: uh-hum 
73 Allan: But as, if you went round all the dots, it would only come to about, if you 
did it once it would come to on-, uh less than nine, 'n' you got, uh, 
because, because there's o-, there's only... 'cause you only have, y- ... 
you can miss out a line exactly, 'cause y- you can miss out a gap, c- 
'cause you um, y'd 'ave to go all the way round the whole dots 
74 Judith: OK ... So why did that make you say fifteen 
75 Allan: because uh, f- for the same reason, 'cause if you um w- tried to go round 
the whole all the dots you'd get sixteen but if you just did it once all the way 
round the dots but missing out gaps you'd still come to uh, you just minus 
one basically and just ... 
76 Judith: So what would happen in some other squares? 
77 Allan: Probably if you minus one from the s-, if you square the number you'd 
probably find that if it was actually, if you minus one from that you'd 
probably find that that would be the answer to the ... 
78 Judith: OK 
79 Allan: to how many dots there are, to how many times you 'ave to go round the 
dots 
80 Judith: OK. Now do you want to try one or are you certain of that? 
81 Allan: No, I'll give it a go with a five by five 
82 Judith: Yup, Good [pause] 
83 Allan: The twenty-five one it, Is diff-... er, it's tweny-six. 
84 Judith: Count, again 
85 Allan: It's twenty-five 
86 Judith: Is that what you expected? 
87 Allan: Yes, it was. 
88 Judith: So if you were doing an investigation what would you write down for me? 
89 Allan: I'd write ... that the pattern is ... if you ti-, times both, if you square the side, 
the side, and um, you minus one, you'd be th', the amount of dots you-, if 
you went round the dots it'd be the same answer. 
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90 Judith: Very good. OK, now what do-, it says 'Investigate for larger squares', what 
do you think you could investigate now for me? Now you've done 
squares, Allan, you've given me a rule for squares, and, you could, um, 
extend this investigation to look at something else, anything you want. Any 
ideas? 
91 Allan: [ pause] 
92 Judith: Do you want me to give you some? [pause] 
93 Allan: No I haven't got any ideas. 
94 Judith: Rectangles? 
95 Allan: Yeah 
96- Judith: Can you make predictions about rectangles first before you draw them? 
97 Allan: Could um ... four by six? 
98 Judith: Yup 
99 Allan: [pause] twenty-three for a four by six rectangle 
100 Judith: Why 
101 Allan: 'Cause I'm basing it on the squ-, same pattern as the square and not, not 
just work [pause] 
102 Judith: So what happened? 
103 Allan: It came to twenty-seven. 
104 Judith: And was that what you expected? 
105 Allan: No 
106 Judith: So what's happening in the rectangle that it's not what you expected? And 
you've counted it twice, did you say? 
107 Allan: Yeah, it's twenty-seven. 
108 Judith: OK, and what size is your square? 
109 Allan: It's four by six 
110 Judith: four by six what? 
111 Allan: Um ... [ pause] centimetre dots. 
112 Judith: What do you mean? 
113 Allan: Um ... [ pause] There's six lines across by four lines. 
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114 Judith: OK, now I've noticed that you've made a mistake somewhere there, but I 
want you to see wh-, see if you can notice it, or if you want to go on to 
other ... rectangles and see what's happened ... OK now it didn't come to 
what you've predicted. Is that'cause you've counted wrong, or you've 
drawn your square, or rectangle rather, wrong, or what? 
115 Allan: [ pause] I think it may be because I've predicted wrong. 
116 Judith: OK, try another one, try maybe a more simple one, what size is this one 
going to be? 
117 Allan: It's going to be a four by five. 
118 Judith: Allright. So there's four dots down one side, and 
119 Allan: Five dots on the top side 
120 Judith: OK. [pause] So according to your original prediction what would it have 
been? 
121 Allan: Would've been twenty-four 
122 Judith: Right, and what's your prediction now? 
123 Allan: Um [pause] 
124 Judith: Hold on, four by five? Twenty-four? 
125 Allan: No, no, the- 
126 Judith: With the original prediction it would've been ... 
127 Allan: Yeah, um, twenty-four. 
128 Judith: Why? 
129 Allan: We-, well I did it on the same basis as the um, um square, the squ-, if you 
um, times both sides, the amount of dots, you um minus by one it might be 
the same amount. 
130 Judith: OK, so if you times the sides you get what? 
131 Allan: For which one? 
132 Judith: This one, this wee one 
133 Allan: It'd be twenty. 
134 Judith: Right, and if you minus one it'd be 
135 Allan: It'd be nineteen. 
136 Judith: Right, so you, your original prediction for this would've been nineteen, but 
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you told me that you thought you'd predicted wrong, correcting 
137 Allan: Yeah 
138 Judith: Right, so what do you think this is going to be now? 
139 Allan: [ pause] It may be twenty-three. 
140 J; Right, try it. [pause] OK, count them. 
141 Allan: It's nineteen. 
142 Judith: Tis nineteen, right I'll tell you that you didn't, well, the size of your 
rectangle was wrong, so look carefully at the size of your rectangle on the 
first one again. How many dots down is it? 
143 Allan: Four 
144 Judith: And how many dots across? 
145 Allan: seven 
146 Judith: Right, so see what you did? 
147 Allan: Yeah 
148 Judith: Was your prediction right? 
149 Allan: Yeah, it would've been, yeah 
150 Judith: Right, so can you tell me, make any general predictions about rectangles, 
or not? 
151 Allan: Yeah, it's, its the same as the square, you um, times it by, ti-, times the 
both sides together, and minus one 
152 Judith: OK, now, here's some triangle dotty paper, hold on, are you sure that 
would work or not, first? Do you want to try another one? 
153 Allan: Yeah 
154 Judith: Yeah, you'd better. 
155 Allan: I'll do a six by five. 
156 Judith: OK, which should be what? 
157 Allan: twenty-nine 
158 Judith: Yup [pause] 
159 Allan: Come to twenty-nine. 
160 Judith: So ... what would you write down if you were doing an investigation? 
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161 Allan: I would write, the pattern is, the same as a square, which is, you times the 
two si-, t-times the length by the width, as if area, and you mi- you minus 
one um, you just minus one from the total 
162 Judith: OK and that'll give you the shortest possible line 
163 Allan: Yeah. 
164 Judith: Sure? 
165 Allan: Yeah. 
166 Judith: OK. Let's talk about triangles then. So I've got some triangle dotty, and this 
time you can go in that direction or that direction or that direction, so if you 
start at that dot you can go to any of the dots near it, you can't go 
diagonally like that 
167 Allan: Yup 
168 Judith: OK, now I want you to look at triangles, so you pick a size of triangle and 
then tell me the shortest line to join all the dots in it. Where's your first 
triangle gonna be, and how big's it gonna be? 
169 Allan: I'm gonna have a ... a three by three triangle 
170 Judith: Right. Draw it for me. First of all draw round your triangle so I can see 
where it is. OK, now what's the shortest line to join all the dots? 
171 Allan: It'd be five 
172 Judith: Why? 
173 Allan: [pause] Um ... that one'd be ... that'd be six, 'cause you have to miss out 
one, one line, miss out one line, you'd have to do one line at one corner 
174 Judith: Right, so how many does that make? 
175 Allan: And what it is, it is two on, two on each side, and three more in fact, and 
two on the other two sides 
176 Judith: So how many lines are there? 
177 Allan: There'd be five lines 
178 Judith: OK, and how many dots would give you five lines? 
179 Allan: six. 
180 Judith: Right. Do you want to try another triangle? What size? 
181 Allan: Yup, um, I want to try five by five 
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182 Judith: Any predictions? 
183 Allan: Y--eah [pause) Actually I don't. 
184 Judith: Don't know enough yet. 
185 Allan: No. 
186 Judith: OK [pause) 
187 Allan: Um, it came to fourteen. 
188 Judith: And how many dots were there? 
189 Allan: Um ... There were fifteen dots. 
190 Judith: OK, what are you going to try now? 
191 Allan: Um, I'm gonna give a, I'll try six by six 
192 Judith: OK. Now, any predictions? 
193 Allan: [ pause] Uh, seve-, I think that there'd be seventeen lines 
194 Judith: seventeen? 
195 Allan: Yeah 
196 Judith: OK, Why? 
197 Allan: Because I think there's a pattern that if you add all the sides together, that 
and minus one, it'd come to, it'd I-, um, that'd be the amount of lines there 
are to go round it. 
198 Judith: OK, did it work for two or three dots? 
199 Allan: [ pause] Yeah, it did 
200 Judith: So tell me exactly what you do with three? 
201 Allan: Um, you add two, y'add, you do two add two add two, and then you just 
minus one which comes to five but it was originally six 
202 Judith: Right, and what do you do with the five? 
203 Allan: You do five add five add five, and minus one, which comes to fourteen. 
204 Judith: Right, the only problem with that Is that when you had a triangle that had 
three along one side you added two and two and two, and when you had 
five along one side you added five and five and five. Do you see what I'm 
saying, no? 
205 Allan: Yeah. 
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207 
208 
209 
210 
211 
212 
213 
214 
215 
216 
217 
218 
219 
220 
221 
Judith: 
Allan: 
Judith: 
Allan: 
Judith: 
Allan: 
Judith: 
Allan: 
Judith: 
Allan: 
Judith: 
Allan: 
Judith: 
Allan: 
Judith: 
Allan: 
222 Judith: 
223 Allan: 
224 Judith: 
Sort of? 
Yeah 
Right, well let's try your six anyway and see if that was right what you said, 
I mean it could still be right. [pause] So how many was it? 
It was twenty. 
And you would've predicted seventeen? 
Yeah. 
So how many dots were there? 
Um ... twenty-one 
Right, what do you notice? Anything? 
Yeah, if you minus one, it, it's actually in dots, that um ... when you start 
getting dots inside the triangle, it, you it's the amount of dots, but before 
that it, it's only, it's the only amount of lines. 
R--ight. Explain that more. 
Um, When you've got triangles that are like one by one by one, you 'aven't 
got any dots in the middle at all, then you wouldn't have to do the dots 
'cause it'd work both ways anyway really, 
Um-hum 
But if you did the ones that had the dots inside them, like um when you 
come to about four by , 
four by five er, four by four by four, they start er, er, 
and they have dots in the middle, you start having to do it by dots. 
Right. And how do you do it by dots? 
You count the, count the amount of dots that go round the whole, i- that, 
um, in the triangle and outside the triangle as well, and then you just minus 
one. 
OK, so you've done three and five and six dots along the outside. Do four 
for me. Can you tell me what you think it's going to be? 
Um, yeah. eleven. 
Right [pause] OK. Right, I mean it is quite diff icult, do you want to draw me 
a table and see if you can see any patterns, you've done three, four, five 
and six now. Do that now. What did you get just there? So what did, what 
are the headings for your table going to be? 
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225 Allan: Um, Size of triangle 
226 Judith: What do you mean by size of triangle? 
227 Allan: How many dots there are, uh, dots around the edges.. 
228 Judith: OK. So the first column is.. 
229 Allan: Size of triangle. 
230 Judith: And then ... OK, well fill in the different sizes of triangle first. [pause] Now if 
you did it three, four, five, six it might be easier to see patterns, do you not 
think? Do you do tables when you do investigations, I can't remember what 
you do. OK, anyway, what's the next one going to be? Well we need one 
for the shortest line, don't we? 
231 Allan: Yeah. 
232 Judith: OK so what ... [pause] 
233 Allan: Well that tells what the shortest line is in the, going round in the triangle 
234 Judith: OK 
235 Allan: Basically [pause] 
236 Judith: um-hum What the shortest line is, is going to be? [pause] OK, four was 
nine, five was.. 
237 Allan: Fourteen. 
238 Judith: six was.. 
239 Allan: six was twenty 
240 Judith: OK, well from that can you see any patterns to do with those numbers five, 
nine, fourteen, twenty that could, give you a way of predicting what seven 
would be? So what sort of things could you look for? Tell 
me what you're doing out loud, in your head. 
241 Allan: Um, I'm seeing if, that if you minus fourteen from twe- uh, that if you added 
fou-, four to five it'd, to make nine, and you added, a four to nine to make 
fourteen, 
242 Judith: Uh-hum 
243 Allan: four to fourteen's twenty, twenty-six, it don't work 
244 Judith: Does it work? 
245 Allan: No [pause] 
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246 Judith: So what, what else can you try? [pause] What do you think? Could you 
times by anything? 
247 Allan: [ pause] No, you can't. 
248 Judith: OK, what else could you try? [pause] Confused? 
249 Allan: Yeah. 
250 Judith: So if I gave you those numbers: five, nine fourteen, twenty and asked you 
what came next .... [pause] What do you think? What are you trying? 
251 Allan: [ pause] Erm, I think I know the pattern, what it is, is if you add four to five, 
you get nine, if you add five to fourteen, you add five to nine you get 
fourteen, if you add six to fourteen you get twenty, if you add seven to 
twenty you get twenty-seven. 
252 Judith: Right, and what would eight be? 
253 Allan: threefive 
254 Judith: OK, so, what oth-, so, there was a long time you were quiet, I want to know 
what sort of things you were thinking when you were doing that, what sort 
of things did you try? 
255 Allan: I was uh ..., well actually 
I was working out whether the pattern I was trying 
was actually working or not, I was just going through it to find out. 
256 Judith: So that was the first thing you tried, then? 
257 Allan: Yeah. 
258 Judith: OK, good. So do you want to see if that works for seven then? 
259 Allan: Yeah. 
260 Judith: So you think eight, or for eight, which one are you going to do seven or 
eight, 'cause you've told me what both of them you think should be. 
261 Allan: Yeah seven. 
262 Judith: OK. [pause] 
263 Allan: Yeah it came to twenty-seven. 
264 Judith: Very good, Well done! 
END OF SESSION 
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TRANSCRIPT NT4: JONATHAN 13th March 1995 
Jonathan is an undergraduate MathematicsEducation student, who has chosen a third year 
option in the Theory of Numbers. The paper is assessed by a 3-hour paper and two 25-hour 
Projects'. Jonathan has chosen to work on the problem of finding the number of integer 
solutions of x2+y2=n mod p. At a previous supervision he had discussed the cases n=0, i with 
me, including a proof for the case n=0. Since then he has generated some data for n> 1. 
1 Jonathan: Well, I had a bit of a bash this time with the theory. 
2 Tim: Right.. we're talking about x squared plus y squared equals n 
3 Jonathan: Yes 
4 Tim: Yes, yes... um, can you ... did we discuss equals zero last time? 
5 Jonathan: It ... came up, yes. 
6 Tim: Right ... you'll forgive me, but I've discussed the same/ 
7 Jonathan: /yeah (yes)/ 
8 Tim: question with one or two people. 
9 Jonathan: Yes, and ... that .... that I'm quite ha .... well, fairly happy with the argument 
I can put for that one. 
10 Tim: [rising pitch] Alright. 
11 Jonathan: That's, that's, that's the happiest argument that I've got [laughs]. 
12 Tim: Right, right. And, um, tell me what the theorem is, in that case then, about 
x squared plus y squared equals zero. 
13 Jonathan: x squared plus y squared equals zero, there, there's either one pair of ... 
one pair of solutions that does it, nought, nought, 
14 Tim: Mm, hmm 
15 Jonathan: or, there's ... quite a lot of them 
16 Tim: yeah (yes) 
17 Jonathan: depending on whether you're congruent to one or three mod p. 
18 Tim: [non-committal, rising] Right ... 
19 Jonathan: And the 'quite a lot of them' turns out to be two p minus one. [pause] 
Where p's a prime. 
20 Tim: yeah (yes). 
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21 Jonathan: Um, I'm just trying to find the page with my argument on it. Um .. 
22 Tim: S.. so.. but it's two p minus one ... but you mentioned whether or not p 
was congruent to one or three mod four [NB he didn'tj that, in fact it's two p 
minus one in either case, is it? 
23 Jonathan: Oh, no, sorry, it's, um, if it's congruent to one mod four, 
24 Tim: Right 
25 Jonathan: then there are two p minus one /solutions/ 
26 Tim: /Oh, sorry, / yes, but if it's congruent to three then there's just one. 
27 Jonathan: Just the one pair. 
28 Tim: OK, OK. And, I mean, can I, I think, I just want to askdoes it hinge on the 
fact that in one case minus one is a quadratic residue and in the other 
case it isn't? 
29 Jonathan: [pause] Um ... well, yes [coughs] ... sort of. Um, I mean /it's, yes there's 
one/ 
30 Tim: /[laughs] Would/ you like to rehearse the argument with me, or ... 
31 Jonathan: Well [coughs], yeah (yes), I'll come back to that bit about the quadratic 
residue bit. Um, but for where it's equal to one mod four... 
32 Tim: right 
33 Jonathan: Or, in both cases we know that nought squared and nought squared is 
going to be there .. 
34 Tim: Right 
35 Jonathan: So that gives us one guaranteed solution for/ 
36 Tim: /right/ 
37 Jonathan: any [inaudible]/ 
38 Tim: right 
39 Jonathan: Um, and then, if p is congruent to one [pause] we've then got ... p minus, p 
minus one is a quadratic residue of that. 
40 Tim: Indeed; or minus one. 
41 Jonathan: Whichever way. So that gives us, um, one squared and p minus one 
squared, so we've got another pair of solutions. 
42 Tim: Umm ... you don't quite mean that do you? I mean, you mean, what you've 
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got, one squared and whatever gives you p minus one ... 
43 Jonathan: Oh, yes, so .. 
44 Tim: ... when it's squared. Right, /OK/ 
45 Jonathan: /OK/ 
46 Tim: Yeah? 
47 Jonathan: And, then there's this pairing thing .. 
48 Tim: Yeah? 
49 Jonathan: Which ... that's the bit I can't, I'm not ... able to explain. I can't, I'm not, I 
can't say why they pair off, like that. Um, but then(? ) we've got, um, p 
minus one over two pairs [number of quadratic residues mod p] [inaudible] 
50 Tim: Oh, p minus one over two squares. 
51 Jonathan: Yes. And so, so you get [long pause] yes, sorry, yes that's it. And they add 
up to give p each time, these two .. these pairs of squares .. 
52 Tim: yes 
53 Jonathan: So you've got p there, nought. 
54 Tim: [pause] Um, [hesitant] that's an absolutely fine ... um, I mean, let's think, 
we're talking about when p is congruent with one mod four here, aren't 
we? 
55 Jonathan: Um, yes. 
56 Tim: Yeah, so, for example, thirteen. 
57 Jonathan: Right. 
58 Tim: So you're saying .. um, um .. I'm trying to think of something that isn't [-13] 
... well, no, let's have something fairly straightforward. If you do two 
squared you get four, yeah? 
59 Jonathan: Right. 
60 Tim: And you're saying that in fact, um, thirteen minus four, or something 
congruent to that, minus four, mod thirteen, is always - in fact it's nine ... 
61 Jonathan: Yes. 
62 Tim: ... three squared - is always there. So you're saying, in that case, there 
always happen to be pairs that add to ... 
63 Jonathan: Yes. 
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64 Tim: OK. I mean, can you take it any further than there. I mean you're 
absolutely right. How can you take it any further than "there always 
happens to be"? 
65 Jonathan: No, I'm stumbling on this, but this is, this is the the bit that, It's sort of an 
assumption I have to make [exhaled laugh] to go through this, and I .. 
66 Tim: OK 
67 Jonathan: .... I can't ... 
68 Tim: OK 
69 Jonathan: I can't ... and I know ... or, I don't know ... from looking at the ones that are 
congruent to three, mod four .. 
70 Tim: Yes 
71 Jonathan: ... that there's not a constant adding up, 
for the pairs, so I can see that the 
two .. 
72 Tim: Right. 
73 Jonathan: ... they really do separate, but I can't explain, why they separate. 
74 Tim: OK. Well, I'd like to take you a bit further down that road, because I think 
you'll be quite pleased when you see it. OK? 
75 Jonathan: Right. 
76 Tim: I'm just wondering whether to talk about thirteen, or something that's less 
obvious. You know, 'cos (because) [laughs].... 
77 Jonathan: Oh dear [laughs], is thirteen obvious! [laughs] 
78 Tim: No, no, no, I mean, um, an argument can be more forceful when you can't 
just - other than the numerical calculations - say "Well, obviously". Yes? 
79 Jonathan: Yes. 
80 Tim: So, um, suppose ... 
81 Jonathan: Yes? 
82 Tim: So suppose... (pause] R1ght, OK, here's a good ... well, this isn't quite .... 
suppose we took seventeen. 
83 Jonathan: Yes, OK. 
84 Tim: And the first thing to note is, you should know that minus one is a 
quadratic residue, and that's a particularly easy one because four squared 
is sixteen, which is minus one. 
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85 Jonathan: Oh, yes. 
86 Tim: So just bear in mind if you will that four squared is minus one, yes? 
87 Jonathan: Right. 
88 Tim: Now pick - you pick, anything from nought to sixteen. 
89 Jonathan: Ten. 
90 Tim: Ten. So ten tens are a hundred, OK? 
91 Jonathan: Right. 
92 Tim: Which mod seventeen, er, happens to be, well it's fifteen actually. 
93 Jonathan: That's about right. 
94 Tim: OK? So you want to find something whose square is two, yes? Or to put it 
another way, something whose square is minus fifteen. 
95 Jonathan: Right. 
96 Tim: Yeah. Now, note that you know that ten squared is fifteen. 
97 Jonathan: Um, hm. 
98 Tim: And you know that four squared is minus one [Tim writes 102=15,42=-1]. 
Can you put those two together to get something whose square is minus 
fifteen? 
99 Jonathan: [long pause] Forty mod seventeen? 
100 Tim: Forty? 
101 Jonathan: Yes? 
102 Tim: And how did you get that? 
103 Jonathan: Well, I'm guessing here but if it was anything else I'd go: well, I want fifteen 
[he means minus fifteen] and I know what minus one is, so minus one 
times fifteen is minus fifteen. So I've taken the four and the ten and 
multiplied them. 
104 Tim: But can you see that's not ... that's more than a guess isn't it? That, you 
know, if x squared is a and y squared is b, then xy all squared Its ab/ 
105 Jonathan: /Oh yes/, if the [inaudible] would say it was a guess. 
106 Tim: [laughs] OK 
107 Jonathan: There were just two [inaudible] 
353 
108 Tim: OK, so now just to confirm it: forty, what is forty mod seventeen? 
109 Jonathan: Um, six. 
110 Tim: OK. Six squared? 
111 Jonathan: Which is two. 
112 Tim: OK. 
113 Jonathan: Right. 
114 Tim: [pause]. Now, can you see that in principle you can do that with absolutely 
... I mean, you took ten, 
but you could do that with anything that you took. 
115 Jonathan: Yeah. 
116 Tim: And it's because, minus one's a quadratic residue. 
117 Jonathan: Oh ... right [chuckles]. 
118 Tim: Yeah, yeah. 
119 Jonathan: That's slightly, yes, slightly reassuring now. 
120 Tim: Well, it takes us beyond this kind of level of "there always happens to be 
one". I mean, that's why there always has to be one. 
121 Jonathan: Right, OK. 
122 Tim: Now, um, what I'm not going to do for you is, when p is congruent to three 
mod four, you know that you've got nought and nought, you know that 
minus one is not a quadratic residue. Right? Why is it that you can never 
find two numbers whose squares add to zero? 
123 Jonathan: OK. 
124 Tim: The fact that minus one isn't a quadratic residue ... I mean, you need a bit 
more argument to show why you can never find solutions other than zero 
zero in that case. 
125 Jonathan: Right. 
126 Tim: [pause] That's quite nice, I think. It kind of wraps up, at least most of that, 
in quite a tidy way. 
127 Jonathan: Yes, it takes out some of the arm waving from the argument ... [Jonathan 
and Tim laugh] which is no bad thing. 
128 Tim: Well, arm waving's alright, as long as It, as long as you're saying "I could 
do this if you asked, if I needed to". 
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129 Jonathan: "It can easily be shown that" ... [laughs, an in joke? ] 
130 Tim: Ye-es. 
131 Jonathan: I recognise that one! 
132 Tim: Yes, yes. [pause] 
133 Jonathan: Right. 
134 Tim: Yes, I mean "It can be shown that" ... is OK if you mean what you say, you 
know, rather than, um ... I mean, that's beyond a conjecture. 
135 Jonathan: Yes, I felt fairly certain that there was a ... reasonable way of showing that 
those were .. seeing that regular pattern, there had to be a good way of 
explaining it. 
136 Tim: OK, OK. [pause] So which then brings us, I guess, back to x squared plus 
y squared equals one, does it? 
137 Jonathan: Uh, yes. Yes. That's a very intriguing way of ... well, actually no, I went on 
to do something else first. 
138 Tim: Ah? 
139 Jonathan: Of x squared plus y squared equals n mod p, but n not being zero and 
having a particular value. 
140 Tim: OK. 
141 Jonathan: Um, having found out how many solutions there were for that ... 
142 Tim: 'cos (because) originally you took it to be anything other than zero... 
143 Jonathan: Yes. 
144 Tim: Which actually is not without interest, if I may say so. 
145 Jonathan: No, I think I did go on to show, um ... 
146 Tim: I mean, now you know how many solutions there are for zero, you can say 
precisely how many there are for not-zero [laughs] 
147 Jonathan: Yes, that's basically what I'd donel [laughs] 
148 Tim: OK. 
149 Jonathan: p squared and taken away how many other bits there are ... 
150 Tim: Excellent. 
151 Jonathan: ... so I've done that. 
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152 Tim: Yes, that wraps up quite nicely too. 
153 Jonathan: Yes, that was very satisfying, actually. 
154 Tim: Yes. I think it's just a nice coincidence that you've two p minus one 
solutions, and when you subtract that from p squared, you get a perfect 
square ... 
155 Jonathan: Oh, yes ... 
156 Tim: p squared minus two p plus one is a, an algebraic square. 
157 Jonathan: Ooh! So when I looked at those I was finding, just from doing examples, x 
squared plus y [omits squared] equals two, or whatever, that there were 
the same number of solutions as there were to x squared plus y squared 
equals one, congruent to one. 
158 Tim: Yes, OK, OK. 
159 Jonathan: So for that, um, I said, well, all you're doing is adding solution pairs, or like 
multiplying solution pairs again. So if you've got ... a solution pair for one .., 
160 Tim: Yes, yes. 
161 Jonathan: And you multiply it by two, it then becomes a solution pair for x squared 
plus y squared is congruent to two. 
162 Tim: [pause] Do you mean that? 
163 Jonathan: I think I do. 
164 Tim: I mean, I was getting quite excited until you said "two", on the end [laughs]. 
Um, can I take an example, right? 
165 Jonathan: I've got one somewhere, I think. 
166 Tim: OK. 
167 Jonathan: Just scrambling here, a little bit ... ah yes, I've got one in two and in ... 
where are we? [pause]. No I think I may have said something that doesn't, 
isn't quite right. Um, I've got two and six, a solution pair to x squared plus y 
squared Is congruent to one ... mod thirteen. Then, is two times that a 
solution to x squared plus y squared Is congruent to two mod thirteen? So 
I've taken two lots of two squareds and two lots of six squareds, like that ... 
which then is congruent to .... 
168 Tim: Alright, two squared plus two squared plus six squared plus six squared ... 
169 Jonathan: Right, by doing it twice. 
170 Tim: Ok, but that's not the same as something squared plus something squared 
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is two. [pause]. I mean, you haven't from that got a solution to x squared 
plus y squared equals two. 
171 Jonathan: Um [pause] No [pause] Oh drat! [laughs] 
172 Tim: Well, don't despair'cause (because) ... [pause] you've got two squared plus 
six squared is one, right? 
173 Jonathan: Um-hm. 
174 Tim: Now what I was thinking of, suppose you doubled two and you doubled 
six, so take four squared plus twelve squared . Right then, what ... what's 
that equal to? [pause] Mod thirteen? 
175 Jonathan: [pause, then laughs]. Let me think. [long pause] 
176 Tim: [quietly] Would you like a calculator then? 
177 Jonathan: [firmly, joking] No! [both laugh]. Er, four. 
178 Tim: OK. And, er, tell me when you're ready [Jonathan is making notes]. I don't 
want to interrupt ... 
[gap here as the tape is turned over] 
179 Tim: ... so you've multiplied the two and the six 
by two, and therefore the one 
becomes four. OK. 
180 Jonathan: Yes. 
181 Tim: But you could in principle do that with every solution to x squared plus y 
squared equals one, to get a solution to x squared plus y squared equals 
four. Yes? 
182 Jonathan: Yes, OK. 
183 Tim: And nine, the same ... 
184 Jonathan: And nine. Yeah. 
185 Tim: Yeah? Or indeed any square on the right hand side. And by square, that 
means quadratic residue. Right? I mean, let's think of something that isn't 
an obvious square but is a quadratic residue. What are we doing, mod 
thirteen? Well alright, three. 
186 Jonathan: Right. 
187 Tim: Four fours are sixteen so three's a quadratic residue. So you could use 
that method to get, um, all the solutions of x squared plus y squared is 
three, right? 
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188 Jonathan: Right. 
189 Tim: So if you've got x squared plus y squared equals n, where n is a quadratic 
residue ... 
190 Jonathan: OK. 
191 Tim: ... then again you 
know there are as many solutions to that as there are to 
x squared plus y squared equals one [pause whilst Jonathan makes notes] 
192 Jonathan: Right. 
193 Tim: Now, let me just put two things to you. First of all, how do you know that 
there aren't any more, right? So for every solution to x squared plus y 
squared equals one you get one to x squared plus y squared equals ... n, 
where n is a quadratic residue, but how do you know there aren't any 
more? 
194 Jonathan: Right. 
195 Tim: And I suppose the way to do that would be, to, sort of, work the argument 
backwards in some way. 
196 Jonathan: Right. 
197 Tim: That whenever you've got a solution to x squared plus y squared equals n, 
where n is a quadratic residue, that must arise from a solution to x squared 
plus y squared equals one. 
198 Jonathan: Right. 
199 Tim: So that's, that's number one thing for you to think about, right, to work on. 
And the second thing for you to think about and work on, is when n is not a 
quadratic residue ... 
200 Jonathan: Right. 
201 Tim: .. that argument doesn't apply, at least not in the form that I gave it ... 
202 Jonathan: Right. 
203 TIm: Can I tell you that I don't know the answer to this [both laugh]. I mean 
simply because I've not allowed myself to think about it ... 
204 Jonathan: Yes, very restrained of you. [both laugh]. As soon as I'm out of that door 
you'll be going [rest inaudible beneath Tim's laughter] 
205 Tim: Nice of you to suggest it. Um ... 
206 Jonathan: Anything to put off sorting through that pile of papers! [gestures to Tim's 
desk] 
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207 Tim: [laughs] Dead right! Um, right ... yes, if n is not a quadratic residue that 
argument does not apply in the form that I gave it. And yet, the conclusion 
holds, about there being the same number of solutions [pause]. And that's 
a, quite a curious one, really. So I'll leave that with you, OK? 
208 Jonathan: Right. Uh ... OK. 
209 Tim: You know the other thing that, um, you haven't proved - but in a way I don't 
feel to desperate about it because there's quite a lot around here for you to 
write up - is ... is why there are ... one more or one less than p solutions to 
x squared plus y squared equals one, in every case. 
210 Jonathan: Ah well, ah, that's, I'm coming on to that bit... 
211 Tim: .. Ah, right! Sorry 
212 Jonathan: I had to backtrack to get to that. 
213 Tim: Oh, right. OK, OK. 
214 Jonathan: This is, this is... Once I'd found out that there were the same number of 
solutions for, um, for all the other values .. 
215 Tim: Right, right.. 
216 Jonathan: Um ... I'm can then get back to some serious arm waving here and ... and 
go back to my sort of proof of why there are x ... there are p plus one or p 
minus one solutions. 
217 Tim: Right. 
218 Jonathan: And, basically, um, you say how many ... you take your mod, number ... 
219 Tim: Right.. ' 
220 Jonathan: And you work out how many possible pairs you can come up with .... 
221 Tim: [hushed] Right ... 
222 Jonathan: And ... whatever that was, p squared ... 
223 Tim: OK. 
224 Jonathan: We already know how many... solutions there are - for p congruent to one 
or congruent to three mod four - how many solutions there are for ... x 
squared plus y squared is congruent to zero [pause] 
225 Tim: [hushed] Yeah ... 
226 Jonathan: So we can get rid of those for starters. And then we know that all the 
solutions that are left are divided up evenly between each of the other 
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numbers ... 
227 Tim: Ohh, that's very nice. [Jonathan laughs]. Oh, well done! 
228 Jonathan: Which was a little arm waving bit there ... 
229 Tim: That's not arm waving at all. 
230 Jonathan: I thought it was a bit contrived, but ... 
231 Tim: Does it come out with the right answer? 
232 Jonathan: It comes out with exactly the right answer, yes. 
233 Tim: Oh, well done, well done. Yes ... [laughs] 
234 Jonathan: I didn't know if that was the way you were thinking of ... 
235 Tim: That's very nice indeed. 
236 Jonathan: ... of attacking it, but um ... 
237 Tim: Um it's ... well, I can tell you that I've discussed this problem with Bob Hall, 
and that was his approach to it ... 
238 Jonathan: Oh, right [laughs] 
239 Tim: Mine wasn't ... that but, it's very nice, no, that's very nice. OK. 
240 Jonathan: Came as a blinding inspirational thought. 
241 Tim: Right. Well, I would suggest you rush away and write all this down. 
242 Jonathan: [laughs] Well, I wrote it all down yesterday, that ... that particular bit.. 
243 Tim: Right. 
244 Jonathan: ... about how to, er, do it, so it's just the, um, it's the pairing up of the 
quadratics when it's congruent and ... that tidying up of the, er, x squared 
[inaudible]. 
245 Tim: OK. I think this is looking extremely good, right, so I think it's quite 
important that you now get down... as coherent an account as you can, of 
what you've done ... before you go on to do anything else. 
246 Jonathan: Right. It's taken a second battering now, it's, er [... ] 
247 Tim: Rush away and write it up. 
248 Jonathan: Yes, before I forget it! 
249 Tim: [laughs] OK. Well that was a good way to start the week. 
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